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This dissertation shows that during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) diverse Cubans 
organized to support the Spanish Second Republic, overcoming differences to coalesce around a 
movement they defined as antifascism.  Hundreds of Cuban volunteers—more than from any 
other Latin American country—traveled to Spain to fight for the Republic in both the 
International Brigades and the regular Republican forces, to provide medical care, and to serve in 
other support roles; children, women, and men back home worked together to raise substantial 
monetary and material aid for Spanish children during the war; and longstanding groups on the 
island including black associations, Freemasons, anarchists, and the Communist Party leveraged 
organizational and publishing resources to raise awareness, garner support, fund, and otherwise 
assist the cause.  The dissertation studies Cuban antifascist individuals, campaigns, organizations, 
and networks operating transnationally to help the Spanish Republic, contextualizing these 
efforts in Cuba’s internal struggles of the 1930s.  It argues that both transnational solidarity and 
domestic concerns defined Cuban antifascism.  First, Cubans confronting crises of democracy at 
home and in Spain believed fascism threatened them directly.  Citing examples in Ethiopia, 
China, Europe, and Latin America, Cuban antifascists—like many others—feared a worldwide 
menace posed by fascism’s spread.  Second, despite their recent anticolonial struggle against 
Spain, Cubans cared deeply about its fate for reasons of personal, familial, and cultural affinity.  
They interpreted the Republic as a “new” Spain representative of liberation and the Nationalists 
as seeking return to the “old” Spain of colonial oppression.  Third, pro-Republican Cubans 
defined antifascism in Cuban terms.  People of many different backgrounds and views united 
around a definition of antifascism closely related to their shared domestic political goals: 
freedom from strongman governance, independence from neocolonial control, and attainment of 
economic and social justice.  Radical, moderate, and even largely nonpolitical individuals and 
groups in Cuba found in antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic a rallying cry with 
broad appeal that allowed them to strengthen solidarity at home and abroad.  Cubans defined 
antifascism in both negative and positive terms, as a movement against fascism but also toward 
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Transnational Activism, Networks, and Solidarity 
 
During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) diverse Cubans organized to support the 
Spanish Second Republic, overcoming differences to coalesce around a movement they defined 
as antifascism.  Hundreds of Cuban volunteers traveled to Spain to fight for the Republic in both 
the International Brigades and the regular Republican forces, to provide medical care, and to 
serve in other support roles; children, women, and men back home worked together to raise 
substantial monetary and material aid for Spanish children during the war; and longstanding 
groups on the island including black associations, Freemasons, anarchists, and the Communist 
Party leveraged organizational and publishing resources to raise awareness, garner support, fund, 
and otherwise assist the cause.  Though committed to political goals at home, Cuban antifascist 
activists made the choice to extend their activism beyond the island’s shores, to participate in 
another nation’s war—they believed that the Republican cause and their domestic goals were 
interconnected parts of a worldwide fight against fascism.  In this study, we examine Cuban 
antifascist individuals, campaigns, organizations, and networks operating transnationally to help 
the Spanish Republic, contextualizing these efforts in Cuba’s domestic struggles of the 1930s.  
We pose broad questions relevant to understanding transnational activism, networks, and 
solidarity generally: How and why do non-state actors organized politically in their own country 
connect with and support like-minded activists of other nationalities?  How and why do they 
interpret domestic political challenges as part of larger international problems? 
During the first half of the 1930s, just a few decades after Cuba won its independence 
from Spanish colonialism, both Spain and Cuba entered into hard-won democratic experiments.  
Spain transitioned from monarchy to the Second Republic in 1931, 58 years after the 
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establishment of the First Republic.  Spain had suffered a crisis of monarchy in the late 1860s 
and the short-lived First Republic was declared in 1873.  A lack of national unity doomed the 
experiment, and the monarchy was restored in 1875.  At the turn of the century, after several 
decades of Cuban independence struggles, Spain lost its remaining colonies—the Philippines, 
Puerto Rico, and Cuba—in war with the United States, a conflict known to U.S. students of 
history as the Spanish-American War.  Following World War I, during which it remained neutral, 
Spain suffered from increasing unrest.  The country had enjoyed some prosperity during the war 
years due to increased trade, but these gains quickly disappeared at war’s end.  Adding military 
insult to economic injury, the country suffered defeat in war in Morocco in 1921.  From 1923 to 
1930 strongman rule under General Miguel Primo de Rivera, who enjoyed the support of the 
king and the military, saw attempts at social and economic changes produce some successes but 
also further discontent.  The Great Depression hit Spain hard.  Primo de Rivera resigned as prime 
minister in January 1930 and, after municipal elections in which Republicans won a number of 
majorities, King Alfonso XIII, in power since 1902, abdicated and left the country in April 1931.  
Upon the king’s departure, a coalition of moderates and leftists declared the Second Republic.  
The Republic’s constitution of 1931 guaranteed a number of new rights, severely restricted the 
special privileges of the Catholic Church and traditional nobility, and paved the way for 
significant reforms.  These progressive reforms of the Republican government under moderate 
liberal Manuel Azaña, combined with popular unrest, pushed many political, economic, and 
religious elites to the right.  Meanwhile, many on the left felt that the Azaña government failed to 
go far enough in addressing Spain’s ills.  The embattled leader lost power in September 1933 
(though he would serve as Prime Minister again in 1936).  Over the next few years, violence 
increased as right and left struggled to control the Spanish government.  Neither right nor left 
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constituted a unified, uniform block—fighting among factions on both sides increased 
disturbance to the country.  Nevertheless, left and right coalesced into two diverse alliances and 
faced off against one another.  Early in 1936 the Popular Front, formed the year prior by leftist 
and moderate Republicans, defeated the right’s National Front in elections.  Their victory was 
short lived, however, as political disunity, widespread violence, and economic troubles seriously 
destabilized the new government.   
Then right-wing Nationalists rose up in military insurrection, beginning in Morocco, 
against those loyal to the Republican government on 17 July 1936, sparking civil war.  Germany 
and Italy quickly offered aid to the Nationalists, and right-wing forces, unifying behind General 
Francisco Franco, soon overwhelmed those loyal to the government in a number of key regions 
of Spain.  Republicans hoped for aid from Western democracies, but were disappointed when 
Britain, France, the United States, and others chose to follow the Non-Intervention Agreement 
(1936) barring partisan foreign participation in the Spanish conflict in the belief that by so doing 
they might avoid larger war in Europe.  The Republican side did receive aid from Mexico
1
 and, 
more significantly, the Soviet Union, which sent war materiel and approximately 2,000 men.  
However, this assistance was no match for that of the Germans and Italians to the Nationalists, in 
violation of non-intervention, which is widely credited with winning the war for Franco’s forces 
(along with the fact that the Nationalist side included most of the formal military, and was thus 
better trained and better equipped even before receiving foreign aid).  Italy sent military planes 
and 100,000 soldiers to Spain; Germany contributed training, weaponry, and bombers.  
                                                     
1
 The Mexican government sent weapons and ammunition to the Spanish Republic, and permitted 
Mexicans who wished to volunteer in Spain to do so with official consent.  During the conflict it gave 
asylum to 500 Spanish war orphans.  After Republican defeat Mexico took in many Republican refugees 
and never recognized the Franco government, maintaining official diplomatic ties with the Republican 
government in exile until 1977.  Gerold Gino Baumann, Los voluntarios latinoamericanos en la Guerra 
Civil Española (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2009), 22, 120. 
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Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy updated, repaired, and continued to 
supply war materiel throughout the conflict, leaving the Nationalists far better equipped than 
their opponents.  German and Italian intervention caused civilian casualties to reach 
unprecedented levels during the conflict due in large part to the bombing of population centers.  
Fascist air attacks on civilians were famously commemorated by Pablo Picasso in his painting 
Guernica (1937).  It is estimated that more than 580,000 people died in the Spanish Civil War 
from bombings, executions, malnourishment, disease, and battle. 
The immediate causes of the conflict were largely domestic Spanish concerns: frustration 
and anger directed at traditional power holders—the monarchy, the military, the Catholic Church, 
and an oligarchic nobility—as well as an ascendant capitalist class; the need for land reform in a 
country that was still largely agricultural; militant organizing by both peasants and industrial 
workers in response to extreme economic inequity; and a general sense of discontent with a 
country weighed down by tradition and perceived by many as anti-modern and backward, 
“barely touched by the industrial and liberal revolution that succeeded in transforming the old 
Europe.”
2
  Many participants and observers, however, interpreted the struggle in international 
terms as one of antifascists (the Republicans or “loyalists”—those loyal to the elected 
government) against fascists (the Nationalists or “rebels”).  As one scholar puts it, the conflict 
“was in many ways a homegrown struggle,” but “it was also a reflection of the struggle between 
the defenders and critics of modernity, which, having originated in the late nineteenth century, 
threatened during the 1920s and 1930s to destabilize all of Europe.”
3
  The struggle was in fact 
                                                     
2
 Pierre Broué and Emile Témime, The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain, Tony White, trans. (1961; 
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008), 31–42. 
3
 Fredrick B. Pike, “The Background to the Civil War in Spain and the U.S. Response to the War,” in The 
Spanish Civil War, 1936–39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 5. 
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much more complex than a dichotomy of political left vs. right seems to suggest, with disunity 
plaguing the factions on both sides of the war, for example, and Spanish political actors unable to 
be classified into neat categories of left and right.  Throughout the course of this study, we will 
come to understand that in fact fascism and antifascism were categories broadly defined, 
encompassing diverse ideas concerning not only Spanish realities but also Cuban ones. 
During the years preceding the Spanish Civil War Cubans struggled to defeat strongman 
president Gerardo Machado, whom some called the “Tropical Mussolini.”  The era from 1925 to 
1933 of Machado’s leadership, known as the Machadato, in which he transformed from an 
elected president into a repressive strongman changed the island’s political arena.  Activists—
some professionals and elite intellectuals, others from poor and working-class backgrounds—led 
the clases populares (popular classes) in sustained rebellion that achieved Machado’s downfall 
but did not stop there.  Although Machado was ousted from the Cuban presidency in August 
1933, the movement made up of diverse individuals and groups organized against him continued 
working for a “new Cuba,” one they hoped would be characterized by freedom from both 
strongman and U.S. control, as well as economic and social progress.  They protested against the 
leadership of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes—plucked out of political obscurity and made president 
by U.S. ambassador Sumner Welles following Machado’s departure—whose extremely brief 
period in office brought little improvement of any kind.  Then, during the government of Ramón 
Grau San Martín—a university professor and liberal moderate who led Cuba from September 
1933 to January 1934—factions within both elite and popular Cuban political sectors jockeyed 
for control.  Grau oversaw the partial implementation of an agenda that brought some substantive 
progressive change to the island including important social and economic reforms and the 
unilateral abrogation of the Platt Amendment that had codified U.S. neocolonialism in the Cuban 
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constitution since the beginning of the twentieth century.  His government of one hundred days 
achieved important goals in the struggle for Cuban democracy and sovereignty, achievements 
that addressed longstanding grievances and raised expectations of further political, economic, 
and social progress.  Nevertheless, many remained unhappy.  Cuba staggered under the weight of 
global economic crisis, making some of Grau’s reforms meaningless in their immediate practical 
application.  Additionally, articulated defiance of U.S. influence over the island in the form of 
abrogation of the Platt Amendment did not cause that influence suddenly to vanish.  Furthermore, 
the president attempted to coordinate progress in a political arena characterized by factionalism 
that was often bitter, vicious, and even violent.  Members of the island’s old political elite saw 
Grau as excessively radical; radicals believed he was too moderate; and powerful U.S. interests, 
both political and economic, felt threatened by his government’s reform agenda.  Disunity, which 
U.S. Ambassador Welles fostered, weakened the movement for change on the island.   
Meanwhile, Fulgencio Batista—an army sergeant who had led the September 1933 
“Sergeants’ Revolt” that allied with anti-Céspedes activists—began to take advantage of the 
political chaos to build his power.  Welles encouraged Batista and helped form a coalition to 
support him.  In January 1934 Batista withdrew the allegiance of the armed forces from Grau.  
Carlos Mendieta took over the government, and the United States gave him official recognition 
within days.  From this point until 1940 when he was elected as president, Batista ruled Cuba 
behind a series of presidents whom he controlled—he ousted them when they disobeyed him.  
Many of those who had fought against Machado turned their ire toward the new strongman.  The 
years 1934 and 1935 witnessed political, labor, and popular activism surge on the island.  New 
political organizations formed.  Grau and his reformers established the Partido Revolucionario 
Cubano – Auténtico (“Authentic” Cuban Revolutionary Party), while revolutionaries under the 
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leadership of Antonio Guiteras, formerly Grau’s minister of government, formed Joven Cuba 
(Young Cuba), a clandestine radical group—both opposed Batista.  Labor unions struck over one 
hundred times, student dissidents organized, and political demonstrations, direct action, and 
violence became common.  Batista met continued activism with force.  He—and the elite 
interests, domestic and foreign, that supported him—saw his role first and foremost as the 
enforcer of order.  When the forces of unrest that had been fighting since the Machadato seemed 
to culminate in a general strike in March 1935, Batista reacted swiftly and ruthlessly. 
 The Pax Batistiana began in March 1935 with the collapse of the general strike.  In the 
eyes of observers at the time and scholars looking back, the general strike of March 1935 
represented the culmination of the revolutionary fight of the Machadato.  Broken by the 
unleashing of brutal dictatorial repression it ended in defeat, disorganization, disillusionment, 
and, for some activists, death.  Joven Cuba leader Antonio Guiteras was among those killed in 
the strike’s aftermath by the military forces Batista controlled.  Others were arrested or fled into 
exile.  Scholars of Cuban history have interpreted the general strike as an endpoint.  Louis A. 
Pérez, Jr. calls it “the last revolutionary surge of the first republican generation.”  Batista’s power 
increased, Pérez asserts, as he “restored order and tranquility.”  And his “opponents never 
recovered.  The tempest of the decade has spent itself.  A respite from revolutionary activity 
settled over the island, due principally to the exhaustion of the passions and depletion in the 
ranks.”
4
  Similarly, Samuel Farber credits the “intense repression and political reaction that 
followed the defeat of the March 1935 general strike” with causing “defeat and demoralization of 
                                                     
4
 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba Between Reform and Revolution, Third Edition (1988; New York & Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 210–211. 
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the students, the working class, and other revolutionary forces.”
5
  Efrén Córdova, focusing on 
organized labor, notes that a “certain languor” came over the island’s workers, “some exhausted 
and others discouraged, after several years of almost continuous agitation.”
6
  Robert Whitney 
states: “After the general strike of 1935, the radical opposition entered a period of defeat and 
ideological crisis.”  Summarizing the endpoint argument, he writes: “In many ways the events of 
early 1935 marked the end of an era in Cuban politics.”
7
  In these narratives, the failure in March 
1935 marks a nearly complete rupture.  A widely-held belief in the effective end of political 
activism on the island for an extended time after March 1935 approaches consensus, 
notwithstanding those scholars who see the Cuban revolution of 1933 as a “prologue” or 
“precursor” to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, a thesis that implies some continuity.
8
  Political 
activists’ losses were immense, and Batista skillfully employed a mixture of severe repression 
and reformist concessions to further weaken them.  One scholar calls the subsequent period “the 
silent, unheroic years” of Cuba’s history.
9
   
Yet out of this context grew Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic.  
The motivation driving the movement in support of these causes had three central components.  
First, fascism threatened Cuba directly.  Cubans characterized fascism broadly as consisting of 
                                                     
5
 Samuel Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933–1960: A Political Sociology from Machado to 
Castro (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1976), 79–80. 
6
 Efrén Córdova, Clase trabajadora y movimiento sindical en Cuba (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1995), 
219. 
7
 Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920–1940 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 140. 
8
 Luis E. Aguilar, Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972); 
Lionel Soto, La revolución precursora de 1933 (Havana: Editorial Si-Mar, 1995).  
9
 Alistair Hennessy, “Cuba,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 




many different tendencies: tyrannical power derived from violence, reactionary conservatism, 
social and cultural regression, economic exploitation, imperialist and enslaving impulses, 
xenophobic and racist nationalisms, and, in Catholic countries such as Spain, clerical overreach 
reminiscent of the Inquisition.  Citing examples beyond Spain in Ethiopia, China, Europe, and 
Latin America, Cuban antifascists feared a worldwide menace posed by fascism’s spread.  In fact, 
German and Italian agents traveled throughout Latin America during the 1930s seeking 
economic and political opportunities for their regimes, and some leaders and activists in the 
region welcomed their presence.  The Spanish Falange—a fascist movement begun in 1933—
and other groups favoring the Spanish Nationalists operated on the island and enjoyed influence 
in the region, as well, which Cuban antifascists decried.  Also, many characterized Latin 
American strongman governments themselves as fascistic, comparing, for example, Machado to 
Mussolini and Batista to Franco.  Second, despite their recent anticolonial struggle against Spain, 
Cubans cared deeply about its fate for reasons of personal, familial, and cultural affinity.  A 
sense of transnational Spanish-Cuban identity made Cubans feel as though they were naturally 
part of the Spanish struggle.  Many Cubans still referred to Spain as “the motherland,” but hoped 
the Republic would bring fraternal relations based on newfound equality.  Cuban antifascists 
interpreted the Republic as a “new Spain” representative of liberation and the Nationalists as 
seeking return to the “old Spain” of colonial rule marked by exploitation and oppression.  
Domestic concerns constituted the third motivation: Pro-Republican Cuban activists defined 
antifascism in Cuban terms.  Beyond comparing their own leaders to specific European fascists, 
they came together around a broad definition of antifascism closely related to their shared 
political goals on the island: freedom from strongman governance, independence from 
neocolonial control, and attainment of economic and social justice.  Radical, moderate, and even 
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largely nonpolitical individuals and groups in Cuba found in antifascism and support for the 
Republic a rallying cry with broad appeal that allowed them to strengthen solidarity at home and 
abroad.  Cubans defined antifascism in both negative and positive terms, as a movement against 
fascism but also toward unity, sovereignty, justice, and a better future for Cuba and the world. 
Connected in this way to domestic concerns, Cuban antifascism constituted a continuity 
of popular struggle through the latter half of the 1930s, a period in the island’s history which 
scholars have argued was devoid of activism.  In the paradigm of the Pax Batistiana, antifascism 
in an anomaly that demands explanation.  The undeniable appearance of antifascism as a popular 
cause on the island during the period suggests that the rupture in activism was not so complete.  
To fit Cuban antifascism into the narrative of rupture, scholars acknowledge it, but characterize 
the movement as located outside of Cuban political activism.  They base their argument for this 
characterization on three elements.  First, they claim that support for the Spanish Republic took 
place on foreign soil, in the case of volunteers who traveled to Spain, and was therefore separate 
from domestic concerns.  Discussing the period following March 1935, Pérez states that the 
island’s activists were either dead, went into exile, or “departed Cuba to carry the banner of 
revolution to other lands, most notably, Spain.”
10
  Farber summarizes this thesis with a quotation 
by a friend of Cuban political activist and Spanish Civil War casualty Pablo de la Torriente 
Brau—the subject, along with his wife and fellow activist Teresa “Teté” Casuso, of our first 
chapter.  Looking back in 1949, Torriente’s friend said of him, “if in Cuba there had been a 
glimmer of any possibility of renewing the struggle initiated years before, without a doubt he 
would have flown to Cuba.  But in 1936, Cuba was a cemetery of illusions and revolutionary 
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  This thesis posits that activists made the choice to support the Spanish Republic 
instead of continuing the Cuban struggle.  Second, scholars assert that antifascism constituted an 
external agenda unconnected to domestic issues.  Whitney, for example, introduces antifascism 
on the island as a project of the Communist International (Comintern).  Following the 
Comintern’s Seventh Congress in 1935, its Popular Front policy directed the Cuban Communist 
Party to form antifascist partnerships.  Within this well-known context of the international 
Popular Front, it is easy to assume that the Party was the only driver of the antifascist movement 
on the island.  Accounts produced in post-Revolutionary socialist Cuba tend to reinforce the idea 
that the Communist Party was solely—or at least largely—responsible for Cuban antifascism.
12
  
Third, scholars assess Cuban antifascism as liberal and mainstream and therefore separate from 
the radical movements that preceded it.
13
  Related to the assertion that a Communist-dominated 
movement of antifascist activists engaged in broad-based coalition-building inclusive of 
moderates during the Popular Front era, this thesis glosses over the political complexities of 
Cuba’s late 1930s, projecting backward from the officially sanctioned antifascism of World War 
II during which Batista—as an elected president partnered with the Communist Party and eager 
for the continued support of the Roosevelt administration—brought Cuba into the war on the side 
of the Allies.  Scholars assert all three elements of this argument briefly, superficially, and in 
passing.  The rupture narrative of the Pax Batistiana does not include space for genuine domestic 
Cuban activism in the years immediately following the March 1935 general strike. 
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The research presented in this study challenges all three elements of the rupture 
argument’s interpretation of Cuban antifascism.  It shows that support for the Republic took 
place on the island and in Cuban exile communities as well as in Spain, and that Cuban 
antifascism included people and groups of diverse political viewpoints and ideologies from 
moderate to radical, including but not exclusively Communists.  In our first chapter—which 
follows Pablo de la Torriente Brau and Teté Casuso as examples of activist continuity across 
Cuba’s 1930s, through the anti-Machado and anti-Batista struggles, into political exile after the 
March 1935 strike, and then into the early months of the Spanish Civil War, setting the stage for 
the subsequent chapters dealing with the war years—we see that the idea of leaving Cuba for the 
Spanish Republican fight expressed by Torriente’s friend (and, in fact, by Torriente himself) was 
not considered by contemporaries so much an either-or decision as an opportunity for continuity.  
Throughout our study, we see Cubans interpreting antifascism as not only closely connected to 
the island’s domestic struggle but also in fact part of or the same as that struggle.  This assertion 
was consistent across diverse individuals and groups with disparate ideas concerning what 
exactly antifascism and the Cuban domestic struggle were.  That diverse individuals and groups 
wrestled to define and promote antifascism challenges the second and third elements of the 
rupture narrative’s argument concerning the movement.  Not seeking to minimize the important 
part played by the Communist Party in Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic, 
we include the Communists’ role not only in coordinating volunteers, both Communists and non-
Communists, to cross the Atlantic (Chapter 2) but also in promoting antifascism on the island 
(Chapter 7).  However, we uncover a much broader and more diverse Cuban antifascist 
movement beyond the Party, one that—years before the mainstream antifascist consensus of 
World War II—included anticommunists as well as those of other political beliefs and many who 
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saw themselves as largely nonpolitical.  Men, women, and children of different socioeconomic 
levels and ethnicities from all over the island and the Cuban exile communities participated.  
Union members and university students, professionals and laborers, tradesmen and intellectuals, 
even boxers, baseball players, and musicians got involved in antifascist activism.  Some were 
willing to go to Spain and take up arms, while others who traveled there provided support in 
nonviolent roles.  Some who stayed on the island focused on work with a broad humanistic 
appeal, while others devoted themselves to partisan activism.  Throughout our study, we consider 
the diversity of Cubans who identified themselves as antifascists.  Examining the widely popular 
Cuban efforts to aid Spanish children during the war (Chapter 3), we analyze how diverse pro-
Republican activists organized a charitable campaign intended to attract nonpartisan Cubans to 
support the antifascist cause.  Exploring antifascism among the island’s black activists (Chapter 
4), Freemasons (Chapter 5), and anarchists (Chapter 6), we see how groups with disparate goals 
and values joined the movement, connected it to the missions of their organizations, and 
interpreted it as vital to both domestic and international struggles.  Following our discussion of 
the Spanish Civil War years, our conclusion begins by considering the liberal and mainstream 
antifascism of the World War II years, exploring how it grew out of the radical activism that 
preceded it and the extent to which Cuban activist continuity existed even after Spanish 
Republican defeat in 1939.  Following the continuity further, our conclusion examines the 
significance of 1930s Cuban antifascism for the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 
Historical actors of the Cuban 1930s saw the general strike of March 1935 as an 
important turning point, rather than an endpoint.  As we will see throughout our study, activists 
recognized the failure of the strike as a significant loss, one that left many feeling hopeless and 
helpless, and about which they thought, debated, and wrote for years afterward.  It certainly did 
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constitute a harsh defeat, and evidence of the setbacks suffered by Cuban activists is solid.  We 
do not seek to overturn, therefore, but rather to temper the traditional argument concerning the 
rupture in activism during the Pax Batistiana.  A significant rupture did take place, but there 
remained more continuity than the above-referenced works have acknowledged.  Two questions 
about this continuity frame many of the considerations of this study: How can we see the 
continuity? And how did the continuity function?  The first is a methodological question; the 
second inspires the bulk of our analysis. 
To see the continuity of Cuban activism after March 1935, we must shift the scale of 
analysis.  Scholars build their interpretation of the Pax Batistiana as a rupture in Cuban activism 
on analysis of the island’s domestic political arena.  They consider the interaction of top activist 
leaders, such as Guiteras, and their organizations with key players in formal government 
(whether electoral or strongman), such as Grau and Batista, and their parties and bases of support.  
The scale at which they study politics is, therefore, at the national level; though acknowledging 
both, they do not consider in depth the everyday individual and grassroots level or the 
international level.  At the national scale of analysis, we find activists and dissatisfied Cubans 
generally lumped into the faceless clases populares and global events considered in passing as 
external influences either unavoidably forced upon Cubans lacking effective agency to engage 
them or largely unconnected to the island’s domestic situation.  This scale of political analysis is 
appropriate for nation-specific studies of Cuban history, but it has the effect of placing the 
activism of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic in an analytical blind spot.  
We study the antifascist activism of the late 1930s at two other scales: at the intimate, personal 
and interpersonal level and at the global level.  Both help us to see the continuity in activism that 
is not as apparent at the national level.   
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Many of the same individuals who were activists in the struggle against Machado, Batista, 
and U.S. neocolonialism up through March 1935 became antifascist activists.  We follow the 
trajectory of Torriente and Casuso across the 1930s as two important examples of this personal 
and interpersonal continuity; we will encounter many other individual examples along the way.  
We will see, therefore, how personal resilience is a vital component of activist continuity.  The 
ability of many individuals to transcend the disillusionment of defeat is necessary for the 
continuation of a movement after the type of dramatic setback Cuban activists experienced in 
1935.  Understanding the day-to-day work of activism is important, too—oftentimes, persevering 
as an activist meant simply overcoming exhaustion, fear, and despair and continuing each day to 
do the work of organizing.  An intimate scale of analysis allows us to examine the personal 
resilience and commitment as well as the daily work of numerous activists that sustain a 
movement after a defeat. 
We can see continuity of activism across the 1930s by studying how individuals persisted, 
relying upon the same personal commitment, interpersonal relationships, organizational 
affiliations, and activist networks that they had in 1935 and before.  Cuban activists seized upon 
antifascism and the Spanish Civil War as opportunities to regroup, reorganize, and continue 
working.  For individual Cuban activists, moving from the anti-Machado and anti-Batista 
struggles into antifascism led to reflection on and articulation of continuity between causes.  
Many activists wrestled with expressing how and why they interpreted antifascism as aligned 
with Cuba’s domestic struggle.  Organizations, too, sought to connect their goals and values with 
those of antifascism; each group we study construed antifascism’s aims differently based on that 
group’s philosophy or ideology, yet all connected around the Spanish Republican cause.  We will 
consider the arguments Cuban individuals and groups made expressing their support for the 
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Spanish Republic and the ways in which they saw antifascism as part of their mission.  Often 
related to their membership in groups were activist individuals’ interpersonal relationships and 
organizational connections, links through which they could achieve organizing work for the 
antifascist cause.  In addition to studying individuals and groups, therefore, we examine Cuban 
antifascist networks.  Antifascist individuals and groups used and strengthened during the 
Spanish Civil War the interpersonal and institutional networks they had formed during the 
Machadato or earlier. 
Employing different scales to study the personal and transnational levels of Cuban 
activist continuity, we see that the two are closely connected.  Cuban individuals, groups, and 
networks were transnational.  Many Cubans had transnational identities.  Individuals of various 
socioeconomic backgrounds traveled to other countries in search of work, for education, to 
reunite with family, or when fleeing political persecution.  Migratory lives were common, and 
even those who never left the island were likely to come in contact regularly with people from 
Spain, Haiti, Jamaica, China, the United States, Mexico, and elsewhere.
14
  In this context, 
individuals had transnational experiences and built transnational connections.  As we consider 
the trajectories of Torriente and Casuso in our first chapter, we will see transnational identities, 
migration, and connections at work in two individual lives and an interpersonal relationship.  
Studying Cuban volunteers in Spain and the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children, we will 
examine further how transnational lives and links shaped Cuban support for the Republic—how, 
for example, Cubans who had lived in New York played a special role as linguistic and cultural 
translators in Spain, or how fundraising appeals played upon a Cuban sense of shared blood with 
Spanish war victims.  Organizations, also, existed transnationally.  All four of the groups we 
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consider as part of the island’s antifascist movement had close ties with brethren in other 
countries, especially Spain, the United States, and Mexico.  Freemasons, anarchists, and the 
Communist Party all engaged in regular exchange with their counterparts in these countries—
Communists interacted, in addition, with the Soviet Union and, in the Spanish Civil War years, 
France.  The black Cuban intellectuals and activists whose associations participated in 
antifascism identified as part of the African diaspora, connecting with African Americans and 
other people of African descent, as well as wrestling with their cultural connections—as 
Cubans—to Spain.  As each of these groups committed to antifascism and supporting the 
Spanish Republic, it did so within its particular transnational context.  Cuban support for the 
Republicans involved transnational exchange of people, material, ideas, and organizations. 
We argue, therefore, that Cuban antifascism and pro-Republican activism constituted a 
transnational movement.  Though deeply rooted in the island’s own political struggles it grew 
also around longstanding connections with other countries, especially Spain and the United 
States, and with particular locales, such as Catalonia and New York City.  What is a 
transnational movement and how do we study it?  At the most basic level, it is a coordinated 
organizing effort by activists and groups with a unifying purpose that is located in multiple 
countries and characterized by people, material, and ideas, and organizations traveling and 
communicating between nations.  To study the Cuban antifascist and pro-Republican movement, 
we consider its components: the activists and groups, the unifying purpose they articulated, the 
multiple locations in which they operated, and the transnational networks that facilitated exhange.  
Interplay between the intimate scale of individuals and groups and the larger scale of movement 
across borders and oceans highlights an element essential to understanding the concept of the 
transnational: the impact of each locale on the others.  Exchange between places leaves each 
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changed, and by moving between nations, a person or an idea both impacts the new locale and is 
altered by it.  Studying Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic as a 
transnational movement, for instance, we note that Cuban exiles living in the United States who 
then traveled to Spain had a particular cultural identity forged by their experience that gave them 
unique opportunities and advantages during the conflict.  We see that Spanish antifascist 
arguments took on a distinctly Cuban character on the island, one often shaped by longstanding 
connections the island had with Spain and the United States.  To antifascist Cubans, as we have 
noted for example, Spanish Nationalists who rebelled against the Republic represented the “old 
Spain” that had colonized Cuba and dominated it for centuries, while the Republic represented a 
“new Spain” that was Cuba’s equal—in other words, antifascism melded with Cuban 
anticolonialism.  We observe the ways in which organizational and ideological solidarities 
overlapped and interacted with solidarities based on nationality and culture as Cuban antifascist 
groups connected with their counterparts in other countries in their efforts to support the Spanish 
Republicans.  In order to analyze a transnational movement, these examples demonstrate, our 
method of analysis must account for the interaction between people, places, ideas, organizations, 
and networks. 
One methodological tool we employ is prosopography.  Prosopography—group or 
collective biography—investigates “a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of 
their lives,” posing “questions about who rather than what.”  It comprises both statistical analysis 
of the group’s characteristics and a collection of biographical case studies or “personal vignettes” 
about the individuals in the group.
15
  Each of these two parts presents relevant information about 
the group of individuals at a different scale, from the statistical overview to the intimate portrait.  
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Both parts of prosopographic analysis require the availability of biographical data on a group of 
individuals; as a result, many studies utilizing this methodology focus on elites about whom 
records of such data exist.  In this study, however, systematic records kept by Communists on 
both Communist and non-Communist members of the International Brigades make possible a 
statistical analysis in Chapter 2 of a sample of  the Cuban volunteers in Spain even though many 
were non-elite.  The limitations of the available biographical data make the sample an imperfect 
one, but with careful acknowledgement of these limitations the analysis is nonetheless extremely 
valuable.  Material from many other sources makes possible biographical case studies of Cuban 
antifascists found throughout this study, personal vignettes that enrich the narrative and 
exemplify many of our assertions.  The ability to conduct this type of analysis of diverse political 
activists including non-elites within a movement presents an exciting opportunity to wrestle with 
how movements function at the level of individual participants. 
One of the principal functions of prosopography as a methodology is “to make sense of 
political action.”  Political prosopography considers the substantial influence individual identity 
and personal motivation have over political action.  In the case of prosopography of elite political 
actors, a behind-the-scenes look at politics has tended to reveal self-interested motivation based 
on economic concerns and kinship ties.  Thus elite prosopography has often “reflected a deeply 
pessimistic attitude toward human affairs,” resulting in a simplistic and cynical assessment of 
individual motivation by focusing too much on self-interest as a driver of political action.
16
  In 
the case of antifascism and pro-Republican efforts during the Spanish Civil War, assessments of 
individual motivation behind political action have often swung too far in the opposite direction.  
Some degree of skepticism—if not cynicism—is necessary as a corrective to the overly 
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simplistic narrative of “the Good Fight” found in the many celebratory accounts that exist of 
international antifascist involvement.  By exploring the myriad motivations for Cuban 
participation based in diverse identities, this study tempers such idealistic assessments.  A belief 
that the causes of the Spanish Republic and antifascism represented the good and that the fight 
for these causes was the fight for a better world was sincere and a strong motivation for many 
participants that should not be underestimated.  We will see ample evidence of this idealism and 
sincerity throughout our study.  However, the diverse motivations of individuals and groups in 
the struggle were much more complex—including personal, financial, professional, even 
criminal reasons for participation, in addition to political ones—as our biographical portraits 
illustrate.  To understand the Cuban antifascist and pro-Republican movement fully, 
acknowledging the breadth of its diversity, we must account for this complexity of motivation.  
Studying activists at the intimate, personal, individual level and employing the technique of 
prosopography facilitates this accounting. 
Examining diversity within the movement and its transnational nature, how do we define 
it as a single, coherent, and Cuban movement?  How did diverse Cuban individuals and groups in 
various locations across multiple countries define themselves as antifascist and pro-Republican, 
devoting their work and resources to a common cause and coalescing around a shared movement?  
The key to answering these questions is the concept of solidarity.  Diverse participants in the 
movement defined shared interests in the fights against Spanish Nationalists and international 
fascism, commonalities that brought them together with others, even with those who had 
different end goals in mind or who were traditionally their rivals.  The cause of the Spanish 
Republic and the fight against the fascist threat, both international and domestic, combined in an 
antifascist rallying cry that brought disparate Cubans together: the child in a small town on the 
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island who sent in her meager savings to help her Spanish brothers and sisters, the doctor in exile 
in New York inspired by U.S. volunteers to travel to Spain and provide medical services, the 
Havana anarchist proud of the struggle being waged by his comrades in Catalonia, the woman 
widowed by a Spanish Nationalist bullet who struggled to continue working for the cause of the 
Republic in the face of personal tragedy, the Freemason reacting in fear and anger to his 
brotherhood and its values being attacked by Spanish Nationalists, the black Communist 
intellectual who saw in Spain an opportunity to fight for the end of both racial and class 
oppression, and so many others identified as part of the movement.  A shared sense of solidarity 
did not result in perfect unity, as we will see clearly, nor in homogeneity of ideology, methods, 
goals, or values; it did, however, bring together diverse Cubans in a single, coherent movement 
composed of many parts.   
Since we study disparate parts of this movement, it is useful to define how it constituted a 
single, coherent whole.  The field of social movement studies lends us a useful delineation of the 
elements of a movement, which we can apply to our case.  Cuban antifascism and support for the 
Spanish Republic was characterized by 1) a “sustained campaign of claim making” on behalf of 
the Republic and against international fascism by Cubans who related these claims to domestic 
concerns; 2) an “array of public performances” asserting these claims, including pro-Republican 
and antifascist editorials, manifestos, creative expressions such as poetry and illustrations, 
assemblies, demonstrations, radio broadcasts, charitable efforts, and voyages to Spain in support 
of the cause; 3) “repeated public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment” by 
participating individuals and organizations on the island and abroad, including presentations of 
the cause as respectable and legitimate, and assertions of solidarity and widespread popular 





  Organizations and networks, as we have noted, carried on with a tradition of 
activism established in Cuba by the domestic struggles against Machado, Batista, and U.S. 
neocolonialism.  Developing antifascist and pro-Republican solidarity was the key to sustaining 
activism into the period after March 1935. 
Antifascism and the cause of the Spanish Republic provided Cuban activists with a 
common cause around which diverse individuals and groups built a movement held together by 
solidarity.  The Cuban movement made up one part of the larger global antifascist movement.  
Transnational solidarity, therefore, is a concept central to this study of diverse, interconnected 
activists and organizations engaged in the work of antifascism.  It signifies both the belief by 
people in different nations that their domestic struggles are related, and their border- and ocean-
crossing work together for mutual benefit.  The process of building transnational solidarity faced 
inevitable challenges of distance and difference between nations, but exchange between activists 
of various nationalities during the war had a profound impact on antifascism in each country.  
This study contributes to our understanding of why activists pursue transnational solidarity, how 
it functions, and to what extent it impacts the course of history.  To do so, its analysis must 
account for the development and sustainability of—as well as the many challenges to—solidarity 
at various scales up to the transnational. 
It was precisely antifascist Cubans’ sense of transnational solidarity that made their pro-
Republican movement fundamentally Cuban.  Based on both personal and political 
considerations, their sense of solidarity with Spanish Republicans (and, we will see, with the 
people of Ethiopia invaded by Italian fascism in 1935 as well) caused them to interpret disparate 
struggles as one and the same.  In other words, the antifascist struggle was the domestic 
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struggle—the Cuban struggle.  Though some, following internationalist ideologies, defined their 
commitment to the Republican cause at least partially in terms of internationalism, virtually all 
Cuban antifascist activists viewed their efforts through the lens of Cuban realities: antifascism 
applied to Cuban problems, they believed, as well as global ones.  Thus the concept of 
transnational solidarity constitutes another way in which we see into the activism blind spot of 
the Pax Batistiana.  Cuban activists believed that the island’s domestic struggle of the 1930s 
formed part of the larger international challenge of fascism.  Therefore, supporting the Spanish 
Republic—the fight for a “new Spain”—was, from the perspective of solidarity, the same fight 
as the fight for a “new Cuba.”  Individuals, groups, and networks from the earlier activist period 
not only continued their work on into antifascism but also constructed a Cuban definition of 
antifascism such that it encompassed their previous struggle.   
What exactly, in the end, did Cubans contribute to the defense of the Spanish Republic 
during the war?  They contributed monetary and material aid, supportive arguments and 
propaganda, and volunteers.  Cuba sent more volunteers to Spain than any other Latin American 
country.  Most volunteers fought, with a good number of Cubans attaining leadership ranks in 
the military, while others served in support roles in medicine, transportation, childcare, and 
administrative work.  Cubans sent food and supplies, emphasizing in particular contributions of 
the island’s agricultural crown jewels: sugar and tobacco.  They raised money by selling stamps, 
bonds, tickets to pro-Republican events, and magazine subscriptions; taking weekly collections 
in places of employment and outside factories; and petitioning exile communities to send in 
contributions.  Women and girls sewed clothes for Spanish children and Republican soldiers.  
Cubans set up an orphanage in Catalonia that, they noted proudly, flew the Cuban and Spanish 
Republican flags side-by-side.  They held rallies, made speeches, gave radio broadcasts, 
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published manifestos, printed posters, and wrote editorials in support of the Republic.  The 
groups we study committed their resources to assisting the pro-Republican cause, arguing for 
antifascism and the Spanish Republic in their publications, organizing informational meetings 
and tours by visiting Republican dignitaries, fundraising, and networking with counterparts in 
Spain, the United States and elsewhere to build solidarity for the cause.  Solidarity itself was of 
vital importance to embattled Republicans, who, we will see, expressed again and again their 
appreciation for Cubans’ commitment to them.  The Spanish Civil War was a brutal and 
protracted fight, and in order to continue fighting Republican individuals and groups had to 
maintain commitment and foster resilience in the face of devastating disappointments and defeats.  
Their Cuban brethren understood this challenge better than many, and offered both their concrete 
aid and their heartfelt solidarity. 
  
Contents and Structure 
 We have already touched upon the specific contents of the chapters, but a more detailed 
summary as well as a brief discussion of excluded topics warranting further study here provides 
the reader with a better understanding of the overall structure and with a sense of the direction of 
future research on the subject of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic. 
As previously noted, Chapter 1 introduces the personal commitment and involvement of 
two individual activists, writer Pablo de la Torriente Brau and his wife Teresa “Teté” Casuso, a 
recently married Cuban couple who fled to exile in New York following the March 1935 strike.  
Based on Pablo’s articles and correspondence and Teté’s memoir, as well as writing by some of 
their closest associates, the first chapter covers the chronological period prior to the Spanish 
Civil War, offering a view of Cuban activism during the Machadato and Batista’s rise to power 
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from the couple’s perspective.  Pablo volunteered in Spain early on in the conflict, becoming 
Cuba’s iconic volunteer, celebrated repeatedly during the war years—inspiring many 
compatriots to follow his lead—and long afterward.  Teté became a leading antifascist organizer 
on the island as one of the founders of the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children.  These two 
individuals are central to Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic, and we will 
return to them periodically throughout the study. 
 In Chapter 2 we examine the identities and experiences of Cuban volunteers in Spain.  
We consider their diversity and compare their demographic characteristics with those of the 
Cuban population at large, determining the ways in which they were representative of or 
diverged from their contemporaries as a group.  We touch upon some of the challenges of 
analyzing the volunteers’ identities, many of which were transnational.  Exploring their 
experience in Spain, we find that their transnational identities gave Cuban volunteers a special 
understanding of the Spanish conflict and unique opportunities and advantages.  They served as 
important linguistic and cultural translators within a context of confusion born of multinational 
participation.  Many of the volunteers worked to portray their efforts as respectable and 
legitimate, and some achieved advanced military rank.  These contributions by Cubans to the 
Republican cause were widely noted, and celebrations of their efforts were used as propaganda 
to recruit new volunteers and antifascist activists on the island and elsewhere.  For these same 
purposes, Cuban casualties were honored as martyred heroes.  Nevertheless, we find that 
complex personal as well as political motivations drew Cuban volunteers to Spain, and cases of 




Chapter 3 studies the campaign for children organized by Havana’s Asociación de 
Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español (Association of Aid to the Child of the Spanish People, or 
A.A.N.P.E.), notable for side-by-side participation by men, women, and children.  Research at 
Spain’s National Library and the Institute of History of Cuba provides detailed information about 
the inner workings and public role of this organization, including its leadership, participants, 
goals, finances, and accomplishments.  This information allows us to examine some of the 
practical elements of everyday activism work in the movement.  The Association’s periodical 
introduces a number of the principal Cuban arguments in favor of the Spanish Republic, 
particularly those most favored by moderates, which the chapter outlines and analyzes.  The 
memoir by Teté Casuso, the Association’s founding president, highlights the role of this 
remarkable woman in organizing aid for Spanish children after her husband was killed fighting 
in Spain alongside Republicans.  Her commitment to the Spanish cause following this personal 
tragedy represents a powerful example of the activist resilience essential for continuity.  In 
addition to considering the function and arguments of the campaign and the personal story of its 
founding leader, analysis of the A.A.N.P.E. touches upon organizing in and participation of the 
Cuban community abroad and upon collaboration among diverse pro-Republican individuals and 
groups on the island, even those who might have been antagonistic to one another under different 
circumstances.  The popularity of the campaign to aid Spanish children—which was firmly pro-
Republican—illustrates the effectiveness of the cause at bringing together diverse Cubans, while 
the tactics employed by Association leaders to draw in broad support raises interesting questions 
about the general public’s perception of partisan activism. 
The remaining chapters present the pro-Republican stance of four Cuban groups that 
predated the Spanish Civil War: black associations, Freemasons, anarchists, and the Communist 
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Party.  All four groups were part of transnational networks that existed before the Spanish 
conflict, and all had prior experience with organizing for political causes, though they were quite 
different one from another.  These four chapters focus primarily on the ways in which each 
group related antifascism and the Spanish Republican cause to its own values and goals and to 
Cuba’s struggle.  To do so, the chapters examine the various arguments the groups advanced 
against fascism and in favor of the Republicans.  Studying these four groups side-by-side, we 
note significant commonalities and assess divergences.  Discussing predictable differences 
between these disparate groups, we see also interesting overlaps, such as the longstanding 
anarchist who was also a prominent Freemason, or the shared interest in the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia by black Cubans and Cuban Communists.  We note tensions and dissent within each 
group, as well, such as the somewhat contentious shift from pro-Ethiopian to pro-Republican 
organizing within black associations or the presence of pro-Nationalist Freemasons and those in 
favor of a neutral stance with regard to political matters.  In addition to considering the 
antifascist views and arguments of these four groups, the chapters examine—to the extent made 
possible by the available sources—the logistical elements of their antifascism and support for the 
Spanish Republic: We account for monetary and material aid sent to the Republicans; we follow 
transnational network connections utilized for antifascist purposes; and we note recruitment to 
the cause. 
Analyzing publications by Cuban activists of African descent, Chapter 4 demonstrates 
that the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935) inspired black Cuban antifascism and examines how 
pro-Ethiopia organizing both supported and experienced tension with the pro-Spanish 
Republican movement.  It contextualizes black Cuban antifascism within the experience of the 
African diaspora during the 1930s, focusing in particular on the cultural and political importance 
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of transnational relationships between black Cubans and African Americans.  Based on research 
at four Masonic lodges, Chapter 5 shows how Cuban Freemasons equated Masonic values with 
antifascism, combated pro-Nationalist opposition within their ranks, and framed antifascism as 
self-defense against the virulent anti-Masonic stance of Spanish Nationalists.  It notes the 
challenge faced by antifascists within Freemasonry posed by the fraternal order’s commitment to 
political diversity, a commitment that made the self-defense argument particularly vital to 
Masonic antifascism.  Chapter 6 uses evidence from fragmentary Cuban and Spanish anarchist 
materials in Amsterdam and Havana to show pro-Republican transnational organizing by Cuban 
anarchists.  It demonstrates that while other groups idealized democracy as the desirable 
endpoint of antifascist activism, anarchists saw democracy merely as a means toward a 
revolutionary goal.  Drawing on Communist archives and periodicals from Cuba and Russia, as 
well as the U.S. Library of Congress Latin American and Iberian Pamphlets collection, Chapter 7 
presents the internationally coordinated Communist campaign of support as it existed locally in 
Cuba, noting the tensions that existed between Communist internationalism and Cuba’s domestic 
antifascism.  The Cuban Communist Party’s role in organizing Cuban volunteers to travel to 
Spain is discussed in Chapter 2; Chapter 7 focuses on the way in which the Party presented and 
advocated antifascism on the island, considering its goals, arguments, and tactics.  The chapter 
also considers the Party’s relationship to Batista during the years of the Spanish Civil War, 
hypothesizing about how Cuban antifascism impacted this changing relationship, and vice versa.   
These chapters explore understandings of democracy, sovereignty, and justice in these 
organizations; consider the impact of their connections to transnational networks; and present 
dissent within and disagreement between them.  Taken together, they illustrate the diversity of 
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Cuban antifascism, its transnational character, and the power of the movement to unify disparate 
individuals and groups around common goals as well as the challenges to this unity. 
The study concludes by considering the ways in which antifascism and historical memory 
of the Spanish conflict functioned in Cuba in the years and decades following Spanish 
Republican defeat in 1939.  The war moved toward inevitable victory for Franco during January 
and February 1939 as Catalonia fell to Nationalist forces.  France and Great Britain granted 
Franco’s regime official recognition shortly thereafter.  Republican refugees made arduous treks 
across the Pyrenees to France and unsuccessful attempts to escape to Portugal, from which the 
dictatorial regime of Antonio Salazar returned them to Franco.  Republican Prime Minister Juan 
Negrin fled the country early in March.  By the end of that month, Nationalist forces controlled 
the entire country, and Franco declared victory on the first of April.  The Republican government 
continued to try to function in exile, and activists around the world maintained hope of its 
resurrection in Spain for many years afterward.  Franco, however, succeeded in remaining 
dictator of Spain until his death at age 82 in 1975. 
Our conclusion begins with Cuban activists’ domestic political position during the early 
1940s, showing that antifascism gained mainstream momentum in Cuba during World War II as 
the island sided with the Allies in 1941.  Organizational records from the National Archive of 
Cuba illustrate a shift in Cuban antifascism at this time.  Then it examines the relationship of the 
Cuban Revolution to 1930s antifascism and the Spanish conflict: the connections participants 
and observers drew between the two events, and the view and use of the earlier movement by the 
Revolutionary government.  Fascinating documentation from the Institute of History of Cuba of 
a Revolutionary effort to find and assess Cuban Spanish Civil War combat veterans in the early 
1960s addresses the significance of 1930s Cuban antifascism for the 1959 Revolution, and the 
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diplomatic relationship Cuba under Fidel Castro had with Francoist Spain challenges ideological 
narratives of left and right.  Next, the conclusion follows up with the 1930s antifascists in their 
twilight years, and touches upon their relationship with both Spain and their own government 
during this later period.  Finally, a broader look at transnational activism, networks, and 
solidarity generates a few thoughts on the relevance of 1930s Cuban antifascism to the present. 
There are a number of topics related to this study that warrant further examination, and 
on which I hope to conduct future research.  The first and perhaps most obvious is pro-
Nationalist activism on the island.  Though I do believe that the majority of Cubans who engaged 
with the Spanish conflict supported the Republicans, there existed a pro-Nationalist movement 
on the island as well.  Records of the Falange on the island in the Cuban National Archive as 
well as opinions expressed in pro-Nationalist periodicals would give us insight into this other 
side of the struggle.  Second, a look at the Cuban government’s official stance on the war—
which was neutral, in keeping with the Non-Intervention Agreement (1936)—and the island’s 
diplomatic relations with Spain during the war years would further complicate our view of 
Batista.  Government documents, including the neutrality decree of 1937 (Decreto Presidencial 
No. 3411), and a fascinating file found in the Spanish military archive at Ávila containing 
Nationalist assessments of Cuban diplomats would provide a good starting point for such 
research.  Third, pro-Republican organizing on the island by self-identified Spaniards and the 
Spanish centers is excluded here as being somewhat separate from Cuba’s domestic antifascism, 
but these people and institutions collaborated closely with those we do examine.  I have 
encountered voluminous source material concerning the Spanish centers during the course of my 
research for the present study.  Fourth, a number of materials already collected and some further 
research could illustrate in greater detail the connections members of specifically Cuban political 
31 
 
groups such as Joven Cuba, Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student Left Wing), and the Organización 
Revolucionaria Cubana Anti-imperialista (Cuban Revolutionary Anti-imperialist Organization, 
or O.R.C.A.) had with antifascism and the cause of the Spanish Republic.  An examination of the 
participation of these groups in the movement would develop further our discussions of Cuban 
activist networks and continuity.  Finally, a broader look at popular participation in the 
movement—beyond the participation of everyday Cubans in the campaign for Spanish 
children—could include surveys and letters to the editor in the mainstream press.  A number of 
relevant pieces in Bohemia expressing diverse views on the conflict—and support for both 
sides—make up one good body of material on this topic. 
 
 A History of Hope 
Cuban activists of the 1930s believed that their fight for a “new Cuba” and the Spanish 
Republicans fight for a “new Spain” were two parts of the same antifascist struggle.  They based 
this interpretation on an understanding of the larger international threat of fascism, of the special 
historical relationship between Spain and Cuba, and of their own domestic problems as tied 
inextricably to both of these factors.  In order to advance their goals on the island, to aid their 
“brothers” in Spain, and to do their part to combat global fascism, they connected with like-
minded activists of other nationalities.  They utilized the mobility of people, material, and ideas, 
and the connections of interpersonal relationships, cultural affinities, institutional ties, and shared 
ideology that constituted transnational activist networks.  The result of their efforts was powerful 
transnational solidarity that, while it did not win the war for the Republicans or defeat Batista in 
Cuba, provided something even more important for activists in the long term: resilience in the 
face of defeat.  The transnational solidarity of Cuban antifascism kept activism going on the 
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island through years during which discouragement and disillusionment could have led activists to 
despair—to give up hope. 
This study of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic offers new 
perspectives on both Cuba during the 1930s and the Spanish Civil War, examining the complex 
intersection of two histories not often considered together.  Additionally, it is a case study of a 
transnational movement and the continuity of activism that provides insight from historical 
analysis relevant to activist efforts in any era.  John E. Toews has stated that the historian’s task 
is to connect memory with hope.
18
  This history studies hope and its resilience. 
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Personal Resilience, Transnational Movement, Activist Continuity: 
Pablo de la Torriente Brau and Teresa “Teté” Casuso from 
Cuban Revolution to the Spanish Civil War 
 
In July 1936, as Spanish Nationalists rose up against the Republic in Spain, there were, 
living humbly in Harlem, a man and woman whose choices and actions would be central to 
Cuban efforts in relation to the war: husband and wife Pablo de la Torriente Brau and Teresa 
“Teté” Casuso, both writers and political activists.  Their individual stories, their relationship, 
and their involvement in Cuba’s domestic struggles, the Spanish Civil War, and international 
antifascism were highly influential among their contemporaries.  Here we begin to examine the 
trajectory of these two political lives, to which we will return at various points throughout this 
study.  Exploring the activists’ identities, their participation in the fights against Machado and 
Batista, their flight into exile in the United States in 1935, and the initiation of their connection 
to the Spanish conflict, we present two examples of individual participation in Cuban antifascism.  
We consider their motivations, the nature of their participation, and the resilience they showed in 
the face of disappointments and defeats.  Following the journeys of these two activists provides 
insight into the formation of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic, the 
transnational quality of the movement, and its connections to the activism that preceded it.  
These personal stories inform a large political question: How and why do activist movements 
cross time and space, through distinct eras and over national boundaries?  Our study of Pablo and 
Teté’s personal commitment and transnational engagement explores activist continuity. 
 




Pablo de la Torriente Brau embodied transnationality, his identity a function of a 
particular historical moment.  There was a considerable population of Spaniards living in Cuba 
during the decades between the Cuban War of Independence and the Spanish Civil War.  
Peninsulares (people from the Iberian Peninsula) not only remained in Cuba after independence 
but also increased their numbers on the island significantly.  In 1899, of the total Cuban 
population of 1.6 million people, 130,000 or approximately 8% were Spaniards.  Between 1902 
and 1916 over 400,000 more Spanish immigrants “arrived in waves, seemingly inexhaustible and 
irreversible,” in the words of historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr.
1
  The presence of Spaniards in Cuba in 
the first few decades of the twentieth century was not uncomplicated, especially because they 
dominated economically desirable positions there, much to the frustration of Cubans.  Yet it did 
strengthen the enduring cultural and familial ties between the countries.  Such ties were strong in 
Pablo’s family.  Though he identified himself as Cuban, Torriente was the son of a man born in 
Spain, Félix de la Torriente Garrido, and a Puerto Rican woman, Graciela Brau.  Félix de la 
Torriente’s nationality was divided between countries like his son’s.  He was the “son of a Cuban 
and Cuban himself in his sentiments,” according to Pablo’s sister Zoe, but born in Spain and 
raised there until the age of five.
2
   
Like so many others during the early decades of the twentieth century, Torriente’s family 
was both multinational and migratory.  Members of the Torriente Brau family moved and 
traveled between Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.  In 1898, Félix moved from Cuba to Puerto Rico 
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to take the position of secretary to the last Spanish governor of Puerto Rico.  On 12 December 
1901, Pablo was born in San Juan.
3
  In 1903 Torriente and his father traveled to Spain to visit the 
infant boy’s recently widowed grandmother.  Then they went on to Havana, where the Torriente 
Brau family lived for several years.  Then the mother and children returned to Puerto Rico.  The 
father remained in Cuba for some time, then joined the others in Puerto Rico, then returned to 
Cuba once more.  In 1909, the family reunited in Santiago de Cuba, where they would remain.  
Later in life, Pablo would go into political exile repeatedly in the United States and would end up 
eventually in Spain in 1936.  Cuban Torriente biographer José López Sánchez writes: “He spent 
his childhood in the islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba but he could not have foreseen that, as a 
volunteer of liberty, he would get his share of Spanish nationality as well.”
4
 
Torriente’s national identity was both complex and politicized.  His mother, Graciela 
Brau, was the daughter of Salvador Brau, Puerto Rican writer, politician, and historian.
5
  Pablo’s 
grandfather Brau was a contemporary of Cuban independence fighter José Martí and, like his 
Cuban counterpart, an important proponent of his country’s autonomy from Spain and an 
eminent intellectual figure.  One of his works was the first history of Puerto Rico.
6
  When Pablo 
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was a young boy living in Cuba, his grandfather sent him a copy of José Mart ’s La Edad de Oro 
(The Golden Age).
7
  The influence of their maternal grandfather, according to Pablo’s sister Zoe, 
had a strong effect on Pablo, shaping the development of his intellect, talent, morality, and 
patriotism.  He was politically aware from an early age.  For example, in his very first 
journalistic endeavor, Torriente envisioned a political life for himself.  When he was nine years 
old, remembered Zoe, Torriente published an article in his school’s student magazine El 
Ateneísta
8
 in which he expressed his “great ambition: to become a sailor, attain the rank of 
admiral, direct a large squadron, go to Puerto Rico, and throw out the North Americans who 
were subjugating the nation.”
9
  Just about a decade into life and into the twentieth century, young 
Pablo understood a central political problem faced by both Puerto Rican and Cuban political 
activists: U.S. neocolonialism.   
As the grandson of an influential autonomista, Pablo certainly did not identify himself as 
Spanish.  Neither was he, however, entirely Cuban, though he called Cuba home.  Proud of his 
Puerto Rican heritage on his mother’s side, he became indignant when introduced at a rally by 
the name Pablo de la Torrente y Bravo: “Pablo is fine, and Torrente doesn’t upset me, but it’s not 
Bravo, but Brau, which is the family name of my mother and my grandfather, of which I am very 
proud and which reminds me of my unrepentant nationality.”
10
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Though he expressed pride in his mixed Puerto Rican and Cuban nationality, however, 
Pablo felt also a strong sense of connection to Spain.  As it did for many other Cubans, the 
connection existed within his own family heritage, and he expressed it in familial terms.  Despite 
his longstanding anticolonial beliefs, Torriente, like other Cubans, referred to Spain as “the 
motherland.”
11
  More than just a common saying, the term “motherland” for Spain used by 
Cubans was based in real and important historic and familial ties between the two countries, a 
special relationship which Cuban activists analyzed and utilized during their involvement in the 
Spanish Civil War.  Torriente distinguished between an “old Spain,” no longer “motherland” but 
rather “stepmother”—in the tradition of Latin American independence fighter Simón Bol var’s 
famous “Jamaica letter” of 1815, in which he called Spain Latin America’s “unnatural 
stepmother”—represented by the Nationalists on the one hand, and a “new Spain” represented by 
the Republic, a Spain that would be Latin America’s “older sister,” on the other.
12
  Following 
Pablo, many Cuban antifascists would make a similar distinction between Nationalist and 
Republican Spain in relation to Cuba and Latin America, maintaining a familial metaphor while 
insisting on an anticolonial status of equality.   
 
 A Revolu ionar  Cou le in  he “Genera ion of  he Thir ies” 
 Whereas Pablo had a transnational and politicized identity from an early age, shaped by 
his family, Teté was shaped from an early age by Pablo.  Ten years her husband’s junior, she 
knew him from the time she was seven years old and moved with her family to Cuba’s Oriente 
Province, where he lived.  He was seventeen at the time, “an extraordinary boy both physically 
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and mentally,” who used to tell epic stories, such as those of Homer, to Casuso and other 
children, and to read to them works by Martí.  Torriente courted the young girl from the time she 
was eleven or twelve, at which point her family was living in Havana and Torriente was a 
student at the Universidad de La Habana (University of Havana).  In her memoir, she remembers 
his “offensive of books, poems, and flowers.  No girl could have long resisted such a charming 
courtship, and for me he was a magician who rendered everything beautiful and noble.”  The 
courtship was not only charming but also lengthy—they eventually married many years later.  
Pablo was responsible for giving Casuso her nickname; the first book of stories he published he 
dedicated “To Teté Casuso, muchacha,” and, writing in 1961, Casuso remarked: “Many people 




 Casuso would fight alongside Torriente in the struggles of the self-identified Cuban 
“Generation of the Thirties,” political activists who made up the movements against Machado, 
Batista, and U.S. neocolonialism on the island during the 1930s.  Together, they began their 
work as activists by taking part in the student organizing against Machado at the Universidad de 
La Habana.  While young revolutionaries such as Pablo and Teté organized around the university, 
widespread popular activism against the dictatorship of Machado spread far beyond students and 
included massive labor strikes in numerous regions of the country.  The students’ political 
organizing developed as one, albeit important, part of this larger movement. 
 Pablo and Teté understood their activism as a struggle against strongman governance and 
neocolonialism, and for social and economic progress on the island.  Casuso wrote about her 
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husband: “Both as a student and as a reporter Pablo was in the thick of the political agitation to 
clean up the government and free Cuba from its colonial status.”  As a result, he was often in jail 
or exile, sometimes along with his friend and fellow revolutionary Raúl Roa.
14
  In a July 1931 
“call to arms” directed at students and the general public, Roa made explicit the connection 
between anticolonialism and the movement against the dictator Machado.  The revolutionary 
student movement Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student Left Wing), of which he and Torriente 
were a part, attacked not only Machado but also “the social classes and foreign interests that 
maintain and profit from him.”
15
  Ala Izquierda’s manifesto of February 1931, “signed” by 
imprisoned compañeros Roa and Torriente as well as five more in prison and 34 others en 
libertad, called for the overthrow of the “dictatorial government of Machado, faithful servant of 
Wall Street.”
16
  Ala Izquierda, Roa explained in a November 1931 letter, was part of the 
“merciless and violent fight against Machado and imperialism.”
17
 
The members of Ala Izquierda were continuing a project of student involvement in 
revolutionary politics begun in the early 1920s by a popular leader of their generation who would 
not live to see either the 1930s or his thirtieth birthday.  The memory and writings of Julio 
Antonio Mella were strong influences on the student revolutionary movement of the 1930s.  
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Torriente’s sister Zoe noted in her narrative of Torriente’s life that her brother contributed to the 
fund that paid for Mella to escape Cuba for exile in Mexico.
18
  The Ala Izquierda manifesto 
echoed statements of Mella’s such as “Los universitarios contra el imperialismo yanqui y el 
servilismo del gobierno cubano” (“The university students against Yankee imperialism and the 
Cuban government’s subservience”).
19
  Casuso attributed the students’ involvement in Cuban 
politics since 1923 to Mella, writing that he had agitated his fellow students by proclaiming in 
manifestoes and public meetings the truth of Cuban politics and of its colonial position, and 
demanding autonomy for the university.
20
  It is interesting to note that one of the projects 
Torriente was working to complete in New York before his departure for Spain was “a copy of 
Mella’s work on his interpretation of the Cuban reality.”
21
  In 1932, several members of the 
revolutionary movement in New York, including Torriente, would found a political organization 
of exiles in the city called the Club Cubano Julio Antonio Mella
22
 that would go on to become an 
important organization in exile for pro-Republican Cubans, and to which we will return in the 
next chapter.  Mella, whose ideology and activism incorporated many efforts of earlier Cuban 
revolutionary thinkers and leaders, was killed under mysterious circumstances while in exile in 
Mexico in 1929; Cuban activists accused Machado of having him assassinated, though the facts 
of the case are still debated.  His death ended one decade of possibilities and left his young 
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compañeros in the position of having to begin a new chapter in the Cuban revolution.  Out of his 
violent end grew the Generation of the Thirties. 
By September 1930, Pablo’s sister Zoe noted, the Cuban people’s discontent with 
Machado was evident, but they lacked the unifying force necessary to turn anger into action.  An 
opportunity for unification came in the form of a tribute to a “wise and prestigious elder,” writer 
and philosopher Enrique José Varona, who had attacked Machado in El País (The Country).  In 
1923 Pablo had gone to work in the law offices of Ortiz, Giménez, Lanier, and Barceló as 
secretary to Fernando Ortiz.
23
  A group of young men with common political and ideological 
affinity gathered around Ortiz; the group included Ortiz’s former secretary who had recently 
been promoted to lawyer, Rubén Martínez Villena, as well as Juan Marinello, Roa, and Torriente.  
In the autumn of 1930, this group organized the tribute to Varona that was to take place on 3 
October.  On 30 September, Zoe recalled, Roa told Torriente to arrive at the Universidad for a 
rally that was to march to Varona’s house.  By the time Torriente arrived, however, police had 
surrounded the Universidad and the plan had changed.  The tone of the gathering had shifted 
from tribute to outrage.  Casuso remembered: “The students ran through the streets shouting 
protests until the police wagons arrived and began carting them off.  None of the students was 
armed, for at that time we did not dream of such things.”
24
  In contrast to Teté’s innocent tone, 
Zoe described students throwing rocks at police officers and shouting “Death to Machado!” and 
“Down with tyranny!”  They did not have firearms, she concurred, but put their faith in the fists 
of their stronger comrades, including Pablo.  Roa, she recalled, commanded: “Polic a que tocan, 
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polic a que cae” (“Police who touch, police who fall”).  Predictably, violence broke out.  
Narrating in the present tense, Zoe described the events, bringing her reader close to Pablo in the 
midst of the action: 
There is a great cry and fighting body to body between students and police.  They hear 
shots from firearms.  Pablo falls, collapsed on the ground.  He believes they have injured 
him with a bullet wound.  Only when he sees Rafael Trejo at his side, growing weak, 
does he realize that the shot had been for someone else.  Trejo dies in the Emergency 
Hospital at dawn the next morning.  Isidro Figueroa, worker, is wounded by a bullet in 
one shoulder.   
 
A mounted policeman’s club left Pablo bleeding on the ground with an eight-centimeter head 
wound.  He suffered a tremendous loss of blood and spent a month in the hospital.
25
 
 Rafael Trejo became an important martyr and rallying cry for the Generation of the 
Thirties.  Not long after leaving the hospital, Torriente published a rousing piece entitled 
“¡Arriba muchachos!” (“Up, boys!”) in the student publication Alma Mater, calling on the youth 
of his generation to rise up in revolution.  Using outrage over Trejo’s death, he intended the 
article to agitate his comrades to action:  
Trejo fell in the streets of Havana...  Fell, no.  He rose up taller than an immense statue, 
and from the height of a granite pedestal, wrought by his valor and the cowardice of his 
assassins, he delivers a powerful cry to wake all sleeping consciences: DOWN WITH 
TYRANNY AND OPRESSION!...  DOWN WITH THE REGIME OF 
ASSASSINATION IN THE BACK!...  DOWN WITH THE MONOPOLY OF THEFT!...  
DOWN WITH THE DISGRACE THAT CORRUPTS US!...  This is how the dead speak, 
those who fall, with their chests facing forward, toward the rough path of dignity and of 
honor...
26
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Forward, Pablo commanded his comrades, “to put all our unmarred spirit into the furnace in 
which must be forged, by the fire of revolution, the new era of liberty and justice!”  Rise up, he 
ordered, to clean away, “with the pure and rushing torrent of our youth, this, our Republic which 
they have rotted and sold to the foreigner.”
27
  Using metaphors of fire and water, Pablo imagined 
that the flame of revolution would forge a new epoch and the river of revolutionary youth would 
clean away the corruption of the old.  He and fellow activists looked forward to a “new Cuba.” 
Cuban activists formed Ala Izquierda in the swell of revolutionary outrage and 
momentum following Trejo’s death; a year later, revolutionaries were still riding the wave of 
discontent.  On the one-year anniversary of the ill-fated demonstration, in September 1931, Roa 
wrote a commemorative piece entitled “Rafael Trejo and the 30
th
 of September” inside the 
Castillo del Pr ncipe prison.  The first anniversary, “which we dreamed of commemorating over 
the crushed head of the Machado tyranny,” found them instead imprisoned.  Cuba’s jails were 
full of political prisoners, among them Roa and his “comrade and beloved friend,” Torriente.  
Whereas Torriente envisioned fire and water, Roa used an image of new growth amid barrenness 
to illustrate the revolutionary movement.  He imagined the “revolutionary event of the 30
th
 of 
September” as a “magnificent spring shoot among the desolation and the shadows of an endless 
winter of horrors.”  That event was just a beginning, in other words, a tender green sprout of 
revolution that would grow large.  Trejo’s “martyrdom” would be used for the purposes of 
revolution.  “His name is and will be,” stated Roa, a “flag of combat we will hoist to all 
winds.”
28
  The young revolutionaries would evoke Trejo’s name as they did Mella’s, “with 
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shouts, with speeches, with a final silence from which our spirits will leave more pure and 
determined.”  Trejo would not be forgotten; even after death he would continue to serve the 
revolutionary cause.
29
  Both Roa and Torriente used the concept of martyrdom expressed by the 
phrase “Hasta después de muertos somos útiles,” that even after the revolutionary dies, he can 
still be of use to the movement.  Mella, Trejo, and other causalities of the fight could be used by 
their survivors to rally support for the cause—to energize activists and inspire new participants—
making defeat serve continuity. 
As the economic and social crisis of the Great Depression created chaos and desperation 
in Cuba during the first few years of the 1930s—and as the revolutionary movement gained 
momentum—Machado, “a bloodthirsty dictator and pillager of the public treasury,” according to 
Teté, began to lose control of the country.  Meanwhile, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
replaced Theodore Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” policy with his own “Good Neighbor Policy,” and 
sent Special Ambassador Sumner Welles to “try to mediate the convulsed country toward a 
‘peaceful solution’ that would avoid the outburst of revolution.”  Welles negotiated a  ou  d’é a  
with Machado officials and the dictator left the country on 12 August 1933.  First the leader of 
Machado’s army took over the presidency and then, after just a few hours, passed it on without 
incident to Manuel de Céspedes.  A telegram from Welles to the U.S. Secretary of State sent at 
one o’clock in the afternoon that day stated: “The next few days will probably be difficult but I 
now have confidence that the situation has been saved and that no further action on the part of 
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the United States Government will be necessary.”
30
  Welles appeared to have obtained the 
“peaceful solution” he had sought, Casuso remembered: “Then something went wrong.”
31
 
 “As always happens when there is total ignorance of a people’s deepest problems,” 
Casuso stated, “those responsible for this neat ‘arrangement,’ including the Special Ambassador, 
suddenly found themselves confronted by a broken dike.”  From her perspective within the 
student movement, the United States had sought to avoid violence and revolution, but had “only 
succeeded in filling the dam till it burst.”  Violence overflowed, and U.S. interests in Cuba “were 
endangered to a greater degree than if the United States had supported a democratic regime and 
recognized the right of the people to protect its interests and guarantee fair treatment and just 
reward for its labor,” Casuso asserted.  Anti-Machado activists meted out vengeance against 
former Machado officials.  Over the course of several days, Welles’s confident and calm tone 
became increasingly strained.  In a 15 August telegram sent at noon to the Secretary of State, he 
complained that “utterly lawless student groups” were making the situation difficult to control.   
The exiles who are now returning from the United States are unfortunately doing a great 
deal to increase agitation.  They are taking the attitude that a triumphant revolution has 
placed the Government in power and that they are consequently entitled to dictate the 
policies of the Government.  Furthermore the student group which is the most pernicious 
element in Cuban public life is constantly issuing inflammatory proclamations and 




“Those were colorful days,” recalled Casuso.  Torriente, who was one of the exiles who had 
rushed back to Cuba from New York “at the first hint of Machado’s fall,” brought her to see the 
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presidential palace, which hundreds of students had occupied.  There she saw an army sergeant 
“curled up and sound asleep” on a Louis XV sofa.  He was “disheveled and very thin, with 
sunken cheeks and a look of utter exhaustion.”  The man, she noted with a literary sense of 
foreboding, was Fulgencio Batista.
33
   
 Pablo’s sister Zoe remembered that her brother took part “in all the important actions” 
after returning from exile.  In addition to taking over the presidential palace, student 
revolutionaries turned the Universidad into a central location of the national government and 
used the revolutionary moment as an opportunity to further the agenda of the student movement.  
They held large assemblies to discuss, debate, and vote on not only issues of Cuban government 
but also the conduct of university professors with regard to their allegiance to or denunciation of 
Machado.  Zoe described Pablo as the revolutionary scribe; he participated as a student with a 
voice and a vote, and as a journalist with a notebook and a pen.
34
   
 An event of deep significance to the activists of the Generation of the Thirties, the 
remains of Julio Antonio Mella returned home from Mexico in September 1933.  In predictably 
exultant prose, Torriente anticipated the event in an article for Ala Izquierda’s publication Línea 
(Line).  Mella, he wrote, was their “precursor, hero, and martyr.”  He was the first “to insult with 
word and with action the slobbering senile monster Machado.”  Three years after his death, 
Mella’s remains would be “received by frenetic throngs that applaud him as a living hero.”  
From the point of view of many of the young revolutionaries, victory over the dictator was 
achieved in Mella’s name.  Now the workers and the students could build him a great national 
monument that, no matter how beautiful it was, would never “shine as much as his simple name, 
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united in a pool of blood with a universal idea: sacrifice for ‘the poor of the world.’”
35
  
Anticipation of Mella’s return marked a hopeful moment; with Machado gone, possibility ruled 
the day.  In fact, on 29 September when the rally in his honor took place, the police and the army 
forced its participants to disperse.
36
  The revolution was not turning out exactly as the activists 
had planned. 
 The students tried to set up a new government for Cuba—a “pentarchy” made up of two 
university professors, a newspaper editor, an independent and unsullied politician, and an old 
banker—but it only lasted six days.  They were inexperienced and the country was in chaos.  U.S. 
marines arrived in the waters of Havana but did not land, succeeding only in rousing anticolonial 
sentiment.  “The population of Havana poured out on the quay,” Casuso recalled, “shouting ‘Get 
out!  Go back to your country!  You have no business here!”  The confusion of those days is 
evident in Casuso’s recollection: “I was present,” she remembered of the confrontation with the 
battleships, “though I hardly know how I got there or with whom.  (Already I was rushing 
around everywhere, gathering items for Pablo’s news reports.)”
37
  
 There was a brief attempt at a Cuban nationalist government from September 1933 to 
January 1934, that of Ramón Grau San Martín.  This period, though short-lived, was hardly 
insignificant.  It marked, notes historian Robert Whitney, the first time in its history during 
which the Cuban government answered neither to Spain nor to the United States.
38
  The moment 
of hope and reform, however, did not last.  The exhausted army sergeant Teté had seen on the 
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sofa in the palace did not stay asleep forever in the halls of power; soon awoken, Batista began to 
position himself as a new strongman leader.  Grau fell
39
 (though he would go on to become 
president of Cuba again from 1944 to 1948) and Batista began to control the government through 
a series of civilian presidents until formally taking office in 1940.  Outraged, the students 
returned once again to fighting.  Not long after the end of Grau’s first presidency, Casuso was 
part of a group of students occupying the Universidad, surrounded by Batista’s military and 
police forces.  She narrated the scene dramatically: 
One day, late in the afternoon, we—the university leaders—were informed that the 
university was going to be taken over by the police.  We decided not to leave.  We had no 
arms, but they would have to kill us all if they tried to occupy our alma mater.  We were 
about twenty.  Armed soldiers and policemen surrounded the university, which stands on 
a hill, and fired tear-gas shells at us from the nearest roofs.  We held out by tying 
handkerchiefs soaked in vinegar over our noses like masks.
40
   
 
Casuso’s story demonstrates the way in which the political and the personal melded for Teté and 
Pablo; her narrative of the university occupation is half revolution, half romance. 
Pablo heard of what was happening and came rushing over to share whatever fate was in 
store for us, to protect me, as he always did in his lifetime.  He sprinted between two 
soldiers and came racing up the great stairway, over a hundred meters high, and reached 
us safely, gasping, “Where is Teté?”  It is a marvel that he was not shot.  I think it was 
surprise, plus the fact that the soldiers and police thought the university was stacked with 
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The young revolutionaries won that particular battle.  Sensing perhaps that giving the 
student organizers a victory they coveted—university autonomy—might weaken their motivation 
to interfere in the larger political arena, the government capitulated to their demand.
42
  Casuso 
recounted her participation in the students’ victory with great emotion, describing how she 
carried the government decree of university autonomy from the presidential palace to the 
university where thousands of students awaited their leaders: 
I think that that has been for me the most solemn and important occasion of my life.  
During the automobile ride from the palace to the university I held that scroll in my hand 
as if I were carrying the sacred fire of a beautiful temple.  What I was carrying 
represented a twelve-year struggle that had begun with Julio Antonio Mella; a struggle 





The car arrived at the Universidad amphitheater, packed with thousands of students, and 
compatriots pulled Casuso from the car, joyfully shouting, “Teté is bringing the Decree of 
Autonomy!”  Carrying her on their shoulders, the students entered the arena full of excitement.  
Casuso did not mention where Pablo was, but we can imagine him there, perhaps carrying her 
aloft, perhaps striding alongside, beaming proudly, helping her up onto the podium in front of all 
their cheering comrades.  Casuso remembered: 
After prolonged applause and happy laughter, and shouts, and cheers, someone made the 
announcement that I was going to read the document.  Instantly the silence was so 
profound that the reading resembled a religious ceremony.  With what pride did I read 
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The triumphant wave of Casuso’s prose in this section of her memoir crests with her marriage to 
Torriente, “a lovely church wedding in a hermitage on a hill.”  It is as if the young Teté on the 
page is floating, almost literally, with joy: “My immense veil of white tulle,” she seems to sigh 
contentedly, “was like a cloud.”  Amidst cheers and congratulations, the newlyweds headed off 
to their life together under a shower of rice.  But the moment of happiness did not last long.  
Literally mid-sentence, politics and struggle reentered Casuso’s story and put an end to the 
honeymoon: “We had a beautiful little apartment . . . in which we spent just one month of our 
hazardous marital life.  After that we were in constant flight from the police and had to sleep in 
the houses of friends like escaped prisoners.”
45
  The ellipsis in the first sentence, present in the 
original, is pregnant with meaning.  The reader can imagine Teté pausing as she composed her 
memoir in 1961, lifting her hands from her typewriter or suspending her pen midair, and drifting 
into a daydream, beginning: “What if . . . ?”  The pause represents the road not taken: the normal 
life, free from activist struggle and revolution, from countless disappointments and defeats; the 
long, happy, married life she and Pablo could have spent and the home they could have made 
together if not for the role they chose to play.   
 The gesture by the government to the students of granting university autonomy, 
regardless of its intent, did not change much.  Autonomy for the university was important for the 
young activists, but it did not improve the situation of Cuban people generally, and the fight 
against Batista went on.  The students continued to run through the street shouting protests 
against the government and organizing public meetings.  These meetings came to be called “hit 
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and run,” Casuso remembered, in honor of the hails of bullets with which they were often met.
46
  
Batista was intent on returning order to Cuba and used military force against not only the young 
revolutionaries but also the thousands and thousands of workers who struck across the country 
during 1934 and 1935.
47
 
Pablo and Teté lived in fear for their lives during these years, moving from place to place 
and continuing to organize and fight.  Meanwhile, Casuso tried to finish school and start her new 
married life with Torriente.  “[I]t was not easy to concentrate on one’s studies in 1934, 1935,” 
she stated in a matter-of-fact tone.  “I would go home, to wherever we were staying at the time, 
without knowing where my husband was, and sit down with a textbook to study for 
examinations.”  Overcome by a specific memory, she became emotional: 
I remember that one day I got home to study for an examination in biology after a very 
dear friend, like Pablo and myself, recently married and happy, had been killed not half 
an hour after we had stood talking on the university steps.  I opened the book and read a 
sentence of Claude Bernard’s: “Death is a phenomenon of perfection.”  My eyes still 
filled with the image of my friend’s corpse as it had been carried still warm to the 
university hospital, I threw the book from me violently.  Our comrade’s death was a 
phenomenon of absurdity!  He had been gentle, intelligent, useful, loved, full of life and 





Indeed, it was difficult to concentrate on reading books. 
 There would be one last forceful attempt at Cuban revolution by the generation of which 
Pablo and Teté were a part.  On 19 February 1935, Universidad de La Habana students went on 
strike.  Teachers and university employees soon joined them, and over the next few days the 
education strike spread rapidly.  By March, a diverse range of unions had joined across the 
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country and the action had become a general strike.  Much of the country came to a halt for nine 
days.  Batista, however, was determined to break the strike.  He ordered the military to take over 
public transportation, the Universidad, and the postal service, and instructed them to protect 
replacement workers.  He suspended constitutional rights, declared unions illegal, and had 
workers locked out of workplaces.
49
   
Batista’s forces used violence in their strikebreaking.  Casuso recalled a report to the 
student leaders by a young man returning from what was to have been a secret workers meeting 
during the strike.  He had arrived at the apartment where the workers were to be, only to find the 
door open and the apartment empty of people—it was “as if buckets of blood had been poured 
over those floors,” Casuso remembered the man saying.  “We never knew,” she wrote, “how 
many people had died there.”  Those with any ties to revolutionary movements were hunted.  
Torriente, Casuso, and many of their fellow activists moved constantly during the strike to avoid 
being caught.  By the eleventh day, the strike had collapsed.  Using language suggesting Biblical 
proportions, Casuso registered the defeat: “And so it came about that Cuba was bathed in blood, 
and that a newly consolidated dictatorship was able to last another ten years.”  Zoe shared her 
sister-in-law’s sadness, remembering “the failed strike of March 1935, that fill[ed] the entire 
citizenry with discouragement.”  The activists were defeated, at least for the moment.  Batista 
knew that “the energy to resist was exhausted,” Teté conceded.  “The ruthless suppression, the 
collapse of the strike, the closing of the university made it pointless for the more active and 
known among us to stay,” she wrote with resignation, “and the survivors of that Generation of 
the Thirties fled to Mexico and the United States.”  Zoe concurred, writing in the present tense: 
“The prisons are full.  The political persecution continues.”  Pablo had to abandon Cuba.  “He 
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did not leave until he himself saw that, for the time being, there was nothing to be done in Cuba,” 
Teté concluded.  “He was one of the last to go.”
50
 
We have arrived at an understanding of some of the history Torriente and Casuso carried 
with them to New York in 1935.  They had felt the jubilation of victory in Machado’s downfall 
and the intense energy of hopeful momentum during Grau’s brief presidency.  They believed for 
a short time that they were finally achieving democratic governance, an end to U.S. 
neocolonialism, and significant economic and social progress—a “new Cuba.”  Then their 
victory fell apart.  Batista’s rise to power was a significant defeat for the Generation of the 
Thirties, one that led many to discouragement, disillusionment, even despair.  Looking back on 
the failed general strike of March 1935 it is easy to interpret it as an endpoint.  By 1936 Batista’s 
forces had achieved the peace and quiet U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles had desired in 1933.  
Bitterly, Casuso called it “the peace of the absent and the quiet of the dead.”
51
  To return to her 
metaphor, it was as if the dam holding back Cuba’s revolution, which had broken in 1933, had 
been rebuilt and the revolutionary waters once again contained. 
The revolutionary waters had not, however, dried up.  Leaving Cuba, Pablo, Teté, and 
their compañeros stepped out of the reservoir that remained behind that dam.  Doing so left them 
with an intense revolutionary thirst.  Stuck in the scorching New York summer of 1936, 
Torriente began to dream of rivers and whirlpools.  Parched for action and feverish with 
revolutionary hope, he sought “the great river of revolution”
52
 in Spain, noting wistfully that this 
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river could teach Cuba “that when a people wishes to fight to the death for its ideals and 
necessities, there is no barrier that can contain it.”
53
   
 
 The Su  er of ‘36 
 In New York, Teté tried, and failed, to grow accustomed to life as a factory laborer.  
Pablo found work clearing tables at the Harvard Club, and after coming home each night 
exhausted and sore from an 11-hour shift, he would write articles for publications across Latin 
America.  Together they helped found a club where they gathered with fellow Cubans and 
worked on a newspaper they sent back to the island covertly.  “Although never poorer,” wrote 
Casuso, “I think I have never been more content or in better company.”
54
 
Torriente, however, grew frustrated.  In his second year of political exile in the summer 
of 1936, and in the heat of July in the city, Pablo felt bored and discouraged.  “I haven’t told you 
about activity here,” he wrote to a friend, “because really there isn’t any.  Anywhere.  Everything 
is dead.  And, consequently, we are, too.”
55
  Everyone was away for the summer.  Their political 
club was vacant.  Maybe he could resurrect it in the winter when its members returned, Pablo 
commented, but he was beginning to doubt that he would still be in New York come winter.  He 
was irritated by his condition there, feeling as though he was wasting his time on menial work 
and glittering trivialities of the big city.  “Here, in a year and a half of political exile,” he wrote, 
“I have done nothing but carry trays and wash dishes.  It has made me stupid.”
 56
  Perhaps he 
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would return to Cuba, he mused, but his mind wandered.  The conflict in Spain had captured his 
interest: The Spanish revolution, he wrote to a friend on 28 July, “has had my imagination going 
full steam these last few days.”
 57
  That same day Torriente heard that Miguel Angel Quevedo, 
director of the Havana publication Bohemia, was going to be in New York.  He had written for 
Bohemia before, and bored as he was, jumped at the chance to meet with an old acquaintance 
and get himself some journalism work.  He went to see if Quevedo would publish an article 
about the repercussions of the Spanish Civil War in New York.  Quevedo asked him to send one 




Here was some excitement, some activity!  Everyone knew Union Square, Torriente 
wrote in his article for Quevedo entitled “La revolución española se refleja en Nueva York” 
(“The Spanish revolution reflected in New York”), as the Red Plaza of New York.  Men and 
women gathered there to talk revolution every day.  Workers and radicals held rallies frequently.  
The gathering Torriente attended in support of the Spanish Republic was truly inspirational for 
the young writer and revolutionary.  The crowded plaza, cries of “Long live the Spanish Popular 
Front!” and shouts against Mussolini and Hitler, red flags and banners in the air, revolutionary 
newspaper sellers, workers pouring out of factories at the end of their workday and joining in the 
rally made Pablo remember why he was a journalist: He “loved to go among the people, seeking 
their emotion to express their longings.”
59
  The international character of the movement in 
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support of the Spanish Republic inspired him.  Recounting the participation of various political 
clubs, he remembered their diverse banners:  
Not only of the Spaniards.  Not only those of the Hispanic Americans.  Also those of the 
German, Italian, Chinese, U.S., and French clubs.  And the orators spoke like this also.  
Nobody understood them but everyone comprehended.  There was one who spoke in 
German.  Another in Hebrew.  Another in Russian.  When one began to speak in Italian, 
many people, in a friendly nature, exclaimed: ‘That’s Spanish!’  And when the Spanish 
orators Garriga, García, and Alonso spoke there were giant ovations. 
 
One speaker, Torriente recalled, emphasized the significance of the fight for Europe and for the 
world.  The outcome, this orator argued, would have an immediate and momentous impact on 
Spain, France, Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union.  Another speaker “signaled the importance 
for Latin America, tied in all respects to Spain, that the revolution there would have and the 
courage it would give our peoples.”
60
  Standing there in the midst of the jubilant revolutionary 
crowd, Torriente struck upon an idea: “And so, remembering the fever with which I had been 
following the course of the fight in Spain, it was then that the luminous idea exploded in me of 
going to Spain, to the Spanish revolution, to march with the columns, to capture cities, to speak 
with the heroes, to see armed children and women.”
61
  Remembering the speeches he heard, 
Pablo suggested several motivations that drove his decision to go to Spain: the international 
threat of fascism, the special relationship between Spain and Latin America, the influence the 
Spanish conflict could have over Latin American struggles, and, as his last statement above 
implies, perhaps a personal sense of duty, excitement, adventure, and curiosity. 
   “The idea exploded in my brain,” Pablo wrote with dramatic flair, “and since then it has 
been setting fire to the great forest of my imagination.  But it didn’t explode by means of a spark.  
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It was even better, the way they used to set off bombs: by means of a long slow-burning fuse.”
62
  
Adrift in exile, the activist felt himself drawn gradually back into the struggle, albeit in a 
different arena.  From the outset, he connected his interest in going to join in the Spanish conflict 
to his hopes for Cuba.  “There, apart from the great experience,” he wrote on 2 August, “I 
believe firmly that I could do much for the Cuban revolution, since it seems clear that the 
Spanish revolution has profound repercussions for Cuba and there will be countless lessons that 
will benefit our people given its vibrant imagination.”
63
  He chastised himself for not thinking of 
going to Spain earlier: “Why didn’t this idea occur to me before?  I would have been in Spain 
already.  It is New York’s fault.”  He contrasted New York with Spain.  In New York he got 
swept away by the “nocturnal river of Broadway,” that “at the door of each burlesque, of each 
movie theatre . . . makes whirlpools.”  In Spain he would be swept away by the “great river of 
revolution.  To see a people in combat.  To meet heroes.  To hear the thundering of the cannon 
and feel the breeze of shrapnel.  To contemplate fires and executions.  To be close to the great 
silent whirlpool of death.”
64
  It was decided: He would go to Spain. 
 Awoken from his summer stupor, Torriente found suddenly that he was pressed for time.  
There was a boat leaving for Spain in less than two weeks, he wrote in a 2 August letter, but that 
was a long time to wait.  Other faster boats would leave for France sooner.  If he could scrape 
together the money in time, he would be on one of those.  He was trying to finish writing his 
novel Aventuras del Soldado Desconocido (Adventures of the Unknown Soldier),
65
 he wrote to 
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his friend Roa on 4 August, and was working on several other projects; but above all, he 
admitted: “I have a feverishness bordering on madness about my idea to travel to Spain.”  The 
young revolutionary was determined.  “If I don’t go,” he told Roa, “it will make me sick.”
66
  On 
6 August Torriente continued to worry about finding a boat to take him to Europe and money to 
pay for the trip: “I am restless, nervous, irritable.  Because there is no boat.  Nor have they 
answered me yet from Cuba, where I asked a periodical for money for the voyage.”  He tossed 
and turned at night, preoccupied: “In bed the hours pass . . . one, two, three, four . . . And I never 
sleep.”  Teté slept in the bed next to his, breathing deeply, he wrote.  She understood, he believed, 
“that it is a glorious duty to go there to learn and tell other nations how liberty was victorious and 
fascism crushed.”
67
  Just a few days later on 10 August, with his plans still unconfirmed, 
Torriente complained: “I have lost four pounds this week.  And if this uncertainty continues, I’ll 
lose until I’m just bones.”
68
  Adopting Torriente’s metaphor of burning and illness, Roa said of 
his friend: “The fever of the Spanish revolution had taken possession of him, absorbing all his 
capacity for service, his inexhaustible energy, and his heroic sense of life.”  Looking back on the 
days described in Torriente’s letters from New York, Roa remembered his determination: 
Pablo had decided to go to Spain and he was going to go.  To impede him, to convince 
him otherwise, was impossible.  In long hours of insomnia, in the momentary gaps 
(huecos relampagueantes) in the brutal work, he saw himself already on the front with 
the armed people, among militiamen (milicianos) without fear and without reproach, one 
more among them, soldier of Spanish liberty, which is to be a soldier of the liberty of the 
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whole world.  He guarded his meager savings with generous miserly zeal.  He had no 
other aspiration or thought than collecting funds to pay for the trip.
69
   
 
Torriente did not want to be dissuaded.  “Write to me,” he commanded a friend, “but don’t give 
me any cowardly advice.”
70
   
His motivations for making the trip were complex, personal as well as political.  He 
wanted to escape boredom and “carrying trays.”  He sought excitement, and to leave New York.  
He thought the journey would advance his journalism career.  He wanted to take part in an event 
of world significance.  He wanted an “opportunity to live” and “to be seen as a man.”
71
  This 
latter personal motivation reveals that Pablo interpreted the Spanish conflict as an essentially 
masculine endeavor, despite the leadership of women such as “La Pasionaria,” Dolores Ibárruri, 
and Margarita Nelken and the oft-noted participation of Spanish women in the fighting.  Indeed, 
though his wife had participated side-by-side with him in the marches, rallies, and day-to-day 
work of political activism in Cuba, Torriente did not view the Spanish Civil War as an 
appropriate setting for her involvement.  When he left New York, Teté remembered, “I returned 
to Cuba to stay with my parents until he sent for me.  In his first letter home from Spain, 




Pablo’s most urgently expressed motivations for going to Spain were political.  One of 
his central, most important reasons for wanting to participate in the struggle of the Spanish 
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Republicans against the rebellious Nationalists and their foreign fascist allies was to learn from 
its example for the struggle in Cuba.  One of his roles, as he saw it, was to use his eyes and his 
maquinita, his little typewriter, to observe, learn from, and convey the lessons Spain had to teach 
the Americas.  He wrote: 
I go concretely and specifically to Spain for us; for the importance I consider this fight to 
have for us and the necessity of knowing its progress, its developments, the popular 
attitude, the dramatic and inspirational force of a people willing to die in a moment of 
justice.  Effectively, I wish to feel all this and transfer it to those of us who will be 
anxious to know.  And for this reason I will not be satisfied with writing only for Cuba, 




The struggle in Spain was—Torriente returned to this point again and again—the fight of a 
people against their army.  And there existed, he exclaimed, “the possibility of the triumph of the 
people!”  The young revolutionary saw this fact as particularly significant for the countries of 
Latin America.  If the people defeated the army in Spain, then the Spanish Popular Front would 
serve as a vital inspiration and model for the revolutionaries and the peoples of Latin America, 
where some day, Torriente wrote, “people fighting against their army” would have to occur.
74
  
Emphasizing the antagonism between the people and their armed forces, Pablo implied a 
comparison between Franco in Spain and Batista in Cuba. 
Torriente sought lessons in Spain not only for Latin America broadly but also for himself 
specifically.  He went there not only as a journalist but also as a student of revolution.  These two 
roles melded together and became inseparable in his mind.  He saw war reporting in Spain as an 
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“extraordinary opportunity” to perform “work of a revolutionary nature.”
75
  He wrote that the 
experience would be for him a “course of ‘specialization,’” an “apprenticeship” in “extraordinary 
reality.”  From the struggle in Spain, he believed, he would learn to be a better revolutionary and 
thus be better equipped to further the cause of the Cuban revolution.
76
 
In addition to lessons, Torriente saw a direct relation between the Spanish and domestic 
efforts.  The chances of the Cuban revolution toward which he, his wife, and so many of their 
dear friends had worked were dependent, as he understood it, on the outcome in Spain.  If 
fascism won in Spain, a country with historic and economic ties to Latin America, “reactionary 
forces” in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay, as well as Cuba, would come together 
in solidarity, Torriente believed, implying that fascism would spread throughout the nations of 
the region.   In this interpretation, Cuba and other Latin American countries struggling with 
strongman governments, neocolonialism, and “reactionary forces” depended directly on the 
outcome of the Spanish conflict.  A tug-of-war between progression and regression characterized 
the historical moment, according to this view.  Victory in Spain would be the “prologue” to 
Cuban revolution; the effort in Cuba would be delayed indefinitely if Spain were lost to 
fascists.
77
   
Despite his belief in the importance of the Spanish conflict for Cuba and Latin America, 
Pablo felt a need still to justify his choice to switch activist arenas from Cuba to Spain, 
responding to criticism by those who did not see the same connection between the struggles as he 
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did.  “I do not dispute,” he wrote to a friend, “that I could . . . be of more use in Cuba, for Cuba, 
today, than in Spain.”  However, he argued, the choice faced in Spain—the choice to accept or 
reject fascism—was, he believed, a matter of life-and-death for the whole world, particularly 
“the colonial or semi-colonial countries.”
78
  It was a highly significant and important event in 
which he felt deeply he should take part.  He summarized to Roa his desire to go to Spain, 
suggesting a dramatic sense of his own destiny as well as modesty about his qualifications as an 
activist: 
You all have confused me a little bit with an organizer or something of this sort.  I am far 
from it, in my most profound and sincere judgment.  Perhaps I go to Spain in search of all 
the teachings I lack to fill this role, to see if someday I can give of myself something 
more than an agitator journalist.  And I don’t carry any aspiration of being a musketeer.  I 
go simply to learn for our struggle one day.  If something else happens it is because this 
is the way of revolution.  Like if a grenade makes me lame.  Do not believe either that I 
am mad.  Sincerely, I am trying to let you in on the secret of my impulse to go there.  
And there is, as there always is in me, the emotion of impulse that tells me that my place 
is there now.  Because my eyes were made to see extraordinary things.  And my 




 Pablo in Spain 
Torriente left New York by ship on 1 September 1936.  He arrived in Madrid on 24 
September after the Atlantic crossing and short periods of time spent in Brussels, Paris, and 
Barcelona.  His arrival in Spain energized him tremendously.  He worked without respite, 
sponsored by two Communist-affiliated periodicals: New Masses of the United States and El 
Machete of Mexico.  His friend and fellow Cuban exile in New York, Jaime Bofill, served as 
interlocutor for Pablo with the editors of New Masses.  (Bofill worked as Torriente’s 
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administrative assistant in New York during Pablo’s time in Spain, translating his articles and 
bringing them to the appropriate offices.  He would go on to follow his friend’s lead, later 
traveling to the Spanish conflict and serving in the same post, political commissar of the brigade 
led by “El Campesino,” Valent n González.)
80
   Torriente requested that Bofill send along orders 
from the periodical.  “I await any kind of instructions,” he wrote to his friend the day after his 
arrival in Madrid.  “But I wait working, naturally.”
81
  He walked the streets, took notes, met and 
interviewed people.  He sought out and obtained interviews with important figures, using his 
connections with other writers and journalists, some of which he formed through his involvement 
with the Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas (Alliance of Antifascist Intellectuals) in Madrid.
82
  
Also, he wrote, “I speak with the people, which is what I like best.”
83
  In addition to the foreign 
periodicals that sponsored him, the Cuban magazines Bohemia, Mediodía, and Noticias de Hoy 
would publish his pieces on the Spanish conflict, also, for readers on the island. 
 Torriente sought to explain to his readers the significant differences between the 
Republican and Nationalist sides.  His essay “En el parapeto: Polémica con el enemigo” (“In the 
parapet: Polemic with the enemy”), first published in English entitled “Polemic in the Trenches” 
in New Masses (8 December 1936) and later printed in Spanish in Bohemia (10 February 
1937),
84
 framed the struggle and revealed how the author understood the positions of the two 
sides.  The essay was based on a curious occurrence.  Torriente had traveled to the Sierra de 
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Guadarrama with a column of soldiers led by Francisco “Paco” Galán.  “And there he receive[d] 
his baptism by fire,” remembered his sister Zoe in an essay written about her brother years 
later.
85
  He attended meetings of the milicianos [Spanish Republican fighters], suffered from the 
daily shelling by Nationalists, and climbed the parapets.  The parapet from which the 
Republicans fired, called La Peña del Alemán in honor of a fallen German comrade, was close 
enough to those of the Nationalists that, “as soon as it gets dark,” Pablo wrote, “little by little 
speeches start that end with harsh insults.”  Both sides taunted:  “Reds!” began the Nationalists, 
“have you eaten today?  Have you smoked?”  “Yes, fascist, we’ve got chicken left over,” 
responded the Republicans.  “Reds, hijos de puta!” cried the Nationalists.
86
   
One distinction between the two sides, Torriente noted, was that whereas many spoke 
from his group, they heard only two or three voices from the opposing parapet.  This difference, 
he asserted, demonstrated “that there was less enthusiasm on the side of the enemy.”  The 
majority of the interchange was a discussion of the fight itself and the relative positions and 
merits of each side.  Particularly interested in the subject of foreign aid, the enemy directed 
attention at him, Pablo claimed, calling on him to speak—“Que hable el cubano”—and saying: 
“Comrade, you who come from abroad should speak to tell us what you think of Spain.”  He 
took the opportunity to describe the difference, as he saw it, between the foreigners who helped 
the Republicans and those who aided the Nationalists.  With his side, he told them, were the 
workers of the United States, France, Belgium, Canada, England, and Mexico, the workers of the 
world, and those Nationalists who “have calluses on their hands” would be welcomed “with open 
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arms” by the Republicans if they defected, while the “exploiters” should prepare for death 
because there was “no hope for them.”  On the Nationalist side, he believed, the foreigners were 
mercenaries, “Italians and Germans, paid by their governments, sent by Hitler and Mussolini, the 
two cocky provocateurs of the European political stage.”  The Italians and Germans who fought 
for the Republic, on the other hand, were those “who fight for the liberty of their countries,” he 
claimed, the antifascists.  “The whole world is against you,” he asserted to his opponents.  “With 
you are the swine of the world.”
87
 
International support for both sides was a subject of intense debate, each side claiming 
legitimacy indicated by foreign endorsement.  The Nationalists claimed that their foreign 
participants demonstrated international support: “Italians, Germans, and Moors come because we 
have the support of the whole world,” Torriente quoted a priest named Calvo, who usually spoke 
for the Nationalists, saying.  Pablo spoke from his own perspective about Latin American 
participation: 
We too, the Hispanic Americans, have come here, and there collected money for the 
cause of the Spanish people, because we are against the Spain which you want to prolong, 
the old Spain of the exploitation of our people, against that which was our stepmother and 
now will be our older sister . . .  
 
The Nationalists, Pablo reported, were silent for a spell after this statement.  Then one cried that 
Calvo would answer his claims.  “Eh, you, reporter.  You have spoken a string of lies,” Calvo 
said.  If all America was with the Republicans, he argued, why were Uruguay and other Latin 
American countries about to withdraw their diplomats from Madrid?  “The America that is with 
you is nothing but the bad America, which is equal to the bad Spain here.”  To Torriente, the 
answer was obvious: 
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Listen, fascist, do you hear me?  Well, I’m going to answer you, man.  What easy things 
you ask! . . .  Look, in the first place, you have to know governments are one thing, and 
people another. . . .  This is what you need to understand, fascist, and this is what I want 
your men to know.  When a people has the government it wants, as with Russia, or with 
Mexico, both send us first provisions and clothes, and second bullets to finish you off.  
Are you content yet, fascist? 
 
Calvo was not satisfied, and the debate continued.  He argued: 
 
Listen, Cuban reporter, how is it that you feel so humanitarian as you say, when you 
accuse us of using Italian planes and yet you brag that you shoot us with Mexican bullets?  
Answer this, now, if you can, go on, that all of you are frauds and you would be better off 
not to meddle in Spanish affairs. 
 
Again, the Cuban revolutionary had a revolutionary answer at the ready.  He spoke “with a great 
voice resonating in the valley and the distance,” stating that the difference between an Italian 
plane and a Mexican bullet was the difference between fascism and antifascism: 
These Italian planes you are using are the same that bomb the defenseless population of 
Abyssinia [Ethiopia], they are the same that Mussolini uses in the name of civilization to 
crush and assassinate a people, the most heroic in the world.  And you who say you want 
a new Spain have attracted these heartless ones, these who represent barbarity, arson, 
assassination, and robbery today in the world; those who wish to provoke new killing in 
Europe.  And you haven’t hesitated to turn Spain into a new Abyssinia, and I know that 
you know what an Italian plane represents.  But you don’t know what a Mexican bullet 
represents, and I’m going to tell you.  A Mexican bullet has never represented the 
conquest and the destruction of a people.  A Mexican bullet has always represented a 
fight for the liberty of the people.  A Mexican bullet represents for us, the Hispanic 
Americans, a constant, tireless fight against imperialism.  For this reason, fascist, we feel 
proud to fire at you Mexican bullets, paid for by the Mexican workers, because they are 
bullets to liberate and not to oppress the people.  And this is the difference between the 
Italian planes you use and the Mexican bullets we use. 
 
With this conclusion, Torriente wrote, the Nationalists parapet exploded with gunfire and angry 
cries: “Traitor, go back to your country.  Hijo de puta!  How much are they paying you?”
88
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Torriente’s arguments in “En el parapeto” claimed that transnational solidarity 
legitimized the Republican cause—certifying it with the approval and support of the working 
people of all nations.  In other pieces, he explored the exchange between the Spanish 
Republicans and their foreign supporters.  Emphasizing transnational solidarity, Pablo expressed 
an understanding of its complexity: Solidarity extended along multiple connections and the 
benefits of aid by foreigners to Spanish Republicans was not one-directional.  Sometimes it took 
concrete form.  Torriente reported widespread monetary support from his part of the world in the 
article “América frente al fascismo” (“America against fascism”): 
I want to say to all of the milicianos . . . from all parts of this front, that in the United 
States, the workers, Americans, Spaniards, and Latin Americans, gathered in numerous 
committees, raise without stopping . . . dollars and more dollars for the cause of the 
Spanish Revolution.  The Hispanic-American Antifascist Committee made up of 
Spaniards and Latin Americans, raises money at a rate of 500 to 1,000 dollars daily. 
 
People in most of the countries of Latin America were managing to collect money for the 
Spanish cause, the article asserted, despite their living under dictatorships.  In Cuba, Torriente 
claimed with pride, the people raised $27,000 in just two days.
89
  Monetary support from foreign 
actors to Spanish Republicans was not the only avenue of solidarity, however.  As he expressed 
in his shouting match with the Nationalists, Pablo viewed the Spanish conflict in the context of 
Cuba’s and Latin America’s historic connection with Spain and anticolonial struggles.  The 
conditions under which many Latin Americans struggled to support the Republicans highlighted 
the potential for aid to travel back across the Atlantic, from Spain to the Western Hemisphere.  
By building solidarity with the Republicans, Cubans and other Latin Americans would not only 
help their Spanish brethren but also further their own causes, both by dealing a blow to 
international fascism that threatened them and by learning revolutionary lessons from the 
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Spaniards.  Pablo’s sister Zoe Torriente summarized this point, which we have seen already 
expressed by Pablo during preparations for his departure: “He [went] to live the Spanish war to 
learn from it and then to be useful to Cuba, because he [knew] that the only way to free Cuba 
from the dictatorships and Yankee imperialism, the only cause of our ills, would be an armed 
fight.”
90
  The idea that Republican Spain provided important lessons for Cuban activists is one 
we will see repeated by others.   
 The clarity with which Torriente preached Republican support to Nationalists in an 
opposing parapet faltered faced with the grim realities of war.  Though there is no indication that 
his support for the Republic waned, Pablo’s zeal and focus wavered after a couple of months in 
the warzone.  Late in November, he remarked in a letter on hearing a piece by Chopin on a car 
radio, “in the middle of a silent camp, close to the enemy.”  He thought wistfully of a time when 
music had for him “more diverse horizons than that of revolutionary hymns sung discordantly by 
marching companies.”  He lost himself in the music, remembering.  The man who had turned on 
the radio, an assistant to the commander of the company, asked if he liked the piece.  “I 
remember,” he wrote, “because the next night, on the same road, he disappeared, probably 
forever.”  This jovial man, of brilliant wit, loved by all, was now gone and forgotten in the 
chaotic struggle of the fight.
91
  Torriente was ardently committed to the cause; but the sharp and 
strident idealistic absolutes of his rhetoric softened somewhat in response to the harsh day-to-day 
experience he was living.  A constant assault on Madrid of cannon fire and enemy planes, 
Torriente wrote, was creating “a type of enraged resignation” in the general population.  La Gran 
V a, Madrid’s equivalent of New York’s Broadway, and Puerta del Sol, its Times Square, had 
                                                     
90
 (Zoe) Torriente, “Pablo,” in Papeles de familia, 29. 
91




borne the brunt of the bombardment.  “I have been very close several times to places where 
inexpressible tragedies have occurred,” the revolutionary journalist reported.  He was standing, 
as had been his wish, “close to the great silent whirlpool of death.”  Yet suddenly he found 
reporting difficult.  He would try to write another piece about the International Brigades, he 
promised a friend, but “understand that in these moments it is extraordinarily difficult to write in 
a journalistic tone.”
92
   
 By the end of November Torriente was struggling personally, both to continue working 
and to keep his spirits up.  He wrote about a party his regiment threw to lift the spirits of the 
people of Madrid, and then he did not write again for 15 days.  His letter of 13 December 
betrayed some annoyance with his friends on the other side of the Atlantic.  He had not written 
because he did not have a spare moment, he stated, but also because he had gotten nothing in 
return for some time.  Dismissing the craft for which he had been known his whole life, he wrote: 
“And I do not like to write for the pleasure of doing it, because this is time I could spend doing 
other things.”  Continuing in a terse tone, he stated that he had had “formidable war experiences” 
during the days he had not written, and that there was general pessimism about the fight.  
Nevertheless, he went on to describe positive elements of the situation, such as military advances, 
education efforts in the regiments, and improved discipline among the milicianos.  He mentioned 
the weddings that were taking place among revolutionaries, marriages affirmed for the time 
being with the statement: “[B]y the powers invested in me by the laws of war and revolution.”  
And then he concluded: 
It is absolutely freezing.  If I am not careful, I freeze to death.  I have a sheepskin vest 
and also I got a very beautiful chilaba de moro.  But it’s not enough.  My feet hurt.  I 
don’t know how I am going to be able to endure this winter without heat. . . .  
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Regards to everyone even though no one remembers to send me anything.  I haven’t 
learned anything of the Conference of Buenos Aires
93
 or of the latest American successes.  




Though he had managed to catalogue a number of hopeful developments, Torriente sounded 
discouraged.   
Pablo, stated his sister Zoe, was not the kind of man who would contemplate war without 
taking part.  So, after a few months, he abandoned his pen and joined with the milicianos.  Roa 
echoed this interpretation.  It was not honorable, he wrote, “to fight with the pen when what was 
urgently needed was to have a confrontation with bullets.”  With bombs falling on Madrid, Pablo 
wrote to his wife: 
I cannot stay seated before a typewriter while the city is being bombed.  I go out into the 
street and see the mangled bodies of women, children, beasts of burden. . . .  On the radio 
two women, “La Pasionaria” and Margarita Nelken, are calling pathetically for all able-
bodied men to take up rifles and help defend Madrid.  I am going to offer myself as a 
volunteer.  I will fight beside the Spaniards.  When the danger is past, I will return to my 
typewriter. 
 
On 19 December Torriente was stuck by a bullet and killed.  He was 35 years old.  “I learned of 
his death on the Madrid front in a newspaper,” Teté remembered, detached.  His body, Zoe wrote, 
spent three days behind enemy lines before being recovered—but her narrative lost track of her 
brother’s remains after this point.  They were, she implied, in a mass grave for dead Republicans, 
“awaiting an opportune moment for their final return to Cuba.”  Pablo was, she asserted, “the 
first Hispanic American to cross the Atlantic to go to the Spanish Revolution, and he will remain 
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there as a symbol of the human solidarity between America and Spain.”  Teté’s conclusion was 
less hopeful than that of her sister-in-law.  “On the fall of the Republic,” she wrote, “his remains 
were carried out by a retreating Cuban, but they have never since been located, and Pablo, like 
Ignacio Agramonte, of whom he used to tell me when he was a youth of seventeen and I a 
fascinated girl of seven, has no known grave.”
95
 
 In your surname, wrote a friend to Zoe de la Torriente Brau in 1941, “is rooted Cuba's 
revolutionary spirit and the hopes of free Spain.”
96
  Indeed, her brother Pablo was transformed, 
in death, into a powerful symbol of the struggles of both countries.  He became an iconic figure, 
an inspiration to other Cubans to travel to Spain.  Even the publication of the English-language 
volunteers in Spain, The Volunteer for Liberty, noted his passing.  In an article describing the 
Madrid mansion that housed the Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas, The Volunteer stated that 
some members of the Alliance “leave the house to continue their work as fighters or artists at the 
front, and they do not come back again.”  “Pablo de la Torriente,” the article continued, “the 
Cuban, went away a few months ago, never to return.”
97
  Like Mella, Trejo, and other activists 
before him, Pablo became a martyr, his memory celebrated and used by those who survived him.  
His death, then, does not mark the end of our engagement with his story.  As we will see, his 
legacy is a recurrent theme in Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic.  
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Widowed, Teté also felt inspired to stay in the struggle by Pablo’s sacrifice.  Despite her 
suffering at this personal tragedy, she found the resilience to continue.  We will return to her 
story when we examine the campaign to aid Spanish children which she helped to establish and 
led for a time.  We will see, too, how her involvement in revolutionary activism reemerged in the 
1950s after a period of disengagement caused by defeat and despair.  The stories of these two 
activists illustrate the ways in which individual lives connect disparate eras and locations of 
activism, and following the trajectories of these lives allows us to perceive continuity of activism 






Cuban Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War 
 
 Hundreds of Cubans, those on the island and those in exile, followed Pablo de la 
Torriente Brau’s example and volunteered in Spain.  Cuba sent more volunteers during the 
Spanish Civil War than any other Latin American country, volunteers who served in both the 
International Brigades and the regular Republican forces.  Though conflicting claims, scattered 
and incomplete records, the use of pseudonyms and fake passports, and the diverse origin points 
of the volunteers’ voyages make identifying a precise number impossible, estimates suggest that 
approximately 1,000 Cubans participated in the Spanish conflict.
1
  Here, after a brief history of 
international participation in the war that serves to contextualize our study, we examine the 
identities and experiences of these Cubans who chose to cross the ocean and take part in a war in 
a foreign country—though, as we have already seen, Spain was less foreign to many Cubans than 
it was to most other international volunteers.  To understand the identities of the Cuban 
volunteers, we utilize the method of prosopography, combining statistical analysis of information 
about their demographics with biographical sketches illustrating their characteristics more 
difficult to quantify.  Using the 1931 Cuban census, we compare the volunteers to the general 
Cuban population in order to determine if their demographic characteristics diverged from those 
of their contemporaries.  We get to know a handful of individual volunteers’ stories more 
intimately; personal vignettes help to illustrate the volunteers’ demographic and political 
diversity and the complexity of their motivations to participate in the war.  The diversity of the 
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volunteers and the complexity of their motivations complicate the overly simplistic narrative of 
foreign participation in the Republican cause as “the Good Fight.”  Interwoven with this study of 
the Cuban volunteers’ identities is an examination of their experience during the war.  We 
consider the transnational networks that facilitated their recruitment in and travel from both Cuba 
and the United States.  We see how Cuban lives, relationships, and spaces were transnational, 
and that this transnational character gave Cubans in the Spanish conflict special opportunities 
and advantages, setting them apart from other foreign volunteers.  The international and local 
involvement of the Communist Party plays a central role, but we are careful also to note that the 
story is not simply or only a Communist one as some authors have suggested.
2
  We conclude our 
discussion of the Cuban volunteer experience in the Spanish Civil War by assessing its outcome: 
What impact did their participation have? 
 
 A Brief History of International Participation in the Spanish Civil War 
 Though the Republicans did not receive formal foreign aid to nearly the same extent as 
the Nationalists did from Germany and Italy, their cause did attract foreign participation by 
numerous and diverse individual volunteers, the majority of whom served in the International 
Brigades.
3
  The International Brigades were a project of the Communist International 
(Comintern).  The Comintern decided in September 1936 to organize foreign volunteers to aid 
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the Spanish Republic and ordered the Communist Party of France to coordinate recruitment and 
mobilization.  It is estimated from Comintern records that over 30,000 foreign volunteers arrived 
at the I.B. base in Albacete over the course of the war.  Initially, these recruits made up five 
International Brigades, traditionally identified by their numbers in Roman numerals: the XI, XII, 
XIII, XIV, and XV Brigades.  Later a sixth I.B. formed numbered the 129
th
.  The foreigners’ 
energy and enthusiasm for the cause provided a valuable boost to embattled Republicans in many 
cases; their combat effectiveness, however, was lacking.  Original orders called for men with 
military training and experience, but many of the volunteers did not meet these criteria, and some 
were even physically unfit.  There was also a shortage of officers among the volunteers, and thus 
many units came to be commanded by unqualified leaders.  As a result, the international units 
suffered extreme losses in battle, and had to be fortified with Spaniards.  Morale suffered.  Poor 
training, political infighting, lack of discipline, and desertion crippled the forces further.  
Nevertheless, the International Brigades took part in nearly every major battle of the conflict, and 
Spanish loyalists and their supporters celebrated the transnational solidarity they represented. 
 That the Spanish Civil War was a conflict both Spanish and international placed Latin 
American volunteers in a unique position relative to their comrades from other countries.  On the 
one hand, notes one scholar of the war, the fight in Spain was between democracy and fascism; 
on the other, it resulted from “peculiarly Spanish controversies…land reform, the role of the 
military in public life, church-state relations, educational and cultural innovation.”
4
  While most 
foreign volunteers in Spain understood well the international significance of the struggle, those 
from Latin America empathized deeply with the country’s domestic problems as well, many of 
which their nations shared.  “Unlike [North] Americans or Western Europeans, Spanish 
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Americans did not ‘discover’ the criticality of Spanish issues in the summer of 1936.”
5
  Latin 
American volunteers in Spain were better able than their international counterparts to 
comprehend all the complex causes of the conflict, not just overarching issues such as 
democracy and fascism.  In their involvement in the Republican fight, they engaged with all the 
causal factors, interpreting the struggle in Spain as one of significance for Spain, for their 
countries in Spanish America, and for nations and people everywhere.  For example, we have 
seen already that Torriente believed the fact that Spanish Republicans struggled against their 
military to be highly significant to Cuban reality, in which Colonel Batista, backed by the armed 
forces, controlled the island as a military strongman.  To defend “the motherland,” to fight for 
their homelands, and to progress toward a better world, Cuban and other Latin American men 
and a few women crossed the Atlantic of their own volition and entered into a war in which no 
one required them to fight.
6
  Yet it was a fight they saw as their own, and many Spaniards 
interpreted the connections between themselves and the Spanish American volunteers similarly.  
It was this special sense of connection that caused Republican officials to welcome Cuban 
volunteers into the regular Republican forces as well as the International Brigades.  We will 
examine below how the Cuban’s special position in the conflict, born of their transnational 
identities, impacted their experience in the war. 
 
Cuban Volun eers’ Iden i ies 
The Cubans who volunteered for the Republic—like other Cuban antifascists—were 
diverse in terms of their places of origin, backgrounds, socioeconomic levels, occupations, and 
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political beliefs, though some groups were represented disproportionately and virtually all of the 
volunteers who went to Spain were young and male.  We discuss the issue of diversity in Cuban 
antifascism throughout this study.  In this chapter, we use the historical method of 
prosopography to explore the volunteers’ identities.  Prosopography has often been used to study 
elites, particularly political elites.  This circumstance is due in large part to the availability of 
records.  In order to perform demographic analysis and to construct biographical sketches based 
on historical source material, the practitioner of prosopography must have access to detailed 
records that include both basic demographic data and more in-depth, qualitative assessments.  
Often such records exist only for elites.  However, though most of them were not elites and 
therefore not the kinds of people who tend to leave behind extensive historical records, the 
international volunteers in Spain left an archival mark.  An extraordinary body of source material 
exists in Moscow’s Records of the International Brigades within the Communist International 
(Comintern) Archives
7
 containing documentation of over 450 Cuban volunteers in Spain.
8
  Due 
to the fact that they were doing something out of the ordinary and therefore notable, as well as 
the fact that the Communists were good record-keepers, we have an archive of detailed 
documents cataloguing thousands of men and women who volunteered from around the world.  
This collection—in addition to other fragmentary and scattered source material—allows us to 
learn a great deal about the Cuban volunteers individually and as a group.  For many of the 
individuals documented in this archive, the records include extensive biographical surveys that 
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contain information about their age and place of origin, family and educational background, 
marital and parental status, and occupation.  Also, the archive contains political assessments by 
Communist officials of the volunteers and by the volunteers of themselves, as well as 
information about their membership in organizations, their connections to one another, and their 
service in Spain.  These sources are extremely valuable not only to the present study but also to 
the study of transnational activism, networks, and solidarity more broadly.  They constitute a 
record of transnational political engagement by a diverse group of Cubans, and give us the ability 
to craft a prosopography that includes many non-elites. 
The first component of our prosopography compares a random, stratified sample of the 
Cuban volunteers in Spain present in the Moscow archive
9
 to the Cuban population at large using 
data from the 1931 Cuban census—the census taken closest to the years of the Spanish conflict.  
We examine characteristics for which the census accounts and which appear in the archive’s 
biographical records, in order to compare the sample to the larger group.  The purpose of such a 
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comparison is to determine how representative the sample is of the general population: Was the 
demographic makeup of Cuban volunteers in Spain similar to that of the Cuban population as a 
whole?  How did they compare?  Based on generalizations of a typical political activist, we 
would suspect that the volunteers might have been more likely to be young, male, unmarried, and 
urban, and perhaps disproportionately well-educated professionals compared to the general 
population.  Using data from the Moscow archive, the statistical analysis component of our 
prosopography allows us to test this proposition in the case of Spanish Civil War volunteers from 
Cuba.  To do so, we use the Pearson’s chi-square test for goodness-of-fit as our statistical 
methodology.
10
  This test uses the distribution of the data from the census for a given variable—
age, marital status, etc.—to predict the distribution for the sample.  We use the table of chi-
square results to determine the probability that any observed discrepancy is due to chance as 
opposed to an actual difference between the census and our sample.  This method gives us a 
statistically meaningful way to assess similarity and divergence between the Cuban volunteers 
and the island’s population as a whole.  
 In 1931 the island of Cuba was home to 3,962,344 people, according to the census.  The 
two most straightforward categories in which to compare our sample to the general population 
are sex and age.  The Cuban population was 53.1% male and 46.9% female.  Sex is the category 
in which Cuban volunteers in the Spanish conflict were least representative of the population at 
large: Though not exclusively male, the group of Cuban volunteers in Spain included only a 
handful of women; the Moscow archive contains records for five people definitively identifiable 
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as women and a later accounting by Cuban veterans lists nine.
11
  Our sample taken from the 
Moscow archive was 98.08% male.  The divergence was so extreme for this variable, that a chi-
square test is unnecessary.   
Age is another characteristic for which one might expect our sample to differ 
substantially from the total population.  It seems likely that our sample of Spanish Civil War 
volunteers would be disproportionately young, and in fact it was.  The chi-square test confirms 
our hypothesis in this case.  In 1931, the year of the census,
12
 none of the individuals in our 
sample of Cuban volunteers was under the age of 10 or over the age of 49.  Within this range, we 
group our sample of volunteers into the same age ranges as used by the census: 10–19, 20–29, 
30–39, and 40–49.  We then compare the volunteers in these ranges to the general population in 
the same ranges.  Predicting the number of volunteers in each category based on the distribution 
in the census, the chi-square test indicates that the largest discrepancies are in the 10–19 and the 
40–49 age groups.  Teenagers (as of 1931) were significantly overrepresented in the sample, and 
the 40–49 group was significantly underrepresented.  The 30–39 group was somewhat 
underrepresented, and the number of twentysomethings is about what we would predict in the 
sample from the data in the census.  Therefore, the chi-squared test, which adjusts for the number 
of categories available, indicates that the volunteers were disproportionately younger than other 
Cubans within their age range, 10–49.     
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 So our sample was disproportionately male and young.  Was it disproportionately 
unmarried?  The Cuban census of 1931 provides data on marital status broken down by both age 
and sex.  Unfortunately, the age ranges used in the presentation of these data are slightly 
different than the age ranges used elsewhere in the census, due, it seems, to the fact that 14 was 
the age of consent for males: 14–20, 21–30, etc.  Also, it is not possible to know whether 
biographical survey responses of “married” by volunteers all represented legally sanctioned 
marriages or if some were unofficial, “common-law” marriages (a separate group, noted as 
“unidos sin sanción legal,” in the census).  That there are a number of examples observed in 
which a survey respondent reported having children but being single suggests that at least some 
volunteers did not consider themselves to be married if they were—or had been—involved in a 
more casual relationship; however it is impossible to know for certain how to interpret these 
responses in relation to the census categories.  The census also includes categories for 
widows/widowers and divorced people, which do not appear on the surveys found in the 
Moscow archive.  In order to create a comparison between the census and our sample, therefore, 
we have had to work with these limitations.  First, since our sample is overwhelmingly male, and 
since marital status in the census differs significantly for men and women, we have tested marital 
status only for men, omitting the one woman who appears in our sample so as not to skew the 
results.  Second, we have omitted data from the census on common-law marriages, divorced men, 
and widowers, since these categories do not appear in the data for our sample.  Third, we have 
created a broader age range, 14–50, which lines up with the age categories for the census while 
not excluding any of the individuals in our sample, thus creating equivalent groups for the 
purposes of comparison.  Having set up our data in this way, we perform the chi-square test and 




men under 50 in terms of marital status.  The men of the sample are in fact representative of the 
marriage rate among Cuban men in their age range, which was approximately 28% of men age 
14–50. 
The next characteristic for which we want to make a comparison between our sample of 
volunteers and the Cuban population at large is province of origin.  Cuba had six provinces 
during the 1930s: Pinar del Río, La Habana, Matanzas, Las Villas/Santa Clara, Camagüey, and 
Oriente.  The island’s two major cities—La Habana (Havana) and Santiago de Cuba—were 
located in La Habana and Oriente provinces, respectively.  We might hypothesize that Cuban 
volunteers in Spain were likely to have come from urban centers, since cities are hubs of political 
action and since trans-Atlantic voyages originated there.  In the case of Cuba, the major cities 
Havana and Santiago de Cuba have both been historically politically active, though it seems that 
volunteers departed for Spain only from Havana.  If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect 
that a disproportionate number of volunteers would come from the provinces of La Habana and 
Oriente.  The biographical records in the International Brigades archive often include individuals’ 
places of birth, making a determination of province of origin possible.  The census provides data 
on the current population of each province in 1931, not place of birth.  In other words, the census 
reports residents in the year 1931, whereas the biographical information for our sample includes 
place of birth for births that took place from the 1890s to the 1910s.  The comparison, therefore, 
is imperfect, since people move around.  However, substantial discrepancies would still be 
informative. 
From the census we learn that Oriente was the most populous province, followed by La 
Habana, and then Las Villas/Santa Clara.  The other three provinces were significantly less 




born in each province based on the total population of each province according to the 1931 
census confirms our hypothesis only partially.  La Habana province was indeed substantially 
overrepresented in our sample.  There are two and a half times as many volunteers in the sample 
from La Habana province as predicted based on the census data.  Oriente province, on the other 
hand, was significantly underrepresented.  We observe approximately one-fifth the number of 
volunteers we would have expected to come from Oriente in our sample.  Las Villas/Santa Clara 
is also underrepresented, with fewer than half the number of volunteers predicted.  The provinces 
of Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and Camagüey are represented in the sample at approximately the 
numbers we would expect.  While it is predictable that a comparatively large number of 
politically active volunteers would come from the island’s political center and main hub of 
volunteer recruitment for the Spanish conflict—Havana—it is important to note that the group 
did encompass significant diversity of origin, and that Santiago de Cuba, the other politically 
active urban center on the island was in fact significantly underrepresented.  That our chi-
squared analysis suggests that more Cuban volunteers were born in La Habana province than we 
would (imperfectly) predict based on population of the province in 1931 might reinforce a 
stereotype of the typical Cuban political activist as being urban.  However, the 
underrepresentation of Santiago de Cuba contradicts this image, as does qualitative evidence, 
such as statements by director of volunteer recruitment Ramón Nicolau González, indicating that 
there were volunteers coming to Havana from other parts of the island specifically for the 
purpose of traveling to Spain.  People coming from small towns and remote parts of the island to 
Havana to volunteer to go to Spain is significant, and might be somewhat surprising given the 
stereotype of the urban-based political activist.  The mobility of Cuban activists of the 1930s 




previously observed in the case of Torriente and Casuso and will continue to consider throughout 
this study.  The volunteers’ biographical surveys make clear that many of them were already 
mobile for personal, familial, economic, and/or political reasons by the mid-1930s.  
Questionnaires asked volunteers to state how many cities and towns in their countries they knew 
in addition to their own, and many of the Cubans answered all or nearly all.  Surveys also asked 
about time spent in other countries, and some of the Cubans reported having lived in the United 
States, Spain, Mexico, or France prior to volunteering in the war. 
 The 1931 Cuban census collected data on level of formal education; but, upon consulting 
the archives of the department of statistics for the purpose of producing a published version of 
the census in 1978, editors found that records for the categories “Public Instruction” and “School 
Attendance” had been lost.
13
  The published version of the census includes literacy rates and 
limited information about academic and professional degrees.  The Cuban census reported that of 
the 2,924,537 people on the island over the age of ten, 2,095,836 (71.66%) knew how to read, 
824,556 (28.19%) were illiterate, and the level of instruction obtained by the other 4,145 (0.14%) 
was unknown.
14
  For men over the age of 21, of which there were 1,084,517, the census reported 
that 756,375 (69.74%) were literate, 326,517 (30.11%) were illiterate, and for 1,625 (0.15%) the 
level of instruction was unknown.  Additionally, the census reported that among men over 21 
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Data for our sample in this category are also imperfect.  We have fewer data on education 
level than we do for the other categories: for only 76.92% of the volunteers in our sample do we 
have this data point, as opposed to 92.31–100.00% for other points.  The question concerning 
education did not appear on all the surveys, whereas questions about the other characteristics 
were more common; it is also possible that those with little or no formal education either did not 
respond to the question or did not take a survey, though it is evident that some of the surveys 
were conducted orally with answers filled in by a third party, so lack of literacy would not 
necessarily keep a volunteer out of the record.  No one in the sample answered that they had no 
formal education.  The question about education level was formatted as a fill-in-the-blank rather 
than a multiple-choice; as a result, the answers are not standardized, and include classifications 
that duplicate or overlap one another: primary, elementary, secondary, baccalaureate 
(“bachillerato”) and baccalaureate year one, military school, university, and business school.  
Some respondents also listed technical courses without indicating the type of institution at which 
these courses had been completed.   
For the purposes of a comparison with the census, however, deciphering these 
classifications and the distinctions between them gets us nowhere in any case, since we lack the 
corresponding data for the population as a whole.  We cannot make any kind of meaningful 
comparison between level of formal education data in our sample—since there is no way for us 
to know if those who skipped the question did so because they had no schooling or for some 
other reason—and literacy rate data in the census—since there is no consistent way for us to 
know if volunteers were literate.  Based only on our biographical data from the Moscow archive, 
we can determine that, of those who indicated their level of education, a large majority (72.50%) 




how their level of education compared to the population at large, therefore, we can assert that the 
majority of the volunteers in the sample were neither highly educated nor entirely lacking formal 
education. 
 The census of 1931 defined as occupations “all that which has a lucrative nature and 
which man works at to live or to sustain those who depend on him.”  People other than the head 
of a household could have an occupation, it pointed out, though it did exclude “children at home 
or in school, the mothers of families, etc.”  Accounting in this way, the census found that 
1,297,764 Cubans had occupations in 1931, approximately 32.8% of the total population.  Of all 
males on the island, 58.5% had occupations.
16
  Since we have chosen individuals from archival 
records who filled in an occupation question on a questionnaire, we have biased our sample in 
favor of the employed.  It is possible that some who left the question blank did so because they 
were unemployed.  There are some questionnaires in the archive in which the respondent 
indicates that he is unemployed, but none of these happened to have been captured in our sample, 
though we do have two individuals who reported being only students with no work listed.  
Therefore, we cannot test our sample against the population for a comparison of the employed vs. 
the unemployed.   
What about comparing types of employment?  The census breaks down occupations into 
five broad categories: 1) agriculture, fishing, and mining; 2) professionals; 3) services, domestic 
and personal; 4) commerce and transport; and 5) manufacturing and mechanical industries.  
Anticipating our trouble with these categories, the published version of the census notes that they 
are not as clearly defined as would be ideal: “The line that divides these groups or classes is 
often difficult to distinguish, and in many isolated cases severe difficulties arise in choosing the 
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most appropriate group in which to classify a person or profession.”
17
  The occupations 
individual volunteers listed in their biographical questionnaires add to our difficulty, since many 
stated their involvement in more than one field.  Thus we have a laborer who was also a student 
and one who was also a baseball player; we have a kitchen helper who was also a tailor and a 
cook who was also a dockworker; we have three people who reported being both chauffeurs and 
mechanics.  Even for those volunteers who listed only one occupation, it is difficult to determine 
the occupational category in many cases, since the census provides little specific definition of the 
groupings.  Additionally, a substantial number of respondents to the biographical questionnaires 
in the Moscow archive listed the generic terms jornalero (laborer) and empleado (employee).  
Despite these difficulties, we will use the data we have to make a comparison between the 
sample and the general population. 
 Doing our best to determine the most accurate placement of each occupation given in our 
sample into one of the categories used in the census, we find the following.  The only 
agricultural worker in our sample definitively identified as such is a “sugar chemist” (which 
would likely have been considered a professional-level agricultural job), though it is possible that 
some of those listed simply as laborers were agricultural laborers.  The non-agricultural 
professionals include an accountant, an elementary school teacher, a court official, a member of 
the military, and two people in the arts.  In the services, we have included food service 
employees, those in couture (tailor, cobbler, washer, etc.), those in communications (telegrapher, 
printer, etc.), and a barber.  In commerce and transport are those who listed simply comercio 
(commerce) or comerciante (merchant or shopkeeper) and the notably large number (for the 
sample relative to other specific occupations) of men who worked in transportation: four 
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chauffeurs, three mechanic/chauffeurs, two mechanics, and a stoker, whom, by including him in 
this category, we have assumed worked on the railroad as opposed to with a stationary machine, 
though we cannot be sure of this.  Finally, in manufacturing and mechanical industries, our 
sample includes no one who listed factory work or other manufacturing; rather, the building 
trades dominate with two carpenters, and one each of a construction worker, an electrician, a 
painter, and varnisher. 
A chi-square test of these data finds extreme underrepresentation of the agriculture, 
fishing, and mining occupations in our sample; even if we assumed that all those who listed the 
generic title “laborer” were in fact agricultural laborers, the sample would still include far fewer 
people in this category than we would predict based on the census.  Professionals are only 
slightly overrepresented in the sample; service workers and those in commerce and transport are 
more substantially overrepresented, though the gap between the predicted and observed numbers 
is not nearly as large as in the case of the agriculture, fishing, and mining occupations.  There is 
parity between the census and the sample in the manufacturing and mechanical industries 
occupations.  It is not surprising that agricultural workers are underrepresented among the 
volunteers, though this fact might be useful in challenging some of the more romanticized 
propaganda to appear in the radical press that extoled the strong ties of solidarity that allegedly 
existed between the Cuban guajiro and the Spanish campesino.
18
  Neither are the other results 
particularly unanticipated, though we might have expected professionals to be somewhat more 
dramatically overrepresented in the sample.  In fact, we find a diverse mixture of the professional 
and working classes.  
                                                     
18
 Both the Word guajiro and the word campesino may be translated as ‘peasant,’ though guajiro is 




 Two other categories of potential interest concerning the volunteers are political 
conviction/involvement and race/ethnicity.  Many of the Moscow archive records include 
information about volunteers’ political identities.  The Communists had a keen interest in 
assessing the volunteers who came to Spain for level of loyalty or danger to the Party.  The 
Cuban census did not include data on political conviction—and in any case, many of the political 
groups of the day were clandestine if not illegal.  Therefore, it is not possible to create a detailed 
comparison between the politics of the volunteers and those of the general population, though we 
may safely assert that many of the volunteers were politically committed leftists (though not 
all—we observe also the presence of volunteers without any specific political affiliation).  The 
reasons this seemingly obvious assertion warrants a brief closer look is to dispel any sense that 
all the volunteers were Communists.  A number of historical factors could contribute to this 
sense: the central role of the Communist International in creating and supporting the 
International Brigades, the work by the Cuban Communist Party to recruit volunteers, the better 
and more extensive records kept by Communists than by some other antifascist groups, and the 
historiography produced on the Spanish Civil War in Cuba after the Cuban Revolution of 1959.  
The historical records make clear, though, that, like the milieu of Republicans in the Spanish 
Civil War and that of the island’s domestic political activists, the Cuban antifascist movement 
was politically and ideologically diverse—though most participants did fall somewhere along the 
left side of the spectrum.  Official commentary and self-assessments concerning political 
ideology and group affiliation list anarchists, unionists, Trotskyists, and socialists; various Cuban 
groups including Joven Cuba (Young Cuba), the Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario Nacional, or 
P.A.N.), the Partido Revolucionario Cubano – Auténtico (“Authentic” Cuban Revolutionary 




imperialist Organization, or O.R.C.A.), and the Club Cubano Julio Antonio Mella; and, among 
those who had lived in Spain prior to the conflict, Spanish unions and political organizations.  
Others were “without party” and unaffiliated with any political organization or ideology, aside 
from being antifascist.  This political and ideological diversity is a concept vital to the present 
study and will recur as a point of discussion in other chapters. 
 The biographical surveys preserved in the Moscow archive did not ask volunteers about 
their race or ethnicity, and photographic records—in addition to being incomplete—are not a 
sufficiently reliable source of information on categories that are often disputed in general and 
that were quite complex in the case of Cuba.  Our accounting of Cuban volunteers of color must, 
therefore, rely on qualitative assessments.  However, for the purpose of considering the relative 
diversity of the Cuban volunteers in Spain it may be useful to note the racial makeup of the 
island at that time.  The 1931 Cuban census reported that the island’s population was 27.2% 
people of color, when the category “white” included Chinese.
19
  Elsewhere in the census, the 
category “of color” included people of Asian as well as African and mixed racial backgrounds 
(“población de color, incluso negros, mestizos y amarillos”), and the proportion rose slightly to 
27.9%.
20
  This discrepancy indicates both the arbitrary construction of racial categories and an 
apparent inconsistency or confusion regarding the racial character of the island’s Chinese 
population.  The proportion of the population that was black or of mixed race (elemento de color) 
had declined substantially since its peak of 58.5% in the 1841 census, as the population of white 
Cubans (elemento blanco, including Chinese) had increased steadily over the same time period—
the total number of people of color went up and down from census to census, while the white 
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population grew consistently in each census except one (1899, during the bloody Cuban War of 
Independence) between 1775 and 1931.
21
  By 1931, therefore, a significant majority of Cubans 
were considered white. 
Perhaps the most famous black Cuban volunteer was baseball player Basilio Cueria, 
whom we discuss in Chapter 4, but there were many others.  Another gained a small amount of 
fame recently as the result of a high-profile photograph and a transnational search for his identity.  
The case of this volunteer, known by the pseudonym “Cuba Hermosa” (“Beautiful Cuba”), 
warrants some exploration here because it is exemplary of the challenges inherent in the creation 
of a prosopography of non-elites.  The identities of many Spanish Civil War volunteers are 
obscured by unintentional errors and intentional concealment; to gain some sense of their 
identities requires that we piece together bits of information from fragmentary records scattered 
across the globe. 
Cuba Hermosa
22
 emerged from anonymity in 2009 because he happened to be 
photographed in January 1937 in Barcelona by the Catalán photojournalist Agustí Centelles.  The 
photograph (Figure 2.1) of the young black man in the estate of the late photographer was 
identified as showing a member of the famous Abraham Lincoln Battalion, a unit made up 
mostly of volunteers who arrived from the United States.  The military uniform in which he was 
shown indicated that he had traveled to Spain as a volunteer for the Republic from the United 
States.  Upon the purchase in 2009 by the Spanish government of their father’s collection, the 
photojournalist’s two sons asked that the government of Spain make a gift of the photograph in 
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question to President Barack Obama as an homage to the more than one hundred African-
American volunteers who went to Spain to fight for the Republic, and the government agreed.  
So the brothers notified the news media in hopes of discovering the man’s identity for the 
purpose of informing his family of the honor.  A transnational investigation followed, and 
resulted in an unexpected discovery: The man was not African-American; he was Cuban.  The 
vital clue was a second photograph (Figure 2.2) in which the same man holds up a banner 
reading, in part, “Centuria Antonio Guiteras.”  Named for the fallen Cuban activist and leader of 
the group Joven Cuba, the Centuria was a subunit of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion known as 
“the Cuban Section,” which we discuss at greater length below. 
      
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 Photographs by Catalán photojournalist Agustí Centelles, taken in 
Barcelona in January 1937, depicting a black volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion 
 
In consultation with scholars of the Cuban participation in the war, including Ana Suárez Díaz of 
Cuba, U.S.-based researchers Sebastiaan Faber and James D. Fernández scoured the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade Archive (ALBA) in New York and other sources looking for clues about the 
man’s identity.  The memoir of Italian-American volunteer John Tisa provided key evidence.  It 
includes a photograph (Figure 2.3) of a number of passengers on the S.S. Champlain voyage that 






  In the photograph appears an individual whom Faber and Fernández determined was 
both the man in the Centelles photograph and the man whom Tisa identified as “Cuba 
Hermosa.”
24
  Another photograph (Figure 2.4) from the same voyage, which I discovered at the 
Centro de Documentación de Las Brigadas Internacionales (The International Brigades 
Documentation Center) in Albacete, Spain, shows only the Cuban passengers, and includes the 
same individual.
25
  Based on the passenger list for the Champlain’s voyage, Faber and Fernández 
came up with five possible names for the mysterious man in the photographs: Bienvenido 
Domínguez, Faustino García, Juan Godoy, Ricardo Pérez, and Ronaldo Rodríguez.
26
  A third 
photograph (Figure 2.5) printed in Tisa’s memoir shows Cuba Hermosa standing next to the 
author sitting on a donkey; this image gives us a slightly closer look at the man’s face.
27
  In an 
April 1937 diary entry, Tisa described him: “Hermosa’s name, translated, means, ‘Beautiful 
Cuba,’ but his first name is really José.  About 5 feet 8, boyish looking, magnificently 
proportioned, erect, and strong, he is beautifully jet black, with a mouthful of pearls for teeth and 
black, glistening eyes that are always smiling.”
28
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 Figure 2.5 Cuba Hermosa standing to the left of John Tisa on a donkey 
 
After several years of research on Cuban participation in the Spanish conflict, I have 
encountered several further pieces of evidence about this now iconic black Cuban volunteer.  I 
remained on the lookout for his face in photographs of Cuban volunteers, keeping in mind his 
jaunty grin, prominent ears, and high cheekbones, and the shape of the hairline across his 
forehead.  Sure enough, in the Harry Randall Fifteenth International Brigade Photograph 
Collection at the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive, I found a photograph (Figure 2.6) from 
April 1938 I believe is a match.
29
  Figure 2.7 shows all five images of the man’s face close-up 
for comparison. 
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Figure 2.6 “Antonio Garcia, Auto Park, 59th Battalion Miguel Lausurica [sic], Darmos Apr 1938”  
 
 
                 
 
Figure 2.7 Comparison of photograph details showing, from left to right, the original Centelles image, 
the S.S. Champlain voyage group shot reproduced in Tisa’s memoir, the group shot of Cubans on the 
S.S. Champlain which I found in Albacete, the image depicting “Cuba Hermosa” from Tisa’s memoir, 





Perhaps Antonio García was the same person as the Faustino García listed by the team of 
researchers who investigated Cuba Hermosa’s identity?  The name as it appears on one version 
of the Champlain passenger list reads “Faustineo A. G. y Fernandez.”
30
  In the ALBA list “Roll 
Call – American Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War” appears the clearly mangled name 
“Faustineo Garcia y Frandez A,”
31
 which we might decipher as Faustino A. García y Fernández.  
Antonio could be the ‘A’ initial found in these lists.  So far so good, except that we have not 
accounted for the fact that Tisa stated the man’s real first name was José.  On that point we turn 
to the Cuban archives.  The nickname “Cuba Hermosa” appears in Cuban records of veterans of 
the Spanish conflict, and, in one instance there, is associated with the name José.  A list of 
veterans’ names in the Registro General (General Registry) of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba 
(Institute of History of Cuba) lists the following two entries: “DIAZ, Antonio (Cuba Hermosa)” 
and “GARCIA CUBA, Jose (Cuba Hermosa).”
32
  The name Díaz does not fit with other clues, 
but we see here the names Antonio, José, and García associated with the pseudonym Cuba 
Hermosa.  It seems, then, that the mysterious Cuban volunteer in the photographs had the 
surname García and some combination of given names and perhaps other pseudonyms including 
Antonio, Faustino, and José.   
A report on Antonio García found in the Moscow archive stated that he was 28 years old 
and a blacksmith, and that he arrived in Spain in mid-January 1937 (which fits with arrival on the 
S.S. Champlain that month) and worked in the American Battalion of the XV Brigade (which 
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was the Abraham Lincoln Battalion) as a cook.  His record also noted a disciplinary incident in 
which he overstayed a leave in Madrid and then became “afraid to go back to the Brigade for 
fear of being punished.”  The report stated that he wanted “to rest and then go back to the front,” 
and that he received a warning that if such an incident recurred he would be “handed over to the 
Spanish court.”
33
  From these various fragments, located in Barcelona, New York, Havana, and 
Moscow, we are able to piece together a small part of the mysterious Cuba Hermosa’s identity.  
Cuban records conclude on a tragic note this brief portrait of the man with the slightly crooked, 
ever-present grin.  The list of Cuban volunteers in the book Cuba en España: Una gloriosa 
página de internacionalismo lists Antonio Garc a as having died after the war’s end; but a list of 
Cubans killed in the conflict found in the archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba includes, 
without reference to his actual name, “(Cuba Hermosa) (suicidio)”—Cuba Hermosa, suicide.
34
 
Our journey through the detective work of non-elite prosopography comes, therefore, to a 
sad ending.  It has illuminated, though, the process by which personal vignettes in this study 
come to be; whereas our statistical analysis is based on data from a relatively uniform set of 
surveys from a single archive, our biographical sketches depend on the extensive collection of 
fragmentary evidence, often across various types of source material from multiple countries.  
And in commenting on the role of volunteers’ racial identity, using the case of Cuba Hermosa as 
an example, it is as important to note what does not appear in the records as what does.  For 
modern observers—the photographer’s sons and those involved in trying to identify the man in 
the photograph in 2009 and 2010—Cuba Hermosa’s race was significant.  His story came to light 
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specifically because of the idea that the first black president of the United States would 
appreciate having a photograph of an African-American volunteer.  Though Tisa gave a physical 
description of the man (as he did of other volunteers), however, none of the other records 
encountered in our search made mention of his race.  It seems that record-keepers did not find it 
noteworthy that a particular volunteer was black as today’s observers seem to do.  The fact that 
the questionnaires volunteers filled out in Spain—surveys that collected all sorts of other 
demographic data and that asked detailed questions about their political allegiance and 
socioeconomic status—did not ask about race further corroborates this hypothesis. 
That Cuba Hermosa was mistaken for a U.S. volunteer illustrates an important point 
about the identities of Cuban volunteers in the transnational movement of support for the Spanish 
Republic: Determining the national identity of an individual is tricky because many individual 
identities were transnational.  For example, one discovery of the research for this study is that a 
significant number of Cuban volunteers who left for Spain from the United States were counted 
both as U.S. volunteers (of which there were, according to various estimates, 2,800–3,300) in 
U.S. sources and as Cuban volunteers in Cuban sources.  This double-counting means that the 
totals of number of volunteers for the two countries overlap.  Similarly, while international 
volunteers from, for instance, Ireland, Germany, or Poland are conspicuous in archival records of 
the war due to their foreign names, in many cases Cuban—and other Latin American—
volunteers blend into records of the Spanish conflict.  Cubans were not always identified as 
foreigners, as we will see, and in a case in which a Cuban’s name was common, it would then be 
impossible to know if, for example, José Alonso or Alberto López or Pedro Rivero were the 




Cubans with common names, therefore, disappear among their Spanish comrades in the archives 
unless identified specifically as Cuban. 
When many Cubans had lived for years in the United States or Spain, or had been born in 
one of those countries or somewhere else besides the island, what does it mean to say that they 
were Cuban?  Is it even useful to determine their national identities?  Since this study examines 
as a group Cuban antifascist and pro-Republican activists, these questions raise critical 
considerations for our analysis.  Evaluating which individuals were Cubans for the purposes of 
this study, we include first those who—regardless of place of birth or length of residency—
identified themselves as Cuban.  Torriente is one example of an individual born elsewhere 
(Puerto Rico) who identified himself as Cuban while simultaneously defining his own identity as 
transnational.  Another is Aurelio Paula Bolaños, a Cuban volunteer who was born in Tampa, 
Florida, whose parents lived in Tampa, and who lived in Philadelphia prior to departing for 
Spain; a cigar worker immersed in Tampa’s politically charged, Cuban-dominated community, 
Paula expressed no sense of contradiction regarding identifying himself as Cuban despite having 
been born and living in the United States.
35
  We will encounter other examples like these 
throughout our study.  Conversely, we will meet some people who were born in Cuba or who 
lived there for many years who did not consider themselves Cuban.  Though we would not, 
therefore, define such individuals as Cuban activists, their experience in Cuba and connections to 
Cubans often contributed to the transnational networks on which Cuban antifascist and pro-
Republican activism relied—the case of Republican military leader Enrique Lister, discussed 
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below, is one example.  Second, we take into consideration those whom our source material 
identifies as Cuban, evaluating on a case-by-case basis the reliability of the sources, and potential 
contradictions between external assessments of an individual and his or her self-identification.  
Combining self-identification and external assessments, then, we make educated decisions 
regarding inclusion of such individuals in the category ‘Cuban.’  Why create this category?  
Studying the Cuban movement is important, we argue, because examining continuity between 
the domestic struggle and the transnational one reveals new findings not apparent in studies of 
one or the other. 
 Our analysis of the Cuban volunteers’ characteristics informs the subsequent discussion, 
and additional biographical sketches of individuals will illustrate and exemplify various points 
about Cuban participation throughout the chapter.  With this overview of the identities of the 
Cuban volunteers in Spain in mind, we move now to examining their experience participating in 
the Spanish conflict and the significance of this experience, beginning with their recruitment on 
the island and in exile. 
   
 Recruitment in Havana and New York 
 According to his writings, Pablo de la Torriente Brau came upon the idea of traveling to 
participate in the Spanish Civil War on his own, guided by his feeling of solidarity with “the 
motherland,” his engagement in the leftist milieu of New York City, and his sense of 
revolutionary continuity.  No one recruited him actively.  His involvement and death in the 
conflict, in turn, inspired other Cubans, both in the United States and on the island, to volunteer.  
Not everyone came upon the idea spontaneously or on their own, however; and those who did 




Active recruitment and organized support, therefore, were vital factors in getting Cuban 
volunteers to Spain. 
 Some Cubans were already in Spain when the conflict began, and the issue of Cuban-
born volunteers who were in Spain for many years or decades prior to the start of the war is 
important to note in terms of demonstrating the difficulties in determining exactly whom to count 
as a Cuban volunteer.  The case of José Luis Raldiri Menéndez is illustrative.  A native of 
Havana, he had lived in Barcelona since he was four years old, a biographical note 
commemorating his death stated.  The obituary in the periodical of the 35th Division did not call 
him Cuban, as other mentions of Cuban volunteers did.
36
  Also, he is not listed among Cuban 
volunteers in Cuban sources, nor does he appear among the Cuban volunteers recorded in 
Moscow’s Archive of the International Brigades.  Despite having been born on the island, 
therefore, he was not considered Cuban, records indicate.  Another case is that of Pablo Arocha 
Toledo, a volunteer who does appear in both the Moscow archive and Cuban records.  Arocha 
was born in Santiago de Cuba, but moved to Cadiz, Andalusia in 1907.  Though his records in 
the Moscow archive list his nationality as Cuban, they also note that he requested to remain in 
Spain at the end of the war.
37
  These two examples of similar cases demonstrate that Cuban-born 
individuals who had lived in Spain for a long time prior to the war might be counted officially as 
either Spanish or Cuban, and that official assessments might not match the nationality with 
which an individual wished to self-identify.   
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 In addition to those who were already in Spain, there were Cuban volunteers who 
traveled there from various places, including Mexico; the vast majority, however, came from the 
island directly or from the United States.  Recruitment of Cubans to volunteer in Spain took 
place primarily in two places: Havana and New York City.  These two cities were, as Torriente’s 
story demonstrates, closely linked.  It is therefore unsurprising that recruitment efforts in both 
were linked as well, a connection fostered in large part—though not exclusively—by 
Communists.    
As we will see elsewhere in this study, many Cuban volunteers went to Spain to support 
the Republican cause who had no affiliation with the Communist Party.  However, Cuban 
Communists recruited and supported the largest number of volunteers—both Communists and 
non-Communists—of any organization on the island.  They coordinated with the Communist 
International’s efforts, and the strength of the Party on the island relative to those of other 
countries in the region likely contributed to the fact that more Cuban volunteers joined the 
International Brigades and the regular Republican forces than came from other Latin American 
countries.  Also, the Communists kept better records than many other organizations on the island, 




 The Cuban Communist Party began its official engagement with the cause of the Spanish 
Republic in November 1936, following the lead of the Comintern.  Longstanding Party activist 
Ramón Nicolau González—a Party member since 1926 and Central Committee member since 
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—took on the role of coordinating recruitment on the island.  Nicolau González would 
remain active in Cuba following the 1959 Revolution and directed the team that produced the 
historical collection Cuba y la defensa de la República Española (Cuba and the Defense of the 
Spanish Republic) for the Party’s Central Committee in 1981; therefore, a substantial record 
exists of his efforts during the Spanish conflict.   
 Nicolau González described a dual intent behind the Cuban Party’s recruitment of 
volunteers to go to Spain.  The Cuban Communists’ internationally-focused reason for 
recruitment efforts was, as they saw it, to liberate the Spanish people from fascism and other 
reactionary forces.  They had a domestic—and more practical—consideration as well: 
Participation in the Spanish conflict would provide military training to Cuban volunteers who 
would return to the island equipped to participate in “an eventual armed anti-imperialist fight in 
our country,” Nicolau González stated.
40
  The latter motivation echoes the argument, expressed 
by Torriente and others, that the Spanish conflict would teach Cubans lessons they could use in 
their own struggles; the Communists were simply more precise about the kind of lessons they 
thought would be most useful. 
 As we will see was the case for many Cuban antifascists, the Communist director of 
recruitment felt it important to emphasize not only the continuity between the Cuban and Spanish 
struggles but also the diversity of participants in Cuban antifascism.  To manage recruitment, the 
Party set up a commission.  Nicolau González was careful to note in a remembrance that the 
commission included members of various political backgrounds, “bonded by their common 
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rejection of fascist designs.”
41
  Many different individuals and organizations devoted to 
insurrection in Cuba, he stated, decided—due to the political situation on the island and the 
events in Spain—to turn their attention and efforts from domestic concerns to the cause of the 
Spanish Republic.  Nicolau González noted not only political but also geographic diversity.  The 
commission was based in Havana, but, he stated, extended its efforts rapidly across the island, 
channeling the “enthusiastic and determined popular willingness to offer concrete aid to the 
antifascist fighters.”
42
  In addition to representing political and geographic diversity, Nicolau 
González emphasized, the volunteers came from different walks of life.  Side by side with 
workers enrolled intellectuals, he stated enthusiastically.
43
 
The work of recruiting, supporting, and transporting volunteers took place clandestinely 
on the island and faced further difficulties internationally due to adherence—official or 
otherwise—of the major western democracies and many governments of smaller nations such as 
Cuba to the Non-Intervention Agreement (1936).  Many in Cuba, however, aided the effort, 
recalled Nicolau González, describing an operational antifascist network of supportive 
participants.  Hotel employees—“who were linked to the Party by militancy or sympathy, or, 
simply, by being supporters of the Spanish Republican government”—attended to volunteers 
from elsewhere on the island staying in Havana prior to their departure across the Atlantic.  Two 
pawnshops in the city with Spanish Republican owners clothed them, offering the recruitment 
commission a discount on prices.  Communists and sympathizers employed by the Secretary of 
State took great risks providing passports and other necessary documentation to the Cuban 
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volunteers without official consent and in violation of the Cuban government’s neutrality in the 
conflict.  Prior to departure, a small committee of doctors examined the recruits, and, Nicolau 
González
 
 boasted, not one man examined and approved for combat by the Cuban doctors 
received any objection from medical officials of the International Brigades upon arrival in Spain.  
The Party opened a travel agency to handle the voyages of the volunteers and cut down on the 
cost of their trips; the agency “saved us fifteen percent on the price of the tickets,” the director of 






s testimony reveals also the transnational Communist network at work 
in the recruitment of Cubans to go to Spain from various locations.  Sent to Spain in December 
1937, the Cuban director of recruitment left the work of the commission in Cuba to another and 
set off on a multinational journey that would take him to the United States and France to meet 
with Communists of those countries prior to his arrival in Spain.  In New York City, he 
remembered, he visited the Club Cubano Julio Antonio Mella, a central location of Cuban 
antifascism and Republican recruitment we discussed elsewhere, at the request of the U.S. 
Communist Party (C.P.U.S.A.) and gave a talk to U.S. comrades detailing the pro-Republican 
work going on in Cuba.  After visiting with French Communists in Paris, the Cuban traveled to 
Barcelona, where he visited another Club Mella.  While in Spain, Nicolau González visited the 
front and maintained contact with Cuban volunteers, to whom he brought an “encouraging 
message from the distant homeland” and whom he “encouraged in the pursuit of the honorable 
internationalist mission they fulfilled so gallantly.”
45
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The Mella Club of New York City which Nicolau González visited during his journey 
was an important hub of organizing efforts for antifascist Cubans living in the United States.  
Located in Washington Heights, founded in 1931 by Cuban activists exiled for their participation 
in the anti-Machado struggle, and named for martyred hero of that struggle Julio Antonio Mella, 
the club—like many other Spanish and Latin American organizations in the city that “lived [the 
Spanish Civil War] with palpable immediacy”
46
 and together made up the Sociedades Hispanas 
Confederadas de Ayuda a España (Confederated Hispanic Societies of Aid to Spain)—became a 
center of antifascist activism and recruitment during the Spanish Civil War.  The painting Club 
Julio A. Mella (Cuban Workers’ Club) (1937) depicts a multiracial crowd of men and women 
eating, drinking, smoking, reading, and discussing.  A famous pro-Republican poster can be seen 
directly above the head of the central figure in the foregrounded trio.
47
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Figure 2.8 Henry Glintenkamp, Club Julio A. Mella (Cuban Workers’ Club) (1937) 
 
Italian-American volunteer John Tisa recalled that prior to his departure he had been 
“directed uptown to the headquarters of the Julio Mella Club, a left-wing organization 
comprising mainly Cubans, many of whom were refugees from the Batista dictatorship.  At this 
club I met others like myself, with passports, listening to briefings and impatiently eager to leave 
for Spain.”
48
  Work by Communists played a vital role in the recruitment and support of Cuban 
volunteers who left from New York, and the C.P.U.S.A. maintained close ties with the Club 
Mella.  James W. Ford, a prominent African-American C.P.U.S.A. leader, played a particularly 
important role as a liaison between the U.S. Party, the Club Mella, and Cuban activists.  Many 
interpersonal and organizational connections existed between the Club Mella and the 
Communists, and recruitment at the club for the International Brigades responded to the call 
from the Comintern; however, the recruitment did not depend solely upon Party members.  It 
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succeeded in large part due to a strong sense of solidarity with the Spanish Republican cause 
among New York’s Latin Americans without specific political affiliation other than 
antifascism.
49
  Just as was the case on the island, Cubans in New York who volunteered to go to 
Spain tended to have some level of connection to the Communist Party, but many were not Party 
members. 
The large initial group of Cubans volunteers who left from New York joined the U.S. 
Abraham Lincoln Battalion, the 17
th
 Battalion of the XV International Brigade (which would 
come to be known as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade).  The 17
th
 Battalion was a unit “composed 
of men from every State of the Union, Cuba and South America,”
50
 and the XV Brigade was “the 
genuine representation of the Popular Front of the world,” inclusive of “Britishers, Americans, 
Canadians, Cubans, Argentines, Catalans, Spaniards: men of all races and colors, men of 26 
nations” in one account,
51
 “plucky U.S., British, Cuban and Canuck lads” in another.
52
  A 
celebratory description of the XV I.B. published in Madrid in 1938, The Book of the XV Brigade, 
emphasized the diversity of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion’s members and acknowledged 
specifically the presence in its ranks of Latin Americans: “Some were young, some middle-aged; 
some workers, some professionals, writers and artists; some college boys and some teachers; 
some native born Americans for a dozen generations whose ancestors fought in the American 
Revolution of 1776, others born in various parts of Europe or Latin America—just an average 
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group of Americans.”  A more detailed description of the various origins of the members of the 
Lincoln Battalion in this propaganda publication listed Cubans—along with Greek, Cypriot, 
Dutch, and Egyptian volunteers—under the category of “other nationalities,”
53
 and the book’s 
authors printed a photograph (Figure 2.9) depicting “some of the Cuban comrades.”
54
   
 
 
Figure 2.9 Photograph of “some of the Cuban comrades” in the XV Brigade 
 
The Cubans, The Book of the XV Brigade noted, were “exiled from their native island, 
escaping the terror groups of Batista.”  The authors of this English-language publication repeated 
the common Cuban antifascist narrative of continuity between the struggle against strongman 
governance on the island and the pro-Republican fight in Spain. “Inspired by a hatred of tyranny,” 
it stated of the Cuban volunteers, “realising how Batista had turned Cuba into a hell of Fascist 
terror, they were determined to come to grips with International Fascism whose disciple Batista 
                                                     
53
 Commissariat of War, The Book of the XV Brigade: Records of British, American, Canadian, and Irish 









  The periodical of the English-speaking members of the International Brigades, The 
Volunteer for Liberty, drew the same connection between Spain and its former colony.  “Many 
Cubans have given their lives and many more will continue to sacrifice themselves fighting with 
the Loyal Spanish people against the forces of fascism that would want to enslave a free people,” 
the publication stated in February 1938.  “With fascism driven out of Spain once and for all, the 
Cubans know that it will mean the gathering of forces to destroy fascism in the rest of the world.  
A victory for the Republic would be a death blow to Batista’s fascist aspirations.  The Cuban 
people, too, are waiting to strike for freedom.”
56
 
The Cuban members of the Lincoln Battalion commemorated this perceived continuity 
between the Cuban struggle and the Spanish conflict when they named the “Cuban Section” of 
the 17
th
 Battalion the “Centuria Antonio Guiteras” after the martyred leader of Joven Cuba, a 
central radical organization in the island’s domestic fight.  Cuban exiles of diverse political 
backgrounds gathered at the Club Mella on 8 May 1936 to commemorate the one-year 
anniversary of Guiteras’s death.  Once the Spanish conflict began, they gathered there again and 
began to organize a military unit to further commemorate Guiteras by fighting for the Spanish 
Republic in his name.  The Centuria “consisted of young men who belonged to the ‘Julio Mella’ 
Cuban Club of New York City,” stated a 1938 article in The Volunteer for Liberty.
57
  Many of 
them were inspired to go to Spain by Pablo de la Torriente Brau’s example, according to Cuban 
historian Ana Suárez Díaz, who has researched and written about both Torriente and the Centuria 
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Guiteras.  Torriente left for Spain even before the call of the Comintern for foreign participation 
in the Spanish conflict and the inauguration of the International Brigades; thus he represents the 
particularly Cuban motivations for involvement in the struggle and the movement of Cuban 
activists from political stagnation and exile into the pro-Republican cause.  Joven Cuba, the 
domestic activist group Guiteras led, had a complicated and not always friendly relationship with 
the Cuban Communist Party.  Suárez D az sees the Centuria as a “complex culmination of the 
heterogeneous political ideology displayed by that Cuban exile of 1935–1936,” a continuity for a 
group of Cubans “who instead of returning to Cuba, chose to transfer to a new stage of political 
struggle: the Spanish people's war against fascism.”  The choice of Guiteras as a symbol, 
“articulated as an ideal in the political imagination of a group of Cubans precisely in 1937,” 
Suárez Díaz points out, complicates in particular our understanding of the role of Communist 
influence.  The men responded to a call by the Comintern and the C.P.U.S.A. sponsored them, 
yet they chose as their martyr and symbol the leader of a Cuban radical group engaged in 
specific domestic problems, rather than any Communist figure—rather than, say, Mella, who was 
a founding member of the Cuban Party.  And they were by no means uniformly Communists.  
Some, Suárez Díaz notes, like Torriente, were “by temperament in the revolution, and by the 
same temperament could not belong to the Communist Party.”
58
  Instead of conformity to Party 
membership, many of the exiled Cuban activists adhered to an ideal of revolutionary manhood 
symbolized by Guiteras; they were “Cubans who wanted to match that courage and bravery in 
the fight, now against the universal enemy: fascism.” 
59
  U.S. volunteer John Tisa observed the 
Cubans’ political diversity, as well as the connection they saw between their domestic struggle 
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and Spain’s.  Some were Communists, some “had Marxist sympathies,” and others “were just 
against Batista for his cruelties and let it go at that.”  They “loved to sing anti-Batista and 
revolutionary songs and did so at the club in Harlem, on the ocean in time with the gentle sway 
of the ship, and in Spain at the training bases,” Tisa remembered.  “Each Cuban had his own 
blood-curdling story of life in Cuba under the fierce dictatorship, and each was going to Spain on 
a personal mission to fight fascism, for to them the defeat of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco would 
be their vengeance on their own dictator, Batista.”  Referring to their U.S. exile, Tisa assessed 




The first group of Cuban volunteers to leave from the island for Spain departed on 15 
April 1937, Nicolau González remembered, several months after the first group from the United 
States.  In keeping with the initial specifications of the call for volunteers, the Cubans in this first 
group were military specialists.  Although they had been officials of the Cuban armed forces, 
they had, the director of recruitment was careful to note, “clean records.”
61
  Documents from the 
International Brigades archive of Moscow corroborate his memory of the group, showing that 
these volunteers, processed on 17 May 1937, were former military men involved in radical 
politics on the island.  Thus this group, too, demonstrates continuity between Cuban domestic 
struggles of the early 1930s and the effort to support the Spanish Republic.  One member of the 
group, Andrés González Lanuza, a 44-year-old captain, wrote on a biographical questionnaire in 
Spain that he was involved in Joven Cuba and had “taken an active part in the Cuban revolution 
against fascism,” presumably a reference to the anti-Machado fight, and perhaps also the early 
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struggle against Batista.  Another called “Don” Julio Valdés Cofiño had served in the Cuban 
military for 13 years and had taken part in all the anti-reactionary fights on the island, according 
to an unattributed typed note.  He and Pedro Dalmau Naranjo, a 35-year-old lieutenant, had at 
one point been condemned to death back home.  The whole group, stated correspondence 
between an official of the 11
th
 Division of the Republican forces and the Central Committee of 
the the Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party, or P.C.E.), “are persecuted for 
their fight against Yankee imperialism.”  These facts seem to have been offered as proof of their 
worthiness upon their entrance into the Republican fight, “although they did not belong to the 
C[ommunist] P[arty] of Cuba.”
62
  Thus credentials for solidarity overlapped and intertwined: 
Communists in Spain might deem worthy of the Republican fight non-Communist Cubans with 
loyalty to and experience in anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial struggles.  Glossing over 
significant political complexity regarding Batista’s role in the anti-Machado struggle, The 
Volunteer for Liberty assessed the participation of Cuban military personnel in the pro-
Republican fight, commenting: “It appears that in the Cuban Services reactionary political 
opinion is by no means as stable as in the forces of the imperialist countries.  After all, it is not 
long since the Army and Navy were fighting on the side of revolution.  For this reason many 




To summarize, recruitment of Cubans for the Spanish conflict had a number of notable 
characteristics.  It encompassed a good deal of political and ideological diversity, though mostly 
                                                     
62
 Andrés González Lanuza, “Biograf a Militar,” 17 May 1937, File 594; “Don Julio Valdés Cofiño,” 
undated, File 603; Pedro Dalmau Naranjo, “Biograf a Militar,” 17 May 1937, File 590; Jefe de Estado 
Mayor to Delegación del Comité Central del P.C., 20 May 1937, File 590, RGASPI. 
63




on the left side of the spectrum.  The Communist Parties of several countries played an important 
role in bringing both Communist and non-Communist volunteers to Spain.  Many who 
volunteered saw their action in so doing as a continuity of the Cuban domestic fight more than as 
an example of internationalism.  Their sense of political continuity between the Cuban and 
Spanish struggles was bolstered by longstanding ties between the two countries.  And 
networks—those organized around political activism as well as those constructed by 
transnational migratory lives—proved vital in the recruitment efforts.  The case of famous 
Republican military leader Enrique Lister illustrates many of these points.  Bringing the Cuban-
Spanish connection full circle, Lister had “spent many years and learned much on the Cuban 
Island.”
64
  An article in The Volunteer for Liberty entitled “Enrique Lister—An Emigrant Comes 
Home” discussed the connection as embodied by Lister.  “No, Lister is not a Cuban,” it stated, 
“but he is one of the thousands of Spaniards who emigrated to the Americas looking for a pot of 
gold at the foot of a foreign rainbow.  Like thousands of these thousands, Lister did not find gold.  
In Cuba he found only hard work, low pay, and dreams that didn't come true.”  He arrived on the 
island at the age of 12, and his days as a “grocery boy and a stone-cutter” taught him, the article 
claimed, that “the main use which America has for foreigners is to make of them a reserve of 
cheap labor to do the hardest and dirtiest work for the lowest pay.”  He learned about those who 
have plenty and those who have nothing, and in 1925 when he was 18 years old he took part in 
organizing the stone-cutters union, the article noted, before returning to his native Galicia the 
next year, where authorities targeted him as a dangerous radical.  Now “one of the great 
commanders of the People’s Army,” the article concluded, Lister brought back from the 
Caribbean not a pot of gold, but rather “a mind and a heart full of the strength which people pour 
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into the channels of unionization and into organized action for the creation of a democracy where 
Fascism cannot exist.”
65
  These mentions of Lister’s experience in Cuba highlight the migratory 
connections between Spain and the island, and suggest that—in an interpretation mirroring that 
which Cuban activists made—Spaniards had revolutionary lessons to learn from Cubans, too. 
 
The Cuban Experience in Spain 
As they had in New York City, Cubans volunteering in Spain established a Club Cubano 
Julio Antonio Mella in Barcelona, which, we have seen, Nicolau González visited it during his 
time in Spain.  On its walls, they hung portraits of their martyred heroes, Mella and Torriente, as 
shown in this photograph (Figure 2.10) published in the Cuban magazine Mediodía.
66
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Figure 2.10 Photograph taken at the Club Cubano Julio Antonio Mella in Barcelona 
 
Like its counterpart in New York, the Catalán Club Mella was a place of transnational exchange.  
John Tisa called the club “a busy center for visiting North and South Americans, for those on 
temporary leave and looking for something to do, and for those passing through on their way to 
the States.”
67
  He remembered meeting at “the Cuban club” with volunteers from various 
countries.
68
  The club was also a location for political discussion where, Tisa recalled, “we sat 
around and talked with some of the members about the course of the war, world developments, 
and the bold and tireless activities of many Cubans in various units of the army.”
69
  And finally, 
the club was a place for socializing where, according to Tisa, the Cubans threw dance parties all 
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the time.  Though elsewhere the Cubans were celebrated by fellow volunteers for their good 
music and good cheer, Tisa came to feel somewhat negative about the frequent merrymaking in 
1938 as the Republicans continued to lose ground in the conflict.  In one diary entry from June 
he wrote of the club: “The city is set on fire from the sky, yet people still dance.”  In another 
from September that year: “Of course, there was the usual music for anyone who cared to dance.  
With the uncertain way the war is going, I don’t know how anyone can enjoy dancing and 
because of this I left [the Cuban club] for headquarters in a bad humor.”
70
  The Barcelona club 
was built upon an earlier experience with exile, the club of the same name built by Cuban exiles 
in New York City.  It had a transnational character, serving as a place in which people of diverse 
backgrounds came together for exchange.  It was inspired by and commemorated a past martyr, 
one who was both an important figure in the island’s domestic struggle and a Communist.  It was 
a site of political engagement but also of socializing and gaiety.  It had a positive impact and was 
praised; but it also garnered criticism occasionally.  These characteristics of the Cuban club 
exemplify the Cuban experience volunteering in Spain. 
 Here we will explore the Cuban experience fighting for the Republic during the war, 
illustrating broad trends with individual examples.  We will see the ways in which some Cuban 
volunteers drew upon prior experience in exile.  We will consider how transnational identities 
gave some Cuban volunteers unique opportunities and advantages during the conflict, and 
examine the transnational exchange they experienced.  We will continue to study the diversity of 
the group, including political and ideological diversity and the tension between Cuban domestic 
activism and internationalism, such as Communism.  We will note the ways in which Cuban 
volunteers came to be celebrated by their comrades in Spain and by observers on the island and 
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in the United States—and how these celebratory accounts served as an important organizing tool 
for activists—but also the ways in which they went astray from expressed ideals and drew 
rebuke. By examining the multiple motivations causing Cubans to volunteer and the various 
gains they enjoyed by so doing, we observe both the sincerity of idealistic commitment and the 
complexity of human participation. 
The case of Dr. Eduardo Odio Pérez exemplifies the ways in which prior experience in 
domestic activism and in exile led some Cubans to volunteer for the Spanish Republic.  Odio 
Pérez was older and more highly educated than most Cuban volunteers, but in that he had a 
longstanding commitment to Cuban political activism and spent a period of time in exile prior to 
the Spanish conflict, his experience is similar to that of many of his compatriots.  The nature of 
the historical source material on Odio Pérez, too, is exemplary, in that it highlights the 
importance of transnational connections and complex political realities in shaping what we know 
about Cuban volunteers in Spain.  We know a good deal about Odio Pérez due in large part to the 
correspondence he kept during the 1960s and 1970s with U.S. volunteer and nurse Fredericka 
Martin, who traveled to Spain with the Cuban and served alongside him in the American Medical 
Bureau (A.M.B.) there.   
The doctor was born in Santiago de Cuba in 1893
71
 to a family one source called “petit-
bourgeois.”
72
  Like many Cubans of his era, Eduardo lived a transnational life, moving across 
                                                     
71
 Multiple primary sources produced by Odio Pérez himself confirm this information.  Odio Pérez, 
“Solicitud de Paso o Ingreso en el Partido Comunista Español (Sección de la Internacional Comunista),” 
9 November 1937, File 598, RGASPI; Dr. Oscar Telge to Comarade Commandant de la Base, 8 
December 1937, File 598, RGASPI; Odio Pérez, “Biograf a de Militantes,” 5 March 1938, File 598, 
RGASPI; Odio Pérez, “Biographical Statistics of the Personnel of the American Medical Bureau and Co-
Workers,” survey sent by Fredericka Martin, 1968, Folder 5, Box 2, Fredericka Martin Papers, ALBA 
001.  The last of these sources is undated, but correspondence indicates that Martin sent the blank survey 
to Odio Pérez in October 1968 and the doctor returned it completed to her in December of the same year.  
In contradiction with these primary sources, the book Cuba y la defensa gives his birth year as 1901.  




national borders frequently starting at an early age.  He attended primary school in Santiago de 
Cuba and secondary school in Far Rockaway, New York, then pursued medical training at the 
University of Havana, Loyola University (1917), and Chicago Memorial Hospital, earning an 
M.D.  He married a Cuban woman in 1919.
73
  An A.M.B. press release that is undated but likely 
from 1938 described his professional medical background.  Dr. Odio Pérez, it stated, “was chief 
of the Disinfection and Sanitation Health Department in Havana from 1933 to 1935.”
74
  A 
biographical survey he completed in Spain in 1938 confirms his employment history as “head of 
disinfection” in Havana, and notes that his salary for this work was $200–1000.
75
 
The A.M.B. press release described the doctor’s politics, stating that he “was a member 
of the Central Committee of the Agrarian Party (P.A.N.) in Cuba and was forced to flee his 
native land because of his political activity.”
76
  His interest in activism began in 1927 during 
“political revolutions in Cuba,” the anti-Machado struggle.  He went into political exile twice 
before Machado’s downfall, in 1930 and 1932, the latter time in Central America.
77
  In February 
1930 a group of doctors protested a planned homage to Machado.  The event divided the 
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Federación Médica Cubana (Cuban Medical Federation), with some members supporting it and 
others vehemently opposed.  Odio Pérez was one of the leaders of the latter group, helping to 
organize a protest letter to the Federation’s executive.  An editorial in the New York City 
Spanish-language periodical Gráfico on 15 February 1930 concluded that, though the tribute 
event would take place despite the protest, the Cuban people would know that “honorable 
doctors” did not support it.
78
  Odio Pérez noted with pride in his 1938 Spanish biographical 
survey that he “renounced Cuban Medical Federation with other companions for giving this 
homage to tyrant Machado.”  On the survey he remembered the date of this event as 1929.
79
  The 
doctor stood before trial courts in Havana in 1929 and 1930, accused of conspiracy and illegal 
publication.  Declared to be a rebel, he spent three days in jail before being freed on bail.  He 
received amnesty in 1932.
80
  In June of that year secret police agents foiled a plot by “Dr. 
Eduardo Odio, revolutionary by profession,” and others to stage an armed expedition from 
Honduras to Cuba.  The group planned to land in Pinar del Río and join forces with troops led by 
General Mario García Menocal against Machado, an article in La prensa of San Antonio, Texas 
reported on June 9, 1932.  Members of the failed mission including Colonel Carlos Mendieta, the 
report stated, were imprisoned on the Isle of Pines.
81
  A few years later Mendieta would be 
among those the doctor protested.   
With a wife and three children, Dr. Odio Pérez found himself in exile again in 1935 in 
New York City because of his participation in the “struggle against the Machado Government,” 
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  The post-Revolutionary Cuban book on the involvement in Spain, Cuba y la 
defensa de la República Española, stated that he was exiled due to his involvement in the March 
1935 strike.
83
  He remembered attending May Day celebrations in New York City that spring.
84
  
In October Odio Pérez, identified in his capacity as a representative of the Partido Agrario 
Nacional (National Agrarian Party, or P.A.N.), spoke at a city meeting of Cuban exiles and their 
supporters against the “government of Caffery-Batista-Mendieta,” a triumvirate of U.S. 
Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, military strongman, and puppet president identified as “traitorous 
to Cuban nationalism and an instrument of Yankee imperialism.”  The doctor argued that the 
“lands of the guajiro” had been “robbed by the North American companies.”  Members of Joven 
Cuba, the Partido Revolucionario Cubano – Auténtico (“Authentic” Cuban Revolutionary Party), 
the Organización Revolucionaria Cubana Anti-imperialista (Cuban Revolutionary Anti-
imperialist Organization, or O.R.C.A.), and Nacionalista Puertorriqueño (the Puerto Rican 
nationalist movement) attended the meeting, held at a dancehall at 146
th
 Street and Broadway.  
U.S. writer Carleton Beals sent a supportive telegram to the meeting calling for triumph of 
revolution in Cuba before Christmas.  Odio Pérez spoke alongside at least two other future 
Spanish Civil War volunteers from Cuba: Pablo de la Torriente Brau and Joaquín Ordoqui.
85
  
During his time in New York, the doctor also became a member of the Club Julio Antonio 
Mella.
86
  All of these examples of involvement demonstrate that the doctor was a committed 
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participant in Cuba’s domestic struggle and in the continuation of that struggle in exile in New 
York.  He was not a Communist, but rather, as a member of one revolutionary Cuban political 
party, the P.A.N., a participant in a broad coalition of activists against Machado, Batista, and U.S. 
neocolonialism that included Communists and diverse leftists, and that had connections with U.S. 
activists as well. 
Odio Pérez remembered attending an exposition of ambulances and information about the 
Spanish Civil War at Madison Square Garden.
87
  The gathering he recalled was probably the 
reception for Spanish Republican Ambassador Fernando de los Ríos, which took place on 4 
January 1937.  The New York Times reported that approximately 16,000 people attended the 
meeting organized by the “United Spanish Societies, an organization of fraternal and benevolent 
groups in the Spanish colonies of the metropolitan area.”  At the meeting, the A.M.B. presented 
four ambulances “to the Spanish Leftist government,” A.M.B. members pushing two of the 
vehicles into the hall amid applause.
88
  “I could appreciate it was a serious and strong 
organization,” the Cuban doctor noted, and so he applied to volunteer with the first A.M.B. 
group to leave for Spain.
89
  His remembrance states that “several days after” the event at 
Madison Square Garden, his group left for Spain.
90
  In fact, as noted above, the A.M.B. group 
that included Martin and Odio Pérez left New York for Europe on 16 January, twelve days after 
the rally at the Garden.   
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When the “Biographical Statistics” survey asked him years later to give his “motives” for 
going to Spain, Odio Pérez listed “humanitarian” reasons and “political awareness.”  Elaborating, 
he wrote that his political motive was that “we could not do much in Cuba or in U.S.A., helping 
to win the war in Spain, it was much easi[e]r [than] to knock down Machado.”  Given the 
chronology of events, Odio Pérez likely meant to write Batista here rather than Machado, whom 
he had helped to pressure out of office in 1933.  In this statement, Odio Pérez articulated 
explicitly the continuity, as he saw it, between Cuba’s domestic struggle in which he had been 
deeply involved and the new fight across the ocean to which he went voluntarily.  The idea of a 
flow of revolutionary activity diverted from the island to the Republican cause in Spain is 
reminiscent of the view we have seen expressed by Torriente and others.  Additionally, and on a 
more personal note, the doctor remembered that he was in a terrible economic situation at the 
time, trying to support his wife and three children.  This final stated motive suggests that the 
doctor received payment, compensation, and/or support for his family in exchange for his A.M.B. 
service.  Indeed, when he returned to the United States and ran into trouble with immigration 
officials, it seems that the Communist Party helped get him home to Cuba.  A faint recollection 
about his deportation recorded by Odio Pérez in the questionnaire he prepared for Martin sheds 
light on his connection to larger networks and with one U.S. figure of particular importance to 
New York City’s Cuban exiles: “My expenses from New York to Cuba I really do not know 
because I spoke about it to the negroe [sic] leader of the communist party of New York, I think 
his name was Ford.”
91
 
 African-American C.P.U.S.A. leader James W. Ford, served as an important point of 
contact between U.S. and Cuban activists during the Spanish Civil War.  An “old friend of Cuba 
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and the Cubans,” as the Cuban periodical Mediodía put it, Ford helped to recruit Cuban 
volunteers in New York and to promote the cause of the Spanish Republic and the activism of 
the Cuban Communist Party on the island.  He praised Cuban involvement in the fighting in an 
interview published in Mediodía in July 1937 under the title “Cuba puede estar orgullosa de sus 
hijos” (“Cuba can be proud of her sons”).  Ford called the Centuria Guiteras “one of the most 
important [units] of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion and at the rate it’s going, soon to become an 
independent body, one of those bastions of global democracy that are deciding the fight against 
fascism in the bloody Iberian Peninsula.”
 
  He described how Cuban volunteer Alejandro “Cheo” 
Anceaume, who had been left for dead for several days due to an error by some stretcher-bearers 
and had lost an eye, joked with him about his glass eye, demonstrating “the extent to which the 
Cuban can maintain his sense of humor.”  Cubans who had never been soldiers advanced against 
the armies of Germany and Italy and made the enemy retreat, Ford reported Anceaume as saying.  
Other individual Cuban volunteers Ford singled out to honor included Dr. Odio Pérez and 
baseball player Basilio Cueria.  Describing the former, Ford praised the doctor’s intelligence and 
dedication to the independence of Cuba.  It made a good impression on him, he stated, “finding 
such a loyal representative of the Cuban intelligentsia caring for wounded Americans and 
Cubans on the front.”  Lauding the latter, Ford noted that, in an achievement probably related to 
his sports career, Cueria had “been promoted for his heroic actions as a grenade launcher.”  
Remembering seeing him play baseball in New York, Ford commented that back then he “put 
the ball…where he wanted” and thus, “[l]ong before leaving for Spain…Basilio Cueria was a 
potential grenade launcher.”  Now, Ford concluded, Cueria had “put his craft, with all his heart, 
in the service of the Spanish people and of world democracy.”  In addition to the bravery of the 




prowess of the athlete, Ford celebrated the Cuban volunteers for their good cheer and good music.  
The Cubans, he noted, “always bring the note of happiness to the trenches.  The Creole music 
brings a note of color in the middle of horrible war.  The Cubans have a magnificent pianist 
Arsenio Brunet, a violinist Gustavo Rodríguez, and lack neither a maracas player nor a master of 
the bongo.”  Ford’s effusive celebration of the Cuban volunteers portrays a diverse range of 
individuals and a number of specific traits for which the Cubans were often celebrated by their 
peers: bravery, good humor and good cheer, intelligence, political dedication, fighting ability, 
athleticism, and musical talent.  That the U.S. Communist reported to Cuban readers about 
Cuban volunteers he had visited and observed in Spain highlights the transnational nature of the 
interpersonal connections and networks on which Cuban antifascism was built.  As Ford’s Cuban 
interviewer noted, Ford’s praise was for “the boys who, from New York and Havana, embarked 
for Spain demonstrating that on our island there are many men—very many—who do not 
recognize borders when it comes to defending a noble and just cause.”
92
 
 Previous experience crossing borders and the ties between Spain and Cuba played 
important parts in the experience of the Cuban volunteers, putting all of them—and especially 
those who had lived in the United States—in a unique position relative to many other 
international volunteers.  Cuba’s history as a recent former Spanish colony—and the linguistic, 
cultural, and familial ties between the two nations that resulted from this history—as well as the 
close connections and frequent migration between the island and the United States presented 
volunteers from the island with potential advantages over and opportunities relative to other 
foreigners in Spain. 
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First of all, Cubans understood the language of the conflict.  In all the celebration of the 
International Brigades and the unity and solidarity they represented, it was at times easy to 
overlook the practical problem their participation created.  Part of what made the International 
Brigades so notable to Spaniards was their foreignness.  As one 1938 article in a military unit 
periodical put it, people from the little villages close to the International Brigades base “stared in 
amazement at the strange men who spoke unintelligible languages.”  And not only did they speak 
a different language than that of their host nation but also they spoke all different languages from 
one another.  The work of the pro-Republican fighters in Spain thus suffered from the same 
affliction as that of the biblical builders of the Tower of Babel.  Language, the article noted, was 
“a very difficult barrier to cross,” particularly on the field of battle.
93
  The difficulties of 
communication between people of different tongues were amplified under the stressful, chaotic, 
and often terrifying conditions of war.  Cubans did not have this problem of simple 
incomprehension, and their advantage in this regard could be the difference between life and 
death. 
Sharing a common language with their hosts gave Cubans not only an advantage but also 
an enhanced opportunity to contribute to the cause.  Spanish instruction was part of the education 
program within the International Brigades.  “Culture Militias” offered daily Spanish classes 
meant to teach international volunteers military vocabulary, phrases common in daily life, and a 
solid grammatical base.  Bridging the language gap was important not only for practical reasons 
but also for ideological and political ones.  As foreign volunteers developed their Spanish 
language skills, one article celebrating the Culture Militias noted, the “comrades of different 
nationalities found in our manner of speaking the formidable bond of unity that was lacking for 
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  In other words, being able to speak to one another was a foundation of solidarity.  
And facilitating this ability was a helpful role certain Cubans could play in Spain.  Many of the 
Cubans had bilingual language abilities from time spent living in the United States, and this fact 
placed the volunteers in a vitally important position.  They could teach Spanish to volunteers 
who spoke English, the many individuals who came from the United States, Canada, Great 
Britain, Ireland, and elsewhere.  For example, Cuban Oscar Soler, a combat volunteer who ended 
up working in medicine after spending time in the hospital at Villa Paz/Saelices, tutored the U.S. 
nurse he met there, Fredericka Martin.  In a letter he wrote to her after the conflict in June 1939, 
Soler called himself Martin’s “Spanish professor.”  Writing in Spanish, he prodded her as a 
concerned teacher to practice her language ability in her reply; “since I suppose you will not 
have forgotten it,” he instructed her affectionately, “I want, when you reply to me, that you do so 
in Spanish.”
95
   
In addition to serving as a Spanish instructor, Soler worked as a translator in the military 
hospitals during the conflict, exemplifying another important function served by bilingual 
Cubans.  For all the language instruction going on, many English-speaking volunteers still 
struggled to understand and to be understood.  Bilingual Cubans could save the day at moments 
when important communication was lost in translation.  U.S. volunteer John Tisa recalled one 
such episode in his memoir.  One day, he remembered, a volunteer from New York serving as 
quartermaster for his battalion called in an order for food items.  “His diction as yet was far from 
perfect and he was misunderstood.”  Instead of the request for jamón, or ham, which he thought 
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he was making, an “order was placed for a hundred pounds of jabón—soap.”  Fortunately, Tisa 
recalled, someone in Madrid thought the order sounded odd and called back to check.  “A Cuban 
got on the line,” Tisa concluded with relief, “and thanks to him we ate ham.”
96
  We can imagine 
Spaniards, Cubans, and volunteers from the United States having a good chuckle over this 
misunderstanding, especially since it was resolved before anyone on the front lines went 
hungry—but it is representative of a persistent problem that plagued the international forces.  
And it demonstrates the way in which the transnational identities of Cuban volunteers who 
traveled to Spain from the United States equipped them to play a critical translation role during 
the conflict. 
Cubans served not only as linguistic but also as cultural translators.  Though they were 
foreigners in Spain, their country’s close historical connection with Spain made them somewhat 
less foreign than other international volunteers.  They could integrate into the host community 
with an effortless ease unavailable to their compatriots.  English-language observations and 
remembrances of the Cubans often made note of this ability.  In the village of Villanueva de la 
Jara, location of the training headquarters for the Americans, the men of the Centuria Guiteras 
impressed their U.S. counterparts when they “quickly established rapport with the villagers 
through a shared language.”
97
  U.S. volunteers had a more difficult time fitting in in the small 
town.  “Language, at first, was a barrier, but it was surmounted with the aid of the Cuban 
volunteers, who never tired of helping,” remembered John Tisa.
98
  Cubans, stated another U.S. 
volunteer, deserved credit for “the winning of the villagers’ goodwill.”  They “acted as 
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interpreters for the other volunteers.  They were a very amiable group—personable and 
simpatico in the truest Spanish sense.  With the Americans they were warmly welcomed and 
invited to dine in village homes.”
99
  These accounts of the Cubans’ ability to meld into the 
Spanish communities that hosted international volunteers celebrate them for this attribute, and 
illustrate the importance of their role as translators for other foreign volunteers.  Their ability to 
serve as interpreters and cultural liaisons between English-speaking volunteers and Spaniards 
was helpful both on the combat front and in the daily life of international volunteers in Spain. 
The so-called Spanish Battalion of the XV I.B. (the 24
th
, later the 59
th
) was another site in 
which Cuban volunteers were able to integrate relatively seamlessly with their Spanish hosts.  
The Batallón Español consisted primarily of Spaniards; but, noted the 35
th
 Division periodical 
Reconquista, alongside them were “other sons of Spain, those who feel palpitating in their soul 
the desire for complete freedom. CUBA.”  The article stated approvingly: “The sensibility of the 
moral values of the beautiful Antillean country is among us.”  There were a few Greek, Polish, 
and U.S. volunteers in the “group of courageous fighters,” the article noted, but Spaniards and 
Cubans made up its bulk.  These men of different nationalities spoke the same language, the 
article stated idealistically: the language of liberty, their common cause.  In reality, of course, 
they did not actually all speak the same language.  The Spanish Battalion may have been 
“[a]uthentically Spanish[,] [o]f soul and of sentiments,” as the article claimed, but in fact it was a 
cultural and linguistic jumble just like the rest of the International Brigades.  Surely the Cubans’ 
ability to integrate with the Spaniards in the unit contributed to the positive feelings the hosts so 
readily expressed in their assessments of their Caribbean brethren.
100
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Recognizing this special position of the Cubans and other Latin Americans, the 
Republicans welcomed them into the regular armed forces as well as the International Brigades.  
Cuban recruitment coordinator Nicolau González recalled that the leaders of the Spanish 
Communist Party “conceived of the idea of placing in the regular Spanish army all Latin 
American fighters that wished” to serve there.  “This determination was met with overwhelming 
joy by our fighters,” Nicolau González remembered.  And it was based upon “positive factors 
such as the identity of language and other characteristics common to Spaniards and natives of 
their former colonies.”
101
  The Latin Americans may have been international, but they were not 
quite foreign, as were other international volunteers; and among the Latin Americans, the 
Cubans were some of the most familiar, due to their late independence and the extensive 
migration between their country and Spain. 
A third advantage many Cubans enjoyed in Spain was their ability to pass as Spaniards if 
doing so would benefit them in a given situation.  Posing as Spaniards—or taking advantage, in 
some cases, of identities that were in fact ambiguous due to the close ties between the two 
countries—gave Cubans a way around the non-intervention policies that made getting to Spain 
difficult for many foreign volunteers.  For example, the Cuban medical volunteer Pía Mastellari 
Maecha, female companion of Dr. Luis Díaz Soto who also volunteered in Spain, pretended to be 
Spanish in order to enter the country.  “For my trip to Spain a Spanish woman’s passport was 
facilitated for me,” she reported in a letter from Barcelona in March 1938 requesting assistance 
from the Communist Party of Spain in orchestrating a similar arrangement for the trip home.  
Like many other Cubans of her era, Pía had a complex transnational identity.  Her father was 
Italian, and she was born in Mexico.  She moved to Cuba with her family when she was a child 
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and became a citizen upon reaching adulthood.  For her trip to Spain, though, she became “Mar a 
Garc a,” a Spanish woman, and entered the country without incident.  Leaving, however, turned 
out to be more difficult even though she and her partner had strong ties with the Communist 
Party.  She was forced to remain in Spain for a time after his departure due to the fact that she 
did not have “documents with which to obtain a legal passport,” and therefore the consulate 
refused to issue her one.  She was delayed “until the situation with the passport was clarified.”
102
  
Nevertheless, her relatively easy entrance into the country would not have been nearly as simple 
had she not been a native Spanish speaker, an advantage which Cuban volunteers enjoyed over 
their compatriots who did not share a language and culture with the country they sought to enter.   
On the other hand, Cubans could fall back on their foreignness in situations in which 
being Spanish would put them at a disadvantage.  One important time at which this ability served 
them well was at the end of the conflict.  Foreign volunteers began to head home en masse late in 
1938, as Nationalist victory loomed.  Many of those who did not make it out in time ended up in 
French concentration camps along with Spanish refugees, while other international combatants 
were imprisoned in Spain.  Back home on the island, activists petitioned the Cuban government 
to assist in freeing and bringing home these Cuban volunteers.  One such petition appeared in 
November 1938, produced at an enormous assembly held by Cuban Communists in Havana’s 
Polar Stadium, and “signed” by the “80,000 attendees of the rally.”  The Communists and fellow 
travelers gathered in the stadium petitioned the Cuban secretary of state, requesting official 
action to help liberate “the Cuban combatants made prisoners by the fascists in the land of 
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  A photograph (Figure 2.11) published in the commemorative book Cuba en España 
published on the island shows a group of activists standing on the front steps of the Cuban 
capitol building with a banner admonishing congressmen that the life or death of 250 Cubans 
depended upon their consciences.  The book notes that they organized the action on behalf of 


























Figure 2.11 Cuban activists petition congressmen on the 
island to assist imprisoned Cuban volunteers 
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Due in part to the intervention of foreign activists and governments, as well as to their 
citizenship status, international volunteers had a relatively easier time than Spaniards arranging 
to get transport to other countries.  Spanish Republicans fleeing were refugees seeking new 
homes for an unknown length of time, whereas Cubans wanted simply to return home to the 
island or resume their lives in exile.  One example of a Cuban volunteer who had married a 
Spanish woman illustrates the advantage the foreign volunteer had over the Spanish Republican 
at the end of the war.   Oscar Soler, introduced above as a linguistic and cultural translator, found 
himself in June 1939 in the Camp de Gurs in the region of Aquitaine in southwestern France.  He 
wrote to his friend U.S. nurse Fredericka Martin with sarcasm: “You know already that I am a 
guest of the French government and that they take very good care of me.”  At this time, it seems, 
he still had hope that he would travel after leaving the camp to the United States, where he had 
lived before the war.
105
  By August, though, he was in Havana.  He did not get his first choice of 
locations, and his life in Cuba was very hard.  “I never know where I’m going to eat of where 
I’m going to sleep,” he wrote.  No one—no group—could assist him, he stated, because the 
“organizations are all broke + the Party can not [sic] render any help as the Party is without 
funds.”
106
  In October he stated: “I’m trying very hard to get out of here + get back to the United 
States but somehow I can never get enough money together for the fare.”
107
  At least, however, 
he was out of harm’s way; his Spanish wife was still stuck in a concentration camp in France.
108
  
He had hoped his friends in the United States would help him raise money to bring her to Cuba, 
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and then the Cuban Department of State had informed him that the government would have her 
on a ship to the island by the end of August.
109
  Two months later, however, she was still in the 
camp.  “I’ve been worrying a lot about my wife who is still in France as there is not a way to get 
her here on account of the war,” Soler confided to his friend.  The Cuban government, he now 
believed, was working to arrange for some U.S. ships to take Cubans stuck in France to the 
United States and then on to Cuba, and his wife might be included in this group, but it would 
probably take a long time and “nothing effective” had yet been done.  Winter approached, he 
lamented, and his wife was “in a very cold region of France” and probably lacked “the necessary 
things to protec[t] her from the cold.”
110
  The record of Soler’s concerns ends here, and we are 
left to wonder if his Spanish wife was ever able to make it to the Americas. 
 Beginning with the martyrdom of iconic volunteer Torriente, positive reports of the 
experience of Cuban volunteers in Spain inspired new recruits to join the fight.  Celebratory 
accounts served as propaganda, an organizing tool used to recruit both new volunteers to travel 
to Spain and new antifascist and pro-Republican activists at home and in exile.  On the island 
Mediodía, begun in June 1936 and edited by Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén, and Facetas de 
Actualidad Española, begun in April 1937 specifically to bring news of the war to the island, 
celebrated Cuban volunteers—those who served in the regular Republican forces as well as those 
who were members of the International Brigades, and those who went to Spain from the United 
States as well as those who left from the island or were already there when the conflict began—
as part of their support for the Republican cause.  Both Mediodía and Facetas published poetic 
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 and notable Cuban intellectual Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring called the 
Cuban volunteers, singling out Torriente, “Creole heroes of liberty” in a piece for Facetas.
112
  
Articles in Mediodía such as “Cubanos en España” (“Cubans in Spain”), “Más cubanos en 
España” (“More Cubans in Spain”), and “Los que vuelven del frente” (“Those who return from 
the front”) introduced Cuban readers to volunteers, their triumphs and their deaths, and made 
them into heroes.
113
  Facetas published photographs of individual Cubans volunteering in Spain 
with captions celebrating their accomplishments there.  These portraits, often showing men in 
uniform, conveyed a sense of the Republican fight as respectable, dignified, and just.  Captions 
told Cuban readers that their fellow countrymen fought for Spain’s “legitimate government” and 
for “Spanish democracy.”  The three examples pictured here (Figures 2.12–14) show Cuban 
medical student Pedro Antonio Rodríguez Iñigo, who was already in Spain working when the 
conflict began and became a medical volunteer; Cuban baseball player Basilio Cueria, who left 
for Spain from the United States; and Andrés González Lanuza, a 44-year-old captain who was 
part of the first group of Cuban volunteers to leave the island.
114
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Figures 2.12–14 Portraits of Cuban volunteers in Spain published by Facetas de Actualidad Española 
 
An article in Facetas introduced Cuban readers to the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, of which the 
Cuban column “Antonio Guiteras,” it noted, comprised a significant part.  The tribute called the 
battalion a unit of “valiant defenders of the ideal.”  Making a comparison between the foreign 
volunteers in Spain and foreign heroes of the U.S. Revolutionary War—Tadeusz Kościuszko, 
Casimir Pulaski, and Lafayette—and of the Cuban War of Independence—Máximo Gómez and 
Carlos Roloff Mialofsky—this article celebrating Cubans in the Spanish conflict sought to 
portray them as heroic and legitimate to readers on the island.
115
 
 Publishing positive assessments of foreign volunteers as pro-Republican propaganda was 
not limited to Cuban periodicals: Spanish periodicals and English-language publications 
celebrated Cuban contributions to the Republican cause in Spain, also.  In addition to providing 
more examples of heroic accounts of volunteers to be used as aids in recruitment and organizing, 
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these celebrations of Cubans in the press of other countries illustrate the transnational nature of 
pro-Republican activism.  The 35
th
 Division periodical Reconquista remembered Cuban Ramiro 
Azcuy in a brief note entitled “Por Cuba” (“For Cuba”): “An example of heroism we have in the 
activist,” it noted.  Despite the fact that there had been a desire to leave him in a position 
working in the rearguard, the article stated with evident approval, he would not accept it.  Instead 
he went to the front, and died there “defending Cuba, his distant country.”
116
  This article drew a 
connection between the struggles in Spain and Cuba.  Another article in the same periodical 
commemorated Cuban volunteer Manuel Digat, a lieutenant of the 60
th
 Battalion of the 35
th
 
Division, and commented on his transnational identity.  A laudatory tribute, the article called 
Digat “brave and determined” and “an encouragement to his comrades,” stating that he never 
encountered insurmountable obstacles.  It recalled one of his notable achievements during action 
in Gandesa when he “entered the village and, pistol in hand, intimidated some fascist forces, 
managing to save a truckload of ammunition, which he led to our base with the smile and the 
satisfaction of accomplishment.”  Reporting that he had died directing the transport of munitions 
under heavy fire just days before he was scheduled to return home, it called the volunteer 
“Cuban by birth but genuinely Spanish in body and soul.”
117
  The Volunteer for Liberty, 
periodical of the English-speaking volunteers, ran a two-page article in February 1938 called 
“Cuban Volunteers in Spain,” which is referenced throughout this chapter.
118
  A Spanish-
language commemoration of the 59
th
 Battalion—the “Spanish Battalion,” formerly the 24
th
 of the 
XV I.B.—in the same periodical noted that “the international comrades and in largest number the 
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Cuban comrades have done a great job.”
119
  An article in The Volunteer reporting on “American 
Volunteers in Spain” remarked that “[f]ighting with the Americans from their first action on was 
an important group of Central and South Americans, volunteers from Cuba, Mexico, 
Argentina—the bravest of the brave.”
120
  The Story of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion published 
in 1937 called upon readers: “Let us not forget…the heroism of the Centurio Guitterrez [sic], the 




Commemorative accounts often celebrated those volunteers injured or killed in action, 
and such articles illustrate for us one important element of the Cuban volunteers’ experience in 
Spain: loss.  As we have seen, Torriente was not only the iconic first Cuban volunteer to cross 
the Atlantic but also among the first and most noted deaths of the international participants.  
Cubans marked his battlefield death in commemorative events and in laudatory published 
remembrances, honored him posthumously in poetry and memorialized his name in titles of 
organizations.  The following advertisement (Figure 2.16) published in Mediodía in April 1937 
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Figure 2.15 Announcement of event posthumously 
celebrating Pablo de la Torriente Brau 
 
Another famous Cuban volunteer death was that of Rodolfo de Armas, organizer and 
leader of the Centuria Guiteras, who received similar attention from Cubans after his death.  
Pablo was posthumously the honorary head of the first Cuban contingent from New York; 
Rodolfo was its actual commander.  These two were often singled out of all the Cubans injured 
and killed for special remembrance in the press outside of the island; for example, The Volunteer 
for Liberty, in a list of those killed from many nations (France, England, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Ireland, and the United States), picked Pablo and Rodolfo as the 
representative dead of their country.
123
  De Armas represents several important characteristics of 
the Cuban volunteers and their experience in Spain: the continuity between the domestic struggle 
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on the island and the Spanish conflict, the transnational connections made especially by those 
Cubans who had been in New York, the leadership role attained by many Cubans during the war, 
and the intense veneration of those killed in action. 
De Armas was only in his mid-twenties and yet clearly admired by many as an effective 
leader.  The Volunteer for Liberty noted that “the energetic Cuban student leader” stood at the 
head of a large number of “youthful antifascist Cubans,” acting as “the leading spirit in the 
organization of the ‘Centurie Guiteras’ Column” that had “played such an honorable role on the 
Spanish antifascist front.”
124
  Another account noted that he “became the cynosure of admiring 
eyes” in the small village where the Americans had their training headquarters, “as he strolled 
during the paseo with a young Villanueva girl who had consented to become his wife.”
125
  
Italian-American volunteer John Tisa, friendly with many of the Cubans who served in the 
Abraham Lincoln Battalion, remembered with evident fondness: 
Our group leader was Rodolfo de Armas, about five feet eight inches tall, broad-
shouldered, and muscular.  His wide, chestnut-brown face had a high, shiny, prominent 
forehead with deep-set, sparkling brown eyes, the left one crossed.  When he spoke, one 
felt that one was in the presence of a powerful tractor in motion.  He wasted no words, 
and one moved fast under his command.  Always serious and in a hurry, he seemed 
intolerant and angry, until one got to know him; then one understood his vigor, his short 
temper, and his anxiety that everything be done quickly and perfectly.  To his friends he 
was no mystery; he was considered to be one of the gentlest of human beings, as well as 
the most advanced Marxist of all the Cubans. 
 
Despite his strong ideological convictions, though, the young leader was able to unite his 
politically diverse brethren; “by the magnetism of his personality and the soundness of his 
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reasoning,” Tisa recalled, he “was able to pull together in common bond the various political 
shades among these antifascist Cubans.”
126
 
The beloved Cuban youth fell during the Battle of Jarama in February 1937.  It is clear 
from the historical record that his dramatic death in battle made a strong and lasting impression 
on those who witnessed it or who heard about it afterward, both Cubans and others supportive of 
the Republic.  The story was repeated again and again in both Spanish- and English-language 
written accounts, including James W. Ford’s celebratory comments about Cuban volunteers.  
Prior to the written versions, it seems that the story was passed around orally; Ford stated that a 
North American had recounted to him the details of the event.
127
  Accounts of the death varied in 
their details, but not in their drama.  Describing the course of the battle at dusk, one account 
began: “All at once everything seemed to go wrong.”
128
  A tank exploded into flames as 
approximately 450 Cuban, Irish, U.S., and Canadian volunteers “were advancing against a well-
entrenched enemy.”
129
  Cuban and Irish units had gone out ahead of other members of the 
Lincoln Battalion to engage the Nationalists.  “Deployed next to the San Mart n road, the Cuban 
section advanced, led by their charismatic leader, Rudolfo [sic] de Armas, who raised a clenched 
fist high in the air and signaled his men forward.  Hit in the leg, he stooped to check the wound 
when he was hit again in the head and jaw.  He was probably dead before he hit the ground.”
130
  
In another telling of the story, penned in 1937 in The Story of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, the 
Cuban leader had just helped an injured soldier when he was shot: “Rodolfo de Armas, leader of 
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the Cuban section, was the first one killed.  After rescuing a wounded comrade he continued the 
advance, and beckoned the others to follow” just before being hit.  He was one among many of 
his fellow countrymen, this account noted: “The losses of the Cuban section were heavy.”
131
  
John Tisa (who was the author behind The Story, though it is often attributed to ‘Anonymous’) 
recalled decades later his own witnessing of the event in similar language, but with more 
personal details added.  If his recollection is accurate, Tisa was one of the closest eyewitnesses to 
the death.  “I was alongside him, about twenty feet to his right,” he remembered, “and felt secure 
under his leadership.”  This sense of security was not to last.  “At that moment, as I looked at 
Rodolfo, at the same time searching out where I would dash for cover in my next spring, a bullet 
struck him in the right leg, and when he stooped to grip his leg with his hands, shouting 
obscenities toward the fascists, two more bullets hit him, one in the head and the other in the jaw.”  
Tisa’s account is poignant, that of a friend: “Instinctively, I ran to him, oblivious of whistling 
bullets, but I was too late.  I stood over him in sadness and uncertainty, and in sudden loneliness, 
for the one person I had looked upon as indestructible, the one I had admired, lay dead.”
132
  Ford, 
too, became emotional as he recounted the death for Mediodía, his interviewer, the author of 
“Cuba puede estar orgullosa de sus hijos,” stated.  Pulling out a handsome photograph of the 
young leader, Ford commented: “Look, all heroism, youth, and fortitude.  It seems incredible 
that he has died.”  Caught up in the image and the moment, perhaps, Ford exaggerated a bit the 
details of the death: “The heroic boy, even though the blood flowed copiously, continued his 
march over the hill.  But eventually he could not anymore.  He tried to tie a handkerchief to 
control bleeding.  In that moment he was the target of another bullet, but this time it was 
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necessarily deadly as it had pierced his jugular.”  Concluding this particularly dramatic account, 
Ford honored the Cuban leader and all the Cubans dead in Spain by comparing them to Julio 
Antonio Mella.
133
  It is clear from Ford’s telling, Tisa’s remembrance, and other accounts of 
Rodolfo de Armas that his fellow volunteers greatly admired him and his capacity for leadership.  
Of the multiple Cubans who died during the Battle of Jarama, his death was the one told and 
retold, suggesting that he possessed a charisma that made him especially notable not only to his 
fellow Cubans but also to many others who knew him.  The emotional tributes cited here 
distinguish a more recent assessment of the death as quite understated: “Rudolfo Armas [sic],” 
writes historian of the Lincoln Battalion Cecil B. Eby, “leader of the centuria of Cubans who had 
fled Machado’s regime, was a major loss.”
134
 
Not surprisingly, the Cuban press reported many of the Cuban losses in Spain.  For 
example, the article earlier cited, “Cuba puede estar orgullosa de sus hijos,” listed a number of 
Cubans already injured or dead by July 1937 for readers back home on the island.  Ricardo 
Triana, it stated, of La Víbora in Havana, had been injured in his right arm; Daniel Rivas, from 
the interior of the island, had one bullet wound in his arm and another in his chest; Luis Rivero 
Villanueva, of Niquero in Oriente, had lost a hand to an explosive; Armando González, of 
Marianao in Havana, was wounded in the leg; and Oscar Hernández, of Havana, was 
hospitalized.  Angel Rufo, Carlos Guijarros, Pedro Hernández, Antonio Rodríguez, Aquilino 
Navarro Conejo, and Jorge de Cárdenas, as well as Rodolfo de Armas, were all dead.
135
  
Periodicals from elsewhere, such as The Volunteer for Liberty previously cited, and unit-specific 
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publications of the Republican military also noted Cuban losses.  For example, the Boletín 
Información Comisariado (Commissioner’s Information Bulletin) of the 35th Division, in an 
article entitled “Héroes!” (“Heroes!”) reported that Manuel Alonso Barroso, a 32-year-old Cuban 
of the 58
th
 Battalion, XV Brigade had been wounded in combat.
136
   
 Another Cuban volunteer to receive substantial attention upon his death in battle was 
Alberto Sánchez Menéndez.  Born in 1915, Alberto began his political engagement as a student 
activist in the anti-Machado struggle when he was 15 years old.  He became a close collaborator 
of Antonio Guiteras, and helped lead the March 1935 general strike on the island, after which he 
went into exile in Central America, Mexico, and finally Spain in March 1936.  He was already 
there, then, when the Spanish Civil War began, and joined the fight in defense of the Republic 
immediately, becoming a commander of the Fifth Regiment, a unit of the regular Republican 
forces formed by the Spanish Communist Party.  A member of the Spanish Party, Sánchez was 
trusted by its Central Committee, a representative of which sought his assessment of the first 
Cuban volunteers to arrive from the island.  He married a fellow commander in the regiment, a 
Spanish woman named Encarnación Hernández.
137
  Facetas de Actualidad Española published a 
photograph (Figure 2.16) of Alberto with his Spanish compañera and notified readers that “the 
young Cuban whose career in the Popular Army of the Spanish Republic had been so brilliant” 
had died in July 1937 in the battle of Brunete.  “Alongside the blood of Pablo de la Torriente, 
Rodolfo de Armas, and so many other Cubans the blood of the Cuban youth remains in the 
Spanish countryside,” the photograph caption read, “fertilizing the NEW SPAIN that is being 
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Figures 2.16 and 2.17 Cuban volunteer Alberto Sánchez Menéndez 
 
Some laudatory accounts of the Cubans killed in action were of higher literary quality than 
others, as one memorial of Alberto demonstrates.  Among the dozens of poems celebrating 
Cuban volunteers, we find a few written by masters of the craft, such as the one commemorating 
Sánchez by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda.  Neruda called the handsome young Cuban “taciturn, 
strong, and small of stature,” and memorialized his valor in battle, describing how he, blinded by 
smoke and blood, leapt up from a stretcher and ran again to the head of his unit.  Out of his body 
flowed “our blood,” Neruda wrote, “and in the soil of Brunete his body remains as a flag.”
140
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As the cases of several individuals already mentioned—including Rodolfo de Armas and 
Alberto Sánchez Menéndez—demonstrate, a number of Cuban volunteers achieved leadership 
positions and attained promoted ranks in the Spanish military, both in the International Brigades 
and the regular Republican forces.  De Armas was one of the two highest ranking Cubans, along 
with Policarpo Candón, to achieve the rank of lieutenant colonel.  Candón was a leader of a 
Brigade of over 3,500 men in the Division lead by “El Campesino,” Valent n González during 
1937.
141
  Mediodía reported him killed in action in March 1938, calling him “one of the most 
valiant defenders of democracy on Spanish soil,” and boasting that he, “Cuban to the core,” 
occupied at the time of his death “a position of high responsibility in the Spanish Popular 
Army.”
142
  In addition to the two lieutenant colonels, 13 Cubans attained the rank of commander 




 As the cases of Alberto Sánchez Menéndez, Rodolfo de Armas, and Oscar Soler have 
demonstrated, another common element of the Cuban volunteer experience in Spain was Cuban 
men becoming romantically involved with Spanish women.  Alberto married a fellow 
commander; Rodolfo, we are told, wooed a girl from the small village where U.S. volunteers 
trained; and medical volunteer Oscar married a Spanish woman who was, by one account, a 
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  It is not surprising that young single men engaged in a military conflict far from home 
would take up with local women.  The prospect of doing so was likely among the various 
personal motivations that drove Cuban activists to volunteer.  In some cases, though, pursuing 
personal gain in this way drew negative attention from officials.  The case of Cuban volunteer 
Manuel Cala Reyes, which we examine in greater detail in the conclusion, is an example.  A 
veteran of the anti-Machado struggle, Cala was already in his late forties when he served in 
Spain.  His age—advanced relative to many other volunteers—played a role in his investigation 
for possible sexual impropriety when he expressed interest in a 14-year-old Spanish girl.  He 
claimed to want to marry the girl, and explained that older men marrying young girls was normal 
in his country—an interesting example of a Cuban volunteer attempting to leverage his foreign 
identity to get himself out of trouble.  However, an official report stated that he had become 
physically forceful with the girl, and that she denied having expressed reciprocal feelings for the 
older man.  Detention until repatriation was proposed.
145
 
The example of Arturo Corona shows that some Cuban volunteers were motivated in 
large part by self-interest rather than ideals or ideology.  Corona (sometimes written as “Coruña” 
and also known as “Coronita”) left for Spain from the United States as part of the second major 
group of U.S. volunteers in January of 1937.  He served in Spain with his female companion, a 
Cuban woman named Dulcea Hernaiz who worked as a nurse.  A good deal of what we know of 
Corona survives in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive in New York due to the work of U.S. 
nurse and volunteer Fredericka Martin’s research on medical volunteers, among them Dulcea, 
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whom she met in Spain.  Martin sought further information about the couple in her 
correspondence with Cuban doctor Eduardo Odio Pérez.  Dr. Odio Perez believed that the man, 
whom he called Coruña, was a Cuban-American from Key West who was later in the U.S. Army 
and died fighting in the Pacific during World War II.  He was, in the doctor’s opinion, “not very 
straight.”
146
  Information compiled by the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive indicates that 
Corona was a student, that he was a member of the Communist Party, and that he had returned to 
the United States from Spain by April 1938.
147
  The Cuban periodical Mediodía mentioned 
Corona briefly in July 1937.  The article stated that he had taken over command of, “according to 
his own childishly proud words, ‘the best contingent of fighters in the Spanish Army.’”  He was, 
it claimed, a former anti-Machado fighter and only 23 years old.
148
  Corona’s personnel file in 
the Moscow Archive raises questions.  A document in English dated 7 April 1937 begins by 
stating that Corona is Cuban, age 36, a member of the Communist Party of Cuba, First 
Lieutenant of the 17
th
 Battalion of the XV Brigade (which was the U.S. Lincoln Battalion), and 
“Commander of Second Company up to Feb. 27.”  It notes that he was, as of early April, at 
Villanueva, and that Comrades Walsh and Suarez investigated him there the week of 1 April.  
Their findings were as follows.  Corona “passed himself as battalion commander when he 
arrived in Villanueva ten days ago.  Corona assigned one comrade Delgado, Albert, to be an 
adjutant and courier to one Doctor Fogarty, now residing in Villanueva.”  The report stated that 
this Dr. Fogarty carried a letter signed by Corona which he showed to Walsh, and that the letter 
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was marked, under Corona’s signature, “A.C.O.L.B.,” for American Commandant of Lincoln 
Battalion.  The report mentioned that Corona claimed he possessed a special pass from the 
International Brigades allowing him free movement, as well as “a Packard and a late model Ford 
motor car to drive around in, one of which was burnt up.”  The report noted also that Corona 
wore three wide stripes on his hat and one on his sleeve.  A document in French, which is 
undated, states that its information is based on a report from Cuban volunteer Florentino Alejo.  
The document accuses Corona of stealing 3,000 pesos from the Cuban Communist Party, and 
also notes that he was a deserter in Spain.
149
  Clearly, officials had their eyes on Arturo Corona, 
and did not think particularly favorably of him.  Arturo made himself infamous back in the 
United States as well, or as Martin put it in one letter, he “turned out badly.”
150
  Upon her return 
to New York, Martin learned that Corona had run a scam in which he solicited money from U.S. 
families of volunteers reported missing, ostensibly to support search and recovery efforts, and 
then vanished with the money and fled back to Cuba.
151
  Believing that Dulcea might have been 
one more victim of Corona’s cons made her angry.  “Dr. Odio thinks he was in U.S. Army and 
killed in the Pacific,” Martin wrote.  Then she conjectured bitterly: “I’d bet [he] is sitting easy 
somewhere.”
152
   
Corona’s case shows that individual actors could be both politically motivated and 
personally opportunistic.  The volunteer may have been a genuine believer in Communism led 
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astray by personal greed, or he may have joined the Party simply to benefit from the 
opportunities for theft and cons with which Party membership presented him.  These 
opportunities, in his case, extended to the battlefields of Spain where he behaved in an 
unscrupulous and devious manner, dishonestly gaining in the process not only money but also 
power.  In Spain Corona showed that he had an inflated sense of his own grandeur by bragging 
about his status and showing off the trappings of his alleged rank.  These behaviors suggest that 
the volunteer may have sought adventure and status as well as money and power in Spain.  It is 
probable that most international volunteers had some combination of political and personal 
motivations for going to serve the Spanish Republic; in Corona’s case, we see a number of 
potential personal gains that could motivate volunteers—power, money, status, and adventure—
overshadowing political reasons and idealism.  Whereas we see many Cuban volunteers 
celebrated for having crossed borders and oceans driven by a sense of solidarity, Corona did so 
like a fugitive to dodge the consequences of his greedy and corrupt behavior.  
Tensions within activists between idealism and personal motivations, between solidarity 
and individual desires, are important to consider in the case of Cuban volunteers and in the 
context of celebratory narratives that have interpreted the fight against fascism and for the 
Spanish Republic as “the Good Fight.”  The diversity of the Cuban volunteers included a 
diversity of motivations, and a wide range of behavior.  Though our overarching thesis concerns 
continuity of activism and the development of transnational solidarity, therefore, we must also 
account for examples that do not fit.  The memoir of U.S. volunteer John Tisa is one excellent 
source of such examples.  Tisa, though very fond of many Cubans and often complimentary in 
his comments about them, noted a lack of discretion by his Cuban counterparts during the 




commanding them to keep their mission secret.  Other volunteers, Tisa recalled, followed these 
orders, trying to “appear as inconspicuous as possible,” but the Cubans did not.  “They were a 
happy bunch, not caring who knew where they were going.  They roamed the ship and invaded 
the upper, first-class decks and often were ordered back to our third-class hole.”  Though Tisa 
admits that he “gate-crashed with them because I too wanted to see how the rich lived,” his 
account of the Cubans’ lack of discretion on board the ship nevertheless shows that they 
disobeyed orders, indicating a lack of discipline.
153
  Tisa included in his memoir a couple of 
other quite unflattering instances of questionable behavior by Cuban volunteers, in which he 
tactfully left the identities of the men in question anonymous.  In one instance a Cuban recounted 
his trip to a whorehouse in Spain.  Having just admitted to seeking out a brothel himself, the U.S. 
volunteer claimed in his memoir that he and several others left, finding it distasteful, and “all of 
us wondering aloud why the government had not yet wiped out prostitution.”  One of the men, he 
remembered, said that it was “unbecoming for volunteers to come into town and right off the bat 
look for a woman joint.”  Later, he remembered, “a Cuban told me of his experience after he 
found a house where he was well taken care of.”  The Cuban volunteer claimed that the woman 
refused his money, thanking him for coming all the way from America to help the Republican 
cause.  In a somewhat humorous twist on political conviction, Tisa concluded the recounting of 
the Cuban’s tale: “Pepe added that the house is a respectable place with high health standards 
because ‘it is unionized and collectivized.’  He promised to take me with him next time.”
154
  In a 
second instance recounted by Tisa, a Cuban volunteer made a mess of a latrine, missing the hole.  
When reprimanded, Tisa remembered, the culprit was embarrassed, but also gave the doctor who 
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scolded him an irreverent riposte.  “The next time you have to go,” the doctor rebuked, “let me 
know and I’ll show you where.”  The Cuban replied, “OK, Doc, what you can do now is show 




In some cases, political conviction and assessment of a volunteer’s behavior interacted in 
complex ways.  In certain records it is difficult to discern whether a negative assessment of a 
Cuban volunteer is based on truly bad behavior or rather on political disagreement—or even a 
personal slight against an authority figure.  For example, a report by the commander of the XIV 
I.B. requested severe punishment for two Cuban volunteers—Luis Silvestre and Daniel Avila—
in October 1937, implying that they were at least badly behaved and self-interested if not 
something worse.  They had, it stated, “participated very actively in the disorders caused on 
Sunday night the 26
th
 of September of 1937 by certain suspicious elements during the party of 
the XIV Brigade.”  They had acted, it continued, as “true provocateurs, exciting the men 
gathered there to create disorder; trying violently to break into the Swiss Hotel; [and] 
disseminating seriously defamatory statements about the heads of the XIV Brigade, to which 
they belong.”  They had a history of such behavior, the report stated, and were suspicious.  They 
lacked political consciousness and were, in fact, “old mercenaries of the fascist Cuban Army of 
Batista come to Spain simply for the spirit of adventure and to escape unemployment, if not for 
something more serious.”
156
  Were these volunteers violent, disruptive thrill-seekers, as the 
report suggests?  Might they even have been agents of Batista?  Perhaps the heads of the brigade 
were insulted by the men’s “defamatory statements” and punishing them for this personal slight?  
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Or maybe the volunteers simply disagreed with the party line in the brigade, their political 
challenges provoking disciplinary action in an attempt to silence critique?  It is likely that a 
combination of factors contributed to the negative assessment of these men, though the wording 
of the critical report strongly suggests that personal insult and political incorrectness played a 
role. 
The opposite might also be true: Poor behavior might be covered over in the record if an 
individual was considered politically correct and useful.  The case of Efrain Gausch León 
illustrates the types of discrepancies evident in the archive which seem to have resulted from 
attempts to perpetuate a celebratory image of the international volunteers by covering up less 
desirable attributes and actions.  Gausch León was a native of La Habana province born in 1909, 
an electrician by trade who had worked for the Cuban telephone company, and an active member 
of the Cuban Communist Party since 1931.  Sent by the Party, he arrived in Spain in February 
1938 and became a member of the 24
th
 Battalion of the XV Brigade; but in April he still had not 
taken part in any fighting due to a lung ailment.  Nevertheless, assessments of the Cuban 
volunteer by International Brigade officials were positive.  He was an activist in the Party and 
loyal Communist, they noted, which had caused him to be injured and imprisoned repeatedly in 
Cuba.  He had been eager to fight fascism in Spain and convinced that doing so was a way to 
fight for his own country, stated one assessment.  But by August 1938 Efrain was dead.  A letter 
sent by the Central Committee of the Party in Spain to that of the Party in Cuba called him “the 
brave Cuban fighter” and reported that he had been killed by “a bullet of criminal fascism” while 
“fighting heroically in the Ebro offensive.”  The remembrance concluded with a laudatory 
commemoration of the fallen comrade: “His death on the front of Liberty constitutes a further 




enemies of Humanity.  We promise comrade Efrain Guasch that his wish for freedom and 
progress that led him to come to our land will be fulfilled.”
157
  This type of celebratory language 
was typical, as we have seen.  Yet another contemporary source suggests that the Cuban 
volunteer’s death may have been in reality significantly less heroic.  Without identifying him as 
Cuban, the 35
th
 Division publication Reconquista used the story of Gausch León’s death as a 
warning to other volunteers.  A September 1938 issue of the periodical reported that the soldier 
got ahold of a bottle of champagne to celebrate a victory in battle.  The bottle was opened, the 
note stated, and beyond the river “remained the empty bottle with the life of the soldier.”
158
  The 
military publication left the specific cause of death ambiguous, but the moral of the cautionary 
tale was not: Irresponsible use of alcohol on the front lines could lead to death.  This 
interpretation of the Cuban’s death contrasts sharply with the laudatory statements in his 
personnel file.  If not for his unusual name, this discrepancy in the record might never have 
attracted attention; but because we can identify the individual in the military periodical as being 
the same person as the volunteer in the Moscow archive records due to his unique name, we can 
see clearly how unflattering traits or behaviors of volunteers might be glossed over or 
deliberately hidden in official documentation. 
 
Outcomes 
What impact did the participation of Cuban volunteers in the Spanish Civil War have?  
Having challenged the oversimplified narrative of “the Good Fight” by examining complex 
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motivations for participation and negative assessments of Cuban volunteers in Spain, it is 
important to note that they did contribute, nonetheless, to the pro-Republican cause.  This point 
is vital to understanding activism.  A history of activism necessarily utilizes, in part, source 
material produced by activists, and the writing of activists often takes the form of ideological 
conviction, idealism, and propaganda.  It would be easy to fall into the trap of glorifying 
individuals, groups, or ideas based on the relentless enthusiasm of the source material.  Bringing 
in complexities—personal foibles, documentary inconsistencies, ideological disputes, etc.—
therefore, is essential to overcoming oversimplification.  As we have noted throughout this 
chapter, the case of “the Good Fight” in Spain is one that exemplifies these tendencies.  However, 
it is important, too, that our corrective not swing too far in the opposite direction.  Cuban 
volunteers in the Spanish Civil War did, in fact, make substantial personal sacrifices to 
participate in the Spanish conflict, supporting a cause they believed was vital to the future of the 
world.  Some of them did act heroically.  Many died.  All did something truly extraordinary: 
They chose to fight in another country’s war. 
In addition to Cuban volunteers’ personal and political commitment and sacrifice, we 
have seen in this chapter that they brought with them a superior understanding of the Spanish 
conflict relative to foreign volunteers from non-Latin American countries.  Their transnational 
identities put them in a position to make unique contributions as linguistic and cultural 
translators in a context in which translation was vitally important.  Many of them worked to 
portray an image of respectability, legitimacy, and heroism which could be used as propaganda 
and to recruit other volunteers and antifascist activists—some contributed to this role in death, as 
their compañeros portrayed them at martyrs for the cause.  A number of Cubans attained 




for their leadership and bravery.  All of these experiences, actions, and characteristics constitute 
qualitative contributions of Cuban volunteers to the Republican cause in the Spanish conflict. 
There is no way to quantify the contribution Cuban volunteers made to the Republican 
cause.  In the next chapter, in which we examine the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children, it 
is possible to discuss the amounts of money and clothing and food sent, but the contributions of 
combat and support volunteers are more difficult to catalogue.  The contribution of foreign 
volunteers in general is further obscured by Republican defeat.  If they had been victorious, 
perhaps we could say at least that they had assisted in attaining the stated goals of overcoming 
the Nationalist challenge to the Republican government and of putting an end to Italian and 
German meddling in Spanish affairs.  That the Republic lost leaves us with historically 
counterfactual questions: If international volunteers had not been present, would the Republicans 
have won or would they have lost more quickly than they in fact did?  Or did the pro-Republican 
foreigners have no impact at all on the final outcome?  On the other side of the conflict, it is 
widely accepted that the Italian and German involvement helped the Nationalists win the war.  
While fascist support of Franco’s forces is usually discussed in terms of numbers of troops, 
officers, trainers, planes, weapons, etc., the contribution of the international volunteers on the 
Republican side tends to evoke statements about solidarity, begging the question: What is 
solidarity worth?   
In addition to boosting morale, which should not be underestimated as a contribution, 
solidarity built networks between the Spanish Republicans and their international supporters.  In 
the case of the Cubans, many networks already existed, and these were utilized and further 




combat and support volunteers.  As we will see in the coming chapters, money, goods, 
publications, and ideas also moved via networks.   
 These networks constituted an important impact of the Cuban volunteers’ participation.  
As Pablo de la Torriente, the Cuban Communist Party, and others had predicted, Spain would 
teach Cuban activists valuable lessons for their domestic struggle; it would also create and 
strengthen dynamic connections between them and their counterparts in Spain, the United States, 
and elsewhere.  The Communist network was a particularly strong one, but as we will see 
throughout this study, it was not the only one in operation.  Multiple organizational networks 
overlapped with one another and with personal connections.  The diaspora of Republican 
refugees fleeing Spain after Franco’s victory—many of whom ended up in Latin America—
reinforced transnational connections and presented countless new opportunities for local 
connections in far-flung locations.  Reverberations of the Spanish Civil War would be felt 








Because Their Blood Runs Through Our Veins: 
The Cuban Campaign to Aid Spanish Children 
  
Whereas campaigns organizing Cuban volunteers to aid the Spanish Republic involved 
almost exclusively young men and a tiny percentage of young women who were committed 
antifascists, the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children successfully recruited men, women, and 
children of a wide range of ages including not only radicals but also moderates and charitable 
contributors without ideological affiliation.  The principal organization of the campaign was the 
Asociación de Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español (Association of Aid to the Child of the 
Spanish People, or A.A.N.P.E.), established in March 1937.  The Association’s founding 
president was Teresa “Teté” Casuso, widow of early combat volunteer Pablo de la Torriente 
Brau who was killed in action in December 1936 fighting with the Spanish brigade led by “El 
Campesino,” Valent n González.  The primary function of the A.A.N.P.E. was the raising of 
monetary and material aid for Spanish children impacted by the war, ostensibly without partisan 
bias.  It was a charitable organization, the leaders of which claimed repeatedly that they did not 
take sides in the conflict.  However, as the Association’s bulletin ¡Ayuda! (published July 1937 
to April 1939) and its archived organizational records demonstrate, the A.A.N.P.E. was in fact 
firmly antifascist and its actions constituted pro-Republican activism.
1
   
The Association’s structure included two leadership groups, a Comité de Honor 
(Honorary Committee) and a Comité Directivo (Leadership Committee), both made up of men 
and women.  The Honorary Committee included notables such as Fernando Ortiz, Emilio Roig 
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de Leuchsenring, and Roberto Agramonte who lent their names and prestige to the cause.  The 
Leadership Committee, initially led by founding president Teté Casuso, included secretaries of 
acts and of correspondence and a treasurer, as well as a “vice” position to each and a 
membership committee (vocales).
2
  In this latter group served people who directed the bulletin 
and contributed many of its articles; records indicate that these individuals did much more of the 
actual work than their figurehead counterparts on the Honorary Committee, to which Casuso was 
added after her resignation as president.  Centralized leadership oversaw the organization as a 
whole, but delegations and children’s committees across the island managed local efforts and 
sent the fruits of their labors—in the form of articles and letters as well as monetary and material 
aid—to the A.A.N.P.E. offices in Havana.  For example, the Delegation of San Francisco de 
Paula sent in $7.90 in October 1937, writing to the central leadership to apologize for the 
“insignificant” amount and promising that they had “redoubled our efforts” to increase donations.  
The problem, they confided to the Havana office, was that many residents of their area who 
cooperated enthusiastically with their efforts were agricultural workers who had little to give.
3
  
Despite centralization of aid efforts, local delegations had substantial autonomy.  Delegation 
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The Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children was part of a larger effort focused on 
children during the war, coordinated in Paris and with adherents in many countries.
5
  It was also 
part of the Cuban antifascist movement that interpreted the struggle in Spain as one that in 
addition to being against international fascism and was also for a people historically closely 
linked to Cuba.  The inaugural issue of ¡Ayuda! (July 1937) stated the Association’s aim to stand 
with the “noble Spanish people,” asserting that their painful tragedy affected Cubans deeply, 
inspiring widespread desire to help.  The Association wished to “translate this national sentiment 
into an act of positive support for the thousands of innocent victims,” meaning primarily the 
children, “in the cities and countryside of Spain.”  If sympathetic people in Mexico, the United 
States, England, France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia could raise so much money to aid the 
Spanish children, the A.A.N.P.E. declared, surely Cubans—“so closely tied for multiple reasons 
to the Spanish people”—should also play an important role in this effort.
6
 
 And so they did.  Throughout the remainder of the war the A.A.N.P.E. successfully raised 
funds, organized volunteers, and accomplished impressive acts of assistance to Spanish children.  
In this discussion of the Association, we begin with a brief personal account of the organization’s 
founder, examining her resolve to aid Spanish children as an intersection of her personal and 
political lives.  A textual analysis of ¡Ayuda! identifies the central themes of the organization’s 
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message and we assess how and why messaging changed over time.  Financial analysis of the 
A.A.N.P.E. follows, made possible by extensive fundraising and expenditure data from the 
Association’s bulletin and archived organizational records, and providing a quantitative 
perspective on the Association’s claim that it enjoyed widespread popular support.  We examine 
the Association’s principal achievements: a welcoming reception in Havana harbor for Spanish 
children bound for refuge in Mexico, two Winter Clothing Drives, the establishment of a Cuban 
residential school for Spanish children in Catalonia, and finally the massive gathering of Cubans 
in Havana to welcome and hear an address by Fernando de los Ríos, Ambassador of Republican 
Spain.  Our discussion concludes with the Association’s reaction to Republican defeat. 
 
 At the Intersection of the Personal and the Political 
When last we took leave of Teté Casuso, she had just learned from a newspaper of her 
husband’s death in Spain.  Cuban writer and political activist Pablo de la Torriente Brau had 
gone into the conflict as a war correspondent, but compelled by the desperate Republican effort 
to defend Madrid against Francisco Franco’s advance, he took up arms to fight with the Spanish 
brigade led by “El Campesino,” Valent n González.  “When the danger is past,” he wrote to his 
wife, “I will return to my typewriter.”  On 19 December 1936 he fell on the battlefield, killed by 
a bullet.  Devastated, Teté sought some activity to keep herself occupied through her mourning.  
The first task that came to her mind was to publish the writing Pablo had done in Spain—but he 
had sent his work to a friend in New York,
7
 and she could not immediately acquire it.  “While 
waiting for his chronicles to be sent to me from New York,” she wrote in her autobiography, “I 
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determined to do something to help the unhappy people for whose liberty Pablo had given his 
life.”  And so she founded the Association of Aid to the Child of the Spanish People in mid-
March of 1937 with help from the “generous initiative of a group of enthusiastic people.”  Her 
memoir’s tone, dull with grief following her discovery of Pablo’s death, brightens momentarily 
with her pride for this organization.  Its membership grew to 300,000, she boasted, “with a 
delegation in every town on the island, and the amount of assistance we gave to the Spanish 
people was enormous.”  She felt particularly proud of the “frequent boatloads of food” sent and 
of the Casa-Escuela Pueblo de Cuba (People of Cuba Residential School) established and run by 
the Association, which housed Spanish children orphaned or otherwise displaced by the war in 
the Catalán town of Sitges.
8
  As founding president, Casuso authored pieces in the organization’s 
bulletin ¡Ayuda!, most of which were articles we will consider during the course of our broader 
analysis of the bulletin.  Two poems she published in the bulletin, however, give us a glimpse 
into her personal motivation, exposing the inner turmoil she experienced following her 
husband’s death.  Her horror at her individual tragedy and Spain’s national tragedy intertwine in 
these works, and the devotion of the author and her organization to the cause of children 
becomes particularly poignant to their reader.  Though not great works of literature, the poems 
express powerfully the intersection of personal and political in Teté Casuso’s early widowhood 
and are worth considering as part of the study of her activism and her organization. 
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 As we noted in Chapter 1, Pablo and Teté had been married for two years at the time of 
his death, but their friendship had been much longer.  They first met in Oriente Province in 1918 
or 1919 when Teté was seven years old and Pablo seventeen.  Casuso’s parents “loved and 
admired” Pablo, and he was “like a son” to them, she remembered.  Reluctantly they agreed to 
their daughter’s engagement to Torriente when she was just twelve years old, but stipulated that 
he must wait until she turned fifteen to wed.  Pablo later released her from this engagement after 
it became clear that she did not feel ready to marry at so young an age, but he continued what she 
called his “charming courtship,” regularly visiting her in her parents’ home.  The two eventually 
married in 1934 after a decade and a half of friendship.
9
  Thus when Pablo died on a Spanish 
battlefield Teté lost the love of her life and became a widowed newlywed.  She was twenty-four 
or twenty-five years old.  She and Pablo had no children, and as she confronted his sudden 
absence in her life, their never-born child added painful volume to the hollow.   
Her first poem in ¡Ayuda!, which she wrote in Mexico in October 1937 and published 
one year after Pablo’s death in December, was “Lullaby without Child.”  One clearly identifiable 
theme in the poem, expressed in the title, is that of unrequited maternal love.  The narrator sits 
singing lullabies and sewing children’s clothes.  The first two stanzas establish her loss.  “Who 
robbed my scissors?” she begins, “Who robbed my thimble?  Who holds my child in arms such 
that I cannot reach him?”  The wind and the lament robber her, she continues; “life took my 
dream, and the child has not arrived.”  The third stanza suggests transference of maternal feeling 
from the never-born child to all children in general.  “I sing my lullabies,” states the narrator, “I 
sew, stitch and thimble, for the children of the world who are in my heart.”  These first three 
stanzas establish a haunting scene: The childless mother sits sewing children’s clothes and sings 
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a lullaby to a little one who is not there.  In the narrator’s interpretation, the child exists, but is 
out in the world somewhere, held hostage, out of reach.  If we take the voice of the narrator in 
Teté’s poem to be her own, we may guess that these opening lines express the realization—
sudden and terrible—that that which might have been very close in her future was now 
impossible forever: She and Pablo would not have a child.  So she decided to turn her love 
outward to all the motherless children across the globe, to sing and sew and care for “the children 
without cradle”—the ones whose little smiles have turned to tears and tears to outcries because 
of death and war, as the poem describes—to give them “the song they do not have, and the 
maternal lap.”  Turning personal loss into altruism was not easy for her.  She struggled: 
Mi delantalcito blanco,   My little white apron,  
ternura clara en la voz,   pure tenderness in my voice, 
unas lágrimas cantando   some tears singing 
al niño que no llegó,    to the child who did not arrive, 
¡y una canción de futuro   and a song of the future 
rompiéndome el corazón!   breaking my heart!   
 
“My lullaby has no child,” she stated in a single-line stanza alone toward the end of the poem.  
She was determined, however, and made her purpose clear:  “For the earth and for the children,” 
she proclaimed, “my love has come to sing.”
10
 
Casuso narrated the second poem she published in ¡Ayuda! from the opposite perspective, 
that of the motherless child.  Written in Mexico and published in December 1938, two years after 
Torriente’s death, it is entitled “Christmas of the Motherless Child.”  The voice of an excited 
child begins, “To my mama, so pretty!”  He wants to make a great Christmas tree with his 
mother, with his hands as its branches and the lights of his eyes providing its illumination.  “And 
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the little silver stars,” he tells his mother, “will be each memento of the Christmas tree of my 
memories.” 
Toma mis alegrías    Take my joys 
de aquel bosque de cuentos   from that forest of stories 
y salpiquemos todo el árbol   and let us sprinkle the whole tree 
de globos de colores, rojos,   with colorful globes, reds,  
 azules[,] verdes,    blues, greens, 
¡de color de contento!    the color of happiness!  
 
Something is not right, as the title has forewarned us: The child’s memory is a forest of stories, 
and there is a story which needs to be told in order for him to be able to remember; he must 
remember because his mother is in his memories, and so he can only reach her through a story.  
“Bring all my childhood,” he begs her, “And later bring the dream.”  Only, his mother is not 
there.  He seems to be searching for the right memory, the right story or dream in which to find 
her.  At this point in the poem, a new voice exclaims: “But you are sad, child of the stories!”  
This second narrator addresses the motherless child as the poem concludes, telling him, “Come 
to my heart.”  Only there will the child recover his memories and therefore his mother—in my 
heart, states the narrator, your mother will return from a dream.  It is possible, especially given 
the poem’s emphasis on Christmas, that Casuso intended the voice of the second narrator to be 
that of Jesus Christ.  “I am this night,” this narrator states, this Christmas night in which your 
mother may be resurrected in my heart.  A few lines earlier, the poem had reminded us of 
another story, that of “that star that went one night to parade across the skies.”  Alternately, Teté 
may have imagined herself as this second narrator, in keeping with the motherless child/childless 








 As we explore texts from the A.A.N.P.E. bulletin ¡Ayuda!, we will encounter other 
instances of the connection Casuso drew between herself as the childless mother and the orphans 
and other displaced children of the Spanish Civil War.  Her article in the bulletin’s first issue, 
“With the Children who Voyaged on the Mexique,” gave readers affecting descriptions of 
individual Spanish children on their way to refuge in Mexico and highlighted the role Cubans 
and Mexicans should play providing them with sorely needed tenderness and care.
12
  The title of 
her radio address published in the second issue, “The Lullabies Will Be Heard Again,” 
previewed the subject of her first poem.
13
  She felt also a more direct identification with the 
Spanish children who had lost their parents; in reference to her own young age in relation to her 
husband and at the time of her death, she commented in her memoir that when Torriente died he 
“made me more than a widow: I was an orphan.”
14
 
Teté expressed in hard work with tangible results a remarkable burst of energy in the 
wake of her personal tragedy.  Resilience, though, proved to be more of a challenge.  “For seven 
months I worked hard building up this organization, speaking over the air and at meetings, 
visiting villages all over the island, helping to get out our monthly publication, soliciting co-
operation through magazine and newspaper articles,” she wrote.  Then she stepped down from 
her role as Association president early in 1938, and escaped once again into exile, leaving for 
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Mexico to work on having Pablo’s Spanish chronicles published.  “I went for three months,” she 
wrote of her trip, “and stayed for almost two years.”
15
  An appropriate coda to her efforts, 
however, could be found in the establishment of several A.A.N.P.E. children’s committees 
named for Pablo.  The ninth issue of ¡Ayuda! (January/February 1939) published a photograph of 
one in Santiago de Cuba, noting that it was the third such group to take Torriente’s name “with 
just pride.”  It was a name, the caption stated, that “due to his noble life, and his heroic death, is a 
worthy medallion, and a faithful shelter to the effort of these children.”  His blood was not 






Analysis of the full run of the A.A.N.P.E. bulletin ¡Ayuda! distills six principal 
arguments mobilized by Association leaders to recruit supporters and raise aid.   Over the course 
of the publication diverse writers deployed these central themes of the organization’s message.  
Some of the themes remained remarkably consistent throughout.  Authors adapted others, 
presumably in search of greater message effectiveness.  Tracing the six arguments over time, we 
consider how they changed and melded, and we gauge probable value of each based on which 
faded out of use and which grew more strident.  We evaluate how well Association claims hold 
up in its messaging, before moving on to quantitative analysis of A.A.N.P.E. financial data 
providing a view of the organization different from that glimpsed through a consideration of its 
six principal arguments. 
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First and foremost, the A.A.N.P.E. dedicated itself to the welfare of children, arguing that 
this mission’s worth was self-evident.  They used words on the subject attributed to José Martí—
“Children are the hope of the world!”—in their bulletin and printed them on their letterhead.  
Association members emphasized the plight of the Spanish children with intense emotion 
suggesting both genuine empathy and a fundraiser’s knack for tear-jerking.  In a typical example, 
the first issue’s editorial note described life for children in war-torn Spain as one in which they 
“learned to flee before they learned to walk, to scream before they learned to smile, to cover their 
eyes and faces with their tiny, trembling hands before they looked at the sky of their country torn 
by foreign shrapnel, not yet able to distinguish between the stars and the death that falls, also 
illuminating the night.”
17
  Descriptions characterized by dramatic language and strong 
sentiment—often accompanied by arresting images of tragedy in Spain—rallied readers to 
donate money and time to a cause presented as universally appealing. 
Children are the future, ¡Ayuda! reminded its readers repeatedly.  A poem verse in the 
second issue equated the death of Spanish children in the war with the death of happiness and the 
future: 
  Los niños son la alegría   Children are happiness 
  son la aurora del mañana   they are the dawn of the future 
  y mueren asesinados    and they die assassinated 




To protect the Spanish children was “to save the conscience of future humanity,”
19
 “the flower of 
life,”
20
 even “hope incarnate.”
21
  One typically dramatic statement read: “In the enormous pupils 
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of the Spanish orphan is now glimpsed the radiant dawn of the world.”
22
  The primary goal of 
this type of language was to motivate volunteers and donors with an assertion that all good 
people would help.  The phrase “save the conscience of future humanity,” for example, formed 
part of the text on the cover of the second issue—accompanying an image of a crying toddler 
flanked by falling bombs—that concluded: “to abstain is to be guilty of indifference.”
23
  All good 
men, stated another article more explicitly, are obliged to construct a defense of the Spanish 
children’s destiny.
24
  By fostering a sense of duty among Cuban readers and defining their 
mission of saving children as inherently good and universally supported, A.A.N.P.E. activists 
hoped to grow their organization and its accomplishments.   
Second, the A.A.N.P.E. did not wish to be seen as partisan and argued that Spanish 
children should be saved regardless of which side their parents supported in the war.  Association 
writers claimed that children did not belong to political parties, but their bulletin provided a 
glimpse into the ambiguity of this claim.  Articles in the first two issues of ¡Ayuda! hinted at the 
challenge faced from critics and a contrary message emphasizing partisanship in the Spanish 
conflict.  “They are not Russians, those we saw fighting in the outskirts of Madrid and in defense 
of Irún,” insisted a film review of a war documentary.  “They are Spaniards, very much 
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Spaniards,” and certainly Cubans, the review concluded, ought to know Spaniards when they 
saw them.
25
  Clearly responding to accusations in anti-Republican propaganda of Communism or 
other leftwing bias, Teté Casuso—who had never been a Communist Party member and was 
already on her way to becoming stridently anticommunist—followed an emotional portrait of 
Spanish war orphans with bitter sarcasm: “These are the ‘red children,’ the terrible children, ‘the 
children who have learned to rob and murder and rape.’”  Just a few paragraphs later in the same 
article, however, she admitted that some of the older children did indeed affiliate with one side 
over the other.  They developed political sympathy, she argued, as “the natural result of the 
moment in which they have lived,” just as Cuban youth—such as she and her late husband—had 
done during revolutionary times.  Confirming “red phobia” and contradicting the A.A.N.P.E. 
claim that children did not belong to political parties, she concluded by admitting that “there are 
a great number of youths with the Republican party.”
26
     
Nonpartisan claims showed their flaws even as they were stated.  A.A.N.P.E. members 
wanted the Cuban people to view their cause of aid to the Spanish children as strictly apolitical, 
yet their organization had a clear Republican bias.  Sometimes their language gave them away.  
One article innocently entitled “In Defense of Infant Happiness” assured readers that support 
they contributed would go to all Spanish children, regardless of whether their parents were leales 
or rebeldes.
27
  Calling the Republicans ‘loyalists’ and the Nationalists ‘rebels,’ though 
historically accurate, was not politically neutral.  One author stated her sympathies plainly: The 
sane part of Spain, she believed, fought to expel from its territory the traitors—or, in a literary 
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flourish, “vampires”—who exploited, murdered, and plundered.
28
  An illustration published in 
May 1938 showed improvements in children’s health from 1931 to 1938 under the Republic, and 
the subsequent negative consequences of the “fascist movement.”
29
  Association leaders 
acknowledged the contradiction in an advertising poster they produced.  They called “those who 
caused this situation” persons “who revile the sacred principles of democracy” and who “have 
attacked and violated the will of a people.”  Yet immediately following this censure of the 
Nationalists condemning their rebellion against the elected Republican government, authors 
emphasized that the A.A.N.P.E. “undertakes a highly humanitarian work free of any 
partisanship.”
30
  Tension between the desire to appear nonpartisan and clear support for the 
Republican side in the Association’s public message resulted from members’ attempts to engage 
and organize diverse Cubans beyond their own circle of committed antifascist activists.  Striving 
to acknowledge and to be inclusive of the political diversity of the Cuban left during this period, 
of which they themselves were representative, A.A.N.P.E. leaders tried also to appeal to those 
who viewed themselves as nonpolitical. 
The nonpartisan argument demonstrated a weakness in the save-the-children argument: 
Clearly, some Cubans required convincing that the A.A.N.P.E. mission to aid Spanish children 
was inherently desirable and universally accepted.  Even the most dramatic language and images 
of the plight of innocent children, it seems, were not deemed sufficiently effective by 
contributing writers.  To foster a sense of duty in Cubans to participate and contribute also 
required an insistent nonpartisan appeal, as evidenced by the prevalence of this claim throughout 
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much of the publication’s run.  The nonpartisan argument acted as a kind of addendum to the 
save-the-children argument.  Leaders argued that the Association existed “without ascribing to 
any political sector, without solidarity with any social creed, for humanity pure and simple.”  It 
wanted only to save children, regardless of race, religion, or political party.  All people of good 
and true hearts regardless of party or creed, the Association claimed, should unite around the 
cause.
31
  Men divided themselves up with political and ideological ‘isms,’ stated one article, but 
that reality should not be allowed to impact children—children should be able to live in peace.
32
  
Another article agreed: Children are not ideological and should not be divided as adults are into 
fascists and Communists, Catholics and Protestants, it argued.
33
  One particularly forthright 
request exemplified this part of the A.A.N.P.E. message.  “Reader friend,” began a December 
1937 note addressed directly to a hypothetical member of the target audience.   
Perhaps you are not a political man, perhaps you have not wanted to raise, in regard to 
the Spanish conflict, the question of responsibility or guilt, perhaps you, as a man, have 
felt shaken to your core with pity at the horror of this war, without passing judgment. 
Well then, friend, you can help to make the Spanish war less hard, you can serve peace in 
the midst of the contest’s horror, helping the Association of Aid to the Child of the 
Spanish People, which only wishes to save the defenseless children of Spain from 




The save-the-children argument relied upon the nonpartisan argument to reach Cubans otherwise 
confused or turned away by the civil war, interpreted as a conflict of brother against brother.  
The tension between these arguments and the Association’s pro-Republican bias reveals the 
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difficult and even contentious divide between charity and activism, a line A.A.N.P.E. leaders 
walked carefully.     
By December 1938 ¡Ayuda! moved away from a carefully politic stance and abandoned 
the theme of nonpartisanship.  Ten-year-old Rafael González—a resident of the Casa-Escuela in 
Sitges—wrote a thank-you note to the Cuban people stating that is was not all Cuba who aided 
the Spanish children but rather “the antifascist people.”
35
  More than a year after the first two 
issues had hinted at challenges to the Association, the eighth issue addressed the attack directly, 
stating outright that it had “many enemies.”  These foes lived in “lamentable error,” and 
Association members’ work had not succeeded in changing their attitude that was “mistaken” or 
in many cases due to “bad intentions.”  The “decent people” working to save the “destitute and 
orphaned infancy cruelly assassinated by the Nazi-Onalists of the Iberian Peninsula” were 
persecuted in Cuba: Opponents targeted cinemas showing films supporting aid to the Spanish 
children, the Association received telephone and mail threats, and its radio hour suffered hostile 
interruptions.  Nevertheless, ¡Ayuda! maintained an optimistic tone.  The noble and generous 
people of Cuba, the humble and middle classes, the bulletin stated, were doing real and tangible 
good in the lives of the Spanish children.  This assistance must remain “our work, constant and 
exemplary.”  The cause continued to gain supporters, and time would judge them favorably, it 
concluded.
36
  The safe and attractive message of nonpartisan cooperation to save Spanish 
children had transformed into one in which enemies of the cause did receive recognition, but the 
final words encouraged motivation and hope.  Too much emphasis on enemies might discourage 
supporters, and gaining and retaining them was the only way for the A.A.N.P.E. to achieve its 
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ultimate goal of aiding Spanish children.  In contrast to the neutral ‘Reader friend’ note asking 
for donations in the third issue, text soliciting support on the back cover of the eighth issue began, 
“Republican who reads us and who helps us: Triple your efforts . . .”
37
  Between the former note 
in December 1937 and the latter in December 1938, the Republican position in Spain had 
deteriorated drastically.  ¡Ayuda! abandoned nonpartisan niceties, addressing both enemies and 
pro-Republican supporters directly. 
Third, in a less frequent but still significant theme, contributors to the bulletin mobilized 
Christian faith in support of their cause.  A female author identified as a member of the 
A.A.N.P.E. Delegation of Camagüey introduced a Christian perspective on the plight of the 
Spanish children to the first issue of ¡Ayuda! (July 1937).  “The children of Spain are the pain of 
the world,” she stated emphatically, and the “remorse of Humanity traitorous to Christ.”  Christ 
was not, she argued, present in the bombs dropped on cities, far from any legitimate military 
target.  He could not be found there among “the worst human instincts and ambitions.”  It was 
“sacrilegious,” “profane,” and “inexcusable” to murder people—especially children—she wrote, 
while “invoking God’s protection and benediction.”
38
   
Several months later Teté Casuso took up the theme of Christianity introduced in the first 
issue, elaborating her vision for “the victorious peace” desired by “Friends of the Spanish 
People.”  Victory in Spain would mean “justice and the right to work and live and love.”  Peace 
could not be a barbarous triumph, a violent dominance; rather it must be a constructive peace of 
brotherly love, a “Christian peace,” she insisted.  Christ, she argued, was not in the sinister 
bombers flying over Spain but rather “with the children” or even “fighting in the trenches against 
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the barbarous invaders.”  Christian peace, she believed, optimistic in the autumn of 1937, would 
come one day.
39
  Arguing that Christ sided with the children she sought to serve and with the 
Republican side of the struggle probably helped Casuso find hope about the war’s course in her 
Christian faith.  It may also have helped her to connect with some readers who would have been 
turned off otherwise by overtly political appeals.   
To bring a touch of humor—and perhaps to evoke in the reader’s mind solidarity with 
everyday people rather than political zealots—one author in the same issue of the bulletin 
recounted the reception of revolutionary poet Rafael Alberti by a group in Andalucía.  The 
peasants, he wrote, after the poet’s “irreligious and libertarian propaganda saw him off 
affectionately: ‘Well, Don Rafaé,’” they said to him, “‘may God accompany you in this 
Communism.’”  ¡Ayuda! sought to reclaim an active or even aggressive Christianity for the 
Republic, envisioning religion in which the poor would not submit to the rich and powerful, 
remaining resigned to their “miserable state.”  Religion should not “sanctify despotism and 
fascist barbarity.”  It should “save every man” from the current “hell” in Spain, and move toward 
“the universal peace of tomorrow and the future brotherhood of men.”  Peace would establish a 
“new world of Love and of Justice.”  The bulletin defended rage as “sacred” when justified, 
reminding readers that the “ire of Jesus of Nazareth was divine when, clutching the lash, he 
threw the merchants out of the temple.”  Similarly, the rage of a people in self-defense against 
attacks “by foreign assassins” was sacred.  In one bold statement the Spanish people would “turn 
into a new Jesus and throw the merchants out of Spain.”
40
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The third issue of ¡Ayuda! (December 1937) also included a number of references to 
Christianity or religion generally, though none of the kind of depth present in the first two.  One 
simply pointed out that beyond any “racial, party, or religious limitation,” the A.A.N.P.E., 
wanted “only to save the children, for Love, from Hatred.”
41
  Another drew the same link as 
previous articles between religion and a future of peace.
42
  A third claimed that the “natural 
impulse of the human heart and social obligation” to defend innocent children “finds stimulus 
and support as much in that which is most mystical in Christianity as in that which is most 
materialistic in Marxism.”  That Christianity and Marxism had this particular value in common, 
the article suggested, showed that the value was among “the biological necessities of the 
species.”
43
   
An interview with women volunteers at the A.A.N.P.E. Winter Clothing Drive in the 
third issue revealed that at least one “fanatic” refused to contribute to the effort because, he said, 
his religion would not permit him to do so.
44
  One explanation for this encounter, which we 
discuss in the section devoted to Association accomplishments, could be the influence of 
propaganda portraying Republicans as anti-Catholic.  Pro-Republican authors declaring their 
Christianity challenged such propaganda.  Born of their challenge to the established Catholic 
Church of Spain, the idea of Republican anti-Christianity grew as Nationalist forces skillfully 
deployed it in their propaganda.  The Christian theme emphasized by some authors in ¡Ayuda! 
sought to reclaim the faith for supporters of the Republic, and to give the cause of the Spanish 
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children more widespread appeal.  It could serve a similar function to that of nonpartisanship: to 
draw diverse Cubans to the cause.  Individuals and families who did not share A.A.N.P.E. 
leaders’ politics might be more receptive to connecting through shared faith.  It seems, however, 
that the true Christianity argument may not have withstood the test of effectiveness, as 
A.A.N.P.E. writers abandoned it early on.  Following the third issue, overt use of an appeal to 
Christianity disappeared from ¡Ayuda! for ten months; and, when it reappeared in the seventh 
and eighth issues of the bulletin, it remained significantly reduced from its earlier prominence.  
An article in the seventh issue (October 1938) protesting that children should not be defined by 
the factions of their parents mentioned religion in passing, arguing that adults should not divide 
children into Catholics and Protestants.
45
  The eighth issue (December 1938) included Teté 
Casuso’s Christmas poem, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, as well as one article 
calling the war in Spain “monstrous and anti-Christian.”
46
  It is difficult to know definitively why 
Association authors downplayed the theme of Christianity after the initial three bulletin issues, 
though it is interesting to note that the theme reemerged—albeit much reduced—just as they 
decisively abandoned the theme of nonpartisanship in the autumn and early winter of 1938. 
Fourth, A.A.N.P.E. members claimed in their publication that Cubans had a special 
relationship with Spain, and therefore a special responsibility to the Spanish people during their 
time of need.  While appealing to the idea that all humanity in good conscience had an obligation 
to help the Spanish children, authors in ¡Ayuda! nevertheless emphasized Spain’s shared history 
with Cuba and Latin America as a whole, arguing that longstanding ties placed an imperative 
upon Latin Americans.  The special relationship was, of course, an historical one.  Many articles 
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recounted historical examples of ties between Spain and Latin America, or between Spain and 
Cuba specifically.  From shared history, authors in ¡Ayuda! selected examples of fraternity and 
cooperation.  One article entitled “Debt of Love and Gratitude” claimed to Cuban readers that 
Spain had supported them in the aftermaths of Cuban natural disasters such as the hurricane of 
1926 and provided assistance to victims of Machado’s dictatorship.  Reaching farther back, it 
reminded them of the colonial-era divide between “defenders, Creoles and Spaniards, of Spanish 
absolutism” on the one hand, and Mart  and the people on the other.
47





 identifying their cause with great men from a shared history. 
Sometimes ¡Ayuda! authors portrayed the relationship between Spain and Latin America 
as one of mother and children; other times, they depicted the relationship as one of siblings.  
Spain was “the mother of this world of ours.”
50
  The countries of Latin America were Cuba’s 
“sister lands,” and together these lands were “daughters” of Spain.
51
  Cuba was to Spain a 
“brother in race and in history.”
52
  Mexico was the “sister Aztec republic,”
53
 a “fraternal 
republic.”
54
  Venezuela was a “sister republic.”
55
  Often authors asserted that the peoples of Cuba, 
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Latin America, and Spain were all one in the same.  We should not forget, they urged, that they 
are a part of us.
56
  “That which is Spanish is very much ours,” stated one author, “we live so 
close, with such parallels, that it is impossible to resist.”
57
  Not only were the countries of Latin 
America metaphorically family members of Spain but also Latin Americans were literally family 
members of Spaniards.  Young Armando Martínez, a schoolboy chosen to greet the children 
refugees on their way to Mexico, melded these familial themes in his remarks.  Addressing his 
“Spanish brothers,” Armando assured them that Cuban children—united with them by “multiple 
ties of confraternity that are not chains which could be broken”—sympathized with their pain.  
He tried to comfort them on their voyage to Mexico by reminding them that they were going to 
live in a “brother country,” a country of their race, their blood, their language.
58
  This theme, 
which Armando used to try to calm the fears of Spanish children on their way to exile, 
Association members would use repeatedly to engage Cubans in assisting their Spanish kin.  The 
special relationship argument was one of the most frequently emphasized themes in the 
A.A.N.P.E.’s message to its Cuban readers—as well as within Cuban antifascism generally.  We 
are obligated to help our brother nation, went their argument; to speak of the Spanish people is to 
speak of our own people.
59
   
Authors arguing for Cuban support of Spain had to distinguish between a Spain Cubans 
fought against and one they would fight for.  They asserted that the same “bad” Spain victimized 
both Spanish Republicans and Cubans: “When Cuba remembers its past, it evokes a militarism in 
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the pay of a colonizing tyranny, and knows that the miliciano [Spanish Republican fighter] has 
been a victim as has been the guajiro [Cuban peasant] in turn.”
60
  Spanish authors in the Cuban 
publication supported the concept of kinship between Cuba and the “good” Spain associated with 
the Republic as distinguished from an imperialist and oppressive Spain associated with the 
Nationalists.  “Your great José Mart ,” stated a Spanish woman to Cubans in a radio address 
printed in ¡Ayuda! in December 1938, “is ours also, of the good Spaniards, who have always 
been his brothers.”  Just as Cuban Association members emphasized their country’s special 
relationship with Spain specifically to inspire support, so too did Spanish authors.  The radio 
address continued with a plea of this sort: We need help from all nations, the speaker stated, 
especially from those who “come from the same trunk as we do and speak the same language.”  
Think of your children, she pleaded, and then help ours.
61
 
Fifth, the Association asserted that its efforts depended on contributions from children 
and women in addition to those of men, an argument that would come to interact significantly 
with the special relationship argument.  An advertising poster produced by the A.A.N.P.E. stated: 
“We are sure to find in every child, every mother, every generous person a member of the 
Association who guarantees his moral solidarity to the cause of those thousands of innocent 
creatures.”
62
  The first issue of ¡Ayuda! emphasized the role of youth in the Havana reception of 
Spanish children on their way to refuge in Mexico.  A.A.N.P.E. leaders chose schoolboy 
Armando Mart nez to greet the children refugees on their way to Mexico.  A “poor boy” from the 
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José Miguel Gómez School, Armando addressed his Spanish counterparts; but, Teté Casuso 
noted, his greatest contribution to the occasion was not the “magnificent spontaneous words” he 
delivered.  It was, she wrote, the shirt off his own back which he gave to a Spanish boy who had 
none.  Another of Casuso’s anecdotes makes an interesting comparison between the Spanish war 
orphans and the “little black children of the bay,” who improvised a show for the children on the 
boat.  It was, she wrote, a “greeting from our own ragged and hungry children . . . full of creole 
sympathy and the generous heart of Cuba” to the children from Spain, “these hungry children 
without shoes, almost as naked as they, whom the horror of war . . . pushed to our generous 
land.”
63
  With these two anecdotes, Teté  illustrates the participation of children, but also implies 
the popularity of her organization’s cause by suggesting that poor children of different races 
represent Cuba’s generous welcome of Spanish orphans.  
The first issue also established a children’s section of the publication with an 
announcement entitled “To Cuban Children” stating that ¡Ayuda! would devote space for Cuban 
children to express their sentiments regarding the events in Spain and the condition of the 
Spanish children.  Following this announcement were two letters written by children.  Berta 
Rodríguez Barco, age eight, wrote that she wanted to help her little brothers and sisters in Spain, 
and so she was sending the entirety of her savings, 40 cents.  The students of “School Number 2” 
in Güera de Melena sent five pesos raised by their community, along with one peso donated by 
Señora Pura Quintana, the teacher at nearby “School Number 1.”
64
  The A.A.N.P.E. celebrated 
this type of cooperation between children and adults.  In March 1938 the bulletin featured a letter 
written by a Mexican boy in which he pledged solidarity with the war victims of Republican 
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Spain and told Cuban children that Mexican children did not eat sweets because the poor 
Spaniards were suffering.  “I ask of you, the Cuban children,” he wrote, “to help the children of 
Spain.”
65
  In May of 1938 ¡Ayuda! published a poem written by a Spanish orphan living in 
Mexico praising President Lázaro Cardenas for welcoming the children from “sister Spain” to 
his country and treating them like Mexico’s own children.
66
   
Though they did not always have letters and poems from children to publish, the editors 
of ¡Ayuda! made certain to emphasize their role in the organization whenever possible.  In 
September 1938 they dedicated a page to work by Cuban children in solidarity with Spanish 
children.  Pictured were children’s committees organized to help Spanish children, made up of 
both boys and girls and demonstrating at least a small degree of racial diversity.  Of the ten 
children pictured, four are female and one appears to be black.
67
  The following month, the 
“Children’s Page” again featured the children’s committees by publishing appeals for aid written 
and radio addresses delivered by officers of the organizations, noting in two cases the authors’ 
ages as nine and ten years old.  One little boy told radio listeners that when the A.A.N.P.E. was 
established, he “felt a great desire to join the work of these comrades who were to help my 
comrades the little Spanish children.”  Since the Association was an organization of grownups, 
he noted, he and his friends started their own group in support of the effort which became a 
children’s committee of the larger group.  Featured during the A.A.N.P.E. radio hour and 
published in its bulletin, little José Alvarez had clearly earned inclusion by the grownups.
68
  The 
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“Children’s Page” feature continued in subsequent issues of the bulletin.
69
  Cuban children also 
gave money to the cause.  As we will see in our analysis of Association finances, they made 
group and individual donations to aid their Spanish counterparts and the A.A.N.P.E. highlighted 
their contributions. 
The Association also placed great emphasis on the role of women—and particularly 
mothers—in efforts to aid Spanish children.  In a typical statement and call for assistance, the 
first issue made a dual appeal to a special relationship of women to children and a special 
relationship of Latin America to Spain: “Two hundred thousand children stretch from Madrid 
their imploring little hands! What Cuban woman, what mother, what pious heart will deny their 
gathering (concurso)? Cuba, like Mexico, will be able to demonstrate, very soon, the generosity 
of its people!”
70
  In this way, the theme of the special relationship between Spain and Cuba 
intersected with the special role the Association proposed for women and especially mothers to 
play in the efforts to aid Spanish children.  Cuban women had a special role to play, authors 
argued in ¡Ayuda!, because of a combination of their connection to Spain and their universal 
maternal instinct.  A message directed at women in the second issue noted that it was the time of 
year when mothers changed their children’s wardrobes from summer to winter clothing, even in 
Cuba’s warm and pleasant climate.  But in Spain, it warned, children would be ravaged not only 
by war but also by the bitter cold of winter.  “It is now, Cuban mothers,” the article asserted, 
“when our feminine sensibility feels most overwhelmed by the abandonment and the poverty of 
the unhappy creatures.”  Every woman could make coats for the poor Spanish children; none 
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need shoulder the guilt of a Spanish child frozen to death, the message offered.  The sad smile of 
the Spanish mother from afar would be the Cuban mother’s reward.
71
  On the next page, the call 
for clothing took a harsher tone.  The poem aimed at mobilizing women entitled “Words to My 
Compañera [Female Companion]” admonished the reader about her contribution to the cause in 
an emphatic typeface: “YOU, WHO ARE ALSO A MOTHER, TELL ME, WHAT HAVE YOU 
DONE, COMRADE?”  Your place is in the rearguard, the poem instructed women.  Sew 
something for the leales; knit a coat.
72
  An echo of the poem’s direct address to the Cuban 
woman as mother followed in the fourth issue.  “And you, Creole mother, representative of the 
universal woman, who gives birth with love and pain,” it reminded the reader, your child is a 
brother of the child who dies in Spain.
73
  “Woman reader,” pleaded a female author in the 
seventh issue, “I who have never forgotten the Cuban child, in the name of the Cuban child, I ask 
you to help the Spanish child.”
74
 
Sixth and finally, members wanted to emphasize that their organization was born of 
popular efforts.  The Comité Directivo asserted in the first issue that their Association filled “a 
need in the bosom of Cuban society.”  The people of Cuba, they claimed in an assertion closely 
related to the save-the-children argument, had a “collective desire” to aid the Spanish children.  
A poster produced by the Association expressed the popularity of its efforts, stating that no one 
in Cuban society could “remain indifferent to the tragedy” or “avoid a generous impulse toward 
the victims,” and that its leaders had “the conviction to interpret the general sentiment.”  The 
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A.A.N.P.E. had the privilege of interpreting this wish, of leading “a coordination of forces to 
materialize effective and measureable aid,” of giving life and form to the organization that would 
“channel this enthusiasm and convert it into a magnificent reality.”  Their task was “that of 
arriving at the deepest part of the people’s heart,” not to tug at heartstrings, which they claimed 
had already happened spontaneously, but rather to achieve and retain the cooperation of each and 
every person.  This organizing and persistence of effort, they stated, was the Association’s 
reason for existence.  New regional and local subcommittees were establishing themselves all 
over the island, writers from the Comite Directivo noted, making the Association’s efforts truly 
national.  A section of the issue entitled “On Organization: How Our Association Grows” 
detailed efforts in different locales, divided into sections by region.
75
  On the one hand 
A.A.N.P.E. writers wanted to give the impression of spontaneous support by all of Cuba, but on 
the other they understood that effective organization always requires more than supportive 
sentiments.  The purpose of the message they crafted was to assist in their organizing efforts.  
The back cover text of the first issue—accompanied by a dramatic image of a weeping toddler 
superimposed over photographs of bombed-out buildings—concluded that the Association 
“called on all who desire and feel that this voice of Cuba should reach a Spain that is hurting and 
suffering, in need of all our support and cooperation.  HELP US!”
76
 
Work to craft the A.A.N.P.E. message for a Cuban audience served one central goal: 
wartime material aid to Spanish children.  Association members claimed from the beginning that 
they enjoyed widespread grassroots support from Cubans.  To substantiate this assertion, authors 
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included qualitative descriptions of diverse people and groups offering donations, volunteer time, 
and solidarity.
77
  The clearest validation of their claim, however, came from financial data 
detailing contributions large and small from people and groups all over Cuba and abroad.  We 
turn now to analysis of these records. 
 
Finances 
A founding donation of $50 from the Círculo Republicano Español (Spanish Republican 
Circle) in March 1937 started off the A.A.N.P.E.’s fundraising.  For most of the months of its 
existence, the Association recorded and published detailed accounting of every single source of 
its income, going so far, for example, as to record the five cents which someone found in the 
Association’s office on 3 October 1938 in an empty jug.
78
  Organizational records indicate also 
that, at least at first, Association leaders penned handwritten thank-you notes to individual 
donors and those who organized group collections; such notes dated May–November 1937 
express gratitude for donation amounts ranging from $0.80 to $178.00.
79
  Though the financial 
records are not perfectly complete or consistent, they provide ample information to give us a 
sense of the A.A.N.P.E.’s fundraising over time.  Quantitative analysis of fundraising and 
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expenditure data provides us with another view of the Association, and particularly its claim of 
popular involvement and support. 
The Association raised more than $18,800.00 during the 19 months for which we have 
financial data—unfortunately, the bulletin did not include comprehensive financial accounting 
for the months of January–March 1938 and no information on this period was found in archived 
organizational records—with an overall monthly average of approximately $992.00.  Fundraising 
success grew quickly over the first few months.  At a time when rural workers in Cuba earned a 
minimum wage of $0.80 per day and those in urban areas typically made $2.00–3.00 per day,
80
 
an average income of approximately $13.51 per day from its founding in mid-March 1937 
through the end of July was an impressive accomplishment for the new Association.  The daily 
average for the following five months, August to December of 1937, more than doubled to 
approximately $29.17.
81
  During 1938, the daily average ranged from a low of $22.77 for the 
month of June up to an extraordinary $147.71 for December, by far the A.A.N.P.E.’s best month.  
A graphic representation (Figure 3.1) of monthly income and expenses illustrates several points.  
Income maintained stability from month to month relative to expenditures, which varied much 
more widely—the notable exception is December 1938, when income spiked dramatically.  
Overall, income enjoyed a modest increase from March to November 1937, and exhibited a 
general decline from April to November 1938.  Expense data display two different types of 
spending.  Day-to-day Association expenditures account for the gradual slope of the expenses 
plot visible in the graph, in which a general increase over time is observed, while spikes in the 
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same plot show large shipments of monetary and material aid to Europe.  The largest spending 
spike corresponds with the largest income month, December 1938. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 A.A.N.P.E. Income & Expenses 
 
The organization gained income from a number of sources: it collected membership dues 
and subscription fees; sold bonds, stamps, postcards, fans, buttons, and copies of ¡Ayuda!; held 
ticketed events; received funds raised by its delegations and children’s committees across the 
island and during radio drives; and enjoyed numerous donations sent in by organizations, groups, 
businesses, families, and individuals.  We argue that membership dues and subscription 
collection and bond, stamp, postcard, fan, button, bulletin, and ticket sales represent centralized 
fundraising, whereas delegation, radio, organization, group, business, family, and individual 
donations represent popular grassroots support.  Getting people to pay dues and buy items in 




of convincing people to part with their hard-earned money.  We do not mean to suggest that 
these donations were somehow inauthentic, only that they represented the hard work of a 
relatively small central group of the Association’s most dedicated leaders and activists.  
Conversely, donations made by radio listeners, organizations, groups, businesses, families, 
individuals, and by A.A.N.P.E. adherents self-organized in diverse parts of the country—the 
delegations and children’s committees—indicate, we assert, diverse popular grassroots support.  
This system of division is imperfect, but even if it cannot provide certain conclusions we believe 
it suggests intriguing fundraising trends. 
How did centralized and grassroots fundraising trend over time?  Choosing April 1937 as 
a starting point because it was the Association’s first full month, we have compared periods at 
three-month intervals: April, July, and October 1937 and April, July, and October 1938 
(complete data are unavailable for January 1938).  Since ticketed fundraising events happened at 
specific points in time and took place sporadically throughout the Association’s existence, it does 
not make sense to include their contributions when seeking long-term trends; therefore, we have 
omitted from centralized income totals the periodic influx of ticket-sale cash.  A graphic 






Figure 3.2 Centralized & Grassroots Fundraising, April 1937–October 1938  
 
Starting off slightly greater than the grassroots income, the centralized income dipped between 
April and July 1937, but appears to have grown strongly and steadily from then on if the missing 
period followed the clear trend.  This progression is unsurprising if we consider that leaders built 
up their fundraising structures over time, maintaining consistent contacts and sources while 
cultivating new ones.  The grassroots income grew sharply during the first year and plummeted 
during the second in a curve similar to that of overall income (Figure 3.1) when we exclude the 
extraordinary month of December 1938.  That the grassroots and overall income curves are so 
similar indicates that grassroots income drove fundraising.  Indeed, for much of the A.A.N.P.E.’s 
existence income we are considering grassroots was higher than that we have categorized as 
centralized, even during most months with fundraising events.   
What does the steep decrease in grassroots income during 1938 indicate?  One hypothesis 
is that donors became disheartened by bad news from the Spanish front early that year as 
Nationalist forces gained momentum and Republicans lost ground.  To test the theory, it is 
necessary to account for the surge in income in December 1938.  If grassroots donations caused 
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month’s unusually large event income—$3,741.00—as we have done for previous calculations, 
we find that from October to December 1938, centralized income dropped sharply while 
grassroots income enjoyed a dramatic resurgence.   
 
 
Figure 3.3 Centralized & Grassroots Fundraising, April 1937–December 1938  
 
That Association leaders were instrumental in the organization of the massive reception for 
Fernando de los Ríos at the Polar Stadium that month probably explains the notable decrease in 
other forms of centralized fundraising—with all the work they did for the stadium event, they 
likely had little time for other efforts.  The event, discussed in greater detail in the upcoming 
section on Association accomplishments, likely impacted grassroots donations as well.  It is 
probable that excitement surrounding the event boosted both spirits and donations, even as 
Republican defeat neared.  Though the reversal in trends for centralized and grassroots income in 
December of 1938 challenges our theory, therefore, it does not invalidate it.  The stadium event 
of that month was unique in the Association’s—and pro-Republican Cuba’s—history, and it 
might account for the change.  
Total monetary donation amount is only one—and perhaps not the best—way to measure 
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support the A.A.N.P.E. enjoyed.  Examining October 1937 and 1938 as sample months allows us 
to form a picture of typical Association fundraising.  In the category of individual and family 
donations in October 1937, the Association received 38 donativos (donations from single 
individuals or families) with an average amount of $1.13 and 24 colectas (collections initiated by 
individuals) with an average amount of $6.81.  In October 1938, there were 17 donativos with an 
average amount of $0.70, three colectas with an average amount of $12.88, and four unspecified 
donations with an average amount of $2.50.  Some typical donation origins from these sample 
months give a sense of participating supporters.  On 7 October 1937, for example, the 
Association received $8.20 from a colecta initiated by a child named Martica Suárez, a $0.40 
donativo from Señorita Josefina Sánchez, and a $1.20 colecta from “José Brell, de Lawton, 
Habana.”  On the 17
th
 of the same month, it received a $20.00 colecta from “Francisco López, de 
Estrada, Oriente.”  On the 27
th
, it received, among other types of donations, a $1.00 donativo 
from Señora Jacinta Peña y Ruíz, a $1.00 donativo from “Benigno López, Tabor, Camagüey,” 
and a $0.60 donativo from Señora Concepción Ruíz.  A year later in October 1938, the 
Association received, among other donations, a donativo of $0.20 from a child named Lydia 
Santana on the 1
st
, a donativo of $0.50 from Enrique Oliva and his wife on the 3
rd
, a donativo of 
$1.20 from Señorita Salomé Hernández of Jobabo, Oriente on the 13
th
, a donativo of $0.20 from 
a child named Lisardito Lister and $10.00 from Bernardo Menéndez collected in ‘La Guardia’ 
bakery on the 15
th
, and a donativo of $1.00 from “Valcárcel and wife” of Guantánamo in honor 




   
These sample donations show diversity typical of A.A.N.P.E. supporters in terms of age, 
gender, relationship status, and geographic origin.  Unfortunately, only some of the donation 
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records in the bulletin and in archived organizational records included geographic origin; 
however, the information we do have indicates substantial geographic diversity.  A handwritten 
list in the archival records of 38 donations notes the province of each donor, showing 
contributions from all six: Oriente had the highest number with 12, Camagüey followed with 10, 
Santa Clara had eight, Havana three, and Matanzas and Pinar del Río both had two, with one 
entry illegible.
83
  Collaboration came from every corner of the island and, over the course of the 
Association’s existence, locations abroad such as Tampa, Kingston, San Juan, Port Au Prince, 
and New York City.  The sample donations also demonstrate the combination of individual, 
family, and colecta donations, and highlight participation by women and children.  A few 
donation records of interest from the archive offer further clues about the diversity of participants.  
In May 1937 the A.A.N.P.E. received $20.00 donated by the fishermen of the Sociedad de 
Marineros Pescadores de Batabano (Society of Fishermen Mariners of Batabano) on the 
Caribbean coast south of Havana; in September 1937 “la señora Ana Rodr guez y Serrano” and 
“la señorita Chana Garc a y Hernández” collected $7.00 in the neighborhood of Luyanó in the 
capital; in October of that year the sister of Cuban combat volunteer Angel Rufo, “who fell in 
Jarama assassinated by fascism” while fighting with the Centuria Guiteras, gave $4.60 collected 
by their friends; and in November the Association welcomed an institutional donation of $5.00 
from the Club Atenas (Athens Club), a prominent  black Cuban society.
84
 
Donations from diverse groups (Table 3.1) also provide insight into the popular 
grassroots character of the Association’s fundraising.  Again comparing October 1937 and 1938, 
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we gain a sense of typical group donations.  In October 1937, the Association received 32 
donations from groups with an average amount of $15.77.  In October 1938, there were 24 
donations from groups with an average amount of $11.57.  
 
Table 3.1 Contributing Groups by Type for October 1937 and October 1938 
 
Organization or Group Type October 1937 October 1938 
   
A.A.N.P.E. Delegations Delegación Almendares Delegación Cárdenas 
 Delegación Ciego de Avila Delegación Marianao 
 Delegación Marianao  
 Delegación Santiago de Cuba  
 Delegación Vereda Nueva  
   
A.A.N.P.E. Children’s Committees  Comité Infantil El Campesino 
  Comité Infantil Enrique Lister 
  Comité Infantil José Miaja 
  Comité Infantil La Pasionaria 
   
Other Organizations & Groups Ateneo Socialista Español Facetas de Actualidad Española 
 Block Pro-Mejoras de Cueto Fileteadores de Partagás 
 Colonia Asiento Logia Eureka 
 Colonia Dos Hermanos Logia Obreros de Morón 
 Diario Español del Aire Logia Sueños de Martí 
 Empleados de Cine Verdún Obreros de la imprenta La Milagrosa 
 Enfermos de Sanatorio La Esperanza Obreros de la imprenta Molina y Cía 
 Facetas de Actualidad Española Obreros del vivero Indalecio 
 Fca. de Sombreros J. Barquín y Cía Sociedad Espírita El Guía del Pastor 
 Fca. Dos Hermanos  
 Fileteadores de La Corona  
 Fileteadores de Partagás  
 Logia América  
 Obreros de Fca. Escobas Casa Porto  
 Plantel Rubén Martínez Villena  
 Respetable Logia José González Valdés  
 Sindicato de Chauffeurs Particulares 
 
 
These sample months demonstrate that, in addition to that of its adherent delegations and 
children’s committees across the island, the A.A.N.P.E. enjoyed support from unions, 
publications, Mason Lodges, and other groups.  We discuss campaigns in support of the Spanish 
Republic by other groups in subsequent chapters.  Here, their donations to the Association’s 
work on behalf of children—along with those of diverse men, women, and children—give strong 






The A.A.N.P.E.’s first major act was coordination of the reception in Havana harbor of 
the ship Mexique carrying Spanish refugee children to Mexico to live.  The Cuban government 
did not allow the ship to land, but Cubans boarded it and lined the shore to welcome the young 
Spaniards and send them on their way to their new home.  Much of the first issue of ¡Ayuda! 
focused on this event, using support for the reception as evidence of the Association’s grassroots 
character: A single call from the A.A.N.P.E., the Comité Directivo declared, was all it took to 
mobilize “all of society represented in its parties, associations, unions, and individually” for the 
reception.  In turn, the Committee stated, the experience of coming face-to-face with the war’s 
young victims had reinforced public desire to assist them.
85
  The theme of a special relationship 
between Spain and Cuba dominated discussion of the event, along with emotional appeals to the 
reader.  One article provided a portrait of a Spanish boy on the Mexique, while another printed 
the text of remarks made by a Cuban boy who boarded the ship to address his “Spanish 
brothers.”
86
  A photograph of the side of the ship packed with children leaning over its rails 
appeared twice in the issue, and three two-page pieces in a row detailed the event and its 
organization.  Teté Casuso wrote the third of these three articles, entitled “With the children who 
voyaged on the Mexique.”  In it, she expressed with deep feeling her own reaction to meeting the 
Spanish children and those of other Cuban participants, depicting a poignant scene of tenderness, 
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sorrow, and hope.  The eyes of her friend Ramiro Valdés Daussá—who, Teté noted, had been 
“hardened in tough fights”—filled with tears as he held the tiny hands of Pepa Henares.  Young 
María Luisa Corzo gave Avelino Rodríguez the only property she had, a portrait photograph of 
her family.  Casuso described a peaceful photographic scene of the family seated by a lake with 
some swans, and then quoted the photograph’s heartbreaking inscription: Please always think of 
your father and your mother, the girl’s mother had written.  “My little girl, do not forget me.”  
Now the family in the photograph did not exist, Teté told readers.  The girl’s father died fighting 
alongside “La Pasionaria,” Dolores Ibárruri, and her mother was in the hospital.  That the little 
girl would give away this photograph to one of the Cubans there to greet her required no 
commentary, Casuso stated.  “A child who gives away the last thing left to her in the world as a 
token of gratitude gives us a piece of her heart.  And she gives us this: her hunger for affection.”  
Including a number of similarly dramatic vignettes and portraits of individual children, the 
A.A.N.P.E. president humanized the victims for whom her organization labored.  After touching 
upon all of the various themes of the Association’s message, Casuso concluded her narration of 
the Mexique reception by emphasizing the momentous nature of the occasion in the 
Association’s organizing.  Here were the people, she claimed, of all races and nationalities, 
neither ‘loyal’ nor ‘rebel.’ “It was the unanimous gesture of the multitude that congregated to see 
them pass through, and to say to them that here, in Cuba, we love them, we empathize with them, 
with them we know suffering.”  As the ship sailed out past el Morro, the fortress at the entrance 
of Havana’s harbor, Teté envisioned Spaniards and Cubans together “in a salute that is now 
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In the autumn of 1937 the Association had two primary goals: to send winter clothing to 
the Spanish children and to establish two refuge houses for them.  Praising the enthusiasm of the 
Cuban people, the article made donation requests of the readers: clothing for the Ropero Invernal 
del Niño Español (Spanish Children’s Winter Clothing Drive) and monetary support to found the 
Casas-Escuelas Pueblo de Cuba (People of Cuba Residential Schools).
88
  The A.A.N.P.E. would 
succeed in sending multiple shipments of clothing to Spanish children and in establishing one 
Casa-Escuela in Spain’s Catalán region for children orphaned or otherwise uprooted by the war.  
Here we chronicle how the Association achieved these two goals. 
Readers of ¡Ayuda! in October 1937 found a special message to women asking them to 
participate in the drive to send winter clothes to the children in Spain.
89
  By the next issue’s 
publication a couple of months later in December 1937, the Association reported having sent five 
enormous crates full of 5,000 coats (piezas de abrigos) for children to the Consul of the Spanish 
Republic in France.  This impressive donation was the result of hard work by the A.A.N.P.E.’s 
Women’s Committee which took on leadership of the drive and organized volunteers to sew and 
collect clothing.
90
  A longer article took an in-depth look at this intense labor.  A reporter 
identified as “G.F.” (probably Gustavo Fabal, one of the bulletin’s editors) visited the A.A.N.P.E. 
offices one evening late in November, and wrote passionately about observing volunteers at 
work.  At ten-thirty at night the atmosphere in the room was feverish and agitated, G.F. noted, 
but the emotion was happy and proud.  Briefly interviewing the women present, the author 
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learned about the functioning of the clothing drive.  In addition to the work of volunteers at the 
central office, distinct Association delegations throughout the island sewed and collected 
clothing to send in.  The Delegation of Santiago de Cuba, for example, had sent 858 piezas de 
abrigo to date.  Other organizations supportive of the Spanish Republic—such as the Izquierda 
Republicana Española (Spanish Republican Left), the Círculo Español Socialista (Spanish 
Socialist Circle), and the publication Diario Español del Aire—conducted clothing drives of 
their own and then brought in the items collected.  Many individual women volunteered to sew 
in their homes, while others coordinated the purchasing of supplies and directed the work.  María 
Prieto’s Dressmaking Academy had devoted entire days to the Ropero.  Clothing stores owned 
by Spaniards contributed, as did “several establishments of Hebrews,” but reception amongst the 
majority of clothing stores had been negative.  One storeowner, the women reported to G.F. 
indignantly, had been so bold as to claim that “his religion did not permit him to donate clothing 
to children in loyalist territory.”  What, the Ropero volunteers asked with agitation, could 
possibly be the religion of this fanatic?  It is likely that the unnamed individual expressed this 
sentiment because he believed the view that the Republic was anti-Catholic, although it is 
certainly also possible that he simply hit upon the first excuse which came to mind not to give 
away his merchandise.  Impressed by the industrious commitment of the clothing drive 
volunteers, the reporter sought to convey the good feeling in the room that night to readers, 
hoping to inspire new participation and contributions.  He imagined a Spanish boy dressed in a 
little suit sewn with care by the “noble women of Cuba,” and the child’s father finding solace 
amidst the devastation of war in this act of solidarity by his Cuban sisters.  In this way, the 
clothing drive would elevate the “moral prestige” of Cuban people, G.F. argued, not before its 
government—“always a transient reality”—but before “another indomitably heroic people.”
91
 
                                                     
91




The A.A.N.P.E. kept Clothing Drive finances separate from other donations, and in 
March 1938 published a detailed account of the first Ropero’s accounting.  The Association 
treasurer established the clothing drive coffers with a $50.00 donation from the general fund in 
October, and five other donors contributed a total of $2.90 that month.  In November, there were 
23 individual, family, and colecta donations, plus a benefit held at the Prado Cinema raised 
$227.00, the Socialist Delegation of Victoria de las Tunas raised $27.27, the Delegation of 
Vertientes raised $18.60, and the Hebrew Committee raised $4.60, bringing the income total for 
the month to $325.69.  Most of these funds went immediately to purchase clothing and sewing 
supplies, leaving just $33.82 at the end of the month.  December slowed somewhat, with income 
totaling $178.84.  Money came from 12 individual, family, and colecta donations, as well as 
$80.00 from the Delegation of Morón, $70.19 from the Delegation of Manzanillo, $9.00 from the 
Delegation of Vertientes, $5.00 from the Alianza Femenina Oriental (Eastern Feminine Alliance), 
and miscellaneous leftover funds raised by the Prado Cinema benefit totaling $10.40, sent in by 
the Asociación Protectora del Preso (Prisoner’s Protective Association), the Spanish Socialist 
Circle, Diario Español del Aire, the Sindicato de Dependientes de Víveres (Grocery Store Clerks 
Union), the Sindicato Industria del Metal (Metalworkers Union), and a Dr. Tavío.  Ropero 




 From January through the summer of 1938, the principal goal toward which the 
Association labored was the Casa-Escuela.  In December 1937 ¡Ayuda! had assured readers that 
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establishment of a residential school was underway.
93
  The Association enjoyed widespread 
support for the project, and took time in its fourth issue editorial to acknowledge (Table 3.2) the 
first organizations and groups to offer their assistance. 
 
Table 3.2 Initial Organizations and Groups that Contributed to the A.A.N.P.E. Casa-Escuela 
 
Asociación de Obreros Manuales Resp. Logia ‘Antonio de la Piedra’ 
Asociación Unión Revolucionaria Resp. Logia ‘Fe Masónica’ 
Centre Catalá Resp. Logia ‘Hijos de la Fe Masónica’ (Sagua) 
Comité Estudiantil 28 de Enero Resp. Logia ‘Los Apóstoles’ 
Comité Femenino Hebreo Resp. Logia ‘P  y Margall’ 
Gran Logia Isla de Cuba de Ciego de Avila Resp. Logia ‘Progreso’ (Santa Clara) 
Gran Logia Obreros de Morón Sindicato de Obreros de Cervecerías 
Hermandad de los Jóvenes Cubanos Sindicato de Panaderos de la Habana 
Nueva Agrupación de Jóvenes del Pueblo Sociedad Naturista ‘Vida’ 
Organización Auténtica Sociedad Unión de Vendedores de la Habana 
Partido Agrario Nacional Unión de Empleados de Cafés 
Partido Revolucionario Cubano Unión Nacional de Mujeres 
 
The editorial expressed the A.A.N.P.E.’s gratitude to the political, social, cultural, patriotic, 
worker, women’s, and Masonic organizations which “offer their generous and cordial hand to 
help save the life and the soul of 100 Spanish children.”  In addition to this strong institutional 
support, the piece acknowledged the many Cuban and Spanish individuals who hoped to achieve 
and worked toward the creation of the residential school.
94
  Another article celebrated grassroots 
participation by the Cuban population in the effort.  While a group of Cubans fought alongside 
Republican forces, it stated, the “little Cuban house” symbolized the “honorable rearguard” of 
the Cuban people.
95
  The Association highlighted in particular the Masonic contribution in May 
1938, gratefully acknowledging a pledge by the Consejo Supremo de la Soberana Gran Logia de 
la Isla de Cuba (Supreme Council of the Sovereign Grand Lodge of the Island of Cuba) to 
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support the Casa-Escuela’s creation.  “With this gesture that enhances it and honors us,” ¡Ayuda! 
stated, “Cuban Masonry says loudly that it does not forget the duty of human solidarity which 
the Masonic tradition obliges.”
96
   
In May 1938 the Association announced that black Cuban educator Rosa Pastora Leclerc 
would travel to Spain to become director at the Casa-Escuela.
97
  Following a summer without 
publication—perhaps indicating hard work focused on other efforts—¡Ayuda!’s sixth issue in 
September heralded the residential school’s successful establishment during May in the town of 
Sitges.  The opening editorial exclaimed, “GREETINGS TO THE EDUCATIONAL COLONY 
‘PEOPLE OF CUBA.’”  It began by describing the “happy and luminous morning” when a cable 
arrived from Spain announcing the “anxiously awaited news” of the school’s opening.  The 
editorial emphasized the need to fund the school now that it was established, stating that the 
achievement of this great accomplishment only imposed a more urgent obligation: the work of 
educating the children for a better future.
98
  Photographs throughout the issue showed the school, 
the finances section noted that the A.A.N.P.E. had sent $202.85 in May for “expenses of our 
Colony in Sitges,”
99
 one article described Rosa Pastora Leclerc’s visit to the children’s colony 
‘Chatenay-Malabry’ in France,
100
 and another took the form of a conversation between the 
director and a Casa-Escuela student.  “Rosa Pastora, where are you from?” the child asked, and 
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then, “Cuba, where is that?”  The teacher replied, “Cuba is an island in the center of America.  
From here it would take us ten days in a boat to get there.  If you went there you would see sun 
like this shining all year, green countryside, beaches and palm trees similar to the ones you see 
here.”  The child asked if she would return to Cuba at the war’s end, and, at her affirmative reply, 
responded, “I don’t want you to go, Rosa Pastora.”  She promised the child she would bring the 
children to Cuba to visit.  “I’ll take all of you in a boat painted white,” she said, “to see the land 
where I was born, and later we will return to Spain.”  The tender exchange, the article noted, 
took place as Rosa sat with the child in her lap, other children a ways off, romping about.  A 
palm tree stood out against the smooth backdrop of the sea, and high above, fluttering together in 
the breeze, were “the flag of Mart ” and that of the Spanish Republic, “the tricolor flag with 
which Spain gloriously opens its new history.”  The Cuban teacher, it concluded, contemplated 
the child for a moment and then kissed him affectionately.
101
   
A Spanish contributor to ¡Ayuda! saw Rosa as the “personification of Cuban teaching,” 
and praised her “exquisite sensibility of true pedagogy.”  Her “woman’s soul,” the author wrote, 
“knew as her own the sacrifice and the pain of the Spanish people.”
102
  Another article described 
Rosa’s participation in the International Conference to Aid the Spanish Children in Paris in July.  
She represented Cuba brilliantly, it stated, delivering during the panel devoted to delegates of 
foreign committees an address entitled “School Age Children and the Colonies,” the text of 
which followed.  In her address, Rosa described the good fortune of children lucky enough to 
have spots in the school colonies and urged efforts to establish more such places so that more 
children displaced by the war could be safe, clean, fed, and educated.  The Association was 
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“jubilant with healthy satisfaction” at the participation of their distinguished delegate in a world 
event of such importance.
103
   
As cold weather again loomed on Spain’s horizon in September of 1938, the Association 
called for a renewed effort to collect winter clothes, expressing the hope that the Ropero of 1938 
would outdo that of 1937.  Accompanying a request printed in ¡Ayuda! was a letter written by 
two Spanish children in gratitude to a Cuban woman who had donated clothing in the past.
104
  In 
October, the bulletin advertised an exhibit of more than 6,000 piezas de abrigo collected thus far 





  It also reported clothing drive finances for the period from the 
beginning of August through October 23
rd
.  During August, the Ropero received $80.00 from the 
A.A.N.P.E. general fund (which clothing drive organizers later repaid to the Association), along 
with 15 individual, family, and colecta donations totaling $25.62, bringing the income for the 
month to $105.62.  September was a much busier month, with dozens of donations totaling 
$265.77 and a large benefit event at Hatuey Park at the beginning of the month bringing in 
$1,571.81.  At the beginning of October, another benefit event, this time at the Belascoaín 
Cinema, raised $336.28.  During this time, expenditures totaled $2,121.21, divided as follows: 
$208.38 spent on the Hatuey Park event, $116.45 spent on the Belascoaín Cinema event, and 
$1,796.38 on sewing supplies and other expenses related to the work of the clothing drive.
106
  
For the remaining days of October, the Ropero received two colecta donations of $26.45 and 
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$1.90, as reported in February 1939.  During the months of November and December combined, 
total clothing drive income reached $800.32 and expenditures totaled $418.40.
107
  In December, 
¡Ayuda! included a summary of the 1938 Ropero’s successes and a statement of its highly 
ambitious goal.  The bulletin reported that in November the Women’s Committee had sent 7,326 
piezas de abrigo, the “fecund result of two months of work.”  This triumph invigorated 
volunteers, inspiring them to reach for a goal of 50,000 pieces for the winter.
108
 
Women, the article stated, should contribute by donating their time.  They could sew in 
their homes, it suggested, or join other volunteers at the offices where sewing machines and 
materials were available.  Men should contribute by donating their money.  Addressing the 
reader directly, the article concluded: “If you have already made a donation, repeat it, because 
wartime necessities also reproduce themselves continuously.”
109
  A printed radio address in the 
same issue praised the clothing drive volunteers, expressing gratitude to the women who worked 
day and night—with tenderness, selflessness, and “the soul of mothers of children they have 
never even met”—for the cause of the Ropero.
110
   
The Association branched out into donating food and other supplies.  The drive’s first 
shipment of the year included, in addition to clothing: 150 tins of sweets, 300 cans of condensed 
milk, 200 bars of guava paste, five ten-and-a-half-pound containers of cookies, 40 pairs of shoes, 
720 stockings (60 dozen), 432 handkerchiefs (36 dozen), 600 tubes of toothpaste, 900 bars of 
soap, 100 toys, and 50 care packages especially for the Casa-Escuela containing school 
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  The Ropero made a second shipment on January 8
th
.  On that date, volunteers sent 
4,700 pieces of clothing (piezas de ropa), 75 boxes containing 48 cans of milk each, 10 one-
hundred-and-twenty-pound boxes of soap, six crates containing guava, and one box filled with 
sweets and various other provisions.
112
  The Ropero managed to raise $187.15 that month, 
mostly from many small individual donations.  It spent the majority of its funds on the second 
shipment, and then, toward the end of January, sent almost all of what remained—$130.00—to 
the Committee for Spanish Children in Paris for “urgent aid to evacuated children.”  Meanwhile, 
its delegations from Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba both sent smaller shipments of clothing 
and other supplies independently.
113
  The second Ropero did not reach its ambitious goal of 
50,000 pieces of clothing, but it sent well over 12,000, along with food and other helpful supplies, 
expanding significantly upon the successes of the first.  Leonor Pérez, a Cuban student leader 
stationed in Barcelona working for the Consejo Nacional de la Infancia Evacuada (National 
Council of Evacuated Children), recounted an emotional scene she witnessed in the Ministerio de 
Instrucción Pública (Ministry of Public Instruction) to emphasize for readers the importance of 
the Ropero efforts: “Upon opening the boxes of clothing sewn by Cuban mothers,” she wrote, a 
man hardened by the war was unable to hold back tears when “taking in his callused hands the 
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Founded in May 1938, the Casa-Escuela was in serious danger by the end of October that 
year.  ¡Ayuda! published that month a happy photograph showing a visit by members of the 
“Cuban Club Julio Antonio Mella in Barcelona, who overwhelmed the surprised and joyful 
children of the residence with Cuban songs and rhythms.”  But in December the bulletin 
published a letter written by Rosa Pastora Leclerc on October 21
st
 discussing her imminent 
departure from Sitges.  The school director managed to keep a hopeful tone in the letter, despite 
the undeniable context of looming Republican defeat.  She mentioned ways in which the 
Association could turn its attention to aiding child war refugees in Barcelona, the number of 
which she estimated as 460,000.  She offered assurances that the children of the Casa-Escuela 
would be left in caring and competent hands after she departed Spain.  And she told of an 
occurrence that would likely inspire both pride and sadness in Cuban readers: The children of the 
Casa-Escuela said that they did not want to be evacuated to France; they wanted to go to Cuba.  
There was no way for sympathetic Cubans to fulfill this wish.  In the “deep pain of farewell,” 
Rosa wrote, their desire was “a pinprick.”  She concluded, “I have not spoken to them about my 
trip; but it seems that [the news] has gotten out among them.”
115
  With grim optimism, a two-
page spread depicted in short articles and happy photographs “that which the children of the 
Colony People of Cuba think and write.”  Ten-year-old Rafael González wrote that the people of 
Cuba “bring us food, clothing” and that “they sacrifice for us.”  The children of the school were 
grateful, he stated, and they sent to the Cubans work they had done “because they had no other 
way to show their gratitude.”  Twelve-year-old Enrique Orejón wrote that he and his fellow 
students were “very content and grateful for the help of Cuba and other nations,” especially the 
Cuban campesinos (peasants), “who work cheerfully to send us everything we need so that we 
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will be healthy and strong.”  He looked forward to being a man and free in the future, he wrote, 
when peace will reign and Spain and all the other nations will be free.
116
   
By the time ¡Ayuda! went to print in February 1939, Pastora Leclerc had returned to 
Cuba.  A photograph of her arrival accompanied an article welcoming her home.  In Spain, the 
article noted, she had lived the horror of the Spanish people as Nationalist forces attacked 
Barcelona.  She narrated the tragedy of the war, it commented, “with a dramatic quality that calls 
to mind the prison stories of Pablo de la Torriente.”  With this comparison, the article’s author 
remembered and honored Cuba’s first loss in the war as the conflict neared its end, honored Rosa 
by comparing her writing to that of such a highly respected author, and gave a nod to the 
Association’s founding president Teté Casuso, Pablo’s widow.  It noted also Pastora Leclerc’s 
multinational journey back to Cuba, during which she made stops in Paris, Brussels, and New 
York “to strengthen relations of solidarity.”  In coming issues of the bulletin, the article 
concluded, Rosa would give readers a sense of the emotions and hopes of her Spanish days.
117
  
But the next issue of ¡Ayuda! would be the last, and Rosa contributed only a short article 
describing the Central Sanitaria Internacional (International Health Center) and requesting 
assistance for the organization.
118
  A letter written to her by Francisco Pelayo, one of the Casa-
Escuela children, did a better job of expressing the poignant reality of the present situation.  It 
described the evacuation of the school, the children’s journey to France, and the living conditions 
in the small French town of Cordes where they were staying.  Do everything possible to have us 
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brought to Cuba, young Francisco begged.  “We ask it with all our hearts.”  They missed their 
teacher, he wrote affectionately, and sent her “many kisses and hugs from your little comrades 
who love you very much and do not forget you.”
119
  The bond Rosa had built with her wards was 
strong, but no amount of close personal connection or broad solidarity of the Cuban people with 
the Spanish Republic would be enough to stave off their suffering by the early spring of 1939.  
As another article put it bluntly, in Sitges the residential school named for the Cuban people was 
no longer.  The little ones who had found refuge there, it stated with resignation, now found 
refuge only in the Cuban people’s hearts.
120
 
The Association’s final large accomplishment was the massive gathering in the Polar 
Stadium on 18 December 1938 to see and hear Fernando de los Ríos, Ambassador of Republican 
Spain.  This event occurred as Republican defeat in Spain approached, and yet it was by all 
accounts an extraordinary success.  The A.A.N.P.E. stated that 80,000 people attended, and 
photographs showed the stadium packed with an enormous crowd.  The event was vital at a 
moment when grassroots energy—and financial support—had been waning.  It raised spirits and, 
as we have seen, significant funds; the Association’s emphasis in its bulletin probably aimed to 
maximize this impact.  The ninth issue of ¡Ayuda! devoted a two-page spread to Juan 
Marinello’s introduction of Don Fernando, and five and a half uninterrupted pages to the guest’s 
speech.  A rousing photograph of the young intellectual and activist with his fist raised 
accompanied Marinello’s introduction.  Addressing “representatives of the Spanish, Mexican, 
and Chinese republics” in attendance, Marinello noted that entering the stadium he had witnessed 
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“the worker arm in arm with the intellectual, the peasant in the company of the student, the man 
with the woman and the white with the black.”  This vision, he interpreted, was a vision of Cuba, 
the people of Cuba who sought “the beautiful and wise, deep, high and human, that is to say 
Spanish, word of Don Ferndando de los R os.”  A multitude was present in the stadium, and 
many more clustered around radios to hear the ambassador’s voice.  With this description, 
Marinello evoked broad solidarity and popular support, seeking to reenergize listeners both 
present at the Havana event and listening to the broadcast across the island.  To inspire Cubans, 
Marinello drew a link between Don Fernando and José Martí, reiterating the common theme of a 
“bad” Spain represented by colonialism and Franco, and a “good” Spain found in the Republican 
ambassador and Cuba’s anticolonial struggle.  He reinforced this connection with the example of 
his late friend, Pablo de la Torriente.  Pablo died for Spain, which was the same as dying for 
Cuba, Marinello said.  He had been proud to have learned to read using the texts of Martí, and it 
was Mart  who taught him that “the obligation of a man was to be where he was needed most.”  
Thus it was Martí who sent Pablo to Spain, Marinello suggested, and Spain inspired in him a 
vision of a marvelous new dawn.  The Spanish children, for whom the Association organized 
Don Fernando’s visit, would live this glorious future, he concluded to a prolonged ovation.
121
   
Fernando de los Ríos similarly emphasized the special relationship between Spain and 
Cuba, calling his Cuban listeners “a substantial element of an eternal Spain that lives in you,” 
and pointing out their shared language and history.  He also started out by making salutations to 
Mexican and Chinese representatives present, calling the Republic of China Spain’s “sister in 
struggle, ideals, and pain at this moment.”  To highlight further the strength of international 
solidarity with the Spanish Republic, he stated that its situation was an issue of “universal” 
                                                     
121
 Juan Marinello, “Palabras de presentación de Don Fernando de los R os pronunciadas por Juan 




relevance and concern, noting majority popular support in various countries.  He claimed that the 
Spanish stand against Napoleon had inspired the Germans in 1808, that in 1823 a famous British 
philosopher had named Spain “the only hope of the world,” and that in the current conflicts 
Spain’s antifascists served as an example for those of China.  He addressed himself to Cubans 
(“sons of liberty!”) and Spaniards (“honored in ideals, in pain and in hope!”), but argued that 
their shared struggle for the Spanish Republic “in this hour of moral semi-darkness” actually 
defended of the future of all of humanity and the entire world.
122
   
Another full page of the bulletin published samples of the telegrams the A.A.N.P.E. 
received in support of the event, many more of which, it noted, had been read aloud in the 
stadium.  The Association received four messages of support from “Ciudad Trujillo” (Santo 
Domingo), Dominican Republic; one from a union in Buenos Aires, Argentina; and two from 
Tampa, Florida from the Círculo Cubano de Tampa (Tampa Cuban Circle) and the Centro 
Español de Tampa (Tampa Spanish Center).  Fifteen published solidarity telegrams from across 
Cuba—demonstrating considerable political diversity among supporters—came from groups 
such as the Santa Clara Provincial Assembly and the Palma Soriano Committee of the 
Communist Party, the Cayo Hueso neighborhood branch of Cuba’s ABC Party, the Eastern 
Regional Anarchist Federation in Palma Soriano, Youth of the People in Isabela de Sagua, and 
the Santa Clara Provincial Assembly of the “Organización Auténtico,” as well as from 
individuals, Cultural Houses, and provincial organizations supportive of the Spanish Republic.
123
  
This outpouring, as our financial analysis shows, was a final boost of popular support and 
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income for aid to the Spanish children before Republican defeat brought the Association to an 
end. 
 
Defeat in Spain 
In an open letter dated 11 January 1939, A.A.N.P.E. president Ramiro Valdés Daussá 
began by claiming that the visit by Fernando de los Ríos to the Polar Stadium the previous month 
had “consolidated [the Association’s] prestige and the seriousness of the work it accomplished.”  
Now, he wrote, in appreciation of this work, the North American Committee to Aid Spanish 
Democracy and the American Medical Bureau had put at the A.A.N.P.E.’s disposal a ship to 
bring food and other products to Barcelona.  One more time, he directed readers, the people of 
Cuba must mobilize all the individuals and groups supportive of Spain to send coffee, sugar, and 
other supplies to their “Spanish brothers.”
124
  Based on the organizations offering the ship and 
the destination of Barcelona for the aid, it is certain that this Cuban assistance was destined 
specifically for Republican Spain.  Unfortunately for the A.A.N.P.E. and other pro-Republican 
Cubans, Barcelona fell to Nationalist forces just fifteen days after the letter was written. 
The final two issues of ¡Ayuda!—February and April 1939—registered Republican defeat.  
Authors wished to turn their thoughts to the coming peace, but found that they could not escape 
anger.  They expressed rage and illustrated the increased drama of the children’s condition.  The 
reality of the day in Spain was “cannibalistic, lacking all military and political decency, lacking 
all virility.”  It destroyed and negated fraternal feeling, a sense of community, every good quality 
of human nature.  And trapped in it the poor innocent children were in most dire need of 
assistance.  Heartbreaking descriptions of the plight of children in Spanish war zones, which had 
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never required exaggeration, now acquired a tone of desperation as in a cable from the Office 
Internationale pour l’Enfance (International Office for the Children) received by the A.A.N.P.E. 
and published in the bulletin:
 
“Our Delegation receives report names all assistance organizations 
Barcelona quotation marks hundreds refugee children little ones mothers arms arrive Barcelona 
after evacuation Reus, Valls, Tarragona, stop Urgent all Committees begin campaigns support 
organizations to supply provisions clothing refuge innocent offensive victims.”
125
  Starvation 
threatened 300,000 infants and 3 million children, stated a notice published by the Association 
reprinting another telegram requesting aid; infants needed $1.00 per month to survive, and 
children over five years old required $2.00.  Telegrams from Paris sounded Spain’s S.O.S. to 
“the civilized world.”
126
  The call for help did not so much change in the face of Republican 
defeat as it increased in urgency. 
¡Ayuda! authors continued to employ familiar themes as they asked for universal 
assistance during “this sad hour” in February 1939.  For all humanity and for their own children, 
they asserted, “all mothers, all women, all honorable men, without distinction of race or belief,” 
should help the homeless and orphaned Spanish children.  They appealed not only to Cubans’ 
humanity but also to their anticolonial sentiment.  The defeat of the Republic, authors argued, 
was a defeat of the Spanish government by foreign powers.  The exclusive goal of the Italian and 
German “invasion” was “to turn our country into a colony.”  A visitor to Rome, they reported, 
had seen hanging in various grocery stores signs with “the following infamous words: ‘We sell 
oil from our colonies in Spain.’”  This framing of the defeat as colonialism extended from the 
special relationship argument, in which the “bad” Spain represented by Nationalists continued 
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the tradition of Spanish colonialism which Cubans had overthrown.  As we have seen, Juan 
Marinello addressed this theme in his introduction to Fernando de los Ríos in the Stadium Polar 
in Havana.  He stated that “Our America” shared a strong fraternity with great Spaniards who 
struggled against the dominant caste in Spain.  “Cuba, which lived and suffered for centuries 
under Franco’s predecessors’ harsh work of oppression,” he argued, knew “better than any other 
Hispanic country” the difference between that Spain and the one represented by an “exceptional 
type” of Spaniard such as de los R os.  Cuba had fought against the “bad” Spain in its 
anticolonial struggles and today gave money and “the blood of its best sons” for the “good” 
Spain.  Republican leaders such as “La Pasionaria,” Dolores Ibárruri, continued the work of 
Martí, Marinello stated.  A female author combined the special relationship argument with that 
of the feminine role, calling on Cuban women to save the children of the Spanish mothers, 
“because the blood of these children is blood that runs through our veins.”
127
  
The final issue of ¡Ayuda! in April 1939 illustrated defeat with a cover photograph of 
refugees from Catalonia.   It showed a haggard woman with two children sitting on the ground in 
an image striking in its similarity to Dorothea Lange’s iconic “Migrant Mother” (1936).
128
  
Articles described and images showed the evacuation process.  “El Martirio Español: Exodo 
Trágico” (“The Spanish Martyrdom: Tragic Exodus”) provided one powerful description.
129
  
Many focused on the evacuation of children.  As noted above, a letter from one of the child 
residents of the Casa-Escuela begged Rosa Pastora Leclerc to do everything in her power to have 
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them brought to Cuba.
130
  Another article chronicled efforts to save children from starvation in 
Madrid.
131
  A description of the work of the Office Internationale pour l’Enfance stressed the 
international quality of the effort to aid the Spanish children, acknowledging efforts by the 
peoples of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, England, France, Holland, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and Uruguay.
132
  An article directed at women, 
entitled “Un llamado a la conciencia de la mujer cubana” (“A Call to the Conscience of the 
Cuban Woman”), pleaded: “Listen and attend, women of America, mothers of the world, to the 
clamor of the Spanish mothers.”
133
  In an article considering fascism and democracy, one author 
attempted to extract a lesson from the defeat.  In the future, he wrote, people would try to 
understand how this could possibly have happened; but in the present, we must study our values, 
the values that have failed in Spain.  We must ask ourselves, he admonished, whether it is 
possible to go on living in a world without completely revising these values.
134
 
The Comite Pro-Repatriacion de Cubanos en Francia (Committee for Repatriation of 
Cubans in France) attended to more practical and immediate concerns.  In the Association 
bulletin’s final issue, free of any claims of nonpartisanship, it urged the Cuban people—always 
“by the side of Republican Spain”—to take new action in response to the catastrophe wrought by 
“the invasion of Catalonia.”  In addition to the tremendous work of the A.A.N.P.E., the 
Committee asserted, Cubans could be proud also that they had contributed combat volunteers to 
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the Republican cause.  These fighters were heroes, the Committee stated to ¡Ayuda! readers, and 
many had fallen in combat.  They had earned the respect and admiration of the Spanish people, 
but now they languished in concentration camps in France.  Help bring these Cubans home, the 
Committee pleaded—it would be, “in addition to fulfilling a patriotic and human duty, a way to 




The final issue included also a timeline listing all Association aid to date, a gesture of 
taking-stock as the wartime effort came to a close.
136
  A brief message on the last page pledged 
continued work on behalf of the Spanish children.  It stated that the organization must sustain its 
work as long as there were Spanish children in need, urging “we cannot abandon them.”  No pen, 
it stated, could describe the misery and the fear felt by Spanish children refugees in the French 
concentration camps.  Now more than ever, it concluded, they need our help.  Peppered with 
emphasized phrases in all capital letters, the article sought to leave readers of the last issue with a 
renewed sense of urgency.
137
  For good measure, the magazine’s back cover featured no images, 
only a restatement of the most salient points of the final article, alone on the page, succinct this 
time and nearly all in uppercase letters: 
400,000 Spanish children, women, and men are refugees in the concentration camps of 
France.  Hunger and cold are decimating those guiltless victims.  The concentration 
camps are inhospitable.  (They do not have shelters.)  The Association of Aid to the 
Children of the Spanish People asks for help for these refugees.  Now more than ever, 
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With these impassioned lines ¡Ayuda! ended after ten issues spanning twenty-two months of 
publication. 
 The last evidence of the existence of the Association in the archive consists of two letters 
to Paris written by president Ramiro Valdés Daussá on 17 and 18 April 1940.  The first noted 
that, as of November 1939, the A.A.N.P.E. had abandoned its organizational headquarters and 
had been operating out of the home of Rosa Pastora Leclerc.  It notified the Office Internationale 
pour l’Enfance that it was liquidating its assets and it included a final donation of $979.27, all the 
Association’s remaining funds.  The president specified a few particular destinations for small 
amounts of the money, including $25.00 to a French concentration camp for the mother of Casa-
Escuela former resident Francisco Pelayo.  The remainder, he indicated, was to serve as “our 
final donation to the Spanish refugee children in France.”
139
  The second letter the A.A.N.P.E. 
president addressed to Francisco Pelayo’s mother, informing her of the money sent in her name.  
“With true sorrow,” he wrote to the woman in the Cahartre-Evre-Loir camp, “we wish to express 
that we have terminated all the work of this Association.”  He told her she could stay in touch by 
writing to Rosa Pastora Leclerc and sent a tender greeting to the boy.
140
 
Defeat of the Spanish Republic, then, brought an end to Cuba’s Asociación de Auxilio al 
Nino del Pueblo Español.  A lack of bulletin issues and archival materials between the spring of 
1939 and these final letters from April 1940 makes difficult the task of determining with 
certainty why A.A.N.P.E. efforts deteriorated so rapidly after the war’s end.  One possible 
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explanation is that the pro-Republican Cubans who supported the Association’s efforts were so 
disappointed and disheartened by defeat that they lost motivation to continue organizing and 
fundraising.  Another obvious possibility is that the organization had lost its most general and 
potent motivating force—both for its leadership and its supporters—the drama of warfare and 
wartime suffering.  Not only a desire for Republican victory but also, and perhaps more 
powerfully, the deeply felt need to save the children of a closely related fellow nation in 
desperate and violent crisis had energized thousands of ordinary Cubans to contribute what they 
could.  Though the concentration camps of France were grim, children languishing in a friendly 
democracy did not match the anguish of children actively bombed by fascist planes.  The Nazi 
invasion of France would change the situation dramatically, but by then the A.A.N.P.E. had 
dissolved.  As we will examine in the conclusion, a new wave of antifascism began to gain 






Sons of America, Sons of Spain and of Africa: 
Black Cuban Antifascism 
 
At the start of the Spanish Civil War, many people of African descent from around the 
world (as well as some Africans) stood ready to join the Republican cause, seeing it, as did other 
foreign supporters, as their own.  Prominent black Cuban intellectuals and activists articulated an 
argument that the fight against fascism was closely linked to the struggle of black Cubans.  Their 
antifascism overlapped with and to a great extent came to encompass during the 1930s their 
critiques of racism, colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and other forces interpreted as 
oppressive globally.  Black Cubans served in Spain as volunteers and organized for the Republic 
at home.  Here we study antifascist and pro-Republican activism by black Cubans. 
Black Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic existed within the context 
of political engagement in the African diaspora.  Considering three other antifascist groups in 
subsequent chapters, we will see that Cuban Masonic and Communist activists operated in 
connection with hierarchical, multinational organizations, while anarchists and anarchist groups 
connected with their comrades in other countries through shared ideology and political 
collaboration.  The transnational connections and networks accessed and utilized by black Cuban 
antifascist activists, on the other hand, were based in large part on a sense of shared cultural 
identity that was not at first explicitly politicized.  Viewing black Cuban antifascism in its 
diasporic context, we encounter the ways in which ethnic and political solidarities interacted.   
Black Cuban antifascism was closely connected with African-American antifascism.  
Examining the context of the black diaspora in the 1920s and 1930s, we see how cultural and 
political movements overlapped and intermingled, with a specific focus on the strong 




motivated a steady political radicalization and shift to the left within the black diaspora—the 
anti-Machado struggle in Cuba, the Great Depression, the trial of the “Scottsboro Boys” in 
Alabama, and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia—set the stage for the black diasporic antifascism 
in which Cubans played an important role.  We touch upon some key figures—particularly 
African American Langston Hughes and black Cuban Nicolás Guillén, both intellectuals and 
activists—who played formative roles in shaping and reshaping transnational black movements 
during these two vibrant decades, considering how they became involved in antifascism and the 
Spanish conflict, and how they interpreted this activism as connected to their cultural and 
political identities.   
We find that some black Cuban antifascists focused less intently on the conflict in Spain 
than other Cuban antifascists, showing more concern for the defense of Ethiopia—a powerful 
African diasporic symbol—against Italian fascism than they did for the Spanish Republic.  
Others argued that Cubans of African descent were also sons of Spain, and that the Spanish 
conflict was their struggle as well.  Black Cuban antifascism was characterized by differing 
viewpoints regarding the role of cultural identity in relation to political identity.  In both types of 
identities tension existed between the national and the transnational. 
 
Antifascism and a Transnational Black Left  
 The years preceding the conflict in Spain constituted a highly dynamic time for 
transnationally connected communities of people of African descent.  Creative efflorescence in 
black cultures coupled with political militancy in response to racism, colonialism, imperialism, 
social injustice, and economic hardship during the 1920s and 1930s.  Black political and cultural 




Négritude, and Afrocubanismo (Afro-Cubanism) created and strengthened links between 
individuals and groups across national borders, and formed important, interconnected parts of a 
racially organized black internationalism: the pan-African movement.  Pan-Africanism arose 
around the turn of the twentieth century as an effort to foster “cultural and political coordination 
of the interests of peoples of African descent around the world,”
1
 which W. E. B. DuBois defined 
in a 1933 article published in the African-American periodical Crisis: “Pan-Africa means 
intellectual understanding and co-operation among all groups of Negro descent in order to bring 
about at the earliest possible time the industrial and spiritual emancipation of the Negro 
peoples.”
2
  The political and cultural movements of the 1920s within the pan-African world 
established connections on which transnational black activism of the 1930s would depend.  Local 
incidents in various parts of the world such as the Scottsboro trials in Alabama (1931) and the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935) inspired transnational organizing campaigns by black activists 
and their allies, serving in many cases to bring together black activists and nonblack leftists.  
Prior to discussing black Cuban antifascism, it will be useful to engage in a brief exploration of 
this context of transnational black cultural identity and political engagement. 
 In this discussion, we will reference the “black diaspora” or “African diaspora.”  It is 
useful, therefore, to begin with a clear definition of what we mean by this term, especially since 
it was not used by the historical actors we study.
3
  Most simply, it refers collectively to African-
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descended communities around the globe, or, more poetically, “Africa’s scattered children.”
4
  
Historically, the concept of diaspora usually connotes forced exile or removal of an ethnic group 
from a homeland and its dispersal to multiple other lands, sometimes referred to as a “victim 
diaspora.”
5
  Originating in the enslavement of Africans, their abduction from Africa and 
distribution as property across the Americas and elsewhere, the black diaspora fits into this 
category.  Other characteristics of a victim diaspora relevant to our study include: a collective, 
idealized origin myth or myths about the ancestral homeland and some discussion of eventual 
return there; a belief that members of the diaspora should share a commitment to maintain, 
protect, and/or restore the homeland; the perception of a permanent lack of full acceptance by 
and integration into host societies; an enriching creative energy generated by the challenge of life 
in sites of captivity and/or oppression outside of the homeland; and an ethnic, cultural, and/or 
community solidarity—a shared consciousness, identity, and “sense of a common fate”—
sustained over time, shaped by the imagined relationship to the mythologized homeland, and 
extant across the national borders of host countries.
6
  We will see that all of these elements 
characteristic of the black diaspora are relevant to the development and functioning of black 
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Cuban antifascism: Ethiopia served in the role of the mythologized ancestral homeland; the 
fascist invasion of Ethiopia inspired an impetus to protect the homeland; racism and economic 
hardship in Cuba, the United States, and other American countries generated cross-border 
solidarity between African-descended people; creative energy employed by black artists and 
intellectuals fostered this solidarity; and a “sense of a common fate” developed around a 
perception of a global fascist threat in which the concept of fascism encompassed all the ills 
suffered by black people around the world. 
Predictably, the final element of diaspora listed—a form of transnational solidarity based 
on a perception of cultural sameness—sometimes experienced tension with other conceptions of 
identity, including nationalism and internationalist ideologies.  Diasporic solidarity competed 
with a loyalty to the host country and came into conflict with a sense of superiority by diaspora 
members in one country over those in another.
7
  As members of the African diaspora, black 
Cubans fostered transnational solidarity with other people of African descent yet struggled to 
reconcile their place in the pan-African world with their Cuban nationalism and with hostilities 
that existed on the island between black Cubans and African-descended people of different 
nationalities, principally Jamaicans and Haitians.  The field of diaspora studies suggests the 
existence of an persistent tension for black people of the Americas relevant to the Cuban case: 
On the one hand, black Cubans desired their rightful place as equals within Cuban nationalism; 
on the other, they felt a permanent separation from a secure sense of homeland due both to the 
kidnapping of their ancestors from Africa and to the racial prejudice that kept them always 
somewhat apart from their fellow countrymen.
8
  In some instances, this tension led to negative 
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outcomes, such as the conception of the above-mentioned hierarchy in which black Cubans 
imagined themselves to be superior to Jamaicans and Haitians on the island.  In other cases, the 
tension inspired more productive developments, such as transnational solidarity.  One diaspora 
scholar interprets the challenge of a multilayered diasporic identity as a potentially positive force, 
writing: “The tension between an ethnic, a national, and a transnational identity is often a 
creative, enriching one.”
9
  We find this to have been true in the case of black Cuban antifascism, 
in which solidarities based on black identity, Cuban national identity, and internationalist 
political identities such as Communism overlapped.  Black Cuban activists worked to reconcile 
their ethnic and political solidarities—both nationalist and internationalist—during the period of 
our study, and we will see such tensions operate within the development of their antifascist 
solidarities. 
 Within the larger diaspora, connections with African Americans were particularly 
significant to black Cubans during the 1920s and 1930s.  They believed that the situation of their 
racial brethren to the north was more similar to their own than those of other black populations 
of the Americas.
10
  One of the most celebrated transnational interpersonal links of this period is 
that between Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén and U.S. poet Langston Hughes, both of whom would 
become antifascists and travel to Spain on behalf of the Spanish Republic.
11
  Hughes had close 
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ties to Spain and Latin America—particularly Mexico, Haiti, and Cuba—throughout his career, 
taking on an international role as a “cultural mediator.”
12
  He met Guillén during trips to Havana 
in 1930 and 1931, during which the latter served as a tour guide for the already-famous North 
American poet,
13
 and the two initiated “a long and fruitful friendship which was later renewed in 
Spain during the Civil War.”
14
   
It was in the Caribbean, argues one Hughes scholar, that the U.S. poet became “conscious 
that the black experience, with its attendant feelings of alienation and subjugation, is an 
international phenomenon.”  For example, his short story “Little Old Spy” (1934) depicted racist 
policies in Cuba under Machado, which he experienced upon encountering legal trouble for 
attempting to visit a U.S.-controlled, segregated beach on the island.  He attacked U.S. 
neocolonialism in Cuba as well, as in the poem “To the Little Fort, San Lázaro, On the Ocean 
Front Havana” (1931), in which he compared the attack of U.S. imperialism on Cuba to pillage 
by pirates earlier in the island’s history.
15
  Back in the United States, Hughes promoted the work 
of black Cuban intellectuals and artists in the context of the Harlem Renaissance.  Analyzing the 
transnational networks that linked the Harlem Renaissance and Afrocubanismo (Afro-Cubanism) 
in the 1920s and 1930s, Frank Andre Guridy places Guillén, Hughes, and their relationship into a 
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transnational New Negro movement located in Havana as well as Harlem.  Participants in both 
countries, he argues, saw the Harlem Renaissance and Afrocubanismo as two parts of a broader 
cultural phenomenon.  The New Negro movement was inherently diasporic; intellectuals and 
artists in the movement drew upon a perception of a common cultural identity to craft a new self, 
the “New Negro.”
16
  Transnational cultural exchange along the “Harlem-Havana nexus”
17
 
created important diasporic links; black people from Cuba, the United States, and other countries 
built a sense of solidarity around shared creative production in the arts and letters, they came  “to 
‘feel’ part of the same ‘gente’ [people] regardless of the language they spoke or their cultural 
proximity to Africa.”
18
  Political engagement facilitated by this solidarity, in turn, inspired new 
creative output.  As Hughes insisted in a conversation in Valencia in 1937 with Guillén and 
Spanish poet Miguel Hernández about the “new literature” that would come out of war and 
revolution: “we know already how the great human movements present always a concurrent 
artistic, principally literary” component.
19
 
Some Cuban intellectuals criticized the transnational solidarity of the black diaspora, and 
took issue with comparisons between Hughes and Guillén, asserting Cuban nationalism against 
any idea of similarity to U.S. culture.  Comparing Hughes’s blues poems with Guillén’s 
“Motivos de son” (“Son Motifs”), Cuban journalist Ramón Vasconcelos stated in 1930: “Cuba is 
not the Yankee South nor is the son the ‘Blues,’ just as the guitar is not the banjo.”  Similarly, 
Cuban critic Regino E. Boti wrote in 1932: “Just as a Yankee and a Cuban have nothing in 
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common . . . [t]he two poets are different, and so are their poems.”
20
  In these assertions, the 
nationalistic desire to assert Cuban independence from U.S. cultural influence attempts to disrupt 
transnational solidarity.  Indeed, Guillén “saw it as his patriotic duty to promote Cuban values, to 
make Cuban popular culture a pillar in the quest for full sovereignty, and to use his literary talent 
to foster the equality and unity of the Cuban population,” states one scholar of both Guillén and 
Hughes.
21
  Guillén connected his own mission to those of Cuba’s national heroes, both black and 
white, who interpreted as fundamentally intertwined the struggles for Cuban independence and 
against slavery.  Guillén possessed a strong nationalist motivation alongside his diasporic racial 
and internationalist political motivations.  There existed significant historical differences and 
hostilities between the nations of Hughes and Guillén, but the “distinction nevertheless left the 
two writers considerable common ground and parallel perceptions.”
22
  The movement within 
which they worked was transnational, operating along interconnected networks across oceans 
and borders as well as fostering collaboration and exchange.  Cultural connections between 
Harlem and Havana—of which the relationship between Hughes and Guillén is an iconic 
example—transformed during the early 1930s into organizing networks used for political action. 
 By that time members of the New Negro movement were becoming increasingly 
concerned with politics.  Political involvement grew out of the cultural project in part: 
Intellectuals and artists of the New Negro movement had come to challenge elite cultural notions 
of respectability.  In both Cuba and the United States, they “foregrounded precisely the cultural 
practices and the material conditions of the working classes shunned by aspiring-class and elite 
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and looked “for alternative sources of ‘intelligence’ in the less ‘respectable’ urban 
cultures of the black working classes.”
23
  Then came the Great Depression.  The economic crisis 
that began in 1929, devastating many working people of different races and classes, came even 
earlier for blacks and for Cubans.  Beginning in the mid-1920s, the onset of economic downturn 
in the United States impacted black communities disproportionately.  As Hughes wrote: “The 
depression brought everybody down a peg or two.  And the Negro had but few pegs to fall.”
24
  
The situation politicized many African Americans who joined with activists of other ethnicities 
in militant organizing.
25
  The crisis came early also for Cubans generally, and the increasingly 
repressive and dictatorial Machado government exacerbated the ills of severe economic hardship.  
By the first two years of the new decade, conditions were deteriorating rapidly.  The island to 
which Hughes returned in 1931 was far more desperate economically and turbulent politically 
than the one he had visited in 1930.  The onslaught of the Depression in both countries and the 
political turmoil in Cuba shifted the emphasis of the Harlem-Havana interaction “from one that 
celebrated the art and literature of the New Negro to a politicized transnational struggle against 
imperialism and racism.”
26
  Transnational cooperation between black Cubans and African 
Americans that had coalesced around vibrant cultural exchange during the 1920s became fertile 
ground for activist solidarity during the 1930s.  Various activist causes served to strengthen 
further the bonds between these groups, and to connect them with the international political left. 
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 One such cause early in the decade was that of the “Scottsboro Boys,” nine young 
African-American men put on trial in Scottsboro, Alabama and threatened with execution in 
1931 after being wrongfully accused of the rape of two white women and of attacking a group of 
young white men on a train.  People of African descent and their allies—including Communist 
Parties, especially the C.P.U.S.A., which led the campaign—organized in multiple countries to 
support the young men, whose plight “stirred deep international indignation.”
27
  Hughes visited 
some of the accused men in jail wrote about Scottsboro in a number of works.
28
  Black activists 
and leftists in Cuba watched the case closely, and took part in the international campaign to save 
the lives of the accused.  Still immersed in the black diaspora’s vibrant cultural moment, some 
expressed solidarity in verse.  The 1934 poem “Hermano Negro” (“Negro Brother”) by Chinese-
black-Cuban poet Regino Pedroso, for instance, exemplified the transition from primarily 
cultural concerns within the Harlem-Havana exchange and the wider pan-African world to an 
increasing politicization, and the role Scottsboro played in this change.  Addressing his “negro 
brother” in Haiti, Jamaica, New York, and Havana, the Cuban poet urged: 
 Escucha allá en Scottsboro,    Listen there in Scottsboro,  
en Scottsboro, en Scottsboro    in Scottsboro, in Scottsboro 
 Da al mundo con tu angustia rebelde   Give your rebellious cry to the world 
 tu humana voz      Your human voice 
 y apaga un poco tus maracas!    And tone down your maracas a  
         little!
29
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To inform interested Cuban readers about the case and to place the events of Scottsboro within 
the broader context of unjust conditions suffered by African Americans to the north, journalist 
Manuel Marsal published a book in Havana in 1932 entitled El negro en los Estados Unidos de 
América: El caso Scottsboro (The Black in the United States of America: The Scottsboro Case).
30
  
Another example of Cuban engagement with the events in Alabama is Cuban author and 
Communist Mirta Auirre’s 1935 poem “Scottsboro,” a critique of race relations and capitalism in 
the United States.  Calling the case “an iron put to the fire and lifted into the belly of a race,” 
Aguirre blamed racism in the forms of lynch laws and the Ku Klux Klan as well as capitalism 
and imperialism for attacking “nine blacks almost children.”  Scottsboro in “Yankeeland,” she 
wrote, “is a cloak of martyrdom and a cloak of shame which covers the two races.”
31
  The 
Scottsboro case and resultant transnational organizing campaign helped to radicalize members of 
the black diaspora, including Cubans, who read works such as those cited above.
32
  In the context 
of economic hardship brought on by the global Great Depression, of horrifying racial violence in 
the United States, and of persistent injustice—racial and otherwise—in Cuba under the 
increasingly oppressive Machado government, the Scottsboro case marked a significant turning 
point at which the cultural-political balance of the black diaspora’s transnational engagement 
tipped from an emphasis on creative output during the cultural moment of the 1920s to an 
emphasis on political activism during the 1930s. 
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 Another key event in the emergence of a transnational black activism tied to the political 
left within the African diaspora during the 1930s was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (also 
known at that time as Abyssinia) in 1935.  The Scottsboro case in 1931 had inspired the ire of 
activists around the world who railed against racism, and in some cases capitalism and 
imperialism.  The invasion of a free African nation by Mussolini’s forces in 1935 drew the same 
angry criticisms, but by this later date, activists had begun to interpret and understand all these 
ills—and others—as parts of a consuming evil force: fascism.  It is in 1935, therefore, that we 
can locate the emergence of strongly articulated antifascism within the black diaspora.  Here we 
consider briefly the reception of fascist Italy’s invasion within the African diaspora broadly, 
using many examples of reactions by African Americans, before examining in depth below the 
black Cuban response.  By considering the interpretations and beliefs of African Americans, we 
do not intend to imply that African Americans and black Cubans were identical—in fact, there 
existed significant cultural differences and inequality between them.  However, we focus here on 
the common ground on which diverse members of the African diaspora built black antifascism 
during the 1930s. 
We have seen the importance of the idea of a “homeland” within a victim diaspora, a 
mythologized place which members feel a duty to protect and renew and from which they derive 
some sense of their identities.  Though the continent of Africa served this function generally 
within the African diaspora, the nation of Ethiopia held a special place in the minds of many.  As 
one diaspora scholar puts it, “by far the most significant notions of the African homeland were 
imbricated in ‘Ethiopia’—the place, the symbol, the idea, and the promise.”  For many members 
of the diaspora in the Americas, the African nation represented not just a mythical homeland but 




connected with the country of Ethiopia itself.”
33
  In this way, antifascist organizing to defend 
Ethiopia by diasporic people of African descent constituted self-defense.  Ethiopia was the only 
nation in Africa that, under the leadership of Emperor Menelik II (ruled 1889–1913), had 
maintained its sovereignty during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries while 
European powers divided between them the rest of the continent into exploitative colonies.  
Menelik’s forces defeated Italy’s colonizing efforts in 1896.  Interpreters of this anticolonial 
history within the diaspora celebrated Ethiopia’s liberty.  In his “Ballad of Ethiopia,” for 
example, Hughes identified Ethiopia as the place  
Where the mighty Nile’s 
Great headwaters rise 
And the black man’s flag 




Ethiopia was also one of the first countries on earth to have adopted Christianity, and signified 
therefore an “African Jerusalem” to many in the diaspora, a “cradle of civilization.”
35
  Ancient 
histories claiming Ethiopia as the progenitor of Egyptian civilization and favorable references to 
it in the Bible
36
 contributed to a sense of Ethiopia as the cradle of all civilization.
37
  Throughout 
the diaspora, argues one historian, many believed “Ethiopia had been predestined by biblical 
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prophecy to redeem the black race from white rule.”
38
  Built upon this powerful narrative, the 
idea of Ethiopia came to represent the freedom and dignity of black people worldwide. 
The Italian invasion, therefore, constituted a deep affront that sparked an “international 
confrontation with fascism that rocked the Pan-African world,” in the words of Robin D. G. 
Kelley.
39
  Members of the black diaspora took the Italian attempt to colonize Ethiopia personally, 
identifying Ethiopians as their endangered kinfolk, and it inspired an organized campaign in 
1935 and 1936 “to save the last outpost of Negro rule in the world from white domination.”
40
  
For example, James Yates, an African American who would go on to volunteer in the Spanish 
Civil War, remembered encountering an angry rally in Harlem one day in October 1935, and, 
upon asking a passerby about its motivation, was told: “Why, man, don’t you know?  That 
Mussolini has invaded the homeland of Ethiopia!”
41
  Hughes called people of the African 
diaspora to antifascism in defense of Ethiopia’s freedom: 
All you colored peoples, 
No matter where you be, 
Take for your slogan: 
AFRICA BE FREE! 
 
All you colored peoples, 
Be a man at last, 
Say to Mussolini, 
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In this way, activists couched pleas for antifascist solidarity with Ethiopia in racial terms, 
counting upon a diasporic sense of identity to move people of African descent to act. 
 As members of the black diaspora fostered solidarity with Ethiopians, they interpreted the 
actions of Italian fascists as representative of the same kinds of racial, colonial or imperialist, and 
capitalist oppression they experienced in their own countries.  For example, African-American 
labor leader A. Phillip Randolph “linked the cruel, uncalled-for rape of Ethiopia to the terrible 
repression of Black people in the United States.”
43
  These forms of oppression constituted “the 
program of the white world” in the words of African-American intellectual W. E. B. Du Bois.  
Expressing a related sentiment, a leader of the N.A.A.C.P. stated angrily: “Italy, brazenly, has set 
fire under the powder keg of white arrogance and greed which seems destined to become an act 
of suicide for the so-called white world.”
44
  Du Bois expressed the opinion that the whole world, 
including the great powers, would have come to Ethiopia’s defense if Ethiopians were white (a 
belief that would be belied shortly by the example of the Spanish Republic).
45
  As these 
statements indicate, some in the African diaspora viewed race hatred as the primary 
characteristic of fascism, encompassing or causing its other ills.  Kelley argues: “Black 
nationalists generally believed that indifference on the part of Western nations (most of which 
had their own African colonies to contend with) was nothing short of an act of racism.  The 
invasion of Ethiopia was merely the first skirmish in what they viewed as a worldwide race 
war.”
46
  This view experienced tension with the promotion of a transnational, interracial, 
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antifascist solidarity.  African-American Spanish Civil War volunteer Yates recalled the looting 
of Italian stores in New York “by a minority of misguided Blacks” played upon by the “Garvey 
people and other nationalist groups.”  He recalled trying to educate people, in an attempt to build 
solidarity, about the fact that many Italians condemned the invasion of Ethiopia and rallied 
against it across Italy.  Yet “[m]ost Blacks saw the war in Ethiopia as merely another malicious 
attempt by whites to destroy Blacks,” he remembered, and “[s]ometimes it was difficult to quiet 
a Black audience long enough to speak.”
47
 
Regardless of their views on interracial solidarity, however, members of the African 
diaspora promoted antifascism as antiracism.  Belief in racial or ethnic superiority and inferiority 
was indeed a central component of fascist ideology in some cases (though certainly not the 
exclusive purview of fascists).  Closely related was the sense among people of African descent 
that fascism encompassed colonialism and imperialism, a view held also by antifascists of all 
ethnicities.  Leftists both black and nonblack often shared the racial and colonial or imperial 
interpretations, and added to them the assertion of fascism as a force of oppressive and 
exploitative capitalism as well.  These interpretations of fascism, typical among all antifascists, 
included other negative characteristics: violence, injustice, loss of liberty and sovereignty, 
exploitation, hatred, social and cultural regression, barbarity.  Members of the black diaspora 
shared with other antifascists this same broad definition of fascism as a global threat that 
encompassed many of the ills they experienced in their own countries and feared worldwide.
48
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We have identified, however, a significant distinction between black and nonblack 
antifascism.  Nonblack antifascists condemned fascism for fomenting hatred among people of 
different races and ethnicities, whereas they saw themselves as promoting fraternity and 
solidarity.  However, as the quotations above show, powerful voices within the African diaspora 
equated fascism more directly with a “white world” agenda.  The antifascism inspired within the 
African diaspora by Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia was in some instances, therefore, 
specifically a black antifascism against a white fascism rather than a multiracial antifascism 
against a racist fascism. 
How, then, did transnational black support for Ethiopia transition and translate into pro-
Republican activism during the Spanish Civil War?  How did black antifascists view the struggle 
of Republican Spaniards as their own fight?  One argument posits that the Iberian Peninsula 
served as a proxy for the African nation.  According to a study of African-American involvement 
in Spain by Kelley, black antifascist volunteers in Spain imagined a confluence of the two fights.   
Since it was known widely that Italian fascists—as well as German Nazis—were aiding the 
Spanish Nationalists, black antifascists interpreted their actions as vengeance: fighting the 
invaders of Ethiopia on Spanish soil.  In fact, approximately a dozen Ethiopians traveled to Spain 
to fight the Spanish Nationalists and their Italian and German allies.  Ras Imru, a member of the 
Ethiopian royal family was among them, and expressed the opportunity for revenge posed by the 
Spanish conflict: “Madrid is not Addis Ababa.  There we had nothing but our justified hatred.  
Here we have guns, tanks, and aeroplanes.”
49
  Kelley captures the existence of this idea among 
less elite people of African descent by quoting from a work of fiction by African-American 
volunteer Oscar Hunter a phrase that encapsulates the thesis.  In the story, a wounded black 
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soldier explains his reason for coming to Spain:  “I wanted to go to Ethiopia and fight Mussolini,” 
he says. “This ain’t Ethiopia, but it’ll do.”
50
   
The concept of confluence between the Ethiopian and Spanish conflicts was not easy to 
accept for all members of the black diaspora.  Despite his commitment to solidarity, Spanish 
Civil War volunteer James Yates remembered his hesitant reaction upon being confronted for the 
first time with the question of volunteering in Spain.  “Am I prepared to go to Spain?” he 
wondered.  “I had been more than ready to go to Ethiopia, but that was different.  Ethiopia, a 
Black nation, was part of me.”  He was less familiar with “the reality of Spain and Europe.”  And 
yet, he remembered—demonstrating again his belief in transnational, interracial, antifascist 
solidarity—“I knew what was at stake.”  The struggle in Spain, he understood, was one between 
the poor, peasants, workers and unions, socialists and communists on one side against big 
landowners, the monarchy, and “right-wingers in the military” on the other.  The former group 
had beaten the latter in an election, he knew, and if such an election had taken place in the 
United States, he believed, it “would have brought Black people to the top levels of government.”  
Republican Spain was “the perfect example for the world I dreamed of,” he wrote, a world in 




 As Yates’ remembrance suggests, the refocus of black antifascism on Spain relied in part 
upon connections within the African diaspora to the international political left.  Like Yates, many 
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members of the black diaspora embraced internationalist ideologies and interracial solidarity as 
important tools in their struggle against social and economic injustice.  These black leftists 
understood the potential of the political and social events taking place in Republican Spain: It 
was, in Kelley’s words “one of the few places on earth where black and white, Jew and gentile, 
could use guns to battle forces that threatened their individual and collective security,” and “a 
nation experimenting in a radical democracy, where peasants, workers, and women had the right 
to vote, where Socialists and Communists held positions of power in government.”
52
  For leftists 
within the black diaspora, therefore, a lack of any racial or ethnic identification—real or 
imagined—with the nation under fascist siege did not preclude a belief that the fight of that 
nation was their own.  They saw the struggle against fascism as the struggle against oppression 
generally, regarding “Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler as representative of their oppressors back 
home.”
53
  In this way, they were exactly like other antifascist volunteers and supporters of the 
Spanish Republic around the world, regardless of race or ethnicity. 
 The Spanish Civil War served as a new meeting place for Nicolás Guillén and Langston 
Hughes, who had first encountered one another in Cuba in 1930.  The two men were pictured 
alongside Soviet writer Mikhail Koltsov and U.S. writer Ernest Hemmingway in a photograph 
(Figure 4.1) published in the periodical Guillén edited in Cuba, Mediodía, in December 1937.
54
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Figure 4.1 Photograph published in Mediodía of Langston Hughes, Mikhail 
Koltsov, Ernest Hemmingway, and Nicolás Guillén in Madrid in November 1937 
 
The writing of both men on the subject of the Spanish conflict is well known.  Guillén’s work we 
will consider shortly during our discussion of black Cuban antifascism; before concluding this 
exploration of the development of antifascism in the black diaspora, however, it will be useful to 
consider for a moment Hughes’s iconic response to the fight for Republican Spain. 
Hughes served for six months as a correspondent in Europe for African-American 
newspapers covering the war, and his prolific written work of the period illustrates the 
perspective of an intellectual and activist within the context of the transnational black diaspora 
and political left.  His journey began in July 1937 with the Second International Writers’ 
Congress, where he reconnected with Guillén.  In a speech he made to the Congress, he 
identified himself as “both a Negro and poor.”  This dual identity, he stated, gave him the 
authority “to speak for the most oppressed group in America, that group that has known so little 




the social, economic, and political oppression of African Americans to the situation in Spain and 
the threat of fascism broadly, he stated: “We are the people who have long known in actual 
practice the meaning of the word Fascism.”  Referencing the plight of sharecroppers, the 
injustices of Jim Crow segregation, the violence of race riots and lynching, and the “sorrows of 
the nine Scottsboro boys, innocent young Negroes imprisoned some six years now for a crime 
that even the trial judge declared them not guilty of having committed,” Hughes made the 
connection for his audience in Paris: “Yes, we Negroes in America do not have to be told what 
Fascism is in action.  We know.  Its theories of Nordic supremacy and economic suppression 
have long been realities to us.  And now we view it on a world scale.”  He catalogued the global 
fascist threat, referencing Hitler’s attacks on labor unions and Jewish and black people in 
Germany; Mussolini’s “expedition of slaughter in Ethiopia” and segregationist policies in Italy; 
the “savage” mistreatment of neighboring peoples by and imperial ambitions of the Military 
Party of Japan; Batista and Vincent, “the little American-made tyrants,” in Cuba and Haiti; and 
the Spanish Nationalists led by Franco.  This global threat, he told the Congress, was linked 
intimately to the practice of race prejudice:   
Those who have already practiced bombing the little villages of Ethiopia now bomb 
Guernica and Madrid.  The same Fascists who forced Italian peasants to fight in Africa 
now force African Moors to fight in Europe.  They do not care about color when they can 
use you for profits or for war.  Japan attempts to force the Chinese of Manchuria to work 
and fight under Japanese supervision for the glory and wealth of the Tokio bourgeoisie—
one colored people dominating another at the point of guns.  Race means nothing when it 
can be turned to Fascist use.  And yet race means everything when the Fascists of the 
world use it as a bugaboo and a terror to keep the working masses from getting together.  
Just as in America they tell the whites that Negroes are dangerous brutes and rapists, so 
in Germany they lie about the Jews, and in Italy they cast their verbal spit upon the 
Ethiopians.  And the old myths of race are kept alive to hurt and impede the rising power 





Hughes imagined that people of color, by “reach[ing] out their hands in friendship and 
brotherhood to all the white races of the earth,” would lead the way to a new society free of race 
prejudice, imperialism, and poverty in which “the workers of the world will have triumphed.”  
This powerful vision placed the “darker peoples of the world,” in Hughes’s words, at the helm of 
the fight.  “We represent the end of race,” he stated.  “And the Fascists know that when there is 
no more race, there will be no more capitalism, and no more war.”
55
  To the African-American 
poet, people of color were the ultimate antifascists, poised to lead antifascism’s global triumph. 
Hughes rejoiced in the black diaspora’s antifascist role, which was also antiracist in his 
interpretation.  Celebrating the presence of black volunteers from the United States, Africa, 
Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the English- and French-speaking West Indies in Spain, the African-
American poet interpreted their fight as “a step in the battle for universal freedom” against 
fascism that “preache[d] the creed of Nordic supremacy and a world for whites alone.”
 56
  The 
use of colonized North Africans by the Spanish Nationalist forces saddened Hughes deeply,
57
 as 
he articulated in one of his most famous pieces on the war, the poem “Letter from Spain 
Addressed to Alabama” (1937).  In the work, he envisioned an African-American Republican 
volunteer from Alabama’s encounter with a captured wounded “Moor.”  The poem’s subject 
expresses racial and anticolonial solidarity with the enemy combatant, interpreting the 
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significance of the fight in Spain broadly in terms that could be described both as diasporic and 
leftist: 
And as he lay there dying 
In a village we had taken, 
I looked across to Africa 
And seed foundations shakin’. 
 
Cause if a free Spain wins this war, 
The colonies, too, are free— 
Then something wonderful’ll happen 
To them Moors as dark as me. 
 
I said, I guess that’s why old England 
And I reckon Italy, too, 
Is afraid to let a workers’ Spain 
Be too good to me and you— 
 
Cause they got slaves in Africa— 
And they don’t want ‘em to be free. 
Listen, Moorish prisoner, hell! 




As Kelley points out in his study of African-American volunteers in Spain, the anticolonial 
idealism Hughes expressed in this poem was complicated by the fact that the government of 
Republican Spain refused calls by radicals to grant independence to Spanish colonies in north 
and western Africa.
59
  However, Hughes’s hopeful sentiments about the Republic—also 
expressed in admiration for the lack of racial discrimination black volunteers encountered in 
                                                     
58
 Hughes, “Letter from Spain Addressed to Alabama,” The Volunteer for Liberty (15 November 1937) 
reprinted in Mullen, Langston Hughes, 156–157. 
59






—are representative of those felt by many politicized members of the African diaspora 
during the Spanish Civil War. 
Though often the grim struggle necessitated uncomfortable pragmatism (and in many 
cases offered opportunities to the unscrupulous), people who were accustomed to suffering 
oppression placed their ardent hopes in the cause of the Republic’s triumph—in the case of black 
antifascism, experience with racial prejudice and economic hardship contributed to a sense of 
solidarity with Spanish Republicans.  Numerous black activists during the 1930s shared a 
consistent progression from engagement with the Scottsboro case to organizing around Ethiopia 
to support for the Spanish Republic.  Black Puerto Rican bibliophile Arturo Schomburg, who 
lived in Harlem and played an instrumental role in connecting African Americans with people of 
African descent from the Caribbean, exemplifies this experience.  He involved himself in the 
campaign to support the young black men accused in Scottsboro, protested against the Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia, and supported Republican Spain against Franco and foreign fascists.
61
  
Driving forces behind this typical progression came from both the black diaspora and the 
international political left of the 1930s.  They culminated in an African diasporic antifascism that 
encompassed diverse struggles and motivated transnational activists to make Spain’s cause their 
own. 
Exploring the African diaspora and the radicalization of transnational black activists 
during the 1920s and 1930s, we have touched upon the Cuban experience and the role of Cubans 
in this process.  With a better understanding of this larger context, we turn our attention now to 
the specifics of black Cuban antifascism.   
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Black Cuban Antifascism  
As it had for many other groups considered in this study, the struggle against Machado 
proved transformative for Cuba’s black associations.  During the republican period up through 
Machado’s downfall, the island’s black elites established and led associations that acted as both 
social clubs and political organizations.  The black societies “espous[ed] uplift, respectability, 
cultural refinement, and intellectual pursuits,” and were “entangled in mainstream parties in 
order to tap the opportunities offered by electoral politics,” in the words of historian Melina 
Pappademos.  In both capacities, the black societies fostered prestige for their leaders, helping 
“privileged blacks generate a robust public presence.”  To access republican Cuba’s political 
system, elite Cubans of African descent carefully crafted civic identities and reliably delivered 
the electoral support of black constituencies to politicians in exchange for significant rewards 
including access to employment, schools, land, contracts, and other valuable resources.
62
  By so 
doing, they participated alongside other Cubans in the island’s pervasive system of political 
patronage.  Historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr. summarizes the function of this system: “Control of 
resources and revenues was the central if unstated issue of politics at all levels of the republic.  
The forms of conventional electoral competition disguised the urgent nonpolitical issues of 
Cuban politics.  At stake was the livelihood of hundreds of political contenders and the many 
more thousands of dependents and supporters who, in varying degrees, relied on political 
patronage and public office for their well-being.”
63
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Through organization of the associations, black elites sought not only material gains 
through the patronage political system but also the establishment of their inclusion in Cuban 
nationalism.  They developed civic institutions as a means to assert their legitimacy in the 
island’s political and social arenas, and to fight racial discrimination and break barriers.  To be 
effective, elites and their institutions depended upon the ability to mobilize the broader black 
Cuban population politically, to exert political pressure and, most importantly, to deliver the 
black vote.
64
  Their actions had some positive outcomes for Cuban blacks.  Pappademos notes 
that “black societies’ exchange of political support for the resources controlled by political 
incumbents (that is, the clubs’ integration of clientelistic electoral networks) helped more 
resources reach black hands than would have been the case had they not participated in this sort 
of patronage negotiation.”
65
  As long as the patronage political system was all Cubans’ primary 
access-point for resources, black Cubans—like all Cubans—had little choice but to participate 
for their survival.  Less clear is to what extent this participation had any impact specifically on 
discrimination and barriers faced by Cuban communities of color. 
By the mid-1930s many black Cuban activists rejected elite black leaders’ acquiescence 
as participants in a political system interpreted as corrupt and as a central source of the island’s 
ills.  In so doing, they made up one important part of the powerful current of discontent that 
included diverse Cubans and that led to Machado’s overthrow and a changed political landscape 
on the island.  Leaders of the established black societies, like other Cuban elites, found 
themselves under attack by new radical forces.  “Although traditional black leaders claimed a 
sense of responsibility to the ‘race of color,’” Pappademos states, “black political outsiders 
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increasingly questioned their motivations and ties to corrupt administrations.”
66
  These activists 
accused eminent black organizations, such as the Club Atenas (Athens Club), of having intimate 
ties to the corrupt and oppressive government as well as elitist pretensions.  They organized a 
renovation of black Cuban activism, creating new societies such as the Directorio Social 
Revolutionario “Renacimiento” (Social Revolutionary Directorate “Renaissance”) and the Club 
Adelante (Forward Club).  These groups shunned connection to the machinery of the political 
patronage system and claimed to be, in contrast with the established black societies, 
representative of the Cuban population of color.
67
  They connected with the broader radical 
moment in Cuban politics.  The “revolutionary mission of the black youth,” as stated in the black 
Cuban activist publication Adelante in 1936, consisted of education and indoctrination of the 
masses and “the recruitment of ethnic factors” to the cause of “common liberation.”
68
 
This new black Cuban activism following the downfall of Machado is one site in which 
we locate black Cuban antifascism.  Specifically, the aforementioned publication Adelante, 
bulletin of the club of the same name, provides us with many examples of the integration of 
antifascism into the black Cuban organizing agenda of this period.  As the quotation above 
suggests, the publication took on as its mission not only the progress of black Cubans but also 
work towards solidarity in the fight of the clases populares (popular classes) for a new Cuba.  
Concerned with “class consciousness” and “collective betterment,” authors in Adelante 
addressed a broad activist agenda.
69
  These black Cuban activists of the 1930s asserted both 
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ethnic or cultural identities and political ones, and addressed both national and transnational 
agendas.  Antifascism became part of their activism, and they related it to their readers’ 
experiences.  Another place in which we locate black Cuban antifascism is in the work of 
Nicolás Guillén, in his own writings and in the periodical he edited during the years of the 
Spanish Civil War, Mediodía.  Guillén’s work and his connections to the black diaspora which 
we discussed above help us to understand black Cuban antifascism as part of that important 
larger context.  Examining these sources, we are able to identify and analyze the principal 
arguments of black Cuban antifascism, and to add to our understanding of the black Cuban 
experience in the Spanish conflict, expanding it beyond our previous mentions of Cuban 
volunteers of African descent who traveled to Spain.  As we would expect having just explored 
some of the political currents and actions of the African diaspora in the 1930s, our discussion of 
black Cuban antifascism begins with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. 
As it did in so many contexts throughout the diaspora, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
inspired a strong assertion of antifascism in the pages of Adelante.  Commentary in the 
publication argued that the Italian project in Ethiopia was colonial, capitalist, and fascist, and 
that these three driving forces were inextricably intertwined.  The Italians’ imperialist appetite 
was whet, wrote one author for the magazine, by the prospect of colonial investment in mines 
and plantations and of labor at starvation wages.  These “economic necessities of capitalism” 
caused Italy to wage war on Ethiopia in an effort “to expand its colonial sphere” and “to oppress 
and exploit the Abyssinian people for the benefit of the Italian bourgeoisie.”  Unlike the colonial 
conquests of the nineteenth century, which had been typical of liberal capitalism, Italy’s present 
colonial action constituted “the first war of corporatist fascism,” according to an Italian author 




revolution of Mussolini which extends from the Mediterranean Basin to the Indian Ocean.”  
From the fascist perspective, the colonial project would therefore benefit Italians generally 
because of the fascist and corporatist organization of their society.  Even war itself would benefit 
the people, Italian fascists argued in justification, because it would “rejuvenate the human body 
and purify the spirit.”  In this way, the Adelante author commented, fascists prepared popular 
opinion in Italy for “the great tragedy that lies ahead.”
70
  Black Cubans worried that the Italian 
people would be douped in this way into supporting fascist colonization efforts abroad. 
The potential for colonization of Ethiopia by Italian fascists was particularly significant 
to black Cubans—as it was throughout the African diaspora—because of Ethiopia’s importance 
as a symbol.  That Ethiopia was “the only free nation of Africa”
71
 was a central historical point 
made by authors in Adelante.  The “ferocious war” waged by Italy was destroying the “relative 
liberty of Ethiopia.”
72
  Its status as the one African nation to resist European colonization 
successfully during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was of vital importance to the 
antifascism inspired in black Cubans by the Italian invasion of 1935.  To emphasize this 
significant status Adelante recounted for readers the history of Ethiopia’s anticolonial struggle, 
the conflict between Italy and Emperor Menelik II known as the First Italo-Ethiopian War 
(1895–1896), and connected Ethiopia’s ongoing defense of its sovereignty to Cuba’s.  It was 
important to authors in Adelante to foster solidarity between their readers and the people of 
Ethiopia by emphasizing connections between the two nations.  “Our country,” wrote one Cuban 
author, “fought mightily for the same principles for which today the country of Menelik does.”  
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In addition to drawing a general historic comparison between Ethiopia and Cuba, the author of 
the article “Menelik and Cuba” claimed a more substantial specific link: the mysterious figure 
Guillermo Enrique Eliseo, a.k.a. William H. Ellis, a man of African descent.  According to the 
Cuban author in 1936, Ellis was a “Cuban born in the city of Santiago de Cuba” who lived in the 
United States from the age of four, where he adopted an Americanized “psychology” and name, 
and became a successful businessman on Wall Street and also in Mexico.  His business interests 
extended to Ethiopia, the author stated, leading him to develop a friendly relationship with 
Emperor Menelik and to serve as a special envoy to Ethiopia for U.S. President Theodore 
Roosevelt.  Having never lost his “sincere love” for the land of his birth—the author claimed that 
Ellis “rendered great services to the work of our independence” during the Cuban War of 
Independence that began in 1895—Ellis allegedly spoke so beautifully about the island to the 
Ethiopian emperor that Menelik is quoted to have said: “The description you give me of Cuba is 
so lovely that it must surely be the second country created by God, after Abyssinia.”
73
  The 
information presented by this Cuban author in 1936 contradicts assertions made in a couple of 
scholarly works on Ellis, who, evidence suggests, was not actually Cuban.
74
  However, the 
significance of these stories for the 1930s Cuban reader is not diminished by uncertainty 
surrounding Ellis’s true identity.  Adelante sought with evident pride to present a strong 
connection between Ethiopia and Cuba, and with this obscure historical figure provided just one 
specific example of the link. 
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 Cuba’s anticolonial past and anti-imperialist present served as a source of solidarity with 
the people of Ethiopia and informed the black antifascist response on the island to the Italian 
invasion.  One editorial that drew an explicit comparison used a different version of the common 
David and Goliath metaphor often employed by Cubans in reference to the island’s struggles 
with the United States to emphasize the valiant actions of a people against an immensely 
powerful adversary.  Italian fascist attitudes and actions, the Adelante editorialist stated, had 
“engendered lively popular revulsion in all countries because the spirit of justice revolts against a 
tragic, desperate struggle between a giant and a child, in which, moreover, the giant is wrong.”  
This revulsion was particularly tangible in Cuba because the island’s historic, economic, and 
social conditions allowed its people “to comprehend the intensity of the drama which Ethiopia 
lives today.”  Cuba had fought heroically for liberty against a country—Spain—vastly more 
powerful than itself, just as Ethiopia did, lacking modern war capacity in the face of the Italian 
fascists’ “technical perfection.”  Cuba was, like Ethiopia, a nation “kept prisoner by the influence 
of great foreign capitals”—both metropolises and financial interests, especially those of the 
United States—and might at any moment lose its sovereignty.  The island was “a small country, 
surrounded by ambitions, harassed by those who see in it, like Mussolini in Abyssinia, a 
necessary and easy prey.”
75
 
Furthermore, Mussolini sought to enslave Ethiopia.
76
  As did other Cuban antifascists, 
Cubans of African descent extended the assertion of colonization to one of enslavement.  The 
contention was even more resonant, perhaps, in the case of the African nation of Ethiopia than it 
would be later in the case of Spain.  Slavery would result from colonization, Adelante reminded 
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black Cubans, drawing upon the example of Latin American history.  Spaniards in the Americas 
claimed to “instill a new civilization in peoples of nonexistent, rudimentary, or radically different 
cultures than that which they brought with them”—as did the Italians in Ethiopia at present—
when in fact they kept American indigenous peoples in “the most degrading servitude.”  Cuba 
was no exception to this pattern.  When the mortality of the island’s indigenous people 
threatened to cut into the Spanish colonizers’ greed, wrote one author in a piece entitled “The 
Black in the Colony,” the conquistadors brought slaves from Africa.  And, the article emphasized 
for readers, other European nations traded in enslaved Africans as well,
77
 just as European 
countries other than Italy colonized other African peoples in the present.  In this historical 
context, Ethiopia’s role as the only African nation to fight off European incursion successfully 
and to remain free and sovereign was particularly meaningful to black Cubans.  Asserting 
Adelante as the voice of “a very important portion of the Cuban population, the black,” an 
editorialist stated a message directed at the Cuban government: “the Cuban people is alongside 
that of Abyssinia and against the methods put into practice by the Italian government.”  Black 
Cubans demanded freedom from European colonization for the nation of Ethiopia and freedom 
from enslavement for the Ethiopian people.  Defining these dual freedoms as inherent Cuban 
values, they called upon their government to defend them in the international arena.  “Cuba is for 
liberty,” the editorial stated, “and the government should assist in this.”  The author made a 
specific policy request of the Cuban government: that it comply with “the sanctions imposed 
upon Mussolini by the League [of Nations] and accepted by our delegate before this institution 
for the maintenance of the peace violated by the fascist.”
78
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 In an argument closely related to those concerning colonization and enslavement, black 
Cuban authors emphasized in the pages of Adelante that racism was inherent to the Italian 
project in Ethiopia.  To justify their colonial aspirations, one author stated, Italian fascists used 
“the absurd pretext of brining civilization to Africa’s tierras incultas”—a phrase with a possible 
double interpretation meaning both uncultivated or virgin agricultural lands and uncultured or 
uncivilized countries.
79
  Raised also in the comparison with Latin American colonization by 
Spain cited above, the question of civilization was central to the struggle between fascists and 
antifascists, as we see in other cases, and did not always pertain specifically to the issue of race.  
Antifascists defined civilization as progress, often in the forms of modernizing culture and social 
advancement, change which they claimed was specifically abhorrent to their fascist opponents.  
Antifascists countered fascist claims of bringing or maintaining civilization by attacking their use 
of violence against innocent human victims, and also specifically their bombing of civilian 
targets, urban centers, and buildings of societal and cultural import.  Within their own countries, 
fascists promoted their conception of a civilizing project as protecting tradition and order against 
both political opponents and internal ethnic others.  In the context of ethnic difference within a 
conflict, as in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, mobilization of the concept of civilization took the 
predictable racist form stated above: The fascist invader claimed to bring civilization (defined as 
European culture and society) to “savage,” “barbaric,” or “backwards” others in foreign lands.  
Antifascists pushed back against this view by emphasizing the humanity of the victims.  
However, antifascist propaganda could stray into racist language, also, as we will see in cases of 
references to the North African mercenaries, or “Moors,” employed by Franco’s forces in Spain. 
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Black Cubans understood that racism could be found beyond the confines of the fascist 
viewpoint in both their fellow antifascists and others.  Many people who were neither fascist nor 
antifascist shared the fascist’s concept of civilization and, defending it, espoused their own 
racism.  One author in Adelante quoted a British publication, for example, that stated: “Italy 
fights for the cause of civilization against a barbaric people, and its victory will be a great 
advantage for Abyssinia and also for the whole world.”
80
  Black Cubans recognized racism in 
Cuban discussions of the Ethiopian conflict as well.  “Every day,” complained another author, 
“some periodical from the capital conveys gruesome news about alleged acts of barbarism 
committed by the soldiers of the Negus [Kingdom of Ethiopia] or just by some ‘fierce’ tribesman 
of Abyssinia.”  These types of reports, he noted, relied upon Italian sources and were “intended 
to present the Abyssinian people as the most ferocious and barbarous in the world” and, 
furthermore, were “intended to justify the bloody fascist campaign.”
81
 
 Black Cubans, like other antifascists, defended the humanity and “respectability” of 
Ethiopian victims and attacked fascist violence in order to challenge the racist conceptualization 
of the civilizing project.  “We admit unreservedly that a good Abyssinian gentleman,” wrote an 
author in Adelante, “driven by a fierce hatred toward the invaders of his homeland, slaughters 
mercilessly the unfortunate who falls into his hands; we admit also that an Ethiopian ‘tribe’ 
beheads a holy soldier of the Pope determined to make them believe that the fascist bombs are 
blessed by the Heavenly Father and that they should submit meekly to the civilizing intentions of 
Mussolini.”  Black Cubans—and Cubans more generally—could empathize, perhaps, with this 
“good Abyssinian gentleman” and his “tribe,” invaded, attacked, oppressed, and colonized by a 
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foreign power.  Violence in self-defense was understandable and justified.  “What is more 
barbarous, to slaughter a Dominican priest or to massacre an entire defenseless people?  What is 
more ferocious, to decapitate an Italian pilot or to bomb cowardly the hospitals and the trucks of 
the Red Cross, the defenseless villages?”  Countless Ethiopian children, elderly people, and 
women had been “decapitated by fascist bombs.”  What barbarism, black Cubans exclaimed with 
indignation, in the name of civilization!  Fighting “heroically” for their liberty, their 
independence, and to preserve their homeland, the Ethiopian people were “respectable in every 
respect.”  They warranted admiration for their ability “to preserve their independence through the 
centuries, fighting against the imperialist pirates of Europe.”  They were not against civilization; 
in fact, they sought to progress, black Cubans emphasized using a characteristic antifascist 
definition of civilization.  The “civilization” they rejected was that to which their African 
neighbors had been subjected, that of colonization and enslavement: the “alleged civilization of 
the Europeans” that brought fierce exploitation characterized not only by wage slavery but also 
by “the most primitive” slavery “of whips and fetters” to other nations on the continent such as 
Somalia, Eritrea, and the Congo.  It was, wrote one author in a comparison to Latin America, the 
same “civilization” Europeans gave “to our brothers the American Indians,” and the Ethiopians 
did not want it.
82
 
 In emphasizing the humanity and innocence of the Ethiopian people, writers in Adelante 
used language to describe the Italian invasion that would become familiar to pro-Republican 
readers during the Spanish Civil War.  Ethiopia witnessed thousands of civilians, including 
women, children, and the elderly, “swept away by shrapnel,”
83
 decimated in “horrendous 
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massacres conducted by plane,”
84
 and, as noted above, “decapitated by fascist bombs.”
85
  
Antifascist authors emphasized the fascist bombing of civilian centers in Ethiopia as they would 
in Spain.  Italian bombs were “destroying defenseless cities.”
86
  Looking back on the conflict, 
one author in Mediodía, the magazine Guillén edited, made the comparison between Ethiopia 
and Spain explicit.  Describing the horrors wrought by fascist “crime” in Ethiopia—“throwing 
incendiary bombs on defenseless civilians, killing children, the elderly and women, destroying 
civilization and peoples”—he told readers that now the peoples of Spain and China and “the 
proletariat of all countries” lived with the tragedy of these same terrible threats of fascism.
87
  
Propagandistic antifascist images depicting Italian aggression in Ethiopia also predated strikingly 
similar images from Spanish Civil War.  For example, an illustration (Figure 4.2) published in 
February 1936 of bombs falling near an Ethiopian mother and her infant identified the horrific 
scene as one representative of “Roman Culture.”
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Figure 4.2 Antifascist illustration of “Roman Culture” in Ethiopia 
 
The conflict in Ethiopia inspired literary contributions in addition to illustrations, as 
would the Spanish conflict.  Cuban journalist Tomás Borroto Mora published a poetic ode to 
Ethiopia in Adelante in November 1935.  The poem emphasized the Italians’ colonial motivation 
and the ruse of a civilizing mission: 
 ¡Más tierra! ¡más!    More land! More!  
… la nuestra es ya pequeña,   … ours is now small, 
 ¡Es preciso buscar gran extensión!  It is necessary to seek a great extension! 




 ¿Un pretexto? … la Civilización.  A pretext? … Civilization. 
 
It portrayed the violence of the Italians in Ethiopia, the soldiers, cannons, planes, and “rain” of 
shrapnel.  “In Rome,” Borroto Mora stated provocatively, “the Wolf howls and the Vatican is 
silent.”  Meanwhile, the poem concluded, making reference to the colonial division of the 
African continent, the other powers of Europe stood by without intervening because “thieves 
who retain their plunder cannot handcuff another thief.”
89
  Also similar to an important trend 
seen later in the case of Spain was the multinational character of the outpouring of literary 
support for the Ethiopian cause.  In October 1935 Adelante printed a Spanish translation of 
Langston Hughes’s “Ballad of Ethiopia.”
90
  Themes established in these types of creative 
expressions would recur in responses to the Spanish Civil War. 
By May 1936 black Cubans expressed deep pessimism about events in Ethiopia.  Each 
day the free African nation was losing its territory, wrote one author, and no one offered to help.  
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union all disappointed black Cubans with their responses to 
the situation.  Fascist aggression and the inaction of the world’s other powers were equally to 
blame for Ethiopia’s fate, wrote Adelante’s administrator, a fate that foreshadowed world war: 
“In the end Italy will achieve its desires and Ethiopia will be one more colony in Africa, with the 
consent of the League of Nations, the Institution which was created for the establishment of 
peace, so that humanity would not again be plunged into the macabre spectacle of a new war.”
91
  
Antifascists would repeat this multipart claim—about fascist colonization, the complacency of 
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other world powers, and the consequent inevitability of a new world war—in the case of Spain 
and beyond. 
 It was with the avoidance of future war in mind that Adelante printed, over the course of 
four issues between August and November 1936, a series of declarations made by the exiled 
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie to French scholar Marcel Griaule, translated into Spanish and 
entitled “El Drama Espantosa que ha Vivido un Pueblo” (“The Frightening Drama a People has 
Lived Through”).  José L. Franco of the Cuban Comité Pro-Abisinia (Pro-Abyssinia Committee) 
oversaw this extensive publication effort, noting his own devotion to the Ethiopian cause, “which 
is that of the right and the just.”  The number of pages and months devoted to Emperor Selassie’s 
words indicates a substantial commitment on the part of the black Cuban periodical to 
publicizing the issue of Ethiopia’s defeat at the hands of Italian fascism.  Franco noted that 
Emperor Selassie’s declarations would serve to inform the Cuban reader about the events of the 
conflict.  To relate the conflict to his readers, Franco drew a comparison between Ethiopia and 
the island: Mussolini called the Ethiopians bandits as the Spaniards had called the soldiers of 
Cuban independence leaders Antonio Maceo and José Martí thieves, he told them.  The “tragic 
and poignant” pages devoted to Selassie’s words, he asserted, would bring to every home “the 
certainty that fascism, … shown in the butchery of our black brothers of Ethiopia, is the most 
terrible danger that threatens civilization.”  Expressing this threat was José L. Franco’s intent; he 
wished to advertise the terrible truth about “what will be the future war, if the peoples do not 
stop in time the unleashed desires of all imperialisms.”  The Ethiopians, he assured readers in 








How did black Cuban antifascism organized around the cause of Ethiopia translate into 
black Cuban support for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War?  The transition proceeded with a 
degree of bitterness for some.  One author addressing black Cubans accused Cubans generally of 
ignoring the case of Ethiopia, of failing to realize the threat of fascism until it impacted other 
countries, especially Spain.  The article by prominent Cuban antifascist and member of the 
Comité Pro-Abisinia Antonio Penichet—whose involvement in both Masonic and anarchist 
antifascism on the island we examine elsewhere—discussed fascism in Ethiopia, China, and 
Spain.  Penichet argued that it took atrocities committed by fascist forces against the civilian 
populations—and especially the children—of Spain and China for the world to comprehend “the 
barbarity of the procedure used against Abyssinia.”  Fascism had “razed” and “assassinated” 
Ethiopian children, youth, women, and elderly people without significant protest, Penichet stated, 
accusing observers across the globe of “accepting Italy’s ‘civilizing’ claim” and of wanting “to 
mitigate or conceal the crime and the theft committed against the Abyssinian people.”  The crime 
was committed with impunity, he wrote, before an unsympathetic world.  Cuba specifically was 
not spared from his condemnation.  The Comité Pro-Abisinia had acted “in an atmosphere of 
hostile indifference,” he chastised fellow Cubans, even though “we had and have in Cuba so 
many motives to sympathize with Abyssinia.”  The Spanish case had proven necessary in order 
to make people on the island take notice of “the bloody biology of fascism.”  The plight of China 
fighting Japanese fascism, too, Penichet noted, though distant, drew more attention on the island 
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than had the pain of the Ethiopian people.  Writing in October 1937, Penichet made an argument 
that would later be applied to the hindsight of World War II looking back on the Spanish Civil 
War: Had fascism been contained in Ethiopia, he asserted, the “somber spectacles” of Spain and 
China would not now exist to horrify those who contemplated them.
93
  By including Penichet’s 
article, the editors of Adelante promoted his condemnation of the Cuban public’s indifference 
about the fascist attack on Ethiopia compared to general outrage at the situation in Spain.  Indeed, 
in the research for this study, we have observed repeatedly a much greater volume of propaganda 
and other material produced by Cuban individuals and groups on the conflict in Spain relative to 
that produced concerning the conflict in Ethiopia, a discrepancy apparent in both periodicals and 
archival sources—Adelante is the one exception we encountered, in which concern for Ethiopia 
is expressed more prominently and voluminously than that for the Spanish Republic.  
Nevertheless, black Cuban antifascists did eventually embrace the Spanish Republican cause; 
Penichet’s article, for example, is accompanied in the black Cuban publication by a poem 
celebrating Spain’s role in advancing the workers of the world.
94
 
Black Cuban activists’ transition from adherence to the Ethiopian cause to that of the 
Spanish Republic proceeded gradually.  During the first few months of the Spanish Civil War—
August to November 1936—the declarations of Ethiopian Emperor Selassie discussed above 
featured prominently in Adelante whereas the periodical’s authors ignored events in Spain.  With 
Selassie in exile and antifascist efforts in Ethiopia frustrated, however, the black Cuban 
publication began to pay attention to the Spanish conflict.   
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Black Cuban antifascism retained many of its central characteristics and emphases in the 
transition from the Ethiopian cause to the Spanish Republican one.  For example, black Cuban 
antifascists interpreted the Republican struggle as one against colonialism.  Even though Spain 
was itself a European power—and the former colonizer and enslaver on the island of Cuba, as 
noted repeatedly in the discussion of Ethiopia—it was still in danger of falling to others.  As 
corrupt Chinese generals had done during Japanese expansion, Spanish collaborators of foreign 
fascists would “bring about the dismemberment of their country, imposing on the lands of Spain 
servitude to foreign powers,” stated José L. Franco in February 1937, having turned his attention 
from the declarations of Emperor Selassie to his “Universal Panorama,” a column on world 
events that appeared in Guillén’s periodical Mediodía as well.  If fascism triumphed, Franco 
argued, Spain would become “a mere Italo-German colony.”
95
 
Black Cuban antifascists used the familiar themes of civilization and barbarity in their 
discussion of the Spanish conflict.  They praised the Republicans for their forces made up of 
“popular militias that have made safe the best of the intelligentsia of the country, in order to take 
the immortal and civilizing soul of Spain today away from the dangers of the fierce and 
exterminating fighting.”  By protecting the intelligentsia, Republicans promoted the antifascist 
version of civilization: cultural and social progress.  In contrast, Adelante emphasized the 
brutality of fascist violence in Spain.  Utilizing language that indicated a lack of civilization—
and which was often used in expressions of racial prejudice by whites against ethnically different 
enemies—the column “Universal Panorama” called Spanish Nationalists “hoards” that 
committed “horrors” and “barbarous deeds.”  Their ferocious acts reminded Cubans, the article 
noted, of the “tragic repressions” of the Spanish colonial era on the island, such as those 
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committed by the infamous Valeriano Weyler during the Cuban War of Independence.
96
  In this 
comparison we can perceive a hint of a common Cuban antifascist argument about Spain, one 
discussed elsewhere: that the Spanish Nationalists represented the old Spain that had colonized 
Cuba—Weyler’s Spain—whereas Republican triumph would herald the permanence of a new 
Spain characterized by progress. 
Adelante’s administrator, Mariano Salas Aranda, made a direct comparison between new 
Republican Spain’s struggle in the 1930s and that of Cuba for independence beginning in 1868.  
The achievement by a people of its liberty and its rights, he wrote, results from revolution.  
Beginning a brief history lesson for readers with the French Revolution,
97
 he stated that the 
accomplishments of the French people cost them “the blood of their sons.”  However, their 
triumph, he argued, inspired other people around the world to fight for their own freedom and 
rights—likely a reference to the countries of Latin America during the first couple of decades of 
the nineteenth century, perhaps including Haiti—struggles also characterized by violence.  The 
social progress implemented in the U.S.S.R., he continued, would not have been possible without 
the revolutionary movement that preceded it, just as Cuban independence would not have been 
achieved if not for the armed movement of 1868.  Like Cuba, Adelante’s administrator wrote, 
Spain “could not be an exception in world history.  The Spanish people, fulfilling the historic 
mission of all peoples to realize the conquest of their liberties and rights . . . must necessarily 
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give their contribution of blood.”  Only in this way, history taught, would the results last: “The 
conquests of the revolution obtained will be sealed with blood and imperishable.”
98
  This 
optimistic assessment of triumph and permanence glossed over many complexities and 
disappointments in the history of all three examples—France, the Soviet Union, and Cuba—but 
nevertheless demonstrated an attempt by Salas Aranda to place the Spanish conflict in a global 
context of justified armed struggle—in Cuba and elsewhere—down through time. 
Salas Aranda conflated the powerful forces of old, colonizing Spain with fascism, as did 
many other Cuban antifascists, and contrasted them with democracy, which he identified as his 
desired goal.  The Spanish Nationalists—the forces of the monarchy, military, landowners, and 
clergy in Spain—represented domestic fascism and allied themselves with foreign fascists.  
Hitler and Mussolini sought to seize Spain “in their eagerness to ‘fascistize’ the world,” wrote 
Salas Aranda, as they had, by April 1938, already become the “owners of the defenseless peoples 
of Austria and Ethiopia.”  Franco and his “henchmen,” the author argued, committed treason 
when they “took up the dangerous adventure of overthrowing the legitimate government of Spain, 
counting on the help of such powerful
 
friends.”  The price exacted by foreign fascists for this 
help would be paid in Spanish territory, he stated, and the lack of intervention by world 
democracies such as France and England made them in large part culpable for the transaction.  
Despite his frustration with these democracies, Salas Aranda expressed optimism nevertheless 
for democracy in general, writing that despite the danger of fascism, “we have hope that 
democracy will come out victorious in this titanic struggle,” in Spain and worldwide.  Even if the 
powerful democratic countries did not come to Spain’s aid, democracy was still at work.  In the 
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Republican army fought “men of all parts and of all races, without whose courageous and 
effective help the Republic would have had to succumb to the savage attack of Fascism” already, 
he wrote in April 1938.  This help would have to grow a hundredfold to defeat fascism in Spain, 
and then be sustained in all parts of the world, including the Americas, where people “suffered 
constantly the despotism and oppression of bloody and cruel tyrants” whose methods “bear close 
resemblance to those used by Hitler and Mussolini.”  The peoples of the Americas “must 
establish genuinely democratic governments, not fictitious ones as we have been experiencing 
thus far,” and in so doing follow the example of Mexico that defeated oppression and marched 
toward true democracy, he argued.  If not, their countries would become fascist.
99
  In his 
conflation of Spanish Nationalism with both old, colonizing Spain and with 1930s fascism, his 
condemnation of powerful world democracies, his embrace of “true” democracy as the antidote 
to fascism, and his admonishment of the Americas to beware the fascist threat posed by their 
own authoritarian rulers, Salas Aranda outlined a typical moderate Cuban antifascist argument.  
Aside from his explicit mention of men “of all races” in the ranks of antifascists in Spain—which 
was uncommon, though not unheard-of, among Cuban antifascists generally—there is nothing in 
the Adelante administrator’s statement of this argument that hints at a race-based antifascism.  
Whereas the cause of Ethiopia had elicited frequent direct references to race and African 
diasporic ideas among black Cubans, the Spanish conflict led some to more general arguments 
shared with other antifascists. 
In his writings on the Spanish conflict, Nicolás Guillén foregrounded the importance of 
his identity as a person of African descent in his antifascism.  Addressing the Second 
International Writers’ Congress in July 1937, he said: “I come as a black man.”  Similar to 
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Langston Hughes, who envisioned a special leadership role within antifascism for members of 
the African diaspora, Guillén foresaw the importance of black antifascists in achieving a brighter 
future in which men would be “without colors, without wars, without prejudices and without 
races.”  He told his audience at the conference: “I am here to remind you that the pariah status of 
the black is his strongest human engine, the force that projects him towards a broader, more 
universal and more just horizon, towards the horizon for which all honorable men of the world 
are fighting.”  Fascism attacked the people who suffered greatest exploitation, Guillén argued, 
because their “utility as slaves” necessitated the impediment of their elevation.  For this reason 
fascism had invented “a superior race, who should exploit, and other inferior ones who must live 
chained,” in Guillén’s interpretation.  In the latter category, the Cuban intellectual included 
himself and other people of African descent on the island.
100
   
No one made a better antifascist than the black man, and especially the black Cuban, 
Guillén argued, because he knows that fascism “is fueled by race hatred and the division of men 
into inferior and superior beings, and that he, the black, is assigned to the lower place.”
101
  Black 
Cuban antifascism should resist such division.  A month before the Writers’ Congress, Guillén 
had debated in the pages of Mediodía a Cuban sociologist who had argued for racial segregation 
in education on the island, and had compared such arguments to fascism.
102
  This type of division 
imposed by fascism would destroy Cuba, Guillén asserted in an argument to the Congress that 
echoed Cuban nationalist conceptions of a biracial cubanidad (Cuban identity).  Both black and 
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white Cubans, he stated, were “irrepressible component[s] in the Cuban historical process.”  To 
divide black and white would “submerge the country in a criminal chaos.”
103
 
Guillén linked black Cuban antifascism and the cause of the Spanish Republic 
specifically.  “I can tell you that there [in Cuba] the black lives the tragedy of Republican Spain 
because he knows that this moment we go through is only one episode in the struggle … between 
the democratic forces … and the conservative classes that already enslaved him once and that 
have to enslave always,” Guillén stated in his first speech to the Writers’ Congress.
104
  In his 
second, he asked about the black Cuban: “How is he not going to feel in the depths of his tragedy 
the tragedy of the Spanish people?  He feels it, and shares with the white of the people the same 
ardors of liberation and struggle that move all oppressed people of the world, with no race other 
than the human.”
105
  In this interpretation, people of African descent were antifascists and 
supporters of the Republican cause in Spain because they translated their experience with 
exploitation into an empathy with a similarly exploited Spanish people.  Guillén illustrated the 
exploitation of the Spanish people in his second speech to the Congress with a quotation from a 
ten-year-old boy he met in Madrid: “Here we are all poor; here there is no one who has a 
thousand pesetas; here we all work, and to win the fascists would have to kill us all.”   The 
Cuban author described the boy as half-naked and having lost his father and two siblings in the 
war.
106
  The fact that black Cuban antifascists were black was significant to their support for the 
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Spanish Republican cause, in this interpretation by Guillén, because this identity led to their 
exploitation which in turn facilitated cross-racial solidarity. 
 What about the significance of the fact that black Cuban antifascists supporting the 
Spanish Republic were Cuban—of their national identity as opposed to their ethnic, diasporic 
identity?  Interestingly, though not unexpectedly given the writer’s intellectual interests, Guillén 
connected the motivation driving black Cuban antifascism in the Spanish conflict specifically to 
Hispanic identity, as well as to African diasporic identity.  In his famous poem about the Spanish 
conflict, “España: Poema en cuatro angustias y una esperanza” (“Spain: Poem in Four Anguishes 
and One Hope”), Guillén expressed the way in which the black Cuban of multifaceted identity—
American, Spanish, and African—found himself drawn to the Spanish conflict.  Addressing 
Spain directly, the poem’s narrator—who has a “curly head” and a “brown body”—identifies 
himself: “I, son of America, son of you and of Africa, slave yesterday of white overseers, owners 
of angry whips; today slave of red Yankees, sugary and voracious.”  Amid a vivid imagining of 
the war, he says to Spain: “I, son of America, I run to you, I die for you.”
107
  Guillén told the 
audience of the Second International Writers’ Congress that “the Cuban black is also Spanish.”  
To support this provocative claim, he argued that the black Cuban “along with the infamous 
marks of the servant received and assimilated the elements of that culture.”  He had a “Spanish 
soul.”
108
  The type of tension exhibited in this argument between diasporic and nationalist 
identities is typical, as we have seen, of members of diasporas.  Guillén himself was of mixed 
African and Spanish ancestry, so for him the assertion of a multicultural identity was literally 
accurate.  That he extended the claim to all Cubans of African descent, however, defined his 
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conception as broader than mere genealogy.  We see elsewhere that the argument of Spanish 
“blood” was a powerful motivating force for white Cubans to get involved in the cause of the 
Spanish Republic; that Guillén extended this argument to black Cubans, therefore, is highly 
significant. 
 Also important was Guillén’s assertion that all Cubans, not just black Cubans, 
experienced oppression and therefore felt solidarity with the people of Spain.  He based his claim 
on both an understanding of struggle as cross-racial and transnational and a conception of the 
special historical relationship between Spain and Cuba specifically.  He argued that black 
Cubans faced exploitation on the island not only because of racial prejudice but also because all 
Cubans suffered for political reasons.  He believed that fascism existed on the island in the forms 
of oligarchic economic control, military dictatorship, circumscribed liberty, and a lack of 
democracy.  Guillén’s own loyalty to the Spanish Republican cause came from his identity not 
only as a black man but also as a Cuban, “because my country is also struggling against fascism, 
represented by a minority that enslaves and exploits, a minority that has the same quality as that 
which took up arms against the legitimate government of Spain.”  Cuba faced a situation in 
which “the will of one man dominates over the others,” he wrote, and it was “true that there is 
there a dictatorship of the military and fascist type, that stifles free expression of thought and that 
kills the weakest attempt at democratic restoration.”  Linking fascism in Cuba and Spain, Guillén 
expressed conviction about antifascist solidarity as not only universal among oppressed peoples 
but also based upon the specific historical relationship between the island and its former colonial 




of Republican, democratic Spain because they know that both have identical enemies, identical 
destinies and identical heroic solutions.”
109
 
Articles about black Cuban volunteers in Spain illustrate some of the concrete ways in 
which black authors discussed race in relation to Cuban antifascism.  Both Guillén and Hughes 
wrote articles about the black Cuban baseball player, former Harlem resident, and Spanish Civil 
War volunteer Basilio Cueria, captain of a machine gun company for the Republican army, 
whom we met during our discussion of combat volunteers.  Guillén’s piece appeared in 
Mediodía in December 1937 and Hughes’s piece was published in The Afro-American in 
February 1938.  Both authors addressed Cueria’s identity as a black Cuban, and their 
assessments of his black Cuban antifascism and participation in Spain are useful to our 
discussion here. 
After a highly favorable description of the military accomplishments of “the fine looking 
young captain who was immensely popular with the officers and the men under his command,” 
Hughes turned to the question of Cueria’s identity as a black Cuban, addressing his race, his 
nationality, and his interpretation of fascism.  “Since there are a large number of Cubans fighting 
in Spain on the government side, many of them colored Cubans,” Hughes wrote, “I asked Cueria 
how they were received, and whether any of them had ever been taken for Moors, or had 
encountered any color prejudice.”  Cueria’s response was laugher, the African-American writer 
reported.  He told Hughes that the Spaniards sometimes asked black Cubans if they were 
Moorish, “but never in an unfriendly way, since the Spaniards have no color feeling about the 
Moors.  (And there are Moors on the loyal side, as well as with Franco.)”  This optimistic 
assessment by Cueria represented his own experience; hostility based on ethnic difference—if 
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not specifically “color”—and contentious history did certainly exist in some cases between 
Spaniards and North Africans.  Hughes referenced the cultural connections between Spain and 
Cuba, noting that Spain was particularly hospitable to Cubans due to a shared language, and that 
Cubans of color seeking homes outside of the island had often chosen to live in Spain rather than 
the United States “where they might run into difficulties on the basis of complexion.”  Though, 
Hughes noted with perhaps a hint of pride, “Cueria himself assured me that he liked Harlem and 
would be coming back to America when the war is over.”  Finally, Hughes portrayed Cueria’s 
assessment of the fascism he was fighting in Spain in racial terms, quoting the black Cuban as 
saying: “We can’t let the Fascists put it over on us.  They’d put all the worst old prejudices back 
in to force and probably even introduce new ones, like Hitler and his Aryanism in Germany.”
110
   
Guillén’s article on Cueria included greater specificity about his identity, points likely 
meaningful to Cubans that would have been of little interest to African-American readers.  For 
example, Cueria was born in Marianao near Havana.  He was biracial; his father was from 
Asturias in Spain and his mother was black.  Seizing upon this identity, Guillén asserted that 
Cueria’s desire to fight fascism derived from his lineage on both sides: from Asturias “the fierce 
impetus, the hard resilience, the unbroken tenacity” and from Africa “the tempest of the spirit 
that crushed slavery and that finally explodes in search of a revolutionary way for its ascent.”  
Black and white skin mixed to form Cueria’s piel mestiza (mixed skin), which for Guillén was “a 
symbol of union before an enemy common to the workers of all races.”  In this way, Guillén’s 
vision of Cueria made him representative of both a nationalist Cuban identity—a biracial 
cubanidad—and an internationalist political identity as a worker.  Both “our people” and people 
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all over the world, Guillén told Cuban readers, suffered persecution, “economic anguish,” and 
“terrible inequality.”  Cueria, he asserted, “is a representative of this conflict” and “fortunately, 
the world is full of men like him.”  Asked by Guillén his reason for traveling to Spain to fight, 
Cueria cited his “condition as a man of the people” and the fact that the Spaniards were, too.  He 
did not express any sense that his racial identity played a specific role in the decision.  His Cuban 
identity, though, he did discuss with reference to his role as a volunteer in Spain.  He recounted a 
meeting with the famous Spanish General José Miaja in which the latter asked him about his 
origin, and then expressed satisfaction that Cubans “come voluntarily to Spain to fight for 
liberty.”  It was a moment of great emotion, Cueria noted.  Interestingly, whereas Hughes 
reported that Cueria told him he would be returning to the United States once the war concluded, 
Guillén claimed that he said he would be coming back to Cuba.
111
  This contradiction serves to 
further emphasize Cueria’s multiple identities. 
Between January and April 1938 Adelante, too, celebrated Cuban volunteers in Spain, 
some of them black.  A series of three articles focused on the 24
th
 Mixed Brigade of the 
Republican Army’s 96
th
 Battalion.  The January and February articles were by authors identified 
as members of the brigade—M. Sánchez and Rafael González—and were written “especially for 
Adelante.”  The authors are not well-known Cuban volunteers; the names could be pseudonyms.  
It is not known, therefore, whether or not the authors were of African descent.  Nor do the 
articles directly address race in a substantive way, although they do mention several black Cuban 
volunteers: Cueria, José G. Bridón (“our Commissar Bridón” in the González article), Tomás 
D az Collado, and the mysterious “Cuba Hermosa” alongside well-known white volunteers such 
as Pablo de la Torriente Brau and Rodolfo de Armas Soto in the Sánchez article.  More 
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significant is the inclusion in Adelante of volunteer reports from the Spanish war zone.  The two 
authors promoted the Spanish Republican effort against fascism, celebrated the Spanish people 
“who will not resign to being slaves,” predicted victory, lauded democracy, and called upon their 
“brothers of America and very especially those of Cuba” to stand strong alongside loyalist 
Spain.
112
  Powerfully articulated arguments written especially for Adelante by Cuban volunteers 
in Spain indicated the black Cuban publication’s full acceptance of and support for the pro-
Republican cause by early 1938. 
An Adelante author confirmed this acceptance and support in the third article, published 
in April 1938, stating that the publication, “lover of liberty and democracy,” had “since the first 
moment placed its sympathies on the side of the Spanish people’s Government.”  The piece 
celebrated José G. Bridón, Comandante (Commander or Major) in the Spanish Republican Army 
and “delegate” of the 24
th
 Mixed Brigade of the 96
th
 Battalion.  A black Cuban, Bridón was 
living in New York when the Spanish conflict began and was, according to the article, one of the 
first international combat volunteers integrated into the Spanish Republican Army “in which, for 
his intelligence, courage, and love demonstrated for the cause of Democracy, he has come to 
obtain the honorable insignia of Comandante.”  Staff at Adelante had an opportunity to meet 
Bridón, the article stated, because he was traveling to Cuba, the United States, and elsewhere on 
a special mission for the Republican Army.  Calling upon democratic and humanitarian 
sentiments, the periodical encouraged readers to follow this Cuban’s example.  In whatever way 
possible, the article concluded, Cubans should, like Bridón, give aid to the legitimate Spanish 
government, defeat fascism, and liberate themselves from “the barbarity of Franco, Hitler, and 
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Mussolini.”  A photograph (Figure 4.3) accompanying the laudatory article pictured Bridón in 
uniform, presenting the image of a dignified officer.
113
   This photograph is similar to those we 
saw in Chapter 2 of other Cuban volunteers in uniform, images that conveyed the legitimacy and 
respectability of the Republican armed forces to Cuban readers. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Comandante José G. Bridón, black Cuban volunteer in the Spanish Civil War 
 
Bridón does not appear to have been a well-known Cuban volunteer.  His name appears 
in a list of volunteers published in Cuba
114
 and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive includes a 
very brief profile that indicates he had no known political party affiliation and spent time in a 
French concentration camp at the end of the conflict.  This latter source suggests that his 
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occupation may have been as a sanitation worker.
115
  The man presented by Adelante, regardless 
of anonymity or class background, was accomplished, admirable, and worthy of praise and 
emulation.  His photograph, in the tradition of formal portraits of Cuban black society 
members,
116
 seems to have been intended to portray respectability, refinement, and civility 
indicative of a high level of “civilization.”
117
  The character of the staged image, along with the 
lack of any explicit discussion of race in Adelante’s three 1938 combat volunteer articles, 
suggests an intriguing possibility: In contrast with writers associated with the African diaspora, 
such as Hughes and Guillén, who saw race as central to a particular black antifascism, perhaps 
some writers for Adelante felt a degree of tension with regard to race.  Perhaps they saw the 
Spanish conflict as an opportunity to present black antifascists as equal to other antifascists by 
deemphasizing their race. 
 Ultimately, then, black Cuban antifascism was characterized by differing viewpoints on 
the role of ethnic or cultural identity and of political identity.  It sprang from the African 
diasporic, the Cuban nationalist, and the political left internationalist contexts in which it 
operated.  Each of these contexts had its own narrative of race, and differences created tension 
between and within black Cubans as they examined, responded to, and participated in the 
Ethiopian and Spanish Republican causes.  The antifascism they developed was rooted deeply in 
outrage born of Mussolini’s colonizing invasion of “the homeland” and symbol Ethiopia, with 
which they felt solidarity as people of African descent and as Cubans with historical memory of 
                                                     
115
 Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive, Profile for “Jose Bridon y Curbie de la Mercedes Gerardo,” 
http://www.alba-valb.org/volunteers/jose-bridon-y-curbie-de-la-mercedes-gerardo (Accessed 2 September 
2010).  This profile cites as the source of its information the “Complete List of Americans on File April 
13, 1937.”  It notes “José G. Bridón” as an alias for the longer name referenced. 
116
 See, for example, Pappademos, Black Political Activism, 76, 128, 135, 167, and 191. 
117




colonialism and slavery, and living under neocolonialist pressures.  With Ethiopia defeated, 
they—like others in the black diaspora and in transnational antifascism—turned their efforts to 
Spain, some seeing it as a proxy for the fight in Ethiopia.  While most identified the Spanish 
Republicans as a fellow oppressed people fighting for common human goals such as liberty and 
rights, the source of solidarity with Spaniards was different for different black Cubans.  Some 
black Cubans identified with Spanish Republicans as exploited people based on their racial 
identity and racialized experience; others as fellow workers; and still others as people of 






Intemperate Campaigns against Very Respectable Entities:  
Cuban Freemasons as Antifascists 
 
By 1936 when the Spanish Civil War began Cuban Freemasonry was an influential 
organization.  At the start of that year there were between 183 and 195 Masonic lodges and as 
many as 16,500 Masons in Cuba.
1
  Though the institution suffered a brief crisis during the years 
of political turmoil earlier in the decade, especially 1932–1933, it was rebounding by 1936.
2
  
Freemasonry had over 130 years of history on the island, and Cuban Masons had a long tradition 
of networking across national borders with their brothers in Europe and the Americas.  In the 
1930s Cuban Masons maintained transnational ties with their Spanish brethren as Cuban 
anarchists did with Spanish anarchists or Cuban Communist Party members did with the Party in 
Spain.  As conflict in “the motherland” began, Cuban Masons watched closely and debated their 
position relative to the fighting.  This chapter explores why, how, and to what extent Cuban 
Masons defined themselves as antifascists and supported the Spanish Republic.  
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 Of the pre-existing Cuban groups examined in this study that took an antifascist stance 
during the Spanish conflict, Freemasonry is the least familiar to most readers.  Cuban Masons’ 
engagement with the Spanish Civil War has not been studied.  Evidence of Masonic efforts in 
primary-source documentation of the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children has introduced us 
to their substantial involvement in the pro-Republican cause, but in the Cuban historiography 
dominated by Communist influence their participation has not received attention.  Additionally, 
much Masonic literature and source material sets the group apart; for example, Freemasonry-
specific works address the role of Spanish Masons in the Spanish Civil War,
3
 and many of the 
fraternity’s primary sources are held in libraries within Masonic lodges.
4
  Not organized around a 
particular political ideology or shared cultural identity, Freemasons nonetheless had powerful 
collective motivation to support the Spanish Republic.  As one eminent historian of modern 
Europe puts it, Francisco Franco claimed that Masons caused Spain’s problems “as Hitler 
blamed Jews for those of Germany.”
5
  Masonic antifascism had historical precedent, was 
grounded in diverse beliefs, and lacked consensus among Masons.  It was a complex stance that 
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was in some ways powerful and in others fragile, as we will see.   Fundamentally, however, 
Masonic antifascism was self-defense. 
An examination of Masonic pro-Republican arguments allows us to compare and contrast 
their position relative to those of the antifascist groups we study in other chapters—particularly 
anarchists and the Communist Party.
6
  We see that within the context of international antifascism, 
Freemasons, whose values as a group are generally considered moderate and liberal, shared 
many opinions with their radical counterparts.  The ominous specter of fascism paired with 
ardent calls for unity and a Popular Front brought together moderate liberals and leftist radicals 
in Cuba as they did in other countries, though certainly not without serious conflict.  Moderate 
Masons and radicals differed in significant ways—Cuban Freemasonry was, for example, 
officially anticommunist—and these differences posed challenges to unity.  Interestingly, the 
years of the Spanish Civil War also saw a great effort to unite all factions within Cuban 
Freemasonry, as well as a campaign to unite Cuban political parties on the left.  Cries of ‘Unity!’ 
resonated throughout much of Cuban society during the late 1930s, but the goal was not easily 
achieved.  Though Freemasons did successfully unite many of the island’s lodges in March 
1938,
7
 debate over Spain within Cuban Freemasonry illustrates considerable political 
disagreement among Cuban Masons.  Not all Masons were politically moderate; there were 
radical leftist Masons and Masons who supported the Spanish Nationalists as well as those who 
preferred neutrality or focused on domestic issues.   
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This chapter introduces histories of Cuban Freemasonry, Masonic transnationalism, and 
opposition to Freemasonry in Europe as a basis for Masonic antifascism.  It presents three broad 
Masonic arguments made in Cuba in favor of the Spanish Republic based in respect for 
democracy and sovereignty, in Masonic philosophical and religious values and principles, and in 
self-defense.  It explores political and ideological disagreement among Cuban Masons, 
particularly their anticommunism and other engagement with radical leftist philosophies.  It 
concludes by examining the charitable impulse of Cuban Masons for the pro-Republican cause, 
showing their achievements in terms of aid sent. 
 
 A Brief History of Cuban Freemasonry  
 There exists no evidence of significant Masonic activity in Cuba prior to the early 
nineteenth century, though the second half of the eighteenth century saw some overtures in the 
direction of its establishment.  During his years as English Masonic Grand Master beginning in 
1754 the Marquis of Carnarvon appointed nine provincial Grand Masters, one of whom he 
designated for Cuba.
8
  The introduction of Masonic principles to the island took place when the 
British conquered Havana in 1762 during the Seven Year’s War (1756–1763).  A regiment of 
soldiers stationed there included some Masons, and the Grand Lodge of Ireland sponsored the 
establishment of Lodge Number 218.
9
  A certificate produced there in May 1763 provides 
evidence of its activity.  A member of the Quatuor Coronati Lodge of London exhibited the 
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original document at a meeting in 1901, and fellow member Robert Freke Gould, an historian of 
Freemasonry, reproduced it with annotation in the lodge’s periodical Ars Quatuor Coronatorum. 
 
“We the Master wardens and Secretary of the Worship full Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons 
Dedicated to St. John No. 218 on the Registry of Ireland held in the Forty Eight Regiment of 
Foot” bestowed the Degree of Master upon a man named Alexander Cockburn “at our Lodge 
Room at the Havanna this 3
rd
 Day of May in the Year of our Lord 1763.”  Gould notes that none 
of the names that appear on the certificate—Cockburn and four others—are those of 
commissioned officers in the regiment, suggesting that they were either non-commissioned 
officers or ordinary soldiers.
10
  Many historians use this document as proof of Cuba’s first 
Masonic Lodge at the time of the British occupation.
11
  Scholars have debated the extent to 
which Masonic ideas and practices may have extended beyond the primarily military British 
communities on the island during the short period before evacuation of the British in July 1763, 
but it is clear that Freemasonry had yet to gain much influence at that time.
12
 
The next wave of Masonic influence came to Cuba with French-speakers fleeing 
neighboring Haiti in the wake of the Haitian Revolution, among them Masons who brought with 
them the charters for their lodges.  During the first few years of the nineteenth century these men 
settled in Oriente Province and their Masonic work laid a foundation for Cuban Freemasonry 
before tensions arising from the Peninsular War (1807–1814) caused many to flee Cuba for New 
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Orleans, bringing the lodge charters with them.
13
  Also during these first years of the new 
century U.S. Masons began to take an interest in Cuba, and U.S. lodges increased their influence 
and involvement as the French exited the island.  French and U.S. influence within Freemasonry 
interacted, too, during these years following the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and surrounding 
Louisiana statehood (1812).  In December 1804 the Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania sponsored the 
establishment of the first lodge chartered specifically and exclusively for Cuba.  Backed by U.S. 
Masons, the Havana lodge Le Temple des Vertus Theologales had Frenchman Joseph Cerneau as 
the first Master, and many of its early members were also of French origin.
14
  At this time the 
Grand Lodge in Philadelphia was an important center of Masonic activity in the Western 
Hemisphere, responsible for over one hundred lodges throughout Pennsylvania, and in Louisiana 
and Cuba.
15
  It chartered six more lodges on the island between 1815 and 1822.  Grand Lodges 
of South Carolina and Louisiana also established lodges in Cuba during the same period, the 
former two and the latter three.  These eleven U.S. chartered lodges were located in Havana (8), 
Santiago de Cuba (2), and Matanzas (1).
16
  Also during this time, French Freemasonry ceded 
authority over the fraternity in Cuba to Spanish Freemasonry.  One Masonic commentator 
hypothesized that Cuban Masons resisted obedience to this new authority due to “the desire of 
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our Cuban brethren to be free Masonically as well as politically” from Spanish colonialism.
17
  
Debate about Masonic sovereignty would indeed parallel and interact with contests for national 
sovereignty.  
From the beginning of U.S. Masonic involvement in Cuba, tension developed between its 
support for Cuban independence from Spain and undue U.S. meddling in Cuban affairs both 
Masonic and political.  As most Spanish colonies struggled for and gained independence early in 
the 1800s, activists organized in Masonic Lodges in the United States, where they traveled 
seeking recruits, money, and arms.
18
  Though Cuba remained a Spanish colony long after most of 
the rest of the empire, its neighbors’ independence movements impacted Cuban society 
profoundly.  Early nineteenth-century revolutionary ideology—influenced heavily by the French 
Revolution—was characterized by values of rationalism, liberalism, and anticlericalism, values 
shared broadly by Freemasonry.  Some Cuban lodges became centers for the practice of these 
principles, revolutionary ideology, and anticolonial nationalism.
19
 
Tension existed, however, with more conservative pro-Spanish forces.  When five Cuban 
lodges combined in November 1820 to form the Gran Logia Española de Antiguos y Aceptados 
Masones de York,
20
 for example, the lodge’s general regulations referred to “the Spanish nation 
in both hemispheres” and assured “absolute independence from other foreign Masonic 
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  Disagreement between pro-independence Masons and those loyal to Spain 
would persist throughout the century, as Cuban Freemasonry grew and subdivided.  The Spanish 
crown questioned the loyalty of Masons and feared their organization; the period of Masonic 
fluorescence in Cuba during the first three decades of the nineteenth century came to an abrupt 
end in 1828, when all Masonic meetings were prohibited by Spanish royal decree.  Members of 
some lodges held clandestine gatherings, but persecution was effective and Cuban Freemasonry 
entered a weak period during which the presence of lodges on the island disappeared almost 
entirely.  A royal amnesty decree in April 1834 had little impact in Cuba, where authorities 
continued to target Masons.  Widespread expansion of Cuban Freemasonry would take place 
only later, beginning in the late 1850s.  Separate Masonic bodies in Havana and Santiago 
struggled for control, and the 1860s and 1870s saw damaging infighting as factions formed 
separate lodges of the same names, each claiming authority as the Grand Lodge for Cuba.
22
  
Work to unite disparate Masonic bodies culminated in 1880 with the creation of the United 
Grand Lodge of Colon and the Island of Cuba, a new institution that gained jurisdiction over 71 
lodges across the island by September of 1881, and which received official recognition from 34 
foreign Masonic groups.
23
  Yet internal Masonic conflict continued. 
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Though Freemasonry did not constitute a coherent political party or have a unified 
political philosophy in Cuba, Masonic intellectuals played a vital role in the development of 
Cuban secular liberalism, civil society, and struggle for autonomy during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.  Shortly after the final war for Cuban Independence began, the captain 
general of the island suspended the activities of all Cuba’s Masonic lodges, though enforcement 
was spotty.  A typically celebratory account of the Masonic role in the conflict claims: “In the 
new period of war for independence begun February 24, 1895, distinguished Masons were the 
ones chosen to raise the banner of freedom, and also those who sustained the insurrectionary 
movement in its critical days.”  U.S. intervention in the struggle brought U.S. Masons to the 
island on the side of independence.  Many of the arriving U.S. military men who proclaimed 
support for Cuba’s freedom and sovereignty were Masons, including those at the highest levels.  
Cuban Masons extended fraternal gestures of cooperation, including welcoming U.S. Masons 
into their lodges and supporting the establishment of English-speaking lodges on the island.  U.S. 
Masons likewise worked to gain Cuban trust; following the U.S. naval blockade during the war, 
for example, the first ship to arrive in Cuba carried several thousands of dollars offered by the 
Grand Lodge of New York to the Gran Logia de Cuba for assistance to Masons during 
recovery.
24
  Yet U.S. Masons espoused racist views of their “Latin brethren” as having a 
particular “temperament and training . . . in the school of a strong, centralized State and Church, 
with authority over all their acts and thoughts,” not conducive to democracy.  Due to these 
defects, one U.S. Mason asserted in 1934, they “naturally endeavored to impress upon 
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Freemasonry the same autocratic practices.”
25
  U.S. Masonic historian Ray V. Denslow captures 
in his 1953 assessment of Cuban independence and its effects on Freemasonry the contradictions 
endured and challenged by Cuban Masons with regard to their U.S. brothers: 
The Spanish-American War did much to bring about new life in the affairs of the 
fraternity in Cuba.  In the first place, it freed our Cuban brethren so that they might carry 
on publicly and without interference the work of their Grand Lodge; again, it brought 
Cuban affairs directly under the surveillance of the Grand Lodges of the United States.  
An influx of American citizens and members of the military establishment was an 
additional encouragement to the Cuban brethren; many of those high in authority in the 




Revitalization for Cuban Freemasonry and strengthened bonds with brethren across national 
borders were positive outcomes for the fraternal order, but Denslow’s unwitting claim that 
Cuban Masons gained freedom from interference by coming “directly under the surveillance” of 
U.S. Grand Lodges illustrates their difficult position at the turn of the century.  Cuba’s new 
constitution (1901) did codify many political values strongly defended by Masons—including 
division of government powers, freedom of the press, separation of church and state, and free 
and secular public education—but also included the Platt Amendment, authorizing extraordinary 
U.S. control over Cuba’s government and internal affairs.
27
 
 Cuban historian of Freemasonry Eduardo Torres Cuevas argues that Masons enjoyed 
their greatest social and cultural influence in Cuba during the Republican era from 1902 to 1933.  
The period illustrates the complexity of Masonic political involvement in Cuba.  Internal 
contradictions and ideological and political tensions in the institution of Cuban Freemasonry 
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continued during this era.  For example, Torres Cuevas hints at a commonly expressed pride 
when he notes that the independence movement’s “three principal figures”—José Martí, Máximo 
Gómez, and Antonio Maceo—were all Masons, but he is quick to add that they took political 
positions distant from those held by the leaders of Cuba’s Grand Lodge at the time.  At the other 
end of the period, he notes that the “greatest error by Masonic leadership during Republican 
history” was the highly publicized act of conferring the 33
rd
 Degree, Freemasonry’s highest 
honor, to “the despot” Gerardo Machado.
28
  How were Masons to defend their values of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity while at the same time valuing ideological and political diversity amongst 
their ranks?  The Spanish Civil War would present Cuban Masons with this challenge. 
 
 Spanish Anti-Freemasonry and Masonic Antifascism 
The Spaniards who sought to topple the Republic despised Masons.  Nationalists engaged 
in an active anti-Masonic campaign during the war, building upon centuries of persecution and 
repression of Freemasonry by clerical and political forces throughout Europe.  Masonic values 
often challenged the legitimacy of secular rulers Masons deemed tyrannical, scaring first 
monarchs and later authoritarian governments, while virulent anticlericalism within Freemasonry 
drew the wrath of the Catholic Church.  Both Catholic and Protestant states prohibited Masonic 
activity during the eighteenth century, based on fear of revolutionary plots against rulers, and 
Pope Clement XII issued the first papal encyclical against Freemasonry, In Eminenti, in April 
1738.
29
  Gaining traction from popular beliefs about the French Revolution beginning in the 
1790s, anti-Masonic discourse and action persisted in Spain throughout the nineteenth century, 
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intertwining with anti-Semitism and anti-British sentiment.  Arguing against Spain’s nascent 
liberal movement and its values of freedom, equality, and the rights of man, conservatives in 
favor of monarchal and church rule effectively used fabulous stories depicting Freemasonry as a 
legion of evil and sacrilegious men, enemies of God, plotting to destroy the world.  Freedom of 
association in Spain during the brief period of the ‘Sexenio’ (1868–1874) allowed Masonic 
institutions to form and function openly, but anti-Masonic opinion persisted.  Pope Leo XIII 
asserted in Humanum Genus (April 1884) that Freemasonry “revived the contumacious spirit of 
the demon.”
30
  In the early twentieth century, authoritarian governments both left and right used 
anti-Masonic arguments.  Soviet officials banned Freemasonry—invoking anti-Semitic fear and 
anti-bourgeois sentiment as justification—beginning in 1917.  In Italy and Germany officials 
conflated Masons, Communists, and Jewish people to produce for the purposes of argument and 
propaganda a single enemy.
31
 
Like their anti-Masonic forbearers and authoritarian contemporaries, Spanish Nationalists 
had both political and religious reasons to fear Freemasonry.  Liberalism and anticlericalism 
were abhorrent to them, and threatened to destroy the ideal of a traditionalist, Catholic Church–
guided Spain in which they ardently believed.  From the conservative Catholic perspective, the 
dangerous faults of Freemasonry included secrecy, paganism, blasphemy, and revolutionary 
tendencies.  One Spanish author of this viewpoint in 1937 speculated about the identity of 
Freemasonry’s leadership with evident bias: “A man?  A people?  A devil?  The Jews?  The 
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Protestants?  The anarchists?”
32
  Whatever secrets Freemasonry hid, Spanish conservatives were 
certain it was comprised of their religious and political enemies.   
The voices of Spanish Freemasonry, too, asserted enmity strongly against their opponents.  
The Spain in which Masons believed was the Second Republic, and upon its triumph the Madrid 
periodical Vida Masónica (Masonic Life) published a jubilant editorial proclaiming that 
Freemasonry “warmly welcomes and congratulates the interim government of the Spanish 
Republic, and hopes fervently that the Great Architect of the Universe will shine for the good of 
Freedom and the Homeland.”
33
  Fascism and Nazism, they stated, brought about a “formidable 
reversal in the beautiful path of universal solidarity,” destroying liberty, halting human progress, 
and representing oppression, barbarism, and race hatred.  To combat these forces, they 
endeavored to “continue our work of creating a society in which reign tolerance, moral dignity, 
contempt for the prejudices born of ignorance, devotion, and selflessness for the good of all.”
34
  
Long-established oppositional polemics increased in fervor during the 1930s.  The period saw 
pro- and anti-Masonic arguments crescendo as conservatives faced off against the Republican 




Pro-Nationalists brought this conservative view to Cuba.  A series of three anonymous 
pro-Nationalist essays published on the island in 1937, for example, denounced the “gold of the 
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French Jews and the Russian Bolsheviks” that had bought the loyalty of some Spaniards who 
were trying to sell Spain to “perverse and bloody communists.”
36
  Spain was theirs, the essays 
reminded Spain’s “children in America,” for it had poured its blood and culture into the New 
World.
37
  They want us to give this country, our country, to Russia, the author warned.  They 




 Cuban Masonic Antifascism 
 Cuban Masons would not act as passive bystanders to the conflict in Spain.  Just weeks 
after the start of fighting, the director of one of Havana’s leading Masonic periodicals, Mundo 
Masónico (Masonic World),
39
 Cesáreo González Naredo urged readers to inform themselves 
about “the unequal struggle that is developing in the motherland” between those in favor of 
freedom and those against it.  He called upon Cuba’s lodges to “awaken from their slumber and 
channel public and Masonic opinion to follow the paths of justice, freedom, and democracy that 
are in imminent danger of being lost for many years” to “despots, dictators, and exploiters.”  The 
elected Republican government of Spain was just and legal, he argued; the “rebels” could have 
waited for an electorally sanctioned opportunity to gain influence and change policies, but 
instead chose treason, illegality, oppression, fanaticism, and dictatorship.  Not only did Masonic 
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values dictate a need to defend freedom and democracy in Spain but also a triumph of fascism 
would threaten the institution of Freemasonry itself.  Look, the author directed, to other 
examples for an idea of what “this criminal fascist movement” in Spain would do to Masons.  
Upon the triumph of fascism in Italy, lodges were burned and Masons persecuted, exiled, and 
murdered.  Germany and Portugal provided further examples of what would happen to Spanish 
Masons at the victory of enemies bent upon destroying them.  And Russia, suffering under a 
“fascist-proletarian dictatorship,” he wrote, demonstrated that Freemasonry “drowns” without 
freedom.  It was not his intention, he insisted, showing some degree of dissent among the ranks, 
to disturb or offend any brother; but Cuban Freemasonry had to remain true to its principles of 
equality, liberty, and fraternity, to protect its liberal credo, its democratic doctrines, its reputation, 
and its very existence.  In keeping with Masonic ideals, he encouraged readers to open lodges to 
rational debate, free from politicking and personal attacks.  By considering both sides of the 
conflict and any “profits or losses that may result from the triumph of one or the other,” he 
asserted with confidence, Cuban Masons would come “to understand the danger to our institution 
if fascism triumphs in Spain,” and take action to defend Spain’s liberty with all their moral and 
material force.  “Masons,” Mundo Masónico’s director concluded, “you know your duty.”
40
 
Antifascist Cuban Masons would return repeatedly to the themes outlined in González 
Naredo’s editorial as they mounted their defense of the Spanish Republic.  The Mundo Masónico 
director had invoked a Masonic tradition of political involvement and proclaimed its necessity in 
the present, while balancing his assertions with a stated commitment to rational and respectful 
debate and plurality of opinions; he had affirmed Masonic politics as pro-democratic and anti-
dictatorship, anticommunist as well as antifascist; and he had presented three components of 
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Masons’ pro-Republican stance: the political, philosophical, and self-defense arguments.  Here 
we examine these three arguments, consider Masonic anticommunism, and explore dissent 
among Cuban Masons regarding support for the Spanish Republic.  Our goal is to gain an 
understanding of the character and extent of Cuban Masonic antifascism from 1936 to 1939. 
 The Masonic political argument for the Spanish Republic—asserted by Spanish Masons 
and picked up on the island—resonated with two domestic political goals of vital importance to 
many Cubans: democracy and sovereignty.  The people of Spain had elected their government 
democratically, Masons emphasized, and therefore the Spanish Republic was not only desirable 
but also legitimate and legal.  A message from the Supremo Consejo Grado 33 de España 
(Supreme Council Grade 33 of Spain) to its Cuban counterpart in October 1936 stated succinctly: 
“The Spanish government is a legally constituted government, formed by the Popular Front 
parties that triumphed in the general elections of last 16 February.  It is therefore a government 
of maximum legitimacy.”  Attempting to present the Republic as respectable to all Masons, and 
to counter claims of leftwing radicalism, the Supreme Council of Spain continued: “The truth is 
that the regime is a democratic republic with great aims of social progress.”
41
  It was a Masonic 
principle, wrote leaders of Cuba’s Grand Lodge in a “Declaration of Principles about 
International Politics” in September 1937, that governmental transfer of power should occur 
without violence and follow democratic norms.
42
  “Our truth is this,” wrote Mundo Masónico’s 
director: Freemasonry respects legally constituted governments of countries in which it exists.  
The majority of Masons, he argued, “understand perfectly the reason Freemasonry should be on 
                                                     
41
 Supremo Consejo Grado 33 de España, “Al Supremo Consejo Grado 33 para Cuba, Madrid, 12 de 
Octubre de 1936,” Mundo Masónico 5, no. 54 y 55 (October/November 1936): 22. 
42
 Luis Mart nez Reyes and Gonzalo Garc a Pedroso, “Declaración de principios sobre pol tica 




the side of the legitimately constituted government of the Spanish Republic.”
43
  That the Spanish 
Republic was legitimate, declared an anonymous editorial, was sufficient reason for no Mason to 
oppose it.
44
   
The government’s legitimacy made the revolt against it “a bloody treason”
45
 and the 
leader of that rebellion, Franco, a traitor.
46
  Furthermore, the rebellion invited foreigners into 
Spain who threatened the country’s sovereignty.  Like other supporters of the Republic, Cuban 
Masons decried the involvement in Spain of foreign military forces—“Moors and foreigners”
47
 
or “the Moorish, Italian, and German hordes”
48
—who fought with the Nationalists against the 
Republican forces.  The term ‘Nationalist’ to describe Franco and his supporters was absurd, 
they asserted along with other critics, because so-called Nationalist forces were in fact made up 
of regiments and divisions of the regular German and Italian armies.
49
  Indeed, the ideology of 
fascism itself was a foreign import, argued a prominent Mason in Spain in a speech published in 
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Cuba in March 1937.
50
  Cuban Antonio Penichet combined arguments regarding fascism as a 
foreign ideology and the Nationalists as foreign forces in January 1938 with an article in Mundo 
Masónico claiming “fascism has nothing in common with Spain, much less with the Spanish 
people.”  It had invited North Africans, Italians, Germans, and Portuguese into Spain, and paid 
them “to manage the apparatus of death.”  This “human debris,” Penichet wrote, shared nothing 
spiritually with Spaniards.
51
  Going one step further, Masons asserted that the foreign fascist 
forces supporting the Nationalists were in fact colonial or imperialist agents; and in a fashion 
typical of Cuban sovereignty arguments, Masonic authors equated colonial intervention with 
slavery.  The “odious foreign invaders” sought to extract minerals and other resources from 
Spain for their imperialist wars, and to enslave the Spanish people.
52
  The Spanish people rose up 
against those who would enslave them.
53
  The foreigners considered their mission “a business of 
the colonial type,” and the Spanish people, fighting for their independence, would “die before 
they would become slaves of foreigners.”
54
  Fascism represented “narrow nationalisms,” “stupid 
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racisms,” and “imperialist greed.”
55
  In one particularly colorful iteration imperialism hovered 
“like a ghost over the white head of the noble Spanish matron.”
56
 
It is important to note here that although the pages of Mundo Masónico declared 
elsewhere that “the idea of superior and inferior races is a myth,”
57
 arguments against foreign 
interference in Spain’s internal affairs in the magazine crossed over into the realm of blatant and 
virulent racism.  Tension around North African mercenaries fighting for Franco in the Spanish 
Civil War—referencing centuries-old history of conflict between Islam and Christianity in the 
Iberian Peninsula—was often perceptible beneath pro-Republican rhetoric’s surface.  Most 
Cuban commentators on the left, however, carefully avoided ethnicity-based insults and seemed 
intentionally to use equal terms of disregard for all fascists, regardless of national or ethnic 
origin.  At most, they would point out the hypocrisy of Franco using Muslim soldiers while 
claiming to fight for traditional Christianity in Spain; a typical expression of this argument 
appeared in Mundo Masónico attributed to an anonymous contributor from Santa Clara: “Why 
do they say that the rebellion in the Iberian Peninsula is among other things to return Catholicism 
to Spain if the action is realized primarily by non-Catholics, Moorish soldiers?”
58
  Prejudice 
boiled over publicly, though, elsewhere in Mundo Masónico.  An article by the magazine’s 
director González Naredo in September 1936 used the term “savages of Africa.”
59
  In a February 
1937 editorial González Naredo took his vitriol a step further: “While the Spanish people suffer 
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and bleed the savage hordes of Africa—these are indeed wild hordes!—sate their carnivorous 
appetites and vengeance contained for centuries.”
60
  It is possible that González Naredo harbored 
an unusually strong personal racial animus, but other Masons used such problematic language 
also.  An article by a prominent Spanish Mason published in Mundo Masónico in April 1937 
used derogatory words for all fascists, but saved the same particularly racially problematic term 
for North African participants in the Spanish conflict: “Spain is today the theater of the most 
cruel and bloody civil war, begun by a band of military despots and reactionaries in collaboration 
with all the obstinate plutocracy and with the most savage hordes of the Rif and of the Tercio de 
Extranjeros.”
61
  Although expressions of racism are not surprising in the context of the era in 
which Cuban Masons published Mundo Masónico, it is important to make note of ignorant and 
hateful language used against ethnic others when considering Masonic proclamations of their 
values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, to which we will turn shortly. 
 One other significant consideration in the Cuban Masonic defense of the Spanish 
Republic as a legitimate and legal democracy was a critique of the position of other world 
democracies relative to Spain.  Making a case for the Republic as a democracy caused 
antifascists to confront non-intervention by the European democracies and the United States.  
Although they praised these nations for hospitality toward Freemasonry, Masons came to the 
same conclusion as others, that the Non-Intervention Agreement was a cowardly betrayal of 
democratic values that aided fascism.  “The absurd policy of panic followed by the European 
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‘democracies’ frightened by the madness of those two lunatic drivers of Italy and Germany” 
marched the world toward the abyss, wrote Mundo Masónico’s correspondent in Spain who went 
by the pseudonym “Bol var.”
62
  France, England, the United States, and all other democracies 
had become pale, silent, and trembling, in the descriptive language of another Masonic author.
63
  
They treated the legal government and the traitors equally, which many observers condemned, 
including Masons.
64
  And in fact, the democracies were being duped by the fascist states, they 
argued, because fascists were indeed breaking their commitment and intervening in Spain.  
Without foreign fascist aid, “Bol var” asserted in August 1936, it was “absolutely 
unquestionable” that Franco’s forces would already have lost.
65
  Parts of the country were 
occupied by Italians and Germans, he wrote in February 1937.  Spain was being colonized by 
foreigners, and would serve as testing ground for Hitler and Mussolini to plan future attacks.
66
  
As one European Mason asserted presciently in a speech printed in Cuba in March 1937, the 
Spanish conflict was transforming into world war.
67
  Tacit accommodation of fascist leaders’ 
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involvement in Spain by the democracies, Masons warned, jeopardized democracy and 
sovereignty in Spain and across the globe.
68
   
Like other antifascists, Cuban Masons saw the hand of fascism reaching across Europe, 
from Portugal to Turkey, and beyond, to Ethiopia, China, and even the Western Hemisphere.  In 
January 1938 Cuban Masons reacted in horror to news from South America that, following the 
1937  ou  d’é a  of Getúlio Vargas in which he abrogated constitutional government, all 
Masonic lodges in the country had been closed, and their archives ransacked, by Vargas’s 
“strong” government.  The Masonic press reported that “that which was the great Republic of 
Brazil today converted into a totalitarian fascist state.”  They took liberty with their definition of 
fascism in this instance, but remained consistent in opposition to anti-Masonic strongman rule.  
They saw Vargas’s actions as dictatorial, and therefore placed him among “our secular 
enemies.”
69
  His coup in 1937 convinced Cuban Masons that fascism had arrived in the 
Americas.  By supporting the Spanish Republic as politically legitimate and desirable, they 
hoped to help protect democracy and sovereignty worldwide. 
The Masonic philosophical argument for the Spanish Republic had two parts, religious 
and secular.  The religious argument followed the Masonic tradition of anticlericalism, asserting 
that the Spanish Catholic Church aided Franco in committing the sins of fascism against the 
country and its people, and that true Christians, including Masons, must support the Republic.  
The secular argument stated that the Spanish Republic represented and practiced Masonic values 
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and principles; that fascism contradicted all such values and principles; and therefore that 
Masons must support the Republic.   
As a group, Masons were anticlerical but not atheistic, setting them apart from some of 
their fellow antifascists on the left.  Cuban Masons professed their faith in God and Jesus Christ, 
but condemned the Vatican, the Catholic Church of Spain, the clergy, and “religious 
fanaticism.”
70
  One Mason from Ciego de Avila expressed this opinion stridently, stating: “the 
Pope of Rome himself is no more Catholic than I.”  To be Catholic was to believe in a supreme 
being, he wrote, not in priests.
71
  The forces of clericalism, Masons from both Spain and Cuba 
argued, were behind fascism; authoritarian states were their “traitorous and unfortunate work in 
the world.”
 72
  The Church had been omnipotent in Spain, controlling not only Catholicism but 
also government and society, they claimed, and the Spanish people lived subservient to the 
clergy before the Republic.  “The proclamation of the Republic was a happy awakening” and the 
Republican government “strove to instruct the people and free them of the clerical yoke.”
73
  
Fascists sought to reverse these positive changes, Masons argued, favoring traditional Church 
rule over true Christianity for their own gain.  An increasingly wide divergence could be found, 
they lamented, within Roman Catholicism “between the best known and most tender preaching 
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Fascists sought government power, and Masons asserted that the Church of Spain, in 
conflict with principles of true Christianity, favored fascist power over legitimate government.  
Quoting a prominent Spanish Catholic and echoing the government-legitimacy argument 
previously discussed, an author from Santa Clara asserted that Christians should not tolerate 
God’s name being used to attack a legitimately constituted State.
75
  Under the heading “Not Only 
Masons,” editors of Mundo Masónico published a piece by leading Spanish religious figures they 
called the “Good Catholics” condemning fascism similarly.  As Catholic priests, the men began, 
we decided in these grave times to speak out to our brothers in the faith.  Quoting statements by 
church officials including papal bulls, they argued that rebellion against legitimate government 
authority violated Catholic principle.  “No political party,” they wrote, “identifies itself with 
Catholicism, and fascism in its most fundamental aspects is in conflict with it.”
76
 
Furthermore, Masons found fascists to be spiritually suspect.  They were “men without 
souls,” argued one Mason from Morón.  They uprooted the seed of brotherly love planted by 
Jesus, he wrote, and replaced it with a seed of hatred and rancor against those who held different 
opinions or beliefs.  If the hell these priests tell us so much about exists, he concluded, it will be 
too small for all these men without souls.
77
  In contrast to these portrayals of evil fascists, 
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Masons pictured themselves as martyrs in a role parallel to that of ancient Christian martyrs.  In 
an “Anecdote from the Spanish Civil War,” an anonymous author described the martyrdom of a 
Masonic brother named Victor Abeal, who had been an engineer in Ferrol, Galicia.  Brother 
Abeal, the author wrote, like many other Masons in his region, was arrested to be executed.  His 
captors offered liberty in exchange for a renunciation of Masonic values and a “conversion” to 
Christianity.  These events have nothing to do with Jesus Christ or his doctrines, the author stated.  
The Mason in question refused the proposed “conversion,” and was assassinated by the bullets of 
“the eternal inquisitors of Spain.”  This is how our brothers are dying, the author wrote to fellow 
Masons, “for the cause of liberty, of honor, and of justice.”
78
  We will return to the murder of 
Masons in Spain shortly, when we discuss the Masonic pro-Republican argument of self-defense. 
 One particularly literary parable published by the Cuban Masonic press shortly after the 
period of intense fighting in Teruel deserves note for its provocative mixture of religious and 
political values, and for its apparent leftist stance.  In May 1938 Mundo Masónico published a 
short story entitled “God is Justice” by Father Hugo Moreno, a Spanish Republican priest from 
Andalusia who used the pseudonym “Juan Garcia Morales, Presbyterian.”
79
  The story imagines 
that falling bombs have awakened the thirteenth-century Lovers of Teruel, Don Diego Martínez 
de Marcilla and Doña Isabel de Segura.  Confused and terrified, Don Diego asks, “Will the final 
judgment take place in Teruel or in the valley of Jehoshaphat?”  Judgment will take place here, 
states the unidentified narrator, because that which the psalm predicts is fulfilled: “The poor have 
occupied today the chairs the rich; the poor have driven from Spain those who, proud, had them 
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under their yoke.  Today the poor lead in Loyalist [Republican] Spain.”  The kings, emperors, 
nobles, rich men, and rentiers once had power in Spain, you among them, he tells Don Diego.  
“You remedied all with charity and abandoned the enormous problem of justice, and the finger 
of Providence has condemned you.  You have filled your mouths, as the prophet says, speaking 
God’s name and not carrying God in your heart.”  Don Diego asks, “Are you the angel who 
comes to judge, are you, by chance, Jesus Christ?  Who are you?”—and here the parable takes an 
unexpected turn.  “I am a red,” the narrator states.  “I have not founded hospitals or asylums like 
you to pick up the homeless and under this pretext gain the kingdom of heaven; I believed that 
the poor should have for their work all the amenities enjoyed by the rich.”  The bombs that 
awoke you, he tells the centuries-dead nobleman, are the bombs of our brothers the poor, who 
are directed by Jesus of Nazareth, God of the laborer and the destitute.  “Don Diego, haughty, 
proud, undaunted, is adamant” in response.  “He does not understand Democracies or poverty.  
He does not understand how the poor can dominate the rich.”  He feels love, but fails to 
understand justice.  And so he and his lover return to the eternal sleep of death, not having 
comprehended the truth—that Labor will triumph over Capital because Labor is on the side of 
reason and justice.  The nobles awoken from death loved God only with their lips, the parable 
concludes, and did not understand that God is justice.
80
  In this remarkable story, a religious 
leader author equates Christian and leftist values in a defense of the Republic.  In the Cuban 
Masonic press, the parable also suggests a reading specific to Freemasonry emphasizing the 
fraternity’s secular principles. 
 The secular part of Masons’ philosophical argument in defense of the Republic equated 
Masonic values with those of Republicans.  In addition to the principles of democracy and 
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sovereignty already discussed, Masons valued above all liberty, equality, and fraternity.  Among 
the central motives for Masons to support the Spanish Republic was the elected government’s 
commitment to these principles which it “so far has proved to keep faithfully” and, they believed, 
would implement at the end of the conflict if it triumphed.  Freemasonry aligned itself with 
“those who defend the rights of man and the liberties of the people in the motherland,” wrote 
González Naredo.
81
  Accordingly, Masons argued, they supported the “persons of liberal 
character” who made up the Republican government, individuals of esteemed and respectable 
“republican-liberal-socialist lineage.”
82
  Masons also valued reason, and argued that the Republic 
had come to power by force of reason.  Republicans displaced Nationalists from power by force 
of reason, they stated, and now Nationalists sought to regain their position through the reason of 
force.  “Fascism does not believe in anything,” asserted Penichet, “but its own force.”
83
 
One way in which Masons—and others—portrayed the fight with fascism was as a 
struggle of civilization against savagery.  Spanish Masons, for example, portrayed Franco’s 
rebellion as “the most abominable crime against civilization” and the Republicans’ fight as one 
of “civilization against barbarity.”
84
  In using this argument, Masons suggested that civilization 
itself was literally, physically in danger because fascism would lead to another world war, and its 
military tactics—bombing cities and killing people with poison gasses—would cause civilization 
to “disappear.”
85
  Furthermore, Masons equated their values with civilization: “On our side are 
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reason, justice, and rights, while the insurrection represents despotism, injustice, and 
barbarity.”
86
  Civilization “ought to consist of the functioning of social institutions that serve the 
greatest good for the largest number of individuals,” they argued, such as freedom, housing and 
clothing, insurance for illness and old age, improved and more accessible public schools, 
prolongation of life and maximization of happiness, “not only for the privileged but also for 
those who have lived until now at the margins.”
87
 
 It is evident that Freemasons shared some ground with leftists.  They presented ideas 
about the equality of men, a positive role for socialism or social democracy, and a conception of 
justice for the poor and the masses.  Some imagined the triumph of the poor over the rich, 
brotherly love as an end to prejudice, and even Christian values shared by “a red.”  Within 
Masonic antifascism, there were individuals who held beliefs corresponding with wide range of 
ideologies.  In a discussion of core Masonic principles as expressed within Cuban antifascism, 
however, it is important to note the official articulation of anticommunism.  Even where their 
values overlapped with leftist ideologies—or where anticommunism was moderate—many 
Masons made a distinction between Spanish Republicanism and leftist radicalism.  Leaders of 
the Supreme Council Grade 33 of Spain asserted: “It is a fallacy to call the legal government and 
the loyal army of the people the RED government and the RED army.”  The rebels, they argued, 
used these misleading names “to justify their treason and their evildoing.”
88
  “They are wrong, 
those who say that the present war in Spain is the work of Communism or of Anarchism,” wrote 
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  Communist involvement, reported Mundo Masónico’s correspondent in 
Spain, consisted of only two ministers who demonstrated “with their collaboration that their 
party is absolutely loyal to the democratic Republic which they support sincerely with all their 
enthusiasm.”
90
  Masonic anticommunism was not consistently expressed, and optimistic 
statements such as these were outweighed by less favorable assessments.  Many Masons, even 
some who felt favorably toward socialism,
91
 condemned the Communist Party and Moscow 
nearly as fervently (though not, it seems, as frequently) as they condemned the ideologies of 
Rome and Berlin.  In a work read on the radio, González Naredo described how all dictatorships 
were anti-Masonic, including Russia: “Freemasonry does not exist in Russia because in Russia 
there is no liberty.”
92
  Another Cuban Masonic author wrote that leftists would substitute the 
“despotism of a Lenin” for the “democracy of a Simón Bol var,” while those on the right would 
exchange the “ideology of José Mart ” with that of Hitler.  “We are Americans,” he stated.  
“These exotic ideas are daughters of Old World despotism, and must be rejected outright.”
93
  The 
Mason could be neither state communist nor fascist, wrote another, because both tendencies were 
dictatorship.  “One brings dictatorship from above, and the other, dictatorship from below; 
Freemasonry repudiates all dictatorships.”  Freemasonry is not rightwing or leftwing, he stated, 
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but persecuted by all autocracies.
94
  In “Germany, Italy, Portugal, Rumania, Brazil, Russia, and 




 Most Masons were anticommunist because Communist states persecuted Masons, just as 
most were antifascist, citing anti-Masonic repression in fascist states.  Though Masons used 
ardent pro-Republican arguments based on ideological and philosophical principles forcefully 
and often, their most salient antifascist claim was self-defense.  The argument was simple and 
frequently repeated.  Fascists defamed and banned Freemasonry, desecrated and closed Masonic 
Lodges, confiscated Masonic property, and assassinated Masons; Cuban Masons received 
accounts of these indignities and atrocities sent by their brethren in Spain.
96
  Fascists and their 
dictatorial sympathizers committed these terrible acts, they claimed, in every nation in which 
they came to power.  Franco said and did all the same anti-Masonic things as his contemporaries 
in these other places.  If Franco and his allies triumphed against the Republic in Spain, the 
argument went, Spanish Freemasonry would perish and anti-Masonic forces would count another 
local victory in their global quest to destroy the fraternal order worldwide.  “Where fascism 
prevails,” summarized one Cuban Mason, “Freemasonry cannot survive.”
97
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 With the self-defense argument, antifascist Masons sought the last word within the order.  
Antifascist consensus did not exist within Cuban Freemasonry, and when erudite pleas couched 
in political and philosophical values failed to convince their brethren, Masons supportive of the 
Spanish Republic resorted to emphasizing existential threat.  Some had trouble distilling the 
message, elaborating on the self-defense argument by connecting it to loftier arguments already 
considered.  “Great exploiters of humanity,” wrote one, have always fought against Freemasonry 
because it is synonymous with “liberty, democracy, justice and reason.”
98
  The Supreme Council 
of Cuba unanimously approved a motion in November 1936 condemning—“in the name of 
reason, liberty, and justice”—persecution of Spanish Freemasonry by Nationalists.  Forces in 
favor of “exclusive and despotic systems,” Supreme Council members asserted, tried to destroy 
Freemasonry because it was “a formidable bulwark.”
99
  A particularly concise summary of the 
Cuban Masonic antifascist position, however, reveals the greater effectiveness of the 
unadulterated self-defense argument relative to those concerning values.  It included four points.  
The first point corresponded to our first argument: government legitimacy.  The second and third 
points concerned Masonic principles and values—liberty, equality, and fraternity—and the men 
of “liberal character” who ran the Republican government, both components of our second 
argument, though leaving out religion.  The last point began, “Fourth and foremost is that on the 
part of the government, Freemasonry has suffered no persecution.”  On the contrary, Republicans 
loved and respected Freemasonry, “because, among other things, almost all of these great men 
identified are Masons.”  Having asserted the correspondence between Masonic and Republican 
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values, antifascist Masons went further in the self-defense argument: Not only were Republican 
principles Masonic principles, Republican principals were Masons.  Not only Republican and 
Masonic values but also the institutions themselves would be lost for many years, the summary 
concluded, if “secular enemies of the Order” triumphed.”
100
   
In this way, antifascists sought to convince their fellow Masons in Cuba of the relevance 
of the contest across the ocean in Spain as well as of the international struggle against fascism.  
Indeed the fight was taking place on the island itself.  “Is fascism acting in Cuba?” asked 
Antonio Penichet.  Yes, he argued, Mussolini had his sights set on the Americas, and, like he had 
done in Ethiopia and in Spain, was sending agents to Latin America with “the mission of 
advising governments that are influenced by his theories.”
101
  The dispatch of Italian and German 
agents to Latin America by their regimes did in fact take place.
102
  In Cuba, an incident of anti-
Masonic propaganda by Franco supporters that took place late in the autumn of 1937 illustrates 
the power such attacks had to activate Masonic networks.  For many months, the radio station 
CMCD of Havana had contracted with the Comité Nacionalista Español (Spanish Nationalist 
Committee) for broadcast time.  In November the Committee cast aspersions on Freemasonry 
over the airwaves.  The corresponding defensive maneuver was swift and effective.  A letter 
from Cuba’s Grand Master to station directors on 24 November 1937 thanked radio staff for their 
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“rapid intervention” in response to the broadcast of “concepts unfavorable to this Institution.”
103
  
The station administrator’s reply enclosed a copy of the letter sent to the Spanish Nationalist 
Committee.  Careful to take a non-partisan tone, he praised the “excellent relations that unite us” 
with the group’s directors, “persons of our highest regard.”  However, he wrote, the prestige of 
the station had been jeopardized by “intemperate campaigns, in language outside the rules to 
which we are accustomed, against very respectable entities.”  The attack had offended national 
pride, he went on to assert, because Masonic Lodges represented the “best and most valiant 
nucleus” of the movement for Cuban independence.  Aggression toward Freemasonry, therefore, 
was an affront to Cuba’s honor.  He regretted the necessity of the determination, the director 
stated, but his letter terminated the Committee’s contract with the radio station.
104
  “We believe 
that for your satisfaction and that of all the Masons of the Republic—among whom I am honored 
to count myself,” he wrote to the Grand Master, “the matter for us is resolved, bringing closure 
to a situation that we were the first to wish finalized.”
105
  This episode illustrates a couple 
interesting points about Cuban Masonic antifascism: it is a clear example of the Spanish 
Nationalist anti-Masonic message being broadcast in Cuba, and it demonstrates the power of the 
island’s Masonic network to respond to such attacks in a swift and effective manner. 
Masons argued self-defense when their other arguments failed.  A short letter to the 
editor of Mundo Masónico in which a Mason from Cienfuegos condemned the magazine’s 
“leftist campaign” and requested termination of his subscription sparked the reiteration of the 
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Masonic antifascist position vis-à-vis dissenters in March 1938.  The letter’s author thought the 
magazine preached Communism, despite its many iterations of anticommunism cited above.  He 
acknowledged political diversity among Masons, but argued, “if Freemasonry adopts 
Communism as its creed, it would cease to be Masonic.”  Communism, he wrote, destroyed 
society and civilization and “all the conquests Christianity has made for the good of 
humanity.”
106
  The response of the publication forcibly stated the overarching message of Cuban 
Masonic antifascism, projecting the self-defense argument upon the individual disgruntled reader.  
“Distinguished sir,” editor Mary Nieves wrote:  “This publication does not maintain partisan 
tendencies; it only shows the enemies of the Masons in order to warn the honorable brothers.  If 
a situation analogous to that of Spain were to develop here,” she continued with sarcasm, “surely 
you would not dare tell those good Christian gentlemen that you are Mason.”
107
 
Individualizing antifascism was a vital recruiting tactic precisely because there existed 
dissent among the Masonic ranks.  While leftist groups suffered infighting within the antifascist 
movement, radical leftists were not also fascists.  Some Masons, on the other hand, were, much 
to the public consternation of others in the fraternity.  Though antifascists saw rightwing Masons 
as oxymoronic and disgraceful, they tried to reach them.  The degree to which Freemasonry 
valued diversity of political opinion, however, handicapped antifascist organizing within the 
order.  The self-defense argument was vital for this reason, and reports of assassinations carried 
the self-defense argument beyond an institutional existential threat to each individual Mason.  
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“This is not a question of politics of the right or left, or of races or much less religion,” pleaded 
an anonymous Cuban.  “It is a proven fact and unfortunately true that many of our brothers in 
those valleys have been killed for the mere crime of being Masons.”
108
  Set aside all political and 
philosophical opinion, antifascists begged their Masonic brethren, and consider the issue of our 
brothers’ life and death. 
In this context, the self-defense argument transitioned into a plea for charity, reminiscent 
of a similar claim of non-partisanship in the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children.  Cuban 
Masons intended the self-defense argument to inspire action across political and ideological 
spectrums on behalf of Spanish brethren.  “Masons in Spain are undergoing active, bloody, 
merciless persecution; our bounden duty is to run to their aid, support them morally and 
materially, no matter the political ideology,” urged the director of Mundo Masónico.
109
  “What 
has Cuban Freemasonry done,” asked an anonymous author, “for its brothers persecuted, killed, 
injured and exiled[?]”
110
   
 
Masonic Aid from Cuba to Spain 
Cuban Masons not only made strong arguments in favor of the Republican cause but also 
sent material aid to help victims of the Nationalists in Spain, both Masons and others.  
Freemasonry on the island was already deeply committed to charitable fundraising and giving.  
In addition to providing for their fellow members, members’ widows, and families during 
difficult times, Masons sponsored efforts that benefitted Cuban society more broadly.  They 
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funded and worked on initiatives in healthcare and public education, building medical facilities 
and providing poor schoolchildren with shoes, for example.  Masonic aid was as fundamental to 
Freemasonry as were Masonic values.  In fact, as we have seen, helping one another and 
providing for the needy in society were among Masons’ most important principles, one of their 
cited reasons for supporting the Spanish Republic, which they saw as sharing their belief in the 
“prolongation of life and maximization of happiness.”
111
 
In order to raise funds for victims in Spain, Cuban Masons used graphic depictions of 
their suffering to inspire generosity.  Like other antifascist publications in Cuba during the 
Spanish Civil War, the Masonic print media used dramatic war photography—of destroyed 
buildings, wounded civilians, and corpses, including those of children—to encourage 
participation in pro-Republican efforts on the island.  A full-page notice (Figure 5.1) appeared in 
Mundo Masónico in September 1937.   
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Figure 5.1 Solicitation for aid to war victims in Spain addressed to Cuban Freemasons 
  
The text reads: “Spanish Freemasonry awaits our help.  Every Mason must consider Spain’s 
tragedy a personal issue.”  The Spanish Republican Circle, it continues, “requests assistance for 
the victims of the war.”
 112
  To establish a sense of obligation, the notice claimed the existence of 
a Spanish expectation of Cuban aid.  In order to elicit such aid, it urged Cuban Masons to put 
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themselves in the place of their Spanish brethren, to consider their tragic situation “a personal 
issue.”  Having framed the need in these terms, the notice then requested aid, blurring Masonic 
and general need in Spain and leaving uncertain whether aid donated would go specifically to 
Masons or be applied more generally. 
Cuban Masons used the example of aid given by their brethren from other countries to 
motivate brothers on the island to give.  In March 1938 Cuba’s Masonic President of the 
Commission on Foreign Relations reported to Cuban Freemasonry on the aid efforts of European 
Masons to mitigate “the sufferings of the victims in this tragic struggle, especially of our brothers, 
who have suffered doubly for being Masons.”  Citing the “persecutions and tortures” Spanish 
Masons had suffered in territory dominated by the Nationalists, the author no doubt intended that 
his Cuban readers feel inspired by the commitments made by European lodges and follow suit.
113
  
Cuban Masons did indeed send money to Spanish Masons.  Although we have not found detailed 
financial records, fragmentary evidence shows instances of successful Masonic fundraising.  In 
September 1938, for example, Masons in Pinar del Río resolved to distribute a flier inviting all 
lodges, in their first sessions following receipt of the request, to take special collections “destined 
to aid Spanish Masons.”
114
  In March 1939 Cuban Masons reported having raised $620.35 in a 
collection for the Grand Lodge of Spain.
115
   
Additionally, we have seen evidence of Masons’ strong support of the Cuban campaign 
to aid Spanish children, indicating their commitment to helping war victims beyond Freemasonry.  
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In response to particularly generous Masonic support of the Cuban residential school for war 
orphans established in the Catalán town of Sitges, leaders of the campaign praised Cuban 
Freemasonry in May of 1938 for its commitment to “the obligation of human solidarity which 
the Masonic tradition requires.”
116
  In the Masons’ annual meeting of that year, they resolved to 
take a special collection during the session that would be a donation from the Grand Lodge to aid 
Spanish children, and they pledged to contribute five pesos per month during the coming year to 
the same cause.
117
  Not only did Cuban Freemasonry as a whole give to the cause of the Spanish 
children but also individual lodges in locations around the island donated separately, 
demonstrating support for the cause among various groups of Masons beyond a centralized 
institutional agenda.
118
   
 
Republican Defeat 
As Republican defeat loomed, two Cuban Masonic commentators embodied the ongoing 
political and ideological tension within Cuban Freemasonry.  In November 1938, after an 
uncharacteristic three-month break in publishing, Mundo Masónico director González Naredo 
gloated in a triumphant headline, “ANOTHER TRIUMPH FOR MUNDO MASONICO: One 
cannot be an acting Fascist and a Mason at the same time, SO CONFIRMS THE GRAND 
LODGE” (“OTRO TRIUNFO DE ‘MUNDO MASONICO’: No puede ser Fascista actuante y 
Masón a la vez, ASI LO CONFIRMA LA GRAN LOGIA”).  A Mason, the article explained, 
had been successfully expelled from his lodge for professing to be an enthusiastic member of the 
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Falange.  By so doing, González Naredo asserted, the brother had “accepted and practiced the 
doctrines of an institution” fundamentally opposed to the Masonic principles of liberty, equality, 
and fraternity, and with a program calling for “the destruction and persecution of Freemasonry 
and of Masons in the whole universe.”  Many other Cuban lodges, he noted approvingly, were 
readying to cleanse themselves of traitors such as these.  Even more encouraging to the author 
behind Mundo Masónico’s longstanding commitment to antifascism were the voices of official 
Freemasonry he cited as publicly supporting this stance.  He listed and quoted esteemed Cuban 
Masons espousing antifascist views, noting that such opinions were glorious “for this humble 
magazine that just a short time ago seemed to be alone and abandoned to its own fate.”
119
  In this 
way, the director’s celebratory article betrays a serious crisis in Cuban Masonic antifascism.  
Was the abandonment he mentioned responsible for the magazine’s unusual three months of 
silence in the summer and autumn of 1938?  Had the Masonic mainstream turned away on the 
issue of fascism from Mundo Masónico, which it had once so fervently praised?  And if so, did 
González Naredo’s jubilant article indicate a reversal, or just wishful thinking? 
A few months later, in March 1939 as Nationalist victory in Spain came to fruition, 
Cuban Freemasonry’s President of the Commission of Foreign Relations concluded a report on 
international news with a comment on Spain.  He addressed his commentary to the Grand Master 
and Masonic leadership body and it was published in the Masons’ official annual report.  Though 
the current situation in Europe was ever more “bleak and saddening,” he wrote, there had arrived 
from Spain “a ray of light.”  In that country, “the land to which we are so closely linked by blood 
and language; the land whose pains we feel like our own,” he stated, a discussion of peace had 
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begun.  After so much bloodshed and horror, he hoped a “real and stable peace” would be 
“reborn” not only to “appease the spirits there” but also to “calm those here in our temples.”  In 
an interpretation quite different from González Naredo’s, the president of foreign relations 
believed Masonic principles dictated “that we admit no more difference than merit and demerit; 
that we reject no one for his beliefs and opinions; that we do not accommodate debates of 
religion or politics.”  Such disagreements, he asserted, acted as “small infernos in which—
painful as it is to confess—the Brotherhood and Tolerance have suffered grave losses.”
120
   
Though certainly not an endorsement of European fascism, these claims turned away 
from Cuban Masonic antifascism and favored a resolution of fighting by Nationalist triumph 
over a commitment to pro-Republicanism.  Whereas González Naredo’s antifascism equated 
Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco, the conclusion of the president of foreign relations showed 
willingness to accept Franco in exchange for peace.  Here we see the values of openness to 
debate and political and ideological plurality ascending over liberal Masonic values incompatible 
with fascism.  It may be that we see also the leaders of Cuban Freemasonry resigned to inevitable 
defeat.  The short time following the end of the war provided a respite, but as a Spanish historian 
of anti-Masonic efforts during the Spanish Civil War writes about Franco’s position in the spring 
of 1939, the “Victory signified only a brief ‘pause’ in the permanent combat against the enemies 
of Spain . . . the Judeo-Masonic-Communist-separatist conspiracy” against which Nationalists 
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Democracy is a Means, Not an End: 
Cuban Anarchists as Antifascists 
 
Though Cuban anarchism had passed its point of peak influence by the start of the 
Spanish Civil War, the ideology and its adherents still played important roles in the island’s 
working class during the 1930s.  Following a lull caused by the disastrous strike results and 
severe repression of March 1935, the conflict in Spain reenergized anarchist mobilization in 
Cuba, as initiations of new organizing and publishing efforts during the years of the war illustrate.  
The surge of enthusiasm which the anarchist triumphs of the Spanish Revolution at the start of 
the war caused throughout international anarchism and the broader left, as well as the threat 
Cuban anarchists felt from international fascism and supporters of the Spanish Nationalists in 
their own country, inspired them to participate in antifascist activism.  Antifascism and the 
Spanish struggle, as they did for other groups and campaigns on the island, provided Cuban 
anarchists with a new rallying cry and a specific set of goals to pursue that fit within the 
principles of their established ideology and movement. 
After a brief survey of the history of anarchism in Cuba and a summary of important 
points about Spanish anarchism and the war, this chapter will study Cuban anarchist antifascism 
during the conflict.  Bulletins, manifestos, and correspondence of the central Cuban anarchist 
groups of the 1930s—the Federación de Grupos Anarquistas de Cuba (Federation of Cuban 
Anarchist Groups, or F.G.A.C.), the Federación de Juventudes Libertarias de Cuba (Libertarian 
Youth Federation of Cuba, or F.J.L.C.), and the Centro Federalista Español (Spanish Federalist 
Center, or C.F.E.) of Cuba, as well as the Ateneo Socialista Español (Spanish Socialist 
Athenaeum, or simply “the Ateneo”) of Cuba, in which anarchists participated—and some of the 




Amsterdam and the Cuban National Archive in Havana provide a fascinating if fragmentary 
glimpse into Cuban anarchist antifascism, and the networks and solidarity built between 
anarchists in Cuba and Spain during the war.
1
 
Using these few rich sources, the chapter analyzes antifascist commentary and arguments, 
shows the ways in which Cuban anarchists saw fascism as threatening and already at work on the 
island, and discusses the overlap and disagreement between anarchist views and those of other 
antifascists, considering efforts toward and hurdles obstructing anarchist unity with other groups.  
In it we study solidarity: anarchist solidarity with some Cuban antifascists and lack thereof with 
others, as well as the transatlantic solidarity Spanish and Cuban anarchists developed during the 
Spanish conflict.  The chapter argues that anarchist antifascism did not view Republican victory 
in Spain as a desirable endpoint; rather, anarchists in Spain, Cuba, and elsewhere looked beyond 
democracy to revolution, and sought not only to defeat fascism in Spain and internationally but 
also to build a freer and more just Spanish society and a better world.  Though they were 
discouraged by Republican defeat, therefore, we conclude that Cuban anarchists took the 
opportunity to look ahead and propose further action. 
 
 A Brief History of Cuban Anarchism and Its Connections to Spain 
Labor began to organize in Cuba in the middle of the nineteenth century, and anarchist 
organizing followed a few decades later.  Substantial economic expansion during the first half of 
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the century caused population and labor forces to grow in rural, small-town, and urban Cuba.  
Under systems of Spanish colonial rule and slavery, workers in Cuba were divided by birthplace 
and race, divisions that hindered labor organization.  More lenient regulations and sharp 
economic recession in the 1850s, however, prompted the formation of mutual aid and artisan 
societies in which workers began to organize.
2
  The emergence of creole reformism in the 1860s 
occasioned the start of a push for increases in Cuban autonomy within Spanish colonial rule.  In 
order to strengthen their movement, elite creole reformists made populist appeals to white 
artisans—both creole and of peninsular origin—for support, achieving significant success 
agitating these segments of the population.  Within the working class, participation in reformist 
efforts had an empowering and motivating effect, and resulted in labor mobilization.  The first 
significant strike in nineteenth-century Cuba took place in August 1865 when cigar workers from 
two factories walked off the job.  This class confrontation over collective bargaining rights 
inspired strike fundraising at other factories, mobilized nonwhite as well as white workers, and 
won the strikers wage increases.  The years 1865 and 1866 saw the establishment of Cuba’s first 
labor periodical, La Aurora (The Dawn), in Havana, and an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to 
organize a cigar makers’ union.
3
  Workers mobilized, forming “strong pockets for industrial 
bargaining” beginning in the 1860s and continuing up to the last decade of the century.  Forceful 
periodic protests by workers extended beyond established labor organizations, addressing issues 
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such as wages, discrimination, and technological advances.  Labor mobilization did not, 
therefore, necessarily depend upon recognized unions with formal bargaining power.
4
 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century tension existed within Cuba’s labor 
movement between reformism and radicalism.  Prominent historians of Cuban labor during this 
period such as Joan Casanovas and Jean Stubbs have commented upon the two trends, the second 
of which included, over the course of many decades, revolutionary anticolonial nationalism, 
socialism, communism, and anarchism.  Historians date the initial establishment of anarchism on 
the island at different points.  The history of Cuban anarchism by Cuban-American journalist and 
anarchist Frank Fernández cites the founding in 1857 of a worker’s organization based upon the 
ideology of French mutualist and anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.  Fernández calls the 
establishment of this group “the first step toward the creation of a civil society within the Cuban 
proletariat,” but notes also that the artisan associations founded at this time were segregated both 
racially and by neighborhood.
5
  Stubbs gives 1872 as the earliest date to which anarchist ideas 
can be traced in Cuba, citing the formation of the Centro de Instrucción y Recreo (Education and 
Recreation Center) in Santiago de las Vegas, a city located 12 miles south of Havana, by tobacco 
worker Enrique Roig San Mart n, who would become Cuba’s most influential anarchist, Enrique 
Messonier, an important anarchist orator and organizer, and others.
6
  Casanovas cites the early 
1880s as the period during which anarchism began to gain momentum, noting that “the labor 
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movement in Cuba was still reformist, but most workers increasingly saw reformism as unable to 
improve conditions in the workplace and in colonial society and out of touch with their own 
political aspirations.”  Unauthorized strikes in 1882 and 1883 demonstrated that rank-in-file 
workers did not trust reformist unions to reach agreements on their behalf with employers or wait 
to become unionized before taking direct action.  Furthermore, these job actions included Cubans 
of different races as well as peninsulares, whereas reformist labor organizations failed to 
integrate racially and were dominated mostly by men born in Spain.  Stubbs depicts a 
monumental struggle between reformists and anarchists during the 1880s.  Strikes of as many as 
15,000 workers in the last few years of the decade indicated active organizing by a formidable 
group of agitators informed by the “classic anarcho-syndicalist concept of a strong revolutionary 
union and the general strike as its weapon against the manufacturing bourgeoisie.”  Yet only 
when labor organizations joined the growing movement for Cuban independence did greater 
masses of workers become involved.
7
   
Anarchists supported Cuban independence from Spanish colonial rule during the war 
1895–1898.  Not in agreement with elite conceptions of nationalism in the struggle, however, 
they interpreted the fight on the island—as they would the war in Spain four decades later—in an 
internationalist context, as anti-imperialist, and for economic and social justice.  Historian of 
Cuban anarchism Kirwin Shaffer has argued that anarchists supported independence because 
they interpreted the fight as “an anticolonial, democratic revolution against tyranny and for the 
benefit of all residents of the island.”  They adopted symbols of the struggle in order to localize 
                                                     
7
 Casanovas, Bread, or Bullets!, 146–156; Stubbs, Tobacco on the Periphery, 99–107.  Casanovas notes 
that many labor reformists were Masons, and that Masonic lodges established mutual aid societies for 
workers in the 1880s.  Anarchist leader Roig, on the other hand, was never a Mason, but rather belonged 





anarchist internationalism in a specifically Cuban context.  On the practices of localizing 
internationalist struggle and distinguishing between national identity and nationalism, Shaffer 
notes the distinction made by anarchist intellectual Mikhail Bakunin between patriotism or 
nationalism on the one hand and “nationality” or “locality” on the other.  Bakunin, a major 
influence on Spanish anarchism, argued for “social union” and true solidarity based on shared 
cultural experience at the local level but against “political union, the state.”  Anarchists followed 
a similar strategy in Spain, using popular cultural symbols “to harmonize an international 
movement,” anarchism, “with local, regional, or national realities.”  This practice helped 
anarchists to appeal to a greater number of people in both Spain and Cuba, whom they hoped to 
recruit for their international social revolution against all governments.
8
 
Though they had an internationalist goal in mind, Cuban anarchists’ organizing impacted 
domestic politics profoundly.  By mobilizing the spirit and symbols of Cuban independence in 
the decades following 1898 anarchists helped “to forge a democratic, internationalist ‘national’ 
identity in Cuba’s evolving political culture.”  Anarchists promoted their own form of radical 
democracy—inclusive of all people as equal regardless of gender, race, and national origin—that 
localized internationalist struggle on the island, and which they claimed preserved the true 
intentions of Cuban independence and its hero, José Martí.  By linking Cuban independence to 
internationalist struggle, Cuban anarchists challenged elites who claimed the mantle of Cuban 
independence but continued to mistreat workers and other non-elite groups in Cuban society.  
Anarchists reminded their fellow Cubans that “independence did not guarantee freedom, equality, 
or justice,” and that the maintenance of pre-independence power relations within Cuban society 
would continue to thwart these objectives.  The new constitution of the Cuban republic offered 
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anarchists little in the way of workers’ rights and protections, and elite control, they argued, 
negated the promises of freedom and democracy.  Furthermore, U.S. neocolonialism put Cuban 
elites in a position necessarily at odds with Cuban labor: Elite concessions to labor would 
threaten U.S. interests on the island and demonstrate to the United States that the Cuban 
government was weak, and could therefore prompt U.S. intervention under the Platt 
Amendment—“if the state could not control labor, then the United States would.”  Cuban 
anarchists believed that this reality betrayed the falsehood of hypocritical patriotism and 




How Spanish was Cuban anarchism?  Due to the prominence and strength of anarchism 
in Spain and the significant flow of people, publications, and ideas between Cuba and Spain, the 
argument that Cuban anarchism was Spanish seems intuitive.  Historian of Cuban anarchism 
Amparo Sánchez Cobos notes that the arrival of anarchists and copies of their periodicals on the 
island from the peninsula planted the “first seeds” of the European political philosophy in Cuba 
precisely in the moment—the latter half of the nineteenth century, as described above—in which 
worker and mutual aid organizations were forming there.  Undoubtedly, Spanish immigrants 
brought anarchism with them to the island.  The Cuban and Spanish, particularly Catalán, 
movements were indeed closely linked; trade between Catalonia and Cuba established a route 
traveled by anarchists and their published materials.  Casanovas notes that both unknown and 
popular Catalán anarchists traveled to Cuba in the 1880s and 1890s, bringing with them ideas 
and periodicals.  These men and publications played an important role in spreading anarchist 
ideas on the island.  Valencia and Andalusia, too, were regions of Spain that had both active 
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anarchist movements and close commercial ties with Cuba prior to Cuban independence.  
However, though Spanish influence was certainly present, it was only one factor in the 
development of anarchism on the island.  Interestingly, some of the most popular and influential 
anarchist leaders of late nineteenth-century Cuba, such as Roig San Martín, were not immigrants 
but native-born Cubans; and those prominent anarchist leaders who were Spanish were not from 
the anarchist strongholds of Spain such as Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia according to 
worker biographies.  Historians of Cuban anarchism reference these demographic facts about the 
movement’s leaders on the island as evidence supporting the claim that, although it is 
indisputable that Spaniards planted the seeds of the philosophy on the island, the movement that 
grew was genuinely Cuban.  Furthermore, they argue that the “localism of political parties and 
Cuba’s colonial condition gave Cuban anarchism its particular characteristics and trajectory.”
10
  
As anarchist participation in the independence movement demonstrates, anarchists localized their 
internationalist philosophy in Cuban realities, “specifically tackling core issues surrounding 
Cuban history, national identity, immigration, health, education, women, and the family.”  Thus, 
Shaffer writes, “anarchism became Cubanized.”
11
 
 Anarchists played a vital role in Cuban labor organizing during the republican period 
following independence from Spain.  Movement among the Cuban working class during the 
period to a position of internationalist solidarity between Cuban and Spanish workers on the 
island progressed due in large part to the work of anarchists, though advancement in this regard 
was stymied to a great extent by effective divide-and-conquer tactics.  Anarchists pointed out the 
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hypocrisy of elites who welcomed Spanish capitalists but simultaneously tried to split workers 
by pitting Spaniards against Cubans, telling Cubans that peninsulares were stealing their jobs 
and using Spanish strikebreakers to weaken Cuban labor organizing.
12
  Worker organization on 
the island during the first decade and a half of the new century was hindered by divisions within 
the working class which anarchists did not successfully overcome.  Not until 1914 did 
organization of unions begin to gain momentum and to incorporate workers of different skill 
levels and from different industries.  A National Worker Congress of August that year gestured 
toward worker unification across industries and the unemployed, but divisions persisted.
13
 
During World War I, anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism played important roles in a 
notable period of Cuban labor agitation.  Industrial laborers such as railway and dock workers, 
machinists, and sugar mill employees formed new groups during the war years that espoused 
anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist ideas.  Worker agitation increased, calls for violent direct 
action escalated, and strikes on an unprecedented scale took place.  Workers organized both 
small localized strikes and large-scale ones between 1917 and 1920 around demands for wage 
increases and an eight-hour work day.  To demonstrate its control over labor to U.S. neocolonial 
observers, the Cuban government reacted with repression and deportation of Spanish anarchists, 
whom it labeled “pernicious foreigners.”  These actions paralleled similar deportations of 
foreign-born anarchists from the United States during the same years.  The concurrent arrival of 
many Spanish radicals was strengthening the influence of anarchism as a force in the labor unrest, 
and it was anarchists who led the strikes and organized many of the worker federations.  The 
Russian Revolution of 1917, however, began to divert working-class radicalism in Cuba away 
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from anarchism and toward Communism.  By 1925, when the Cuban Communist Party was 
founded, Communist influence had grown significantly within the labor movement and its 
organizations, while anarchism declined—due at least in part to a continuation of targeted 
repression including arrests and deportations of anarchist leaders.
14
 
The election of Gerardo Machado as president that year was a death sentence for 
anarchist control of Cuba’s labor movement.  He led a “reign of terror” against anarchists on the 
island soon after he came to power, which included forceful strikebreaking, the dissolution of 
labor organizations, and the closure of radical publications.  Leaders were not only arrested or 
forced into exile but also assassinated.  Through these measures, Machado reestablished the 
strength of the Cuban government, demonstrated to the United States that he was in control of 
labor and capable of protecting capital, and asserted himself as a strongman.
15
  Repression of 
anarchism and labor organizing continued after the overthrow of Machado in 1933, culminating 
in the period directly preceding the Spanish Civil War with the defeat of the March 1935 strike 
by forces loyal to Cuba’s emerging new strongman, Fulgencio Batista. 
As their positions on Cuban independence, democracy, freedom, equality, and rights 
make clear, anarchists’ role in Cuban society during the republican period comprised more than 
labor agitation and organization.  Beyond a powerful force in the labor movement, Cuban 
anarchism was a “countercultural social movement that sustained a thirty-year challenge to 
Cuba’s power holders in the name of the island’s popular classes” during the island’s republican 
years.  The movement was diverse in terms of gender, race, national origin, age, and occupation, 
and it “challenged not only those political, economic, and cultural leaders who held power but 
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also the political, economic, and cultural foundations upon which Cuba’s postindependence 
leaders based their rule and their notions of what it meant to be Cuban.”  Elite leaders saw Cuba 
as a republic that should be capitalist and Christian, whereas anarchists rejected these parameters 
in favor of their own radical vision of justice, freedom, and equality.  They envisioned cubanidad 
(Cuban identity) as internationalist but localized to Cuban reality, and as based upon gender, race, 
and national origin equality.  They represented the far left of cubanía rebelde, a Cuban tradition 
of revolutionary and leftist movements, and fit into a broader international and internationalist 
leftist surge during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.  Anarchists were 
among the key figures promoting this internationalism on the island.
16
 
Though it is indisputable that the simultaneous government repression of anarchists and 
rise of Communism during the late 1910s and throughout the 1920s struck a blow to Cuban 
anarchism, the movement continued throughout the 1930s and beyond, truly ending on the island 
only with the exile of remaining anarchists during the early 1960s.
17
  Anarchists participated in 
strikes that contributed significantly to the overthrow of Machado in 1933, and workers adopted 
anarchist direct action tactics during the conflict that demonstrated the movement’s lasting 
influence.  Shaffer concludes that “anarcho-syndicalism, though not the only radical doctrine 
involved in the [1933] revolution, still lingered in the hearts, minds, and actions of various 
sectors of the workforce.”  Though weakened by the late 1930s, therefore, Cuban anarchists 
continued to be a force in activism and culture on the island.
18
  Antifascism inspired in them a 
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boost of energy and activity.  Cuban anarchists joined in the antifascist movement in support of 
the Spanish Republic, coordinating as they had always with their Spanish comrades, sending 
volunteers to Spain to fight, and returning to the island with Spanish anarchists fleeing in the 
wake of Franco’s victory. 
 
 Spanish Anarchism and the Spanish Civil War  
Cuba and, above all others, Spain are two of a few countries worldwide in which 
anarchist activists succeeded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in turning 
theoretical anarchism into significant action, building strong and effective labor movements 
organized around the ideal of voluntary cooperation in worker-controlled unions as a political 
and economic alternative to state and capitalist control.
19
  In the period immediately preceding 
the war in Spain, two principal organizations made up the Spanish anarchist movement: the 
Confederation Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Work, or C.N.T.) and the 
Federación Anarquista Iberica (Iberian Anarchist Federation, or F.A.I.).  The former, founded in 
1910 by anarchist groups in Catalonia, was syndicalist.  It organized a militant working-class 
movement based on principles of class struggle and direct action, and coordinated difficult and 
important strikes.  The latter was a “mysterious and powerful” organization made up of 
anarchists dedicated to maintaining the purity in practice of their philosophy.  Semi-clandestine, 
it began in 1927, “made up of kindred groups similar to Masonic lodges” overseen and 
coordinated by a central committee.  Tension arose and debates took place among various 
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factions within and between the C.N.T. and F.A.I. during the Republican era of the 1930s, but 
the two organizations worked closely together during the war, and the red and black flag printed 
with “C.N.T.-F.A.I.” became synonymous with Spanish anarchism.
20
 
When Spanish anarchists triumphed in Catalonia and elsewhere in Spain in the summer 
of 1936, they interpreted the action with enthusiasm and hope through the lens of their 
preexisting philosophical framework.  It was “the spontaneous unleashing of the forces of the 
oppressed” against “the forces of repression” which anarchism taught would—with some 
coordination by a militant minority—overthrow capitalism and the state and mark the beginning 
of their new free and just society.
21
  Others reveled in the moment as well.  The Spanish 
Revolution inspired leftists across the globe, both anarchist and non-anarchist.  George Orwell 
famously described the scene in Barcelona in December of that year, recounting the red and 
black anarchist flags draped over worker-seized buildings, collectivized shops and cafés, clerks 
and waiters who “looked you in the face and treated you as an equal.”  He noted that use of 
formal and servile salutations had been discontinued, private cars commandeered, walls plastered 
with revolutionary posters, and the air filled with revolutionary songs blasted through 
loudspeakers.  The wealthy classes, it seemed to him, had practically ceased to exist.  “All this 
was queer and moving,” wrote Orwell. “There was much in it that I did not understand, in some 
ways I did not even like it, but I recognized it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for.”  
This changed society was in fact precisely what anarchists in Spain, Cuba, and worldwide fought 
for.  Yet as Orwell himself noted, the change was not as complete or as permanent as it seemed 
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during those exciting days in 1936.  “I did not realize,” he stated in hindsight, “that great 
numbers of well-to-do bourgeois were simply lying low and disguising themselves as 
proletarians for the time being.”
22
  Such “adverse circumstances were barely perceptible during 
the ‘glorious days’ of July in Barcelona” and in the months following when anarchists remained 
armed after their participation in defeat of Nationalist military insurgents.
23
 
Far removed from the romanticism of Orwell’s passage in Homage to Catalonia, Spanish 
historian Julián Casanova provides insight into the realities of the Spanish Revolution that began 
in the summer of 1936.  The Nationalist military coup attempt against the Republic in July 1936 
created division in the military and government security forces.  Though the Republican state 
remained for the time being, it lost its monopoly on weapons.  Armed individuals and groups, 
especially in major cities, played a vital role in helping to put down the initial Nationalist 
uprising in various areas around the country.  Following these victories, many such individuals 
and groups in places where they had defeated the rebels proceeded to instigate revolutionary 
movements.  “New armed protagonists,” states Casanova, many of them previously strong critics 
of the Republican government, “invaded the public sphere.”  He summarizes the sudden, and for 
anarchists exciting, fundamental change: For unions, “it was no longer a question of declaring a 
new general strike, or of embarking on a new insurrectionary adventure, but rather of opposing 
an armed movement.”  The war presented anarchists with new opportunities to gain considerable 
influence in light of a power vacuum and to promulgate armed revolutionary struggle within a 
nationwide context of using violence as a means to resolve social conflict.  Calling for “purifying 
violence,” they participated in a practice of popular justice that would result in the execution of 
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6,400 people in Catalonia by the end of 1936, assassinating “proven fascists” and others seen as 
enemies including conservative politicians, capitalists, and clergy.  The violence was justified 
and “purifying” in their view because it was necessary to purge enemies in order to consolidate 
the revolution and build a new society.  “What could not be achieved through the constant 
struggle of a revolutionary minority, with the uneven support of several hundred thousand 
followers,” Casanova notes, “now came about as a result of the failed  ou  d’é a .”  However, 
these anarchist achievements in the Spanish Revolution did not bring about a popular majority 
adherence to the philosophy and its proponents, a “militant minority.”
24
 
This context of opportunity and challenge is fundamental to an understanding of anarchist 
participation in the Spanish Civil War.  The Spanish Revolution at the start of the war is widely 
considered to be one of international anarchism’s greatest victories in history; yet anarchists 
suffered defeat by Nationalists in the end along with the rest of the left and center-left.  From the 
beginning of the Republican period, Spanish anarchists had struggled to make the most of the 
turbulent era, excited by circumstances changing in their favor, yet wary of not only 
counterrevolution by right-wing forces but also inadequacy and untrustworthiness of 
Republicans and other leftists, especially Communists.  Leading up to their defeat, anarchists 
faced off against not only fascists but also would-be antifascist allies.  As we will see in our 
discussion of Cuban anarchists and their relationships with their Spanish compatriots in the 
context of the war, anarchists saw revolution and complete transformation of society—into 
neither fascism nor Soviet Communism, but rather based on the principles of their philosophy—
as the only acceptable end goal, whereas other antifascists prioritized other aims.  Yet despite the 
thrill of initial victories and accomplishments during the Spanish Revolution, anarchists 
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recognized that they were not strong enough to defeat the Nationalists on their own.  Many of 
their antifascist allies pursued different goals than they did, disagreed with them, or even 
attacked and jailed them, but they needed these allies nonetheless for the most important 
immediate priority: defeating fascism in Spain. 
Pragmatism, therefore, played a vital role in Spanish anarchist decisions and actions.  As 
it often does, pragmatism posed a challenge to ideals.  Contrary to their own philosophy and to 
some accounts of their actions, anarchists in Spain “were more concerned, in the initial stages, 
with combating counter-revolution” than with pursuing central goals of anarchism such as 
collectivization of the means of production and establishing new alternative economic and 
political systems.  For the sake of pragmatism, they even joined the remaining government 
institutions and emergent power structures.
25
   
To strengthen their antifascist movement, Spanish anarchists sought allegiance not only 
with often dubious allies of Spain’s left and center-left but also with their fellow anarchist 
compatriots internationally.  Transnational solidarity itself was an important commodity during 
difficult times, encouraging sustained motivation and resilience for the fight.  It led also to more 
tangible forms of support, such as international volunteers, monetary donations, and other aid 
sent.  One of the anarchist movements with which the C.N.T.-F.A.I. sought to build solidarity 
was that of the island of Cuba.  A small number of Cuban anarchists are known to have traveled 
to Spain to fight, and it is likely that others did so without revealing their specific political beliefs.  
We will examine the experience of one Cuban anarchist volunteer, Universo Lípiz Rodríguez, in 
the conclusion.  Here, we turn our attention to the efforts made during the war by those 
anarchists who remained on the island. 
                                                     
25





Cuban Anarchist Antifascism 
Following the violent defeat of the March 1935 strike in Cuba that caused so many leftist 
activists to go into hiding or exile, Cuban anarchism was in disarray.  Individuals hid, groups 
dissolved, and the movement moved underground.  Citing severe state repression in the wake of 
the disastrous strike, Cuban anarchists commented in October 1937 that they had been forced to 
work clandestinely.
26
  The Nationalist revolt that began the war in Spain, however, jolted Cuban 
anarchism into action anew.  On 1 September 1936, a few weeks after the coup, the Federación 
de Grupos Anarquistas de Cuba (F.G.A.C.) initiated publication of a bulletin providing 
information and opinion about the Spanish conflict.  The mainstream press in Cuba, the bulletin 
asserted, was “blatantly fascist” and printed “slanderous fabrications” in its “eagerness to favor 
the fascist scoundrel.”  They took it upon themselves, therefore, to disseminate fact as they 
perceived it.  It was anarchists’ “inescapable duty,” in their opinion, to provide the Cuban public 
with the truth about events taking place in Spain.  As this assessment of the mainstream press 
makes clear, anarchists positioned themselves far to the left of center politically during the 
immediate post-Machado era.  They interpreted as “fascist” politics which moderate observers 
did not label as so extreme.  Furthermore, they criticized the sitting government in Cuba much 
more brashly than many of their fellow antifascists, though they took precautions when doing so.  
The “conduct of an eminently reactionary government” on the island forced them to comment on 
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Spanish events clandestinely—individual authors rarely identified themselves in publications.  
Do so they must, however, to support “progressive Spain” and its workers, “courageous and 
determined to establish a new social system” based in true justice, economic equality, and 
freedom for all.  For anarchists, as we have stated already, the end goal of the Spanish conflict 
was not Republican victory but rather the construction of a better society in Spain as one 
important step in their global goal of creating a better world.  As previously noted, some 
anarchists in Cuba were Spanish-born and others native to the island; however, since all 
anarchists scorned adherence to a belief in national borders and distinctions, none of them saw 
the war in Spain as someone else’s fight.  Cuban anarchists must be involved in the Spanish 
conflict, they believed, because it was a vital part of the international anarchist struggle.  This 
obligation constituted the mission of the F.G.A.C. bulletin.
27
 
Though the majority of space in the five-page bulletin presented news items taken 
directly from the Barcelona publications of the C.N.T. and F.A.I., Solidaridad Obrera (Worker 
Solidarity) and Tierra y Libertad (Land and Liberty), expressing Spanish anarchist perspectives 
on the conflict, accompanying commentary by the Cuban anarchists provides us with a view of 
the perspective of anarchists on the island at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War.  Fascism in 
Spain, Cuban anarchists argued in September 1936, represented the culmination of various forces 
on the Iberian peninsula: monarchy, capitalism, militarism, and, above all, clericalism.  The 
“military-capitalist reaction,” they wrote colorfully, “is the grim shadow of the steeple, ferocity, 
authority, evil, ignorance.”  Spanish fascists sought to return the country to the days of Philip II 
(1527–1598), the F.G.A.C. claimed, in which the clergy celebrated executions by burning.  The 
heroic Spanish people faced “enslavers and executioners.”  Defending them would require a 
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coalition of support of “all liberal men,” F.G.A.C. “sympathizers and friends,” and “our 
libertarian comrades.”  A lack of antifascist unity might allow Spain to become like Italy and 
Germany, where fascists prepared for war and for the “ruin of current civilization.”
28
 
Anarchists, like other antifascists, identified various components of fascism.  In some 
ways, the Cuban anarchist definition of fascism and conception of antifascism were the same as 
those of other groups on the island.  In agreement with others, they saw fascism as endangering 
culture and civilization because it elevated brute force over reason and justice.  Legitimate Spain, 
they wrote, was characterized by honor, liberty, science, and art, while the Nationalists 
“destroy[ed] Iberia with the shameless help of the most abominable monsters on earth: Mussolini 
and Hitler.”
29
  Militaristic, fascism imposed its will by “bestial force,”
30
 and anarchists cited the 
“bestiality of fascism.”
31
  Fascism was an “assassin of women and children.”
32
  However, 
anarchists were careful to draw a distinction which their more moderate antifascist counterparts 
generally did not.  Violence itself was not what made fascism brutish and dangerous; rather, it 
was violence without proper ideology that was the problem.  “When violence is a materialist 
force,” anarchists wrote, “it is counterrevolutionary, regressive.”  Violence motivated by correct 
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ideology, however, had a pureness that allowed humanism to negate cruelty, they believed.
33
  As 
noted above, Spanish anarchists had practiced this principle during the Spanish Revolution 
following the Nationalist coup in July 1936.  The fundamental problem with fascism, therefore, 
was not its violence per se but rather its reactionary and regressive violence.  Fascism was the 
“cohesion of all retarding forces.”
34
  It sought to start a new world war “to assassinate more 
millions of workers,” Cuban anarchists quoted Italian antifascists as proclaiming.  The Italians 
urged their fellow antifascists to sabotage the war-making.
35
  War could not destroy fascism; war 
would serve only to consolidate fascism’s power.
36
  Antifascism, on the other hand, was not only 
a force against fascism but also for social progress and the progress of humanity.
37
 
Anarchist anti-statist and anti-capitalist ideology shaped their particular form of 
antifascism.  Whereas many Cuban antifascists saw fascism as principally an invading, even 
imperialist force foreign to Spain, anarchists interpreted it as not only external but also a natural 
outgrowth of nationalism and capitalism.  “Jingoistic nationalism” triumphed with “bloody 
bayonets,” destroying all that was good in human beings,
38
 and capitalist nationalism was “the 
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wet nurse of the Fascist,” they wrote.
39
  Fascism was the totalitarian state,
40
 the predictable end 
of a statist progression pushed by capitalists or bourgeois socialists.  Since anarchists saw the 
state as part of a corrupt system to be overthrown, they believed that all states—totalitarian, 
nationalist, socialist, communist, and democratic—were their enemies.
41
  Unlike many of their 
antifascist counterparts, therefore, anarchists did not idealize the Republican government of 
Spain, and in fact criticized it bitterly over its disputes with and repression of Spanish anarchists.   
As we have seen, in place of fascism many Cuban antifascists envisioned democracy or 
social democracy.  Conversely, anarchists saw democracy as a means to either fascism or 
revolution.  In some cases, democracy served fascism.
42
  Spanish democracy did not overthrow 
capitalism, the state, or the church.  The corrupt system controlled by these forces was, therefore, 
decaying, anarchists claimed.  Fascism indicated “a rotting system.”  It was “not a toxin which 
you can expel independently of the overthrow of the capitalist system,” stated a February 1938 
article in the F.G.A.C. bulletin entitled “Democracy is a Means, Not an End.”  As long as the 
capitalist order remained in place, so too would fascism, either “in the shadows or boldfaced.”  
For this reason, “leftist” governments or the democracy expressed in popular fronts, anarchists 
argued dismissively, were not the ultimate solution.  These institutions and systems could not 
deal the final death blow to fascism.  Only “frankly revolutionary regimes” would be capable of 
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combating the danger of fascism.  The article’s illustration (Figure 6.1) depicted democracy as a 





Figure 6.1 Illustration accompanying the article 
“Democracy is a Means, Not an End” 
 
Despite these strong ideological convictions, anarchists were not incapable of thinking 
strategically and working toward building antifascist unity in the present moment.  They placed 
themselves in the somewhat paradoxical stance of favoring antifascist unity while drawing a 
clear distinction between their own revolutionary antifascism and a lesser form of democratic 
antifascism.
44
  However, the distance between circumstances and ideals called for pragmatism.  
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Though they made bold and optimistic claims to the contrary in their propaganda—stating, for 
example, that fascism represented the “last bastion of the exploiter class” and that the war in 
Spain would be the “last stage in the triumph of the universal proletariat”
45
—anarchists 
recognized that in the present moment a decisive contest between fascism and anarchism would 
lead to their defeat.  “When deciding the final battle our forces are vastly inferior to those of the 
enemy,” they wrote.  Fascism pushed confrontation with revolutionary forces at this time, 
anarchists claimed, precisely because its leaders knew their adversaries were not strong enough 
to win, and that a right-wing victory was highly likely.  In this regard, democracy and popular 
fronts had a role to play, anarchists admitted.  “Only for this [reason] does Democracy serve as 
an anti-reactionary force,” they believed.  Resisting fascism by democratic means was inferior to 
destroying fascism by revolutionary ones, but in the face of an overwhelmingly strong enemy, 
mere resistance would have to do for the time being.  To delay the final battle until such time as 
they could win, anarchists would have to resist through democracy and hope that crises of the 
popular fronts would create opportunities for more substantive change.  Furthermore, anarchists 
resolved, while the threat of fascism loomed, they should not attack democracy.  However, 
neither would they “defend Democracy against Fascism,” because this course was a false path.  
Anarchists must, they understood, rely on collaboration with other leftists to resist fascism until 
they could start the revolution, but they called for demanding that each leftist group take its place 
in the struggle.  In the future, they hoped, they would then “clear the field” before the final 
attack.
46
  We glimpse here anarchist pragmatism at work within the context of work toward 
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antifascist unity.  Pragmatic schemes, however, cover only thinly an unwavering belief in the 
superiority of the anarchist ideology over all others and a plan for eventual ruthlessness against 
not only stark enemies but also traitorous or insincere “friends.” 
More intensely than other antifascists, anarchists were persistent in their assertion that 
fascism operated in Cuba, threatening the island directly.  The threat comprised two parts: 
External influence from foreign sources and homegrown fascism, although as we have noted the 
distinction between foreign and native was less certain for anarchists than for others, given their 
dismissal of the significance of nationality.  It might be more accurate to think of the difference 
as one of geography—simply distant vs. near—or in terms of Bakunin’s conception of “locality,” 
as discussed above, rather than of nationality as it is commonly understood.  Nevertheless, the 
F.G.A.C. proclaimed itself against “the fascist conspiracy of foreign elements in our country” in 
a manifesto.
47
  It noted the director of the Circulo Nacionalista Español (Spanish Nationalist 
Circle, or C.N.E.) in Cuba as “one of the most prominent representatives of fascism” on the 
island.
48
   
In addition to these “foreign” influences, Cuban anarchists interpreted as fascist the 
“criminal repression carried out by the military dictatorship which we suffer.”
49
  We are forced 
into a clandestine life, they wrote, “by the fascist repression to which this country is 
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  Individuals and groups who fought for liberty and justice in a moment of such 
historic significance for the island, they stated, were subjected to “barbarous attacks” against 
their attempts to provide moral and material aid “to countries that defend their honor and 
national liberties.”  The principal such attack against which the Cuban anarchists railed—like 
many of their antifascist counterparts—was the Cuban government neutrality decree of 1937 
(Decreto Presidencial No. 3411) banning all “partisan” organizations that took sides in the 
Spanish conflict.  “El Decreto,” they seethed, was “unprecedented,” the “supreme manifestation” 
of persecution.
51
     
Twenty-five workers who met to organize for the antifascist and democratic cause of 
Spain, the Federación de Juventudes Libertarias (F.J.L.C.) reported, were arrested.  Cubans 
supportive of the Spanish cause—“which is the cause of all”—were detained.  Centers of 
Spanish antifascist activity were shuttered.  These acts represented an “avalanche of fascist 
savagery,” the article stated.  “Are we in Germany?  What is happening in Cuba?” asked 
anarchists.  “Is it possible to continue this shamelessness?  What are the Cuban revolutionaries 
doing?”  The Cuban revolutionary parties were, anarchists believed, in essence “nothing more 
than fascist.”
52
  The “great tragedy,” they argued, was that these revolutionaries were “men of 
good will.”  Once in charge of the country, however, they went astray.
53
  “The ‘revolutionary’ 
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politicians,” anarchists asserted, only pretended to liberate Cuban workers.
54
  “To overcome the 
indifference of the people,” they chastised the former revolutionaries, would require the “force of 
tenacious work” and “fecund sacrifices.” It would not happen, they told the politicians scornfully, 
“in the comfortable armchairs of your little Party offices.”
55
  In this way, anarchists saw the 
institution of the state as corrupting otherwise principled individuals.  At best it made them lazy, 
and at worst, despotic and counterrevolutionary.  Bad enough already on its own, the state took 
on the worst characteristics of all other reactionary forces represented on the island by “the 
magnates of industry, of the bank, of commerce, and crafty Jesuitism, creole and foreign.”  The 
combination of these sectors created an “oligarchy” in Cuba that kept the people subjugated with 
“insolent arrogance.”  This “repressive and obscurantist” current was a “horrible threat to 
humanity,” Cuban anarchists warned, and they urged their readers to bring to bear all available 
resources and to set aside all personal and party differences to unite forces to block its advance.
56
 
One particularly colorful article in the F.J.L.C. bulletin described fascism as the 
“apocalyptic monster of our era” that was “slowly but surely infiltrating the entrails of the Cuban 
People.”  If the monster was not stopped, it would devour the population’s collective insides and 
would submerge the island “in the darkest shadows of horror and misery, never before known.”  
Italy, Germany, Portugal, and “so many pseudo-democracies (that are no more than masked 
fascisms),” Cuban anarchist youth asserted, provided terrible examples of the realities of the 
monster: “tortures, prisons, murders by starvation, harassment, and a whole range of evils.”  All 
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this wickedness illustrated the “excellence of this system which our rulers are imposing on us 
gradually.”  In order to impose a fascist regime in Cuba, anarchists argued, leaders established 
militarism in the name of order.  Then the clergy joined in, they stated, mobilizing its “regressive 
forces” as it had in Italy in its “pact with the cannibal Mussolini.”  The result would be all 
manner of ills against humanity, and ultimately, chaos.
 57
  The arrest of a worker that resulted in 
illegal detention and severe mistreatment—the man, named José Castillo, was tied by his neck to 
the tail of a horse and paraded through his town—and a crackdown by armed men on a union 
radio transmission that included brutal beatings were both perpetrated, anarchists of the F.G.A.C. 
noted, by members of the Constitutional Army.  These events, they argued, demonstrated the 
brutality of fascism, and their repetition indicated the current weakness of the Cuban people’s 
resistance to the threat.
58
   Against this negative progression Cuban anarchists called for constant 
vigilance, and advocated persistent resistance whenever possible, passive or active, but always 
energetic.  The Cuban people—especially the youth—must remain alert to the danger of fascism, 
they declared, or their hopes of liberty would be strangled, and the island would “drown in the 
black abyss in which lie the enslaved peoples under the death grip of Fascism.”
59
 
Anarchists also compared the governments of neighboring Santo Domingo and Haiti to 
fascist regimes elsewhere.  Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo ordered his “army of beasts” to 
assassinate Haitian workers, while the “tyrant of Haiti” was complicit in the massacre, they 
claimed, stating that these men were an affront to the Americas and an embarrassment to the 
world.  Like other antifascists, anarchists looked also to examples around the world, such as 
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China, “invaded by the bestial typhoon of Japanese fascism,” and Romania, “one more country 
that has fallen into the clutches of fascism.”  They cited in particular Romanian government acts 
against racial minorities,
60
 while elsewhere they praised themselves for the long tradition in Cuba 
of anarcho-syndicalist organizing across traditional racial boundaries.
61
 
In addition to endorsing the crossing of racial boundaries, Cuban anarchists promoted 
crossing national borders, which, as we have seen, they interpreted as equally “artificial.”  They 
celebrated the ease of international travel and communication in their age as an antidote to 
nationalism.  Powerful, rapid, and numerous boats, trains, busses, and planes crossed nations, 
borders, and seas, they observed approvingly.  Telegrams and cables transmitted daily word of 
each country’s events.  The radio broadcast news instantly, and the published press commented 
on everything that occurred from “the most trivial to that of the greatest transcendence.”  
Continually edited books distributed the most important information in multiple languages.  
Frequent international conferences and congresses brought together the people and ideas of 
diverse countries.  And multinational organizations and agreements addressed political, 
economic, social, scientific, literary, and other topics.  All these means of interaction, Cuban 
anarchists summarized, defined their epoch as one of “a vast internationalization in many aspects 
of human life” that advanced the progress of people’s aspirations and of the universalization of 
knowledge.  Internationalization represented progress, they believed, as did internationalism.  
The “triumphal march toward fraternity and human solidarity,” they predicted, “would end the 
nationalisms and racisms that divide humanity into aggressive hordes.”
62
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However, a negative reaction also characterized their age.  Though all the aforementioned 
developments ought to foster “good relations between nations and fraternity among men,” 
anarchists lamented, “by a strange contrast we see manifest narrow nationalism with its natural 
characteristics of phobia against anything foreign.”  Fascist, Nazi, and Falangist leaders used this 
xenophobic nationalism, they observed, “to impede the manifestation of the noble sentiment of 
human fraternity” and to breed in its place feelings that were “anti-human, aggressive, brutal, 
[and] full of hatreds.”
63
  In the anarchist interpretation, nationalism led directly to fascism in an 
age when internationalism seemed triumphant.  Thus, the cause of the fascist reaction, at least in 
part, was the same phenomenon that provided antifascists the tools of their most powerful 
countermeasure: transnational solidarity. 
“Any increase in the spirit of SOLIDARITY and initiative,” Cuban anarchist youth 
reminded their bulletin readership with a quotation by the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta, was 
a step in the right direction, toward the ultimate goal of anarchism.
64
  To this end and for more 
immediate practical reasons as well, Cuban and Spanish anarchists worked on fostering 
transatlantic networks and building solidarity with one another.  Records of correspondence 
between Cuban anarchists and their Spanish counterparts during the Spanish Civil War are even 
more fragmentary than the collections of Cuban anarchist periodicals.  The correspondence faced 
contemporary challenges: Many of the letters indicate that materials had to travel between Cuba 
and Spain along disjointed routes that included stopovers in Paris and transmission via an 
individual named David Alonso in Langeloth, Pennsylvania.  They include warnings about the 
proper safe mailing addresses and the appropriate manner in which to send things, precautions 
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necessary, according to the Cubans, “given the circumstances we go through.”
65
  However, the 
letters that are preserved in the archives demonstrate a mutual interest in developing 
relationships with one another, and show that the war provided an opportunity and an impetus to 
connect.   
The Secretary of the Exterior for the National Committee of the F.G.A.C. wrote to 
Spanish comrades in October 1937 responding to their stated wish for a general description of 
anarchist and antifascist groups and activities on the island.
66
  Apparently eager to comply with 
the request, the F.G.A.C. representative gave a great deal of information and analysis.  He told 
the Spaniards that his group was reorganizing following dissolution in the wake of the disastrous 
March 1935 strike.  The conflict in Spain, the timing indicates, provided the motivation for this 
regrouping.  He mentioned successfully constituted organizations—as well as those in the 
process of forming—assembled in regions across the island.  Seven groups made up the Havana 
local, while member groups and locals also functioned in Marianao, Pinar del Rio, Camagüey, 
Santiago de Cuba, and 8–10 other towns.  According to this assessment, Cuban anarchism 
enjoyed significant geographic diversity in 1937.  The letter’s author expressed pride also in the 
age diversity of the island’s anarchists.  In addition to its regular chapters, the F.G.A.C. counted 
five youth chapters in the capital city and six in various locations across the island.  These 
anarchist militants and sympathetic youth had formed an antifascist committee, the F.G.A.C. 
representative wrote, that had made modest achievements.  Despite having to operate 
clandestinely, it had published truthful information about proletarian and revolutionary Spain and 
had collected through the sale of stamps and bonds “some quantities which have been sent to the 
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C.N.T. Committee in France.”  Considering, however, that antifascist efforts had to be increased 
and that the clandestine nature of the F.G.A.C. hindered this work, Cuban anarchists, wrote the 
Secretary, established the Centro Federalista Español (C.F.E.) as a front group “legally 
constituted in both the Provincial Government and the Spanish Embassy.”  This new 
organization, he told his Spanish comrades enthusiastically, “begins its activities with high 
potential for success and will soon open its clubhouse.”
67
 
Documentation from the archives of the Registry of Associations in Havana indicates that 
the C.F.E. was officially registered with the state as a cultural organization in July 1937.  Its 
founding bylaws promised to unite members for the purpose of “human betterment” and the 
achievement of “a high level of human society.”  The Center would maintain a library for the 
benefit of its members, and would give legal and medical aid when funds allowed.  The bylaws 
stated that the C.F.E. would “support and cooperate with any entity that is akin to our ideology,” 
without stating the particulars of the ideology or naming anarchism.  The group did, however, 
have to name members of its board in order to register with the state, and the list included the 
prominent anarchist (and Mason) Antonio Penichet.
68
  On official letterhead far more 
professional in appearance than most Cuban anarchist publications, one of the C.F.E. secretaries 
of correspondence, Jesús Dieguez, wrote to a Spanish colleague in January 1938 explaining that 
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the Center was “an antifascist organization made up of revolutionary workers” united by the 
ideal of a federalist Spain.
69
 
In addition to explaining about the establishment of the C.F.E. as a legal entity capable of 
carrying out the work of Cuban anarchist antifascism more publicly, the F.G.A.C. representative 
took time in his letter to Spain to analyze other antifascists on the island.  His analysis is 
illustrative of some of the challenges to unity, particularly with other leftists.  In his estimation, 
the antifascist left in Cuba consisted of two groups of organizations.  On the one hand, the Frente 
Democrático Español (Spanish Democratic Front) consisted of Communists (Círculo Español 
Socialista) and “elements of the Spanish high and low bourgeoisie” (C rculo Republicano, 
Izquierda Republicana Española, and Centre Catalá).  These organizations called themselves 
leftists, wrote the anarchist, and defended bourgeois, democratic, Republican Spain.  On the 
other hand, he stated, anarchists collaborated with “a group of workers sympathetic to Largo 
Caballero” of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker Party), elements 
of the Partido Bolchevique Leninista (Bolshevik Leninist Party), meaning Trotskyists, and “some 
other sincere antifascists” in the Ateneo Socialista Español.  They asked for our cooperation, 
wrote the F.G.A.C. representative to his Spanish counterpart, and we gave it to them.  But the 
Frente Democrático Español “saw that the Athenaeum gained adherents [personalidad] and 
prestige by the day, and decided to eliminate it.”  He went on to list the disruptions to meetings, 
real estate battles, and interference in radio air time perpetrated by the Communist-led 
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organization against the Ateneo, concluding that these “so-called antifascists” used any number 
of means, including betrayal, to attack it.
70
   
These statements show that the lack of leftist unity well known in the context of the 
Spanish Civil War—characterized in particular by tensions between Republicans, Communists, 
Trotskyists, socialists, and anarchists—paralleled the political situation in Cuba during the 
conflict.  We see when we consider elsewhere the views of Communists that Party officials 
viewed anarchists with as much suspicion, anger, and derision as the anarchists had for them in 
return.  A lack of unity among the left and center-left in Cuba had been key to the downfall of 
the democratic experiment on the island following the overthrow of Machado in 1933, and to the 
subsequent rise of Batista as a new strongman.  Indeed, the problem of infighting among leftist 
groups plagued movements and efforts around the world during the 1930s.  The era of the 
conflict in Spain as well as the war itself are characterized by both a lack of leftist unity and 
attempts to address the problem that proved ultimately to be unsuccessful. 
With regard to establishing transnational interpersonal links with Spanish comrades, the 
F.G.A.C. representative wrote that a propaganda tour of Cuba by representatives of the C.N.T. 
would be immensely useful.  To that end, he mentioned having written to C.N.T. representatives 
in New York City to invite them, in the name of the Ateneo and the C.F.E., to the island for such 
a visit.  He hoped that they would have an opportunity to explain the Spanish Revolution, he 
wrote, and impressed upon his colleague the importance of sufficient advanced notice of arrival 
to the appropriate groups in Cuba in order to facilitate proper preparations and accommodations.  
Since the political and economic situation was not optimal, he stressed, this measure would be 
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necessary to ensure the most effective and efficient visit possible for the Spanish comrades from 




During the autumn of 1937 and the winter and spring of 1938 letters back and forth 
between anarchist representatives in Spain and the F.G.A.C., C.F.E., and Ateneo in Cuba shared 
expressions of solidarity-building.  Cuban and Spanish anarchists based the solidarity they 
worked to establish across the Atlantic upon both a common belief that fascism threatened both 
nations and shared ideology.  Your cause is our cause, Cuban anarchists told Spaniards.
72
  
Fascism wishes to dominate your country also, Spaniards warned their counterparts in Cuba.
73
  A 
representative of the C.F.E. in Havana asked a Spanish comrade to “receive our enthusiastic 
encouragement and our sincere adherence to all antifascist workers enrolled in revolutionary 
organizations whose purpose is not only to crush criminal fascism, scourge of humanity, but to 
overcome the state of things prior to July 19, 1936.”  In other words, Cubans understood and 
supported the dual goal of anarchist antifascism: not only defeating fascism but also building a 
better society in Spain and a better world.  His group believed, the C.F.E. representative told the 
Spaniard, that working people were the only ones capable of winning the war and conquering 
capitalism.  For this reason, he stated, they chose to align themselves with “the legitimate 
representatives of the Spanish proletariat”—the radical unions—that would drive social 
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Cuban anarchists wished to demonstrate to their Spanish counterparts both that they were 
antifascist and stood with those fighting fascism in Spain and also that they would take action in 
solidarity with anarchists against other antifascists hostile to them.  As the C.N.T. expressed in a 
universal manifesto in November 1937, anarchists believed strongly in making their best effort to 
move away from inter-antifascist hostilities.  The organization’s National Committee stated: 
“The unity of antifascist action cannot be a slogan of political speculation.  The tragedy of the 
people at war deserves more respect.”  In commentary accompanying the Cuban publication of 
this manifesto, Cuban anarchists showed their eagerness to prove their commitment to unity and 
solidarity, expressing the opinion that people in the countries of Latin America were particularly 
odious of dictatorships and fervent in their antifascist sentiment, and that they had a special 
interest in the “greatest disclosure of Spanish truth.”
75
  In November 1937 leaders of the Ateneo 
sent word to Spain of their unanimous support for the “Revolutionary Alliance” of the C.N.T. 
and the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers, or U.G.T.)
76
  And in 
January 1938 the C.F.E. reported to Spain that they had sent a telegram to the Republican 
government petitioning for the release of anarchist antifascists: “Centro Federalista Español 
requests freedom antifascist prisoners members of revolutionary organizations U.G.T. C.N.T. 
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and F.A.I.  Havana 11 January 1938.”
77
  A Spanish anarchist representative replied two months 
later, expressing profound satisfaction at the Cubans’ “devotion to our cause.”  He was pleased 
to be able to communicate, he wrote, the successful formation of the alliance between the 
anarchists and the U.G.T. and to inform the Cubans that the antifascist prisoners in question had 
been released.  He appreciated Cuban efforts and devotion.  The “greatest desire of the Spanish 
people,” he wrote, was the support of the international proletariat.
78
 
Both Cuban and Spanish anarchists expressed appreciation for information shared across 
the Atlantic.  In a December 1937 letter, a representative of the F.A.I. wrote to the F.G.A.C.: “we 
address you as comrades of maximum reliability to inform us and advise on the structuring of the 
most effective relationships with the Cuban movement.”  Every day, he told the Cubans, they 
realized more and more that “these relations with our true compatriots must be much more 
extensive” and they hoped that “the effectiveness of revolutionary action abroad” would also 
increase to the same extent.”
79
  A representative of the C.N.T. wrote to the Ateneo in December 
1937 that his organization, taking note of a suggestion from the Cubans, sent “the greatest 
possible quantity of propaganda” materials for Cuban use.
80
  The F.G.A.C. wrote to the 
secretariats of foreign relations for the F.A.I. and the C.N.T. in February 1938 seeking “how to 
establish relationships that allow us to see firsthand the true characteristics of the events taking 
place there” and “the basis for strong relations.”  In the letter, Cuban anarchists shared their 
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desire to inform Spanish anarchists about the work of the movement in Cuba and expressed the 
opinion that all movements around the world should study the Spanish example.  They accepted 
gladly the offer by the Spanish anarchists to send published propaganda to the island, and 
promised to establish a committee devoted to receiving such materials.
81
  In April 1938 
representatives of the F.A.I. and C.N.T. expressed gratitude for the correspondence of the 
F.G.A.C., stating that they had taken “very good note of all its contents,” and informed the 
Cubans that in response to their desire for a relationship with and information from the Spanish 
anarchists, they would begin to send reports “now that we have initiated contact.”
82
  The timing 
of these letters between different individuals and groups, and some repetition of efforts to 
connect evident therein, indicate that establishing reliable channels of communication and 
steadily building solidarity were difficult endeavors.  In addition to logistical and security 
challenges already mentioned, disorganization caused both by multiple different groups 
representing anarchism in various countries and by dislocation due to war hindered the effort at 
times.  Yet both Cuban and Spanish anarchists persisted in the attempt to connect. 
Solidarity across borders meant a lot to anarchists under siege in Spain.  They expressed 
with gratitude “the satisfaction it produces in us to know that in distant lands there are comrades 
who are deeply concerned with our struggle.”
83
  They responded to Cuban correspondence with 
emotion, telling their counterparts across the Atlantic that they were moved by the support.  They 
wrote to the Cubans: “We are excited about the level of understanding that motivates you and 
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that you have a clear vision of our fight.”  As the Cubans were eager to give proof of their 
support through action—such as petitioning the Republican government for the release from 
prison of antifascist anarchists—Spanish anarchists felt equal urgency about explaining 
themselves to their foreign allies.  “Be assured,” representatives of the F.A.I. and C.N.T. wrote to 
the Cubans referencing the difficult pragmatic choices they felt forced to make in the context of 
war and antifascist struggle, “that the Spanish anarchists have not forgotten our ideology and 
only the cruel imperative of circumstances obliges us to set aside its immediate application.”
84
   
Anarchist efforts in this context all centered around solidarity, and whereas fostering 
solidarity across the ocean with Cuban anarchists faced significant political and logistical 
challenges, meaningful and sustained unity with other antifascists would prove impossible.  A 




In the wake of Nationalist victory in Spain, Cuban anarchists initiated publication of a 
new monthly periodical entitled Rumbos Nuevos: Órgano Libertario (New Directions: 
Libertarian Medium).  Their purpose, they wrote, was “to maintain upright the banner of the 
ideals of social liberty and social justice, object and purpose of the libertarian philosophy.”
85
  In 
the publication, they assessed the reasons for defeat in Spain, took stock of the grim realities 
around the world in the present historical moment, and proposed further action. 
                                                     
84
 Pedro Herrera and Mariano R. Vázquez, Barcelona, to Federación de Grupos Anarquistas, Havana, 9 
April 1938, #6, Carpeta 60A, Archivo del Comité Nacional C.N.T., C.N.T. (España) Archives, IISG. 
85




Cuban anarchists proclaimed that the present was “truly discouraging for those of us who 
hold libertarian ideals” and wrote of “the terrible current circumstances of our history.”  
Reactionary forces continued unimpeded and stronger than ever, threatening all nations, “even 
those considered more democratic.”  Spain, anarchists wrote in April 1939, “has fallen at last.”  
Spain followed Italy, Germany, Portugal, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other nations, but not 
without a fight.  It fell to the fascists not because of the will of the Spanish people, Cuban 
anarchists argued, but because of “the conjunction of declared enemies and delinquent friends,” 
“the imposition of the fascist governments and the complacency of the so-called democrats.”
86
  
Here anarchists expressed an opinion common among Cuban antifascists and antifascists more 
broadly, which we have observed already in other instances: anger at the democratic 
governments’ adherence to the Non-Intervention Agreement in Spain while fascist governments 
perpetrated flagrant violations of the agreement.  Whereas some other antifascists expressed 
surprise and shock as well as anger over this transgression, or attempted to portray the 
democratic countries as hypocritical for their stance, anarchists interpreted the position of the 
“limping democracies”
87
 as entirely consistent and predictable.  The fence that divided the 
democratic and fascist sides, they reminded readers, was not as large as many believed.
88
  The 
“intransigent nationalism” that became fascism, Nazism, and Falangism in Italy, Germany, and 
Spain also infected the democracies, although perhaps “not in such a brutal and aggressive 
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  England was a capitalist empire run by conservative nobles.  Surely these men could 
not bear to see forces in favor of “the social emancipation of the working classes” triumph in 
Spain.  France was a “republic of the petit bourgeoisie,” anarchists stated, “with hesitant socialist 
parties, lacking revolutionary audacity,” and therefore “was bound to go along with England, 
fearful of facing off with totalitarian states alone.”  Any dispute between these nations and the 
fascists did not result from ideological difference, anarchists asserted, but rather merely from 
rivalries concerning economic interests, territorial occupation, and influence in international 
relations.  Capitalist, conservative, and reactionary forces within England and France, who used 
their influence to maintain their class and caste privileges, “decided ultimately to throw 
democracy overboard.”  With the exception of a few countries such as Norway and Sweden, 
Cuban anarchists stated, Europe was entirely covered by dark clouds.  And despite the fact that 
its present government made efforts favoring stronger democracy, the United States, Cuban 
anarchists assessed within the context of their own neocolonial experience on the island, 
demonstrated characteristics of an exploitative economic imperialism.  Additionally, in the 
countries of Latin America dictatorships persisted that were similar to the totalitarian countries 
of Europe in methods of repression, intransigence, violence, and horror.  “In most of the 
republics of this continent,” Cuban anarchists lamented, “openly fascist groups work under the 
benevolent tolerance of governments, while those advocating the ideals of true freedom and 
progress are pursued covertly or openly.”
90
  Even when they were able to report in May 1939 
that the Cuban government had declared the Spanish Falange illegal in Cuba, anarchists warned 
that though it had been officially dissolved, the Falange “lives in the heart of every reactionary.”  
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We must remain alert, they commanded their readers, and “strangle it whenever it raises its head, 
with or without official support.”
91
 
Cuban anarchists criticized not only fascist and democratic nations for the tragedy in 
Spain but also the Soviet Union.  As their analysis of defeat in Spain progressed from April to 
June 1939 in Rumbos Nuevos, Cuban anarchists focused more and more on that which they 
interpreted as the traitorous role of Communists, both Soviet and Spanish.  Furthermore, they 
chronicled the ways in which, in their view, Communist influence had infiltrated, corrupted, and 
come to dominate the Republican leadership.  They expressed these opinions as their own, and 
also reprinted statements by Spanish anarchists to the same effect, in a series of articles claiming 
to tell “the truth” about events in Spain.  Anarchists were anticommunist as well as antifascist, 
though they critiqued Soviet Communism from the left rather than from the center as did their 
moderate antifascist counterparts.  The anticommunism of anarchist antifascism was far more 
virulent, however, than that of moderates, and unlike the latter’s, extended deep into their vision 
of the Spanish Republican government. 
Russia, despite its “great revolution that liberated it from the yoke of the Czar and 
aristocracy,” was beholden to “the tyranny of the State and the salary, falling under the 
dictatorship of a party that seemed each day to work more under the sign of reaction than of true 
revolution.”
92
  Cuban anarchists accused the Communist state even of collaborating with Italy: 
Despite virulent rhetoric against one another, they asserted, Russia and Italy were close, friendly 
nations, and the government of Stalin had gone so far as to provide that of Mussolini with the 
raw materials necessary for military campaigns during the war in Ethiopia and the invasion of 
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  Echoing anti-Republican propaganda, anarchists claimed that some Spanish Republican 
elements actually worked for the Soviets.  In a piece published in Cuba, the national committee 
of the Spanish anarchist organizations stated that the Italian and German invasion of Spain had 
required a request for aid from abroad.  Russia sold them this aid “not only for a price in gold but 
also at the cost of our political independence.”  In order to get the arms they needed, Spanish 
anarchists told their international brethren, Republicans gave up their country’s riches but also 
found themselves forced to tolerate domestic and foreign agents of the Soviet Union taking 
control of their politics and military activities.  Thus the U.S.S.R. imposed “indignities” upon 
Spain and Spaniards.
94
  Cuban anarchists asserted that “certain organizations and parties that 
claim to act on behalf of loyalist Spain” in fact pursued their own objectives, obeying “the 
ukases [official proclamations in Imperial Russia] of the modern Czar incarnate” at the expense 
of the “misery of the Spanish people.”
95
  Republican leaders whose attitudes and decisions 
aligned perfectly with Russian policy, Cuban anarchists stated, constituted a “suspicious 
indication.”  Actions by the Communist Party of Spain against socialists and anarchists were 
“criminal” and “advised by the Russian Embassy.”  Soviet agents within the International 
Brigades, anarchists claimed, “assassinated thousands of non-Stalinist comrades, who had gone 
to Spain to fight for the proletarian revolution.”  These Communist-perpetrated “monstrosities,” 
Cuban anarchists believed, “contribute[d] to the triumph of fascism.”
96
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Unlike most of their fellow antifascists in Cuba, anarchists advanced an intense critique 
of Spanish Republican leaders themselves for their own defeat by Franco.  One reason the war 
was lost to the Nationalists, they asserted, was betrayal of the anarchists—“the best 
antifascists”—by the Republican government.  Republican leaders “inflicted all sorts of infamy” 
on them and did “everything possible to remove them from the direction of the war.”  They gave 
up defense of major cities such as Valencia and Barcelona, anarchists stated, claiming even that 
after defeat “half of the military leaders defected to the Franco camp.”  The betrayal of anarchists 
by Republican leadership, they believed, resulted in large part from the latter’s above-mentioned 
entanglement with the Soviet Union and Communist interests.  Together with their pro-Stalin 
allies, anarchists claimed, Republican leaders promulgated partisan politics that hindered 
progress in the struggle.
97
  In alliance with Communists, leaders in Spain protected bourgeois 
interests over those of workers, leading to counterrevolutionary actions that contributed to 
Republican defeat.  “All the slogans of the Communist Party during the first two years of the 
war,” Spanish anarchists stated bitterly, could be summarized as: “Better to Lose the War than 
Tolerate Revolution.”  If, by contrast, “all antifascists within and outside of our country had 
fulfilled their obligation like we did,” anarchists boasted, “the Spanish people would have 
triumphed.”
98
  Instead, in alliance with Communists, the Republican leaders had behaved 
dictatorially, rebelliously, and had not truly represented the Spanish Republic, according to 
Cuban anarchists.  They “operated without consultation and did not allow discussions with the 
Ministers that formed the Government and that represented the parties and organizations.”  From 
these disappointments, Cuban anarchists gleaned a lesson applicable to their own situation on the 
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island, which they shared with fellow anarchists and others sympathetic to their message: “Not 




In summary, Cuban anarchists concluded, the present hour was that of reaction, against 
which they must put up their best fight.  Country after country reactionary forces conquered in 
their quest to dominate the entire globe.
100
  “It would suggest a new Middle Age, with all its 
obscurantism, intransigence, persecutions, and atrocious fights.”
101
  All lovers of liberty should 
continue to combat this tide to avoid a second coming of the Dark Ages.  Against Reaction, 
anarchists urged, we must wage Revolution.
102
  Faced with growing reaction, anarchists must 
amplify revolutionary struggle.
103
  In place of monopolizing economic forces and arrogant 
fascism that threatened the last vestiges of freedom and would plunge humanity into an awful 
inferno, they stated, there remained only one option: Working people must come together and 
organize, and through their unions resist and commit to constant transformative work, “the daily 
fight.”  Humanity’s final liberation required as a prerequisite the development of a “broad sense 
of solidarity and mutual trust” that would build a “harmonious spiritual environment 
consolidated by the intimate recognition derived from learning bound by the community of 
interests.”  To achieve “the conquest of a future more worthy of man's existence” diverse people 
would need to work together against reactionary forces.  One man by himself is weak, they 
reminded readers in a short primer on solidarity.  Individuals must be respected, but in fact 
                                                     
99
 Anon., “La Verdad Sobre la Tragedia Española,” Rumbos Nuevos 1, no. 2 (1 May 1939): n.p. 
100
 Adrian del Valle, “La Reacción en Marcha,” Rumbos Nuevos 1, no. 1 (1 April 1939): 1. 
101
 Adrian del Valle, “Panorama Internacional: Nacionalismo,” Rumbos Nuevos 1, no. 3 (1 June 1939): 1. 
102
 Adrian del Valle, “La Reacción en Marcha,” Rumbos Nuevos 1, no. 1 (1 April 1939): 1. 
103




individuality is affirmed through the practice of solidarity and mutual aid, they asserted.  
Building upon belief in their central principle of solidarity, therefore, Cuban anarchists called 
upon their fellow libertarians to join together with all workers and “men of progress” in the 
ongoing struggle against fascism.
104
 
Even in defeat, Spain provided an important example of necessary antifascist attributes 
for the world to follow.  The Spanish people waged their heroic defensive battle against 
international fascism, Cuban anarchists asserted, not because of some cultural characteristic.  
Rather, they were able and willing to fight while other peoples acquiesced because they had vital 
qualities those other nations lacked: revolutionary education, the practice of direct struggle, and 
the habit of sacrifice for an ideal.  These qualities resulted from many years of fighting—against 
feudalism, clericalism, monarchism, “miserable and retardant capitalism,” and reactionary 
political and social forces in Spain—and experience passed down from generation to generation.  
This longstanding knowledge of struggle forged an “extraordinary hardening of combatants” in 
the Spanish proletariat, “making it the only invincible barrier against the progress of fascism.”  
Where did the Spanish people learn their revolutionary education?  In their unions, anarchists 
asserted.  Revolutionary syndicalism represented “the exultation of the dignity of man.”  The 
Spanish proletariat, therefore, had the greatest antifascist energy.  However, fascism threatened 
all sectors of Spanish society and had to be defeated by any means necessary.  So without 
forgetting the revolutionary importance of the working class, the fight against fascism must 
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include a more extensive group of people.
105
  Syndicalist principles and practices combined with 
broad solidarity, these arguments demonstrate, were the keys to anarchist antifascism.   
As all antifascists took stock of defeat by Nationalists in Spain, anarchists projected their 
particular variety of antifascism forward into the looming larger conflict.  True social revolution, 
Cuban anarchists argued, was the only means by which to prevent impending world war between 
totalitarian nations such as Germany, Italy, and Japan and the “so-called democratic nations, led 
by England and France.”  Through revolution, anarchist antifascists envisioned themselves 
leading humanity away from all-consuming war toward a new world.  They would give society 
“a truly human organization, in which the liberties of peoples and of men would be fully 
guaranteed.”  Though they advanced this optimistic vision for a brighter future, however, their 
assessment of the present and of hope for the realization of their ideals remained grim.  
“Unfortunately, neither the people nor men seem ready yet for so momentous a revolution,” one 
anarchist author wrote in Rumbos Nuevos in May 1939.  Perhaps before the better world could 
become a reality, he concluded, “we must first pass through the horrors of a world war.”
106
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Unity against Reactionaries: 
Cuban Communist Antifascism 
 
At the start of the Spanish Civil War the Partido Comunista de Cuba (Cuban Communist 
Party, or P.C.C.) was a relatively young organization—having been founded in 1925—working 
to grow and to strengthen its influence on the island.  During the entire revolutionary struggle 
against Machado and the intense period of activism afterward leading up to the general strike of 
March 1935, Cuban Communists had been constrained in their organizing efforts by the policy 
of the Communist International (Comintern).  For nearly a decade the P.C.C. had struggled to 
reconcile directives from Moscow with Cuban realities.  A few months after the general strike, in 
the summer of 1935, Comintern policy changed from one in which Communists were to reject 
collaboration with other leftists and with moderates (Third Period policy) to one that promoted 
antifascist unity between Communists and these other groups (Popular Front policy).  By that 
time, members of the Party on the island lamented the missed opportunities of the previous years, 
blaming Comintern policy of the late 1920s and early 1930s for holding back the P.C.C.’s 
growth in membership and influence.  Over the coming year, as the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
and especially the outbreak of the Spanish conflict inspired a widespread grassroots antifascist 
movement on the island, Cuban Communists finally found themselves in a position in which 
international Communist policy and domestic Cuban activism aligned.  They were determined 
not to miss another chance to connect Communism with the goals and aspirations of Cuban 
activists and the Cuban general public.  They recognized powerful organizing potential in the 
movement of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic. 
 Cuban Communists’ engagement with antifascism and the Spanish Republican cause 




involvement in the Spanish conflict, especially those produced in Cuba after 1959, have 
emphasized these contributions by Communists, particularly their role in organizing volunteers.
1
  
The movement against fascism and in support of the Spanish Republic on the island, however, 
had much to offer the P.C.C. in return as well.  In this movement that was both Cuban and 
transnational the island’s Communists found a cause that connected the dictates of international 
Communism—the policy of Popular Front unity against fascism worldwide—with a genuinely 
popular domestic effort around which diverse Cubans rallied.  As antifascism and support for the 
Spanish Republic gained momentum on the island, Communists could finally relate the orders 
they received from their institutional hierarchy to the grassroots activism going on around them.  
Assertion of a leadership role in Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic proved 
to be an important organizing strategy for the P.C.C. that helped it to grow its membership and 
influence on the island.  
We saw in Chapter 2 that the island’s Communists utilized their domestic and 
transnational networks, as well as disciplined organizing and Party resources, to recruit and 
support Cuban volunteers in Spain, work that depended upon collaboration with the Parties of 
the United States, France, and Spain, as well as the Communist International (Comintern).  In 
this chapter we examine other elements of Cuban Communist antifascism: the arguments the 
island’s Communists used to articulate their antifascism and support for the Republic, how they 
connected the movement’s efforts to the Party’s values and goals, and how they used the 
movement to strengthen their relations with Cubans and their position in Cuban politics.  We 
begin with a summary of the history of the P.C.C. prior to the rise of antifascism and the Spanish 
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conflict, examining the interplay of Cuban politics and Comintern policy during and immediately 
after the Machadato.  We discuss the critical year of 1935, during which a confluence of 
events—the general strike on the island in March, the start of the Popular Front Comintern policy 
that summer, and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October—changed the Cuban Communists’ 
position significantly.  We follow the development of Cuban Communist antifascism, from the 
establishment of the Popular Front policy through the response to the Ethiopian conflict to the 
Spanish Civil War.  We consider various elements of Communist antifascism on the island, 
including arguments and organizing activities.  We analyze, too, Cuban Communist assertions 
about the fascist threat to Cuba and “fascist-like” operatives on the island.  Discussing 
Communist interpretations of fascism in Cuba brings us to an examination of the complex and 
changing relationship between the P.C.C. and Batista during the latter half of the decade, which 
culminated in a seemingly unlikely alliance between the two in 1938.  We argue that antifascism 
constituted one key element of this alliance.  We conclude by considering the question of activist 
continuity through the Pax Batistiana, arguing that antifascism and support for the Spanish 
Republic played a key role in keeping activism going on the island through the late 1930s and 
hypothesizing about the ways in which the movement—especially Communist work within and 
in relation to it—contributed to dramatic changes in Batista and in Cuban politics at the end of 
the decade.  This discussion will lead into the conclusion of this study, which begins with Cuban 
antifascism becoming officially sanctioned under Batista during World War II. 
Considering Communists’ antifascist and pro-Republican arguments and actions, we 
observe also the ways in which these differed from those of the other groups we have studied.  
The central difference was the relationship between the P.C.C. and international Communism.  




Cuban Communist antifascism that was, predictably, unique to the Party was its emphasis on the 
role of the U.S.S.R.  Although other antifascists minimized the Soviet role and countered claims 
of Communist dominance in the pro-Republican movement in response to anticommunist 
assertions by their opponents, Communists promoted the Soviet Union’s contributions to the 
cause of the Spanish Republic and portrayed international Communism as leading antifascism 
worldwide.  An emphasis on unity, while not unique to the Party, was particularly prominent 
among Communists within the Popular Front context, since this Comintern policy centered on a 
goal of antifascist unity.  Unity faced challenges on the island, including overcoming the 
divisions in Cuban labor and politics exacerbated by the militant sectarianism to which the 
Communists had adhered prior to 1935 (due to the Comintern’s previous Third Period policy) 
and continuing Communist antipathy towards leftists of different ideologies such as anarchists 
and especially Trotskyists (also policies dictated from above).  These characteristics of Cuban 
Communist antifascism highlight difference between the Communists and many of the other 
activists considered in this study: Whereas others we have observed relied upon loose, organic 
networks based on common experience in domestic struggles or exile, or on shared culture or 
ideology, Communist networks were built around a hierarchical Party structure based in Moscow.  
The one other example in our study of a group with a hierarchical institutional structure is the 
Freemasons, and we have seen that their organizational values experienced some tension with 
antifascist activism; but Freemasonry did not have a centralized source of changing policy 
directives equivalent to the Comintern.  Sometimes, policy dictated by the Comintern was at 
odds with Cuban realities; other times, the island’s Communists made important gains while 




international Communist policy, with many important changes concerning fascism, which Cuban 
Communists sought to follow while simultaneously navigating complex domestic politics.   
 
 A Brief History of Cuban Communism 
 Many Cubans had lived with economic deprivation for years already when a severe 
recession descended upon the island following the end of World War I.  Unemployment surged, 
wages stagnated, and the cost of living increased.  These dire conditions struck a workforce that 
was larger and more dominated by Cubans—as opposed to foreigners—than ever before, factors 
that combined to increase labor militancy.  From 1917 on strikes became numerous, frequent, 
and often effective.  Anarcho-syndicalism still predominated within organized labor on the island, 
as it had since the latter half of the nineteenth century, but it was in decline by the 1930s due in 
large part to severe targeted repression of anarchists.  In the wake of the Russian Revolution, 
Communism began to gain ground.  Enthusiasm for the turn of events in Russia spread among 
activists, giving Cubans revolutionary hope.  Longstanding socialists on the island, led by Carlos 
Baliño, began to work toward establishing a Communist Party.  Even some of Cuba’s prominent 
anarchists, such as Antonio Penichet, expressed initial optimism.  As it did elsewhere, the 
Russian Revolution would divide the island’s anarchists, as some were attracted by its early 
achievements, while others became bitterly disillusioned and turned away from the Soviet state.   
The 1920s proved to be a critical decade for activism by the island’s leftists, who 
organized to protest against government corruption, U.S. neocolonialism, economic exploitation, 
and the injustices of Cuban society, such as racism.  Cuban Communism grew out of this 
historical moment of economic hardship, social unrest, and radicalism.  The founding of a series 




Socialist Party) at the beginning of the decade, the Agrupación Comunista de La Habana 
(Havana Communist Group) in 1923, various Communist agrupaciones across the island and 
one in Havana of Polish Jewish immigrants in the following two years, and the initially 
anarchist-dominated Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba (National Workers Confederation 
of Cuba, or C.N.O.C.) in 1925—preceded the establishment of the Partido Comunista de Cuba in 
August 1925.  The P.C.C. was formed out of the consolidation of the Communist agrupaciones, 
and, once established, applied for membership in the Communist International.  One of its 
founders was the septuagenarian socialist Baliño; another was the charismatic student leader 
Julio Antonio Mella.  During the latter half of the 1920s, through disciplined and aggressive 
organizing work, the P.C.C. began to gain influence in the C.N.O.C. and leadership roles in 
many of its constituent unions.  Just a few months after the founding of the P.C.C., however, 
Gerardo Machado became president of Cuba and began to crack down on leftists with fervor.
2
 
The Cuban Communist Party, then, was established precisely at the start of the 
Machadato, and, as we have seen, Machado wanted little to do with radical leftists.  As a 
candidate for president in 1924, he presented himself as a reformer with a “Platform of 
Regeneration,” causing many who wished to see positive change on the island to support his 
candidacy.  Upon winning, he continued at first to promote reform.  Radicalism, however, was 
another matter.  Though Machado maintained a positive image for the public through the first 
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couple of years of his presidency, political activists on the island got a preview of his dictatorial 
tendencies.  The president professed ignorance of leftists even as he assessed them negatively: “I 
don’t know what anarchism is, what socialism is, what communism is.  For me they are all the 
same.  All bad patriots.”
3
  He had labor leaders, anarchists, and student activists, such as Mella, 
rounded up.  Some, like Mella, were jailed.  Some who were Spanish nationals were deported.  
Some were shot.  Leftists had no illusions about Machado, then, from the beginning.  It took a bit 
longer for him to show his true colors to the general public.  Though Machado continued to 
promote popular public works projects and to cultivate an image of personal charm and 
charitableness, rumors and reports began to hint at his leanings toward dictatorship by early 1927.  
U.S. Ambassador Enoch Crowder informed his superiors in March of that year that the 
president’s actions “cannot be interpreted otherwise than as savoring of dictatorship.”
4
  The 
following month, the Cuban Congress proposed a change to the constitution to extend the 
presidential term from four to six years.  In 1928, as the island’s economy continued its rapid 
decline, the Cuban public began to experience the president’s increasingly tyrannical behavior.  
Machado secured a second, six-year term as president by forcing the traditional political parties 
by corrupt means into a joint nomination, making him the only candidate.  Also that year, his 
crackdown on activists began to horrify a wider spectrum of the general populace after several 
students accused of being Communists were executed in a grisly manner.  Their death early in 
1928 was followed by a number of other assassinations of individuals deemed dangerous to 
Machado’s power over the spring and summer.  Early in 1929, Julio Antonio Mella was 
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murdered in Mexico City.  Though the true motive for his killing and the party responsible are 
still debated, many at the time believed a Machado henchman was to blame.
5
 
  Machado’s dubious acquisition of a second term and outrage over assassinations 
combined with a new U.S. tariff on sugar that was a huge blow to the Cuban economy and the 
onset of worldwide depression to usher in the island’s turbulent 1930s.  An atmosphere of crisis 
wrought of both political and economic desperation fueled already potent anger over strongman 
rule and U.S. influence in the Cuban economy, while failures of reform and repression of 
activism radicalized many.  Activism and solidarity increased.  The C.N.O.C. had been declared 
illegal, but in March 1930 it succeeded nonetheless in organizing an effective general strike of 
200,000 workers that was broken by violent repression.  Soldiers broke up political 
demonstrations forcibly as confrontation between Machado and his growing number of 
opponents escalated.  The president cemented his strongman governance with police and military 
brutality, a suspension of constitutional guarantees, the closing of schools and the university, 
widespread arrests, and censorship of the press.  As Louis A. Pérez, Jr. puts it, “Cuba assumed 
the appearance of an armed camp, and terror became the principal means of government.  The 
government physically eliminated opposition, real and suspected.”
6
 
 Machado did not, however, manage to eliminate the Communists, or Communism, from 
the island’s political arena.  There were many factions competing with Communists in the 
struggle against Machado, but, these competitors aside, the polarized struggle between the 
president and his opponents provided the Party with opportunities for organizing and leadership.  
The Party gained activists from the anti-Machado struggle, some who discovered Communism 
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while in prison.  Two new recruits during this time who would go on to become prominent 
Cuban Communists were the shoemaker Francisco Calderío (better known as Blas Roca) and the 
ex-anarchist Joaquín Ordoqui.  Between 1929 and 1933, the Party grew from a few hundred 
members to 3,000, a figure that would double after Machado’s downfall, according to historian 
of Cuban labor Efrén Córdova.  “Although Party affiliates were still few compared to the 
200,000 members the Confederation [C.N.O.C.] alleged to have,” writes Córdova, “the Marxists 
had become an influential force in the management of the labor movement.”  The P.C.C. and 
C.N.O.C. worked not only to grow their memberships but also to expand their organizations 
across the island, making inroads into both the industrial and agricultural sectors in numerous 
locales around the country.  As Machado’s persecution of them intensified, Communists relied 
upon effective organizing work to survive.  Beyond growing Party membership, Communists 
increased their influence over the larger fight on the island as, in the words of Robert Whitney, 
“a significant number of Cuban radicals, whether party members or not, came to take Marxism 
seriously as one source of ideological inspiration in their struggle for a new Cuba.”
7
 
 Yet while Cuba’s economic and political problems created opportunities for the island’s 
Communists to organize and gain influence, the Communist International’s policy of the early 
1930s hindered the potential for them to build solidarity with the island’s other activists.  
Between the Comintern’s Sixth Congress in 1928 and the Seventh in 1935, the Party line forbade 
collaboration with other leftists and moderates whom Communists considered “social fascists”—
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anyone advocating reform or nationalism was thought to threaten worldwide solidarity among 
workers and the imminent overthrow of capitalism.  Known as the Third Period, this time in the 
Comintern’s history was in fact characterized by sectarianism and division rather than solidarity.  
Though the Communist view of Latin America did little to take into consideration the specific 
reality of each country, the Communist Parties of the region followed this official line.  In the 
case of Cuba, Communists disparaged rivals in both politics and labor.  The Party attacked 
political moderates and leftists—followers of Ramón Grau San Martín and Antonio Guiteras, 
respectively—with equal fury.  Likewise, Communist union activists fought against both 
reformists and anarchists to take over the labor movement.  For example, at a 1931 labor 
conference held to bring together eighteen of the island’s unions, a delegate of a non-C.N.O.C. 
union complained of aggressive raiding by C.N.O.C. of fellow unions, while C.N.O.C. delegates 
called other labor activists “social fascists.”  During the onset of economic depression worldwide, 
the Comintern policy produced many such failures and missed opportunities.  Backlash from the 
right against the establishment of the Spanish Second Republic (1931), the Nazi ascent in 
Germany (1933), and the riot of right-wing forces in France seen by many on the left as a failed 
fascist  ou  d’é a  attempt (6 February 1934), however, began to raise serious doubts about 
Third Period Comintern policy.  A growing recognition of the threat of various right-wing 
groups and movements led many Communists to a belief in the need for collaboration.  The 
Seventh Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935 cemented this growing belief into 
policy change: Antifascist collaboration was now the Communists’ primary goal, as expressed in 
the Popular Front.  As historian of the Comintern William J. Chase notes, the new policy 
revitalized the Communists: “Its call for a broad-based antifascist struggle won many supporters 




Cuba, too, the Party obediently changed course along with the Comintern in 1935.  At the 
Seventh Congress, a delegate from Cuba explained the way in which the Third Period policy had 
negatively impacted Communist efforts on the island, lamenting that they had taken a “hostile 
attitude” towards moderate and leftist parties and groups such as those of Grau and Guiteras and 
characterized them as “fascist.”  Following the Third Period line, he stated, “hindered the 
expansion of the Party and the consolidation of its influence over the masses.”  Communists’ 
sectarianism of the early 1930s crippled their ability to collaborate with other groups on the 
island.  Following the disastrous general strike of March 1935 Raúl Roa, a dear friend and fellow 
activist of Pablo de la Torriente Brau’s and at the time a non-Stalinist Marxist, wrote in 
September of that year that all the groups on Cuba’s political left were “groping about like a 
blind man with his cane,” unable to oppose Batista as he consolidated power.  Following the 
sectarianism of the Third Period, Communists had contributed to this disunity of the island’s 
activists.  Cuban Communists, then, faced a seemingly insurmountable challenge of their own 
making when it came to the implementation of Popular Front policy on the island.
8
   
Shortly after Popular Front policy was introduced at the Comintern’s Seventh Congress 
in the summer of 1935 the Italian invasion of Ethiopia sparked the beginning of antifascism in 
Cuba.  Participation in the Cuban antifascist movement gave Communists, if not success in 
mending relations formally with certain political groups such as the Auténticos of Grau and 
Guiteras’s Joven Cuba, at least an opportunity to connect with Cubans (including the many 
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members of Joven Cuba who volunteered in Spain) and to gain new leadership roles in Cuban 
activism.  The onset of the Spanish Civil War provided a more widely popular cause than that of 
Ethiopia on the island, and Communists were eager to inform Cubans of international 
Communism’s role in supporting the Republic.   
 
 Cuban Communist Antifascism 
Cuban Communists shared with other antifascists on the island a broad conception of 
fascism that included not only those traditionally considered in that category—such as Italian 
fascists and German Nazis—but also conservative or right-wing forces in Spain and Latin 
America such as monarchs and strongmen or dictators, feudal nobility and large landholders, the 
Catholic Church and its clerics, the military, and capitalist and imperialist interests.  During the 
Comintern’s Third Period, as we have seen, Communists had considered moderates and left-
wing reformers “social fascists.”  And even during the Popular Front period, Communists 
sometimes used the term “fascist” to describe any person or group they disagreed with—calling 
Trotskyists, for example, “allies of fascism.”
9
  Given this lack of precision in their definition of 
fascism, we might argue that Cuban Communists simply called anyone they did not like a fascist 
indiscriminately.  Their use of the term was not so much careless, however, as it was deliberately 
inclusive for the purposes of building solidarity and organizing.  Hyperbolic diatribes against 
Trotskyists aside, Cuban Communists used the term “fascist” to relate to other Cubans on the 
island by constructing a concept of a shared enemy against whom Communists positioned 
themselves as uniquely suited to fight.  Antifascism was relevant to Cubans precisely because 
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Cuban antifascists defined fascism so broadly.  Communists’ use of fascism and antifascism for 
their own organizing purposes is more perceptible than that of other groups because their need to 
negotiate the space between Comintern policy and Cuban reality exposed revealing 
inconsistencies.  Here we explore the development of Cuban Communist antifascism as an 
organizing tool for the Party on the island. 
The Italian invasion of Ethiopia represented an important stage in the development of 
Cuban Communist antifascism as it did for that of some of the island’s black activists.  Unlike 
the island’s activists of color, though, Communists did not, as a group, have a cultural bond with 
the African nation imagined as a mythologized homeland.  To Communists generally Ethiopia in 
1935 was the current example of a global phenomenon, one geographic location on a list of 
places around the world threatened by their enemies.  International Communism had just 
committed to battling fascism worldwide at the Comintern’s Seventh Congress, and it was clear 
that Ethiopia represented an important site within the context of Popular Front policy—there was 
not, however, any particular preexisting connection between Communists and Ethiopians.  Some 
Cuban Communist arguments against the fascist invasion expressed a lack of specificity 
concerning Ethiopian realities in keeping with this general Communist viewpoint toward the 
conflict.  Public statements condemning Italian action on the African continent produced by the 
P.C.C. District Committee of Havana and Central Committee in September and October of 1935, 
respectively, evoked many of the standard antifascist themes with which we are by now familiar: 
Italian fascists were barbaric, killed women and children, assassinated workers and intellectuals, 
destroyed the people’s rights and freedoms, brought crime and terror, reversed progress, and 
robbed Ethiopia to benefit powerful Italian capitalists whom Mussolini served, in the Communist 




Havana Communists declared: “Italian Imperialism Hands Off Abyssinia!”—and it sought to 
install “the yoke of slavery” in the African nation, despite claiming to have a civilizing mission.  
Fascist “civilization” was in fact “death and destruction.”
10
  These statements Cuban 
Communists made about Ethiopia could have been made, at different times, about China, Spain, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria, or any other country invaded by or in conflict with Italy, Germany, or 
Japan. 
In their calls for solidarity with Ethiopia, Cuban Communists promoted solidarity with 
the Soviet Union as well, and lauded the U.S.S.R. for standing with the African nation and 
against war.  “The Soviet Union is the bulwark of world peace!” they proclaimed.  The “U.S.S.R. 
is the only great country that does not possess colonies or enslave people,” they asserted, 
contrasting their portrait of the Communist country with their depiction of fascism.  “She” 
formulated non-aggression pacts, defended oppressed peoples, and “points the way to peace and 
happiness!”  Cuban Communists sought to tie the cause of Ethiopia to that of the Soviet Union in 
the mind of the reader.  Cubans should support both Abyssinia and the U.S.S.R., they stated.  In 
“this supreme hour,” they wrote, “every man or woman, everyone who loves freedom and hates 
the barbarism brought to Abyssinia by Mussolini, must be beside the people of Ethiopia, beside 
the Soviet Union, against the new world war, against fascism and imperialism.”  In addition to 
portraying the Soviet Union as a worldwide guardian of oppressed people, Cuban Communists 
described the P.C.C. similarly: “The Communist Party launches its cry of alarm, and calls all the 
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people to fight against the war and support the brother people of Ethiopia, a victim like us, of 
imperialist rapacity.”
11
   
Communists on the island tried also to assert ways in which the conflict in Ethiopia was 
relevant specifically to Cubans and the Cuban domestic political situation, seeing an opportunity 
to organize Cubans—and not just black Cubans, who had their own sense of diasporic ties—
around the Ethiopian cause.  The heroic Ethiopian people—who, though “weak and poorly 
armed” were defending the “only independent black State of Africa”—“rose en masse against 
the fascist invader with the same valor and the same contempt of death with which rose our 
people in 1895 against the Spanish yoke,” wrote the Cuban Communists, promoting anticolonial 
solidarity.  To defend Ethiopia against fascism was to defend its independence and sovereignty 
against foreign control, a struggle with which Cubans were all too familiar.  Communists urged 
Cubans to organize “mass protests in factories, neighborhoods, with attacks on the embassy and 
large commercial houses, representatives of Italian fascism.”  The people of Havana, “hating 
imperialist interference in their territory,” would come to the aid of the Abyssinian people, the 
Communists believed, drawing a parallel between the expansionism of Italian fascism and the 
meddling in Cuba of not only old Spanish colonialism but also newer “Yankee imperialism.”  
Communist authors conflated the defense of Ethiopia against fascism with Cuba’s domestic 
political struggles, tying the two together in their antifascist arguments.  They called for unity 
around both the defense of Abyssinia and Cuba’s domestic fight.  In keeping with the new 
Comintern policy of leftist and moderate unity, they attempted to use the Ethiopian cause to 
build a Cuban Popular Front, aiming their mobilization efforts regarding Ethiopia at Cubans of 
various political stances, including “Auténticos” (followers of Grau), “Guiteristas” (followers of 
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Guiteras), and “Agrarios” (members of the Agrarian Party or P.A.N.).  In documents ostensibly 
devoted to the cause of Abyssinia, Cuban Communists argued for democratic rights; against war, 
intervention, and fascism generally; against fraudulent elections and for a constituent assembly 
in Cuba; and for a “popular, revolutionary, anti-imperialist government,” presumably in both 
Ethiopia and Cuba.  Alternating between the cause of Ethiopia and their own domestic concerns, 
the authors of these Communist statements wove them together into a fight for people 
everywhere.  Their goals, they believed, represented “the cause of our people and all oppressed 
peoples.”  The antifascist fight was one for national independence in both countries, against war 
and imperialism in general, and against Cuba’s “Dictatorship of Batista and Caffery,” a reference 




In the text of these Cuban Communist statements on Abyssinia, it becomes impossible to 
discern the point at which the cause of Ethiopia ends and that of Cuba begins.  On one hand, 
Communists expressed in these antifascist arguments a type of perfect solidarity: The struggles 
of Ethiopia and Cuba became one as noble peoples fought against the oppression of dictators, 
imperialism, and fascism.  On the other, however, in contrast with black Cuban activists, 
Communists did not succeed in analyzing or presenting any specificity about the Ethiopian cause 
aside from an acknowledgment of the country’s status as the only independent nation of Africa.  
Most Cubans knew few specifics of the Ethiopian conflict or Ethiopian realities.  Communists 
did little to offer such information in their antifascist proclamations concerning the African 
nation, in contrast with black antifascists who explained at length the history and the present 
situation of the country.   






When civil war broke out between the Spanish Republic and right-wing Nationalists, 
however, the conflict seemed closer to home to many on the island.  Based on the volume of 
material produced on the subject, we hypothesize that Cuban Communists did not consider Spain 
to be just another place of the list of fascist threats around the world.  Though struggles in 
Ethiopia and other places, such as Europe and China, did appear repeatedly in Communist 
publications on the island, the pro-Republican cause dominated much more extensively during 
the years of the Spanish conflict.  At times, Cuban Communists even expressed their belief in a 
Spanish antifascist exceptionalism in relation to other threatened countries.  For example, 
Communist leader Joaquín Ordoqui stated in a speech in 1938 that Spain was different than the 
nations succumbing to fascism at the time; Hitler, Mussolini, and Chamberlain wished to resolve 
quickly the issue of Spain as they had those of Austria and Czechoslovakia, Ordoqui claimed, 
“but the unity and bravery of the Spanish people has shown them that this is not so easy to 
achieve.”
13
  The reader of Ordoqui’s speech is left to wonder whether or not the Cuban would 
have expressed his opinions about the superiority of the Spaniards’ unity and bravery if he found 
himself face-to-face with his Austrian or Czech comrades.  It may be that some feeling of pride 
in Cuba’s Spanish heritage—or a sense that his audience would have such a feeling—prompted 
this seeming slight to other nations and lapse in universal solidarity. 
One common Cuban Communist argument in favor of the Spanish Republic concerned 
the multilayered solidarity antifascist Cubans should feel with Spanish Republicans.  The belief 
that “their triumph will also be our triumph,” as one manifesto exclaimed, referred to the 
historical relationship between the two countries and to the threat of fascism and “reactionary 
forces” in both, but also to a broader human solidarity.  Communists compared the suffering of 
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Cubans during colonial times—“oppression, regression, and extermination” under the despotic 
rule of Miguel Tacón during the mid-nineteenth century and the vicious treatment of Valeriano 
Weyler during the War of Independence—to that of Spaniards at the hands of Nationalists, 
whom they viewed as the “successors” of Tacón and Weyler.
14
  The comparison with Weyler 
had a particularly chilling resonance for Cubans observing European fascism, since, in his brutal 
policy of reconcentración, he directed the Spanish military forces fighting against the island’s 
independence late in the nineteenth century to intern Cubans in what were essentially 
concentration camps where thousands suffered and died.  Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler sought to 
do in Europe what Weyler had done in Cuba, Ordoqui told Cubans, voicing a comparison made 
repeatedly by Communists on the island.
15
  By making this type of comparison, Communists 
asserted their belief that Spain and Cuba had a special solidarity based on shared history.  All 
countries, however, were at risk of falling to fascism.  Spaniards were Cubans’ “brothers,” both 
because of shared ancestry and because all antifascists were brothers.  “The cause our Spanish 
brothers defend is our own cause, it is the cause of all advanced and progressive humanity,” 
Communists argued.  Regressive forces gathered against Spain and Cuba as they did against 
Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other nations.
16
  The conflict in Spain was of critical 
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Communists in general defined fascist and right-wing forces around the world as 
“regressive” or “reactionary.”  Cuban Communists lent some Hispanic specificity to their 
discussions of such reactionaries in the cases of Spain and Latin America.  Reactionary forces, 
they argued, had for centuries “sucked the blood” of the Spanish people as they had “subjected 
under their heel the peoples of Latin America.”  The forces of “old Spain” represented by Tacón 
and Weyler in colonial Cuba were in Spain the monarchists, clerics, feudal lords, and, more 
recently, capitalists who now joined with fascists, Communists stated, in a traitorous, “anti-
Spanish” bloc—anti-Spanish because these forces were, according to the Cuban Communist 
interpretation, against the elected Republican government and against the Spanish people.  All 
these reactionaries, perpetrators of longstanding oppression and inequity in Spain, formed the 
Nationalist side of the conflict.  The Nationalists—representing both all the ills ever to plague the 
Spanish people and modern fascism—had “undertaken the task of violent overthrow of the 
democratic regime won in long years of arduous struggle by the Spanish people.”  These forces, 
in the Cuban Communist conception, sought to set up a system in Spain similar to those of 
Germany, Italy, and Portugal under fascism, and with such a system to dominate and enslave 
workers, peasants, the petit bourgeoisie, and intellectuals.
18
 
Traditional reactionary forces allied with fascism threatened Cuba as they did Spain, 
Communists believed.  Secretary General of the National Committee of the P.C.C. Francisco 
Calderio (better known as Blas Roca) warned against these “fascistoid” reactionaries on the 
island.
19
  As did anarchists, Communists conflated fascists and capitalists, as well as the elite 
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more generally.  Included were “those who are servants of the enemies of the people, that is to 
say, of imperialist capital, of the large landowners, of the land thieves, of the large Spanish 
merchants, and of the large proprietors.
20
  Also sugar industrialists,
21
 banking and business 
attorneys, and Cubans who acted as administrators of foreign holdings
22
 were among the forces 
Communists opposed and considered reactionary.  Fascist-like individuals on the island included 
“figures holding high offices of state or high positions in society.”
23
  Though no Cuban political 
parties had the name “fascist,” Roca claimed that political rivals of the Communist Party such as 
the right-wing ABC organization and the conservative party of Mario García Menocal had 
“reactionary directors, enemies of the people.”
24
  Communists targeted specific individuals also.  
One repeated subject of their ire was Pepín Rivero, director of the newspaper El Diario de la 
Marina.  Unpopular among leftists for his views and those of his periodical, Rivero garnered 
especially vitriolic attention from Cuban Communists, who portrayed him at the archetypal 
representative of all the forces on the island which they opposed.  “The forces ‘Pep n’ leads” 
(“las fuerzas que acaudilla ‘Pep n’”) became Communist shorthand for fascist-like individuals 
and groups.
25
  He was, they claimed, “decorated by the governments of Hitler, Mussolini, and 
Franco.”
26
  Even those who claimed to be revolutionaries, Communists warmed, could be 
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reactionaries.  Once again targeting political rivals of the Communist Party, Roca singled out 
anticommunist politician and activist Eduardo Chibás, writing that “the truth is that the only 
thing he does is to defend the millions of pesos of his father,” which, Roca claimed, he gained 
from workers through abusive rentals of numerous houses in Havana and Santiago de Cuba.  All 
politicians who only sought personal gain at the expense of Cuba and the Cuban people—




During the first few years of Cuban antifascism, Communists considered Batista to be 
among these reactionaries and fascists on the island.  They called his power a military 
dictatorship that would turn the Cuban public into a puppet as it had the Cuban president.
28
  
Batista had “robbed the people of the human right to freedom of thought,” Communists asserted 
in 1936.
29
  He committed “acts of terror” against Cuba.  He commanded “fascist hoards of the 
military dictatorship” to attack supporters of the Spanish Republic, they claimed.
30
  Only unity of 
all of the progressive and popular groups and parties on the island, they asserted, would 
overcome the dictatorship and reestablish the promise of democracy born of Machado’s 
overthrow.  Communists compared Cuba’s situation with Spain’s in 1936: There, the people had 
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“achieved a legitimate electoral victory that ensured their improvement.”  However, Communists 
told Cubans, reactionaries in Spain rejected this triumph of democracy.  The clergy, monarchists, 
and capitalists, they stated, “found, the same as in Cuba, a military officer willing to impose by 
blood and fire all the injustices that for centuries have been maintained in Spain.”  In this 
interpretation, Batista was equivalent to Franco, and the remedy to the situation, Communists 
argued, was for “the worker, peasant, professional, and woman” to fight together in a Popular 
Front.
31
  In other words, Batista and Franco were both fascists and to defeat them and restore 
democracy in Cuba and Spain would require Communist-led unity.   
If Batista were Cuba’s Franco, then it followed in Communist arguments that he might 
receive support from Hitler and Mussolini as Franco did in the Spanish Civil War, as well as 
from Franco himself.  Communist antifascist propaganda on the island emphasized dramatically 
the threat of foreign fascism in Cuba, which, they argued, would come in two forms.  First, 
Cuban Communists believed that dictatorial regimes in Latin America were “fertile ground for 
the Nazi-fascist penetration,” and warned Cubans of “Nazi-fascist-Japanese penetration,” the 
direct intervention of agents of Germany, Italy, and Japan in their country.
 32
  An illustration 
(Figure 7.1) on the cover of Mediodía (a periodical that was not exclusively or expressly 
Communist but inclusive of Communist authors and views) in March 1937 by political cartoonist 
José Cecilio Hernández Cárdenas, a black Cuban leftist known as “Her-Car,” depicted the 
leaders of these three countries pulling on the island in a game of tug-of-war with the country 
most frequently associated with imperialism in Cuba at the time: the United States.
33
  Though the 
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cartoon probably overstates the level of interest “Nazi-fascist-Japanese” leaders had in 
possessing Cuba in 1937, it does clearly demonstrate the Cuban fear of the geopolitical threat of 
foreign fascism on the island expressed by Communists and other antifascists. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Mediodía cover illustration, March 1937 
The cartoon leaves ambiguous the role of the United States: Is it an imperialist fighting to 
maintain its dominance of Cuba in the face of fascist threat, or is it a benevolent protector trying 
to keep the island away from evil forces?  We will return to ambiguous views of the U.S. role in 
antifascism below when we discuss the Cuban Communists’ changing attitude toward the 
island’s northern neighbor.   
Second, pro-Nationalist Spanish agents operating in Cuba would work to establish 
fascism there.  Ordoqui described the insolence of “a commercial representative of the 




the island all fly the monarchic flag, threatening to “excommunicate from Spain” the members of 
any center that did not.  And, Ordoqui claimed, the Falange in Cuba was “completely dominated 
by foreign fascism.”
34
  It was the organization, the Communists stated, “in which are grouped the 
most rotten representatives of fascism, domestic and foreign, and especially the henchmen of 
Franco, fierce executioner of the heroic Spanish people.”  It was “the center of the reactionary 
conspiracy against Cuba and against the people.”
35
 
In describing the threat of foreign fascism in Cuba, Communists tied the island’s fate to 
that, alternately, of Latin America, the entire Western Hemisphere, and Spain.  One of the best 
opportunities Communists had to address the Cuban public was at an enormous rally they 
organized in the Polar Stadium in Havana in November 1938, at which they warned of these 
interconnected threats of foreign fascism.  Attended by 80,000 Cubans who listened to speeches 
by Cuban Communist leaders Roca and Ordoqui as well as African-American Communist leader 
and transnational political activist James W. Ford, the gathering gave Communists a chance to 
pitch their antifascism (and domestic agenda) to a large, sympathetic Cuban audience.  Ford—
whose important role in the transnational coordination of Cuban volunteers in Spain we 
discussed in Chapter 2—portrayed the fascist threat to Cubans at the rally, developing the idea of 
a fascist threat to the Americas as a whole and to Spain, and drawing a number of connections 
for the audience.  “The sinister plots of the fascists,” he told them, “have as one of their coveted 
purposes the establishment of fascism in our hemisphere.”  They sought the fertile soil, mineral 
resources, and strategic military positions of Latin America and the Caribbean.  “Every republic 
of Latin America runs the risk of having the same fate as Czechoslovakia,” he warned.  Hitler’s 
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plan was to surround both the Soviet Union and the Americas, Ford told his audience, claiming 
without presenting evidence that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave Hitler access 
to Canada and the West Indies, to use as bases for fascist expansion in the Western Hemisphere.  
“This new threat to democracy and peace of the people of our hemisphere,” he urged, “makes 
imperative the closer collaboration of our continent.”  To these admonitions concerning the 
threat of European fascism in the Americas Ford connected the cause of the Spanish Republic.  
“One of the most important moves in this fascist plan to dominate the world,” he told the Havana 
audience, “is the war in Spain.”  A Nationalist victory there would hand over control of the 
country to Italy and Germany, he said, and then the fascists could “close the doors of Europe to 
America.”  The cultural connections of the Spanish-speaking world which antifascists cited so 
often to encourage solidarity would be turned against them for nefarious purposes: The fascists 
would “use the cultural and economic ties between Spain and Latin America to seize power in 
the West and to try to take away from the United States the countries that lie south of its borders.”  
Like Her-Car’s cartoon on the cover of Mediodía, Ford acknowledged in his phrasing of this 
warning that the United States would fight to keep Latin America away from European or Asian 
fascists—whether as benevolent protector or as imperialist competitor was not clear.  The U.S. 
Communist leader gave his audience examples of the ways in which their two countries were 
connected in struggle, drawing a distinction between a “good” and a “bad” United States in the 
same way that many antifascists distinguished between a “good” and a “bad” Spain.  The 
monopolists and antidemocratic forces at work on the island, he told Cubans, were the “same 
interests that are fighting to establish fascism in our country.”  The African-American 
Communist leader told Cubans about the C.P.U.S.A. roll in mobilizing progressive forces “in aid 




national economy of Cuba.”  The Communist connections between Ford’s country and the island 
were part of a larger Pan-American antifascist force, he asserted.  And the most urgent work 
before this force, Ford reiterated, was the victory of the Spanish Republic.  “The last door in 
Europe must not be closed,” he insisted.  “Fascism must not possess this vantage point of 
penetration into Latin America.”  European fascism threatened the entire hemisphere in Ford’s 
interpretation, but stopping it in Spain would help keep it out of the Americas.
36
 
In case there was anyone on the island who did not have a suitably high level of fear of 
the fascist threat, Communists asserted bleak and dire predictions of what fascist victory would 
entail.  Communists imagined dire consequences of fascist victory in Cuba, and Party leaders 
shared the details of their dark vision of this possible future with Cuban audiences and readers.  
The fascist agenda for the island, they warned, was a “conspiracy against progress.”  In addition 
to facilitating “the penetration into our country of the Spanish Falangists, the Italian fascists, and 
the German Nazis who wish to take Cuba’s sources of wealth and strategic military positions,” 
the triumph of fascist forces would have a terrible direct domestic impact on Cuba’s economy, 
politics, society, and culture.  Fascist rule would go against “the rights and demands of workers” 
and bring about oppression and enslavement.  Fascists would set up company unions, and 
independent unions would become illegal, as would the Communist Party and other 
“revolutionary and progressive parties” on the island, and all “popular organizations” of women, 
professionals, blacks, youth, campesinos, etc.  Fascists would create a new constitution that 
would allow them “to snatch the little bit of land that is left for the guajiros” and to raise rents, 
lower wages and pay in vouchers, increase work hours, abolish paid time off, dictate 
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employment termination, and import cheap labor.  Monopolists would run rampant.  Progressive 
social laws would be revised.  The free press would be censored.  The “reactionary clergy” 
would resist the “Cubanization” of private education on the island, keeping it under Church 
control.  Reactionaries would destroy also Cuba’s “citizen equality proclaimed in the 
Constitution,” persecuting “citizens on account of their being of a particular race or religion.”  
Racial prejudice would ascend to horrific heights, as it had in Europe.  Cuba would witness “the 
revival of the anti-black campaign.”  For example, reactionary forces would not defend the right 
of black Cubans to access all schools, jobs, and public places.  The impact of their prejudice 
would go much farther than segregation, though, Communists asserted, referencing the horrors 
taking place in Germany: The ascent of racism on the island under fascist rule would lead to “a 
campaign of assassinating blacks, en masse, in the same way as in Germany are conducted 
assassinations en masse of Jews,” Blas Roca claimed.  The K.K.K. would be resuscitated on the 
island.  Religious discrimination would also intensify against different groups, even Catholics.  
Glossing over the complex role of Catholicism in relation to various “fascists,” especially the 
Spanish Nationalists, Roca asserted that victory of right-wing forces in Cuba would invite 
“agents of the murderers of Catholics in Austria” to the island, who would there perpetrate “the 
murders of spiritualists, Masons and Catholics and all the religious who oppose their evil, anti-
human ends.”  In summary, fascism in Cuba “threatens the foundations of our nation,” 
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To avoid this terrible fate, Cubans must look to their Spanish brethren, Communists 
believed.  Based on the idea of shared history and ties between Spain and Latin America, 
Communists argued that Spain provided an ideal antifascist model for Cubans, and that, as we 
have seen argued elsewhere, the Spanish struggle had lessons to offer activists on the island.  
Communist intellectual Juan Marinello outlined this argument optimistically after a visit to Spain 
during the war, discussing the link between the Republican cause and Cuba with pride.  Leaving 
Spain, he felt joy both as a revolutionary and as a Cuban.  With evident optimism, he stated that 
before the Spanish conflict began, revolutionaries knew that the progress of revolution would 
produce “prodigious works.”  Now, he continued, “we know how they will be produced.”  The 
Spanish were exemplary in their fight against fascism, and, as a Cuban, this made Marinello 
proud.  The people responsible for the prodigious works of revolution, he noted, were “people of 
our blood, of our psychological modes, of our historic rhythm.”  Echoing the common metaphor, 
he called Spain “Mother, because now we do wish to be loyal children of her universal force.”
38
 
These examples demonstrate the argument we have made elsewhere that Latin American 
observers of and participants in the Spanish Civil War had a deeper understanding of the factions 
in the conflict and its longstanding historical causes than did other international observers and 
participants due to linguistic, familial, and cultural ties that existed historically between their 
nations and the “motherland.”  Cuban Communists, as individuals, were no different than their 
countrymen in this regard.  As members of a hierarchical international organization, though, and 
as adherents to a centralized agenda, they tended in their writing on antifascism to return again 
and again to the Party line.  As they had done with the cause of Ethiopia, Cuban Communists 
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appropriated the Spanish Republic’s struggle as their own, not just as Cubans but also as 
Communists.  Within the Popular Front policy, Communists worked to position themselves as 
the leaders of antifascism and the Spanish Republican cause.  To quote comrade Stalin, one 
manifesto declared, “the fight in Spain is not a private matter of the Spaniards.”
39
   
This quotation from Stalin exemplifies an emphasis that set Communists apart from their 
fellow antifascists: One of the most striking—if predictable—distinctions between the antifascist 
arguments of the Communists and others concerned the Soviet Union.  We have seen that the 
Soviet Union played an important role in the conflict in Spain and in the formation and 
coordination of the International Brigades; also, we have observed various viewpoints offered by 
diverse Cuban antifascists assessing the Communist country, debating its merits, criticizing its 
faults, and questioning Stalinism or Comintern policy, as well as attempts to deny or downplay 
the Soviet and Communist roles in the conflict to counter Nationalist propaganda.  Cuban 
Communists, in contrast, did not hesitate to assert, proudly and publicly, that the Soviet and 
Comintern roles in worldwide antifascism and the cause of the Spanish Republic were 
unquestionably positive, as we have seen already in the case of Ethiopia. 
In the case of Spain, also, the Communists differed from other Cuban antifascists in their 
insistence on the central role of the U.S.S.R. in the conflict.  One typical enumeration of the ills 
of the Spanish Nationalists and their alliance with foreign fascists, for example, ended with the 
Communist assertion that their purpose was to start war in Europe against the democratic 
countries and “principally against the Soviet Union, the bastion of freedom, progress and 
civilization of the peoples of the world.”  The Popular Front, they argued early on in the conflict, 
deserved credit for keeping fascism from triumphing and the monarchy from being restored in 
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Spain; the masses of the world “under the direction of the Communist Parties” would save the 
government in Madrid and avert a new world war.
40
  A poster depicting a cartoon of “Don 
Fascism” in Spain and abroad as a creation of capitalists stated: “But in Russia it is another 
matter and there will never be fascism because Bolshevism prevented it with its victorious fight.”  
In the places fascism threatened such as Spain, the poster claimed, Communists “fight with skill 
and tenacity to impede its progress.”
41
   
Though this type of language is familiar and unsurprising to students of Communist 
history, it deserves careful attention in the present analysis.  The close ties between Spain and 
Cuba were central to pro-Republican organizing.  Cubans of color—though lacking the same 
kind of direct familial and historical bonds—felt deeply connected to Ethiopia culturally in the 
context of the African diaspora.  And the Ethiopians’ fight against Mussolini’s forces resonated 
with Cubans’ anticolonial sentiments.  Even the struggle of China against Japan had some 
relevance on the island due to its Chinese population.  In each of these cases, some form of 
organic ties existed between Cuba and the foreign country in question.  The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, had no link to Cuba other than through its Communist Party, and even that tie was a 
loose one during the 1930s.  It was a great power that shared little with Cuba in terms of culture 
and from which very few immigrants arrived on the island.
42
   Adulation of the U.S.S.R. in pro-
Ethiopian or pro-Republican documents, therefore, raises a provocative question about 
motivation: In a text that celebrated the Soviet Union and the antifascist cause, were Cuban 
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Communists more intent upon promoting to their readers the former or the latter?  In other words, 
did Cuban Communists believe that celebrating the Soviet Union would draw Cuban readers in, 
making them more likely to support the Communists’ domestic and international agenda?  Or did 
they think that Cuban readers already sympathetic to antifascist causes and drawn in by 
discussions of Ethiopia or Spain would then read their tributes to the U.S.S.R. and be converted 
to a position supportive of Communism? 
 Given the level of diverse popular support for antifascism among Cubans, we 
hypothesize that Cuban Communists saw an opportunity to organize for the Party while 
organizing against fascism and for Abyssinia and especially the Spanish Republic.  Communist 
work on the island surely contributed to growing the antifascist movement, but the relationship 
between the Party and the movement was symbiotic rather than unidirectional.  The antifascist 
cause, as we have seen, elicited broad-based adherence.  Many Cubans wanted to help the 
Ethiopians and, to a much greater extent, the Republican government of Spain; the Soviet Union 
was supporting those causes.  This confluence of events presented the P.C.C. with a chance to 
portray the U.S.S.R. and Communism as aligned with Cuban interests.  Communists on the 
island wished Cubans to view the Party as the “guarantee of triumph in the antifascist and anti-
imperialist fight.”
43
  They wanted to foster unity and to build a broad Popular Front coalition, 
with the assumption that they would lead it.  Seeking ways in which to implement the new 
Comintern policy of unity initiated in the summer of 1935, Cuban Communists encountered the 
Abyssinian cause that autumn and the Spanish Republican cause the following summer, and 
interpreted them as opportunities not only to increase their influence and gain a leadership 
position in the island’s political landscape but also to grow Party membership.  “Help conquer 
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fascism!” exclaimed one advertisement (Figure 7.2) at the end of a Communist publication: “If 






Figure 7.2 Antifascist recruitment 
advertisement for the Cuban Communist Party 
 
Having argued in favor of the Soviet Union and Communism as stalwarts of antifascism 
and supporters of Ethiopia and the Spanish Republic, Communists went further, working to 
convince the Cuban people of the positive characteristics of the U.S.S.R. more broadly.  Ford, 
for example, described the Soviet Union in contrast with the dark vision of fascism expressed by 
Communists.  Point by point, he claimed that the U.S.S.R. was the opposite of fascist states: 
People there, he stated, had a right to work, to education, and to security; there was no 
unemployment, and the profits of work were distributed among the workers; there was no 
prejudice or division based on nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion, he believed; farmers lived 
well in the countryside; and a great culture, with many innovations, had developed in this 
country where “man cannot exploit man.”  It was, he asserted to his audience of Cubans—who 
had no personal experience with the distant Communist country—utopia.
45
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Furthermore, Communist antifascists expressed explicitly their Party’s desire to establish 
“the Soviet Cuba.”  Ford encouraged Cubans to imagine the possibilities that would exist if “the 
millions of dollars robbed from Cuban labor were spent on developing the cultural and economic 
resources of this rich Island.”  Roca was careful to tie this vision for a Communist future in Cuba 
not only to defeating global fascism but also to the island’s domestic struggle.  Surely with a 
realistic assessment of the Party’s modest stature in Cuba at the time, Roca used caution in 
explaining the Communist vision for the island: “Our Party works so that in time Socialist Cuba 
can be established, but the popular triumph of tomorrow is not yet socialism.  The popular 
success we anticipate tonight is only that of the liberated and democratic Cuba.”  To achieve this 
“popular triumph,” Roca told Cubans, they must build a strong Communist Party of the masses, 
“the Party of the unity of all the Cuban people.”
46
 
To achieve victory in Cuba’s domestic struggle, also, Communists argued, “national 
unity” would be necessary.  In the Popular Front context, the Cuban Communists saw themselves 
leading the island’s factious political groups toward partnership.  “For this sacred union,” 
Manuel Luzardo stated, “our Party is working ardently.”
47
  In 1935 Communists called upon 
their fellow activists: “Now more than ever the P.R.C., Joven Cuba, and all anti-imperialist 
parties must respond to the Communist Party’s calls for the coordination of the Popular Front.  
Let us join forces and give unity to the people, in a powerful Revolutionary Front for the struggle 
against war, against Dictatorship, for our national independence!”
48
  In 1938 Roca called on 
Party members to embrace Communists within and communists outside of the Party, to welcome 
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those who were communists without realizing it.
49
  Throughout these years, the P.C.C. tried to 
negotiate with other parties and groups of the center and left, such as the P.R.C. and Joven Cuba, 
to form a coalition.
50
   
Uniting in a powerful Popular Front on the island would be the means by which Cubans 
would triumph over fascism and reactionaries, abroad and at home.
51
  “Unity will conquer 
fascism,” proclaimed one Communist publication.
52
  The Popular Front, led by the Party, would 
achieve victory in Spain: “Cuban people, friend of freedom and democracy, come with us in 
support of the heroic Spanish people,” Cuban Communists urged, “come with us to support the 
Popular Front government.”
53
  One documentary example of Cuban antifascist unity in action is 
a list, found in the P.C.C. archive, of contact people for the various organizations that made up 
the national executive board of the Association of Aid to the Spanish People (Ejecutivo Nacional 
de la Asociación de Ayuda al Pueblo Español).  Communists listed unions, student and youth 
organizations, political parties including the Auténticos and the P.A.N., the Casa de la Cultura 
(House of Culture), the Federación de Sociedades de Color (Federation of Societies of Color), 
and several other groups.  Next to each group they listed the name of a contact person, and some 
of the people’s names they marked with the letter ‘P’ to indicate that they were members of the 
Party.  Of the 22 groups listed, half were represented by contact people who were Communists.
54
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This document demonstrates that within a broad-based movement in which Communists publicly 
supported unity, they were nonetheless carefully accounting for which individuals were Party 
insiders and which were not. 
This document shows that Cuban Communists were in fact part of a unified effort of 
moderates and leftists on the island to aid the Spanish Republic.  The antifascist movement was 
as close as they were to come to the establishment of a Popular Front in Cuba.  Communists 
worked together with Auténticos, members of Joven Cuba, black Cuban antifascists, and others 
against fascism and for the Spanish Republic.  They were willing even, as we will see below, to 
work with anarchists if the latter were not overly anticommunist.  Yet the unity Cuban 
Communists found in antifascism and pro-Republican organizing did not translate to an official 
Popular Front political coalition on the island.  By early 1939 they were embittered by refusals 
from those on the island who remembered their sectarianism of the Third Period.  Grau, Roca 
complained in January of that year, rejected any form of alliance with the Communists, 
destroyed collaboration between his party and Joven Cuba, and refused to enter into a Popular 
Front.  Overlooking their antifascist collaboration, Roca stated that those like Grau who 
obstructed progressive unity went against the wishes of the masses and risked the triumph of 
fascism and reactionaries.  Anything that weakened the Party or unity helped the fascists and 
reactionaries win, Cuban Communists claimed.  They used attacks against their Party as 
propaganda pieces.  Those who recognized the true threat of fascism, Roca argued, knew that “a 
truly popular and progressive unity” was necessary.  They must, then, recognize that any attack 
on the Party came from “fascistoid and reactionary forces.”  If “all Cubans who wish to defend 
Cuba from the fascist snares,” to improve the Cuban government and economy and the lives of 




Communists would become intolerable.  In such propaganda, anticommunism equaled fascism, 
as did any refusal to work with the P.C.C., such as that of Grau.  And the unwillingness of such 
leaders to cooperate in progressive unity indicated their betrayal of the Cuban people.  They lied 
to Cubans, Roca claimed.
55
  Thus even as they worked together with groups such as Grau’s 
Auténticos in the antifascist movement, Communists separated themselves from such groups in 
their rhetoric: They might work together to defeat fascism, but Communists were the true 
representatives of the people—others fell short of the ideal of unity in both antifascism and 
domestic Cuban struggle. 
Despite the fact that the promotion of unity was a common theme for the Cuban 
Communists, they, too, sometimes undermined this aim.  Communist efforts to foster unity did 
not extend, for example, to Trotskyists, whom they considered “overt enemies of our p[arty],” 
“enemies of the proletariat,” individuals “of the lowest morality,”
56
 “counterrevolutionaries,” and, 
as noted above, even “allies of fascism.”  In the first few months of the Spanish Civil War 
Communists wrote that Trotskyists “take advantage of the defeats in recent weeks by the Spanish 
government to do the only thing they can do: throw mud on the Soviet Union, the Communist 
International, and the leader of the worldwide struggle against fascism, compañero Stalin.”
57
  
And after the Spanish conflict was over Cuban Communists were still complaining that 
Trotskyists attacked the Republican government of Spain.  They grouped Trotskyists and 
anarchists, even conflating the two into a single category: anarcho-Trotskyists (“elementos 
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anarco-trotskistas”).  Both were targets of critical Communist assessment in May 1939 as the 
P.C.C. contemplated Cuban volunteers returning and Spanish refugees arriving from Spain.  
Cuban Communists tried to keep individuals they believed to be Spanish Trotskyists from 
disembarking on the island because they were considered dangerous to the revolution,
58
 and 
created a list of individuals of interest, commenting on their ideological and political positions.  
One man in the group they considered, Augusto Campos, for example, was an “[e]lder anarchist 
element,” an “[o]ld convinced fighter imprisoned many times in different countries,” while 
another, Pedro Fajardo, lacked “true anarchist formation, although he says he sympathizes with 
it.”
59
  Some in the group were allied with the C.N.T. and F.A.I., at least one, a “Del Toro” whose 
given name and first surname the Communists did not know, with the Partido Obrero de 
Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification, or P.O.U.M.).  Negative 
assessments of these individuals illustrate an internal drive toward political disunity within the 
Communist Party; clearly, Cuban Communists felt it necessary to evaluate detractors and 
competitors and work actively to minimize their deleterious impact on the Party, separating them 
out from those they considered potential allies in a united front.  One man, Alvaro Cabal, for 
instance, they deemed “to be somewhat intellectual, and dangerous as an enemy of the P[arty].”  
Of another, José Pendás (a Cuban anarchist volunteer in Spain according to a different source),
60
 
they stated: “Be careful with this element.”  Disagreement with the Party could be based not only 
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on ideological allegiance but also on domestic Cuban concerns: The abovementioned Pedro 
Fajardo, who lacked “true anarchist formation” according to the Communists, exhibited 
dissatisfaction with the Party in 1939 on account of its political shift to a policy of collaboration 
with Batista.  Communists combined condemnations of personal faults and political ones.  One 
individual, Armando González (a Cuban volunteer in the Centuria Guiteras according to a 
different source),
61
 they claimed, was “[w]ithout true ideology, without a formed political 
consciousness, of very low moral character with sexual aberrations,” in short, a “bad element.”  
An “adventurer,” Jesús Hevia, they deemed not very dangerous politically.  A group of young 
men they assessed, perhaps somewhat condescendingly, as “good boys” lacking “true political 
ideology.”  And of one anarchist leader, Julio Constantino Cavarrocas (elsewhere written 
“Cabarrocas”),
62
 they felt it important to note—without comment, but perhaps with commentary 
implied—that he was a “mulatto” with a female companion who was Spanish.  Predictably, those 
among the “anarcho-Trotskyist elements” whom the Communists assessed favorably tended to 
be those who were least anticommunist.  For example, one, José García,
63
 whom they considered 
a “good element” had been positively influenced by the Party, Communists believed, and had 
spoken “in defense of unity with us, and against sectarianism.”  Of a young C.N.T. militant—a 
son of Cubans born in Galicia named Oscar Jaime Portela—the Communists stated: “Is serious, 
good morals, and we do not consider him dangerous, since he is fairly quiet and has not made 
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demonstrations against our P[arty].”  Individuals who had fought well for the Spanish Republic 
also earned respect from the Communists despite their being of questionable political allegiance.  
And finally, always on the lookout for organizing opportunities, Communists assessed those 
members of the group they felt might be potential recruits.  Of these “compañeros who have no 
real ideology” they stated: “For these good, politically sound comrades, our concern must be to 




 Thus we see that even in the case of a group of individuals deemed to consist of enemies 
and competitors, Cuban Communists kept recruitment always in mind.  In order to achieve unity 
for the domestic struggle and to defeat fascism, Communists took action to build the unity they 
sought, both for the benefit of Cuba and of their Party.  They organized: “Our Party,” stated 
Luzardo, will work at “constructing pro-Unification committees.”  To this work, he continued, 
the P.C.C. would lend “our cells, sectional committees, etc.”
65
  The cause of the Spanish 
Republic was a powerful issue around which the P.C.C. organized for unity on the island.  Cuban 
Communists included a plan to aid Spain in their “Program of Action” outlined in a volume 
entitled “The Road to Popular Victory” (“El Camino de la Victoria Popular”) produced at the 
Tercera Asamblea Provincial de La Habana del Partido Comunista (Third Provincial Assembly 
of Havana of the Communist Party, the precise date of which is unknown, but which occurred in 
the autumn of 1938 or the early months of 1939, between the Munich Agreement and the end of 
the Spanish Civil War)—other causes considered alongside that of the Spanish Republicans were 
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those of the workers, the peasants, the unemployed, women, the population of color, youth, 
professionals, and artists, as well as mastering the electoral process and growing and 
strengthening the Party.  The Spanish Popular Army relied on the strength of the people and, the 
Communists insisted with what must have been forced optimism following the Munich 
Agreement, both had never been stronger and were ready to defeat fascism and win the war.  
Despite this strength, they noted a bit more realistically, a show of international solidarity in the 
form of products sent was “necessary and essential” to sustain the millions of people in loyalist 
territory.  Material aid to Spain from Cuba should consist of sugar and tobacco, Communists 
asserted.  They believed, in true Cuban spirit, that “each and every heroic miliciano” should have 
cigars to smoke and enough sugar, important items among “everything necessary to defeat 
fascism.”  They urged that 36,000 tons of sugar be sent from Cuba to the Spanish Republic.  
Additionally, they singled out aid to Spanish children, the Cuban campaign for which many 
Communists supported.  Finally, they pledged to work “to reinforce the committees and 
organizations” devoted to aiding the Spanish Republic.
66
  We have seen already in Chapter 2 the 
central role Communists played in recruiting and supporting both Communist and non-
Communist volunteers from Cuba for the Republican cause.  These concrete efforts to send aid 
to Spanish Republicans represented a significant contribution that served also as an organizing 
method for the Party. 
 The P.C.C. grew dramatically during the years of the Spanish Civil War and the Cuban 
antifascist movement.  By one account, the Party had 2,800 in January 1938 (a reduction from 
the membership of 3,000–6,000 reported elsewhere for the early years of the decade
67
), 5,000 by 
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September, and 23,300 in February 1939.  Communists reported that 71% of these members 
were workers and just over 8% were peasants, meaning that a large majority of the membership 
came from the clases populares (popular classes).
68
  Another account put membership at 24,000 
in 1939 and noted also that the Party oversaw the reorganization of the national labor federation 
into the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (Workers Confederation of Cuba, or C.T.C.), an 
organization of 350,000 which “emerged as a source of enormous political influence” by the end 
of the decade.
69
  During these same few years, Cuban Communists entered into an alliance with 
Batista, and their growth has been attributed to the strongman’s legalization of the P.C.C. and 
allowance of its organizing work, particularly in labor.
70
  What role did antifascism and support 
for the Spanish Republic play in the Party’s growth in membership and influence, and in its 
alliance with Batista?  We turn now to this question and a consideration of the Communist role 
in the continuity of activism during the Pax Batistiana. 
 
 The Communists and Batista 
 In the midst of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic, Colonel Batista 
did an about-face.  As a member of the British embassy observed, the Colonel “has attained a 
dominant position by his work to establish order throughout the island and this brusque transition 
from the role of Military Governor to that of advanced social reformer has taken people by 
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  Having firmly established strongman governance between 1934 and 1936, by using 
the military to impose order on the island with violent repression, Batista now turned his 
attention from repression to reform.
72
  Many were surprised by his sudden “apparent 
transformation from reactionary to reformist,” but Batista interpreted his goal as consistent 
throughout.  At first he had to restore order, but even throughout the period in which he did, he 
retained his own beliefs and aspirations from the revolutionary moment of 1933 in which he had 
participated.  The Colonel stated: “Many want to forget that I am the chief of a constructive 
social revolution, and see me as a mere watch-dog of public order.  My idea of order is that of an 
architect rather than that of a police man.”
73
  Moving forward from the 1934–1936 period of 
severe repression, Batista courted various political groups and parties on the island, including 
two organizations long opposed to him: the Auténticos and the P.C.C.  He made no progress with 
Grau’s party, but found success in building an alliance with the Communists.  It was, in the 
words of one scholar, “a rather amazing turn of events.”
74
 
A series of concrete advances for the Cuban Communist Party signaled the establishment 
of the alliance.  In 1937 the P.C.C. front Partido Unión Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Union 
Party, or U.R.) gained legal status; in May 1938 the Communists secured permission to begin 
publishing a legal periodical; and in September 1938 the P.C.C., illegal since 1935, finally 
gained status as a legal political party on the island.
75
  Communist Party leaders campaigned for 
office.  The Party “adopted a reformist and openly collaborationist posture.  It acquired legality 
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in September 1938 and permission to organize labor and in return pledged to support Batista.”
76
  
The transaction seems simple: The P.C.C. gained legal status and a respite from persecution in 
exchange for delivering a working-class constituency to Batista.  How, though, does this 
assessment fit into the narrative of the Pax Batistiana, in which Cuban activists after March 1935 
were totally devastated?  Why, under such circumstances, would Batista need support from the 
Communists or a working-class constituency? 
Just as Cuban Communists had experienced a confluence of events at home and abroad 
that set them on an antifascist course in 1935, Batista’s transformation over the last few years of 
the 1930s resulted from a number of coincident factors both domestic and international.  Not 
wishing to go the way of Machado, the Colonel embraced a program of reform; having restored 
order by force, he then courted the support of the clases populares he had repressed; and feeling 
pressure from the United States, he sought political legitimacy.  Unlike the Cuban elite and U.S. 
observers, Batista understood that dealing carefully with labor and leftist activism would be 
critical for any leader on the island in the era after Machado’s overthrow.  The early years of the 
decade had raised popular expectations, but real change had not come.  Despite the calm 
Batista’s crackdown achieved, there remained many reasons for discontent.  Labor and living 
conditions were still as bad as they had been before 1933.  Unemployment and 
underemployment were high, and the standards of living for both the working and middle classes 
were low.  A bad sugar crop, and other economic problems including rising unemployment and 
reductions in public employees’ salaries increased unrest in late 1937 and early 1938.  Though 
activist forces had been repressed, in other words, they had not been extinguished—in this 
atmosphere, the Colonel understood that he might share Machado’s fate.  Batista did not have 
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confidence that the Pax Batistiana on the island would endure.  Additionally, he worked within 
an international context.  He needed to retain the support of the United States, and he was 
influenced by momentum in favor of reform across the Americas.  Thus, if he was going to retain 
power for the long term, he needed to present himself as a reformer, legitimize his political role, 
and win over the masses.   
Batista’s negotiation of this complex political terrain reveals the tension apparent in the 
Pax Batistiana narrative.  On the one hand, organized labor and leftist political groups were 
disillusioned, disorganized, and defeated after the March 1935 strike.  On the other, the popular 
activism of the early 1930s had forever changed Cuba, and Batista found himself having to court 
the very people he had repressed in order to gain political legitimacy in the late years of the 
decade.  The disillusion, disorganization, and defeat of activism post-March 1935 are well 
documented and undeniable.  Yet it seems that the activists retained important power which 
Batista felt compelled to take seriously.  How do we account for the evident continuity? 
One possibility is that the defeat of the island’s activists was not quite so thorough.  The 
Communist Party was in fact gaining momentum, strength, and influence even before its alliance 
with Batista, due at least in part to its leadership role in Cuban antifascism.  Communist 
publications of the period hint at the terms of the agreement between Batista and the Party, and 
suggest that the Communists negotiated if not on equal footing than at least with confidence in 
their political weight.  Following the establishment of the alliance, Communists commented in a 
predictably positive manner on the Colonel’s “democratic steps” and his “democratic and 
popular orientation.”
77
  Roca stated publicly in 1938 that the P.C.C.’s support of Batista was 
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meant to highlight the Cuban people’s desire “to unite against fascism, for democracy, for better 
living conditions, for the development of our economy, [and] for the consolidation of our 
independence.”  His public statements did not simply list pleasant-sounding talking points, 
however; the P.C.C. Secretary General sought to hold the Colonel accountable.  With its 
“thousands of militants,” he stated, the Party sought from Batista “the culmination of that which 
is started” and “the realization of all his promises.”
78
  Colonel Batista, stated an editorial in 
Mediodía, “proclaims the legality of the Communist Party not as a concession but as a right.”
79
  
According to the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires at the time, during the period of Batista-Communist 
alliance, the Party, though “relatively small,” had “growing strength and prestige.”  Its leaders 
were “capable, energetic men and include[d] some of the best political brains of the country,” the 
U.S. official reported to the Secretary of State.  They were “able and inspiring leaders, excellent 
orators.”  And these leaders could produce measurable results for Batista: “Strict discipline 
among its members,” wrote the Chargé d’Affaires, had enabled the Party “to steal the show in 
any public rally, in contrast to the poor attendance by members of the other loosely-organized 
political groups.”
80
  Cuban Communists could rally the masses for the Colonel, literally and 
figuratively.  They saw their efforts as responsible for “the extension, in the popular masses, of 
the positive position regarding Batista.”  In return, they expected “the growth of the authority of 
our Party, which is already a national political factor of prime importance.”
81
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Also, disunity was not complete in the period after 1935, thanks in large part to 
Communist organizing.  Though it is true that no Popular Front government coalesced in Cuba, 
antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic on the island constituted a Popular Front 
movement.  Occurring just after the change in Comintern policy, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
in the autumn of 1935 provided a perfect opportunity for the P.C.C. to engage the Cuban public 
and other activists in anticolonial and antifascist outrage and organizing.  The onset of conflict in 
Spain proved to be an even more popular cause on the island.  Antifascism and support for the 
Spanish Republic—in which the Communist Party played an important role—provided 
continuity of Cuban activism through the difficult period after March 1935.   
The impact of the movement could be observed in Batista himself.  Having remained 
neutral in the Spanish conflict, due in large part to pressure from the United States to adhere to 
the Non-Intervention Agreement (we have seen that his enforcement of neutrality on the island 
caused many on the left to accuse him of aiding right-wing forces at home and in Spain), Batista 
began, over the same period, to move toward antifascism.  That he did so over the last few years 
of the 1930s, of course, kept him in step with the United States and other large democracies.  The 
change, however, also had domestic motivations.  As Batista courted Communists and the clases 
populares, engaged as they were in antifascism and support for the Spanish Republic, he 
necessarily moved closer to the movement as well.  A December 1938 article in the official 
periodical of the Comintern stated that Cuba’s sugar oligarchs and Francoist/Falangist forces on 
the island were becoming increasingly hostile to the strongman.
82
  Reactionary forces on the 
island decried Batista’s legalization of the P.C.C.  The acolytes of Hitler and Mussolini in Cuba, 
stated an editorial in Mediodía, declared that they would combat the Communist Party’s 
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legalization.  Their doing so, stated the opinion piece, made clear that “the laws of the [Cuban] 
Republic do not signify anything to these advocates of organized violence.”  Under the pretext of 
combating Communism, the article argued, reactionaries disobeyed the law—and by so doing, 
they threatened peace.  “Those who provoke war,” the piece quoted Batista as saying, “will find 
us ready to defend peace.”
83
  This editorial positioned the Cuban Communists as legitimate, law-
abiding keepers of the peace, allied with Batista against domestic reactionaries and foreign 
fascists.  From late in 1938 on through the early 1940s the alliance between Cuban Communists 
and Batista would be an antifascist one, as antifascism on the island moved from its era of 
popular mobilization to that of officially sanctioned national policy. 
The beginning of the alliance of Batista and the P.C.C. coincided with the end of the fight 
for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War.  In September 1938, as the Cuban Communists gained 
full legality, the Communist-led International Brigades were pulling out of Spain and Republican 
defeat approached.  Over the first few months of 1939, Franco’s Nationalists swept through the 
remaining Republican-held parts of Spain and achieved final victory.  Meanwhile, the newly 
legalized Cuban Communists looked ahead to the looming threat of world war and related 
changing antifascist circumstances to their ongoing domestic struggle.  They left far behind them 
prior condemnations of Yankee imperialism and Batista’s fascism, and moved toward the 
moderate, mainstream, officially sanctioned antifascist collaboration that would become the 
Allied Forces in World War II.
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 In July 1939 Blas Roca attended a conference of American Communist Parties in New 
York City that produced a manifesto outlining Communist antifascism in the hemisphere.  
Representatives from the Parties of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela 
determined as their goal “finding improved methods for cooperation among all democratic forces 
in our hemisphere for struggle against aggression by the fascist powers and for the defense of 
peace and the freedom of our peoples.”  Latin American Communists pledged antifascist 
cooperation with not only the Anglo-American people but also the Roosevelt government.
85
  
Batista, too, continued to seek cooperation with the U.S. administration during this time, and 
Communists chose to interpret his doing so in a positive light within the Popular Front context.  
After a trip to the United States in October and November 1938 the Colonel’s return to Havana 
was met by a mass rally organized by the Cuban government, attended by 3,000 Communists 
“who, waving red flags and holding clenched fists in the air, chanted, ‘Democracy! 
democracy!’”
86
  Commenting on the Colonel’s trip, U.S. Communist leader Ford told Cubans it 
was “an example of how democratic cooperation can be supported.”
87
  Roca called F.D.R. a 
“great democrat” and expressed his hope that out of the U.S. President’s meeting with the Cuban 
leader would come “a strengthening of democracy in Cuba, a strengthening of the democratic 
steps of Colonel Batista,” and “a greater cooperation between the people of Cuba and the United 
States against this worldwide threat which is Nazism.”  We, the Cuban Communist leader stated 
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in November 1938, wish to tell the democratic government of Mr. Roosevelt that we are ready to 
fight the Nazis.
88
   
Over the period from the legalization of the P.C.C. and the Cuban leader’s trip to the 
United States in the autumn 1938 through the official entrance of Cuba under the Coronel’s 
leadership into the Allied Forces in 1941, Batista was able to work with both the Cuban 
Communist Party and the Roosevelt administration.  Ties between these improbable allies were 
strengthened by antifascism.  Used as an organizing tool by the Cuban Communist Party during 
the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War, antifascism went on to become an 
important framework for collaboration between the Communists and Batista in both the domestic 
and international arenas.  We turn now to a discussion of the legacy of antifascism in Cuba 
following Republican defeat in Spain, beginning with the World War II period. 
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Cuban Antifascism After 1939 
 
In this study we have come again and again to the same point: Republican defeat early in 
1939.  In so doing, we follow in the footsteps of countless pro-Republicans during the many 
decades since the conflict’s end who have rehashed what happened, what should have happened, 
what could have been, and what can be learned.  Notably, the Spanish conflict does not follow 
the old adage: “History is written by the victors.”  Due in large part to the ardent international 
support the Spanish Republic garnered, its memory did not fade despite decades of Franco’s rule 
in Spain.  Scholarship, public commemoration, and vibrant political debate within certain circles 
continue to focus on the war to this day.  The phrase ¡No Pasarán! stands alongside other icons 
of the twentieth-century international political left, such as the image of Ché Guevara, that elicit 
enough popular recognition to appear on t-shirts the world over.  Throughout this history, we 
have encountered numerous contemporary Cuban antifascist commentators who predicted that 
the struggle would continue, that the Spanish people and their international supporters could 
never truly be defeated—if popular historical memory can be considered a sufficient indicator, 
they were correct. 
To conclude, we consider here the ways in which antifascism and historical memory of 
the Spanish conflict functioned in Cuba in the years and decades following Republican defeat in 
1939.  We begin with the World War II years, during which several newly-established 
organizations tackled the threat of fascism, and antifascism on the island received official 
recognition and support.  Next, we examine the Cuban Revolution, considering the connections 
participants and observers drew between the Spanish conflict and the Revolution, the Cuban 




1960s, the interpretation and use on the island of historical memory of 1930s antifascism, and the 
diplomatic relationship between Cuba under Fidel Castro and Spain under Franco.  We consider 
the relationship members of Cuba’s 1930s antifascist generation had both with Spain and with 
their own government during their later years.  Lastly, we offer a few final thoughts, based on 
our findings in this study, on the relevance of antifascism and of transnational activism, networks, 
and solidarity to the present. 
 
World War II  An ifas is  “Ma ures”  
 In the United States prior to 1940, supporters of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War 
were among the first to publicly recognize the threat of fascism.  Activists from this era would 
come to be known as “premature antifascists,” suspected of being dangerous leftist radicals and 
in some cases harassed by various branches of the U.S. federal government during the war and 
beyond, most notably during McCarthyism.  In contrast, being an antifascist became politically 
sanctioned and socially acceptable in the United States just a few years later during World War II, 
as fascists became official enemies of the nation.  In Cuba, also, antifascism gained official 
acceptance beginning in 1940 when Batista became the democratically elected president of the 
island.  The circumstances, however, were quite different.  Pressure from the superpower to the 
north played a significant role in causing the Batista government to side with the Allies, but two 
other political realities figured into the new Cuban president’s calculations: his recent alliance 
with Cuba’s Communists and the widespread grassroots antifascism already established on the 
island during the Spanish conflict.  Historian Jorge Domingo Cuadriello summarizes: As a result 
of the agenda of its militant Communist allies, the demands of “broad democratic sectors of 




Roosevelt, Batista’s government “began to assume antifascist positions that, before the dynamics 
of the complex international situation, became more radical and manifested themselves not only 
in speeches and press statements but also in concrete acts.”
1
 
The series of antifascist acts by Batista’s government following his inauguration in 
October 1940 was swift and forceful.  Some precedent preceded Batista’s official ascension.  In 
conjunction with the government censure of groups on the left, Cuban officials had targeted 
overtly Francoist groups as early as December 1937; the Decreto Presidencial (Presidential 
Decree) No. 3411, which we have discussed elsewhere in relation to its impact on antifascist 
groups, made illegal any group with the fundamental function of providing moral or material aid 
for military conflicts in foreign countries.  The Cuban government ordered the Falange Española 
Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S. to close indefinitely in December 1937 in compliance with the 
new law; in April 1939 it cited the organization, once again ordering it to dissolve “for having 
violated with its conduct the oft cited Presidential Decree No. 3411.”
2
  Though this early 
governmental antifascist action is notable, the necessity of its renewal in 1939 indicates that it 
was ineffective.  Also in 1939, though the Cuban government recognized the Franco regime 
shortly after the end of the conflict, it maintained relations at the level of a  hargé d’affaires 
rather than an ambassador despite pressure from Franco supporters.  Early in 1940 the 
government shuttered the suspect right-wing organization Auxilio Social as a threat “against the 
stability of the Republic.”  After Batista’s inauguration, the Cuban government’s antifascist 
stance hardened and action intensified.  In January 1941, the Cuban Senate, with the approval of 
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the Minister of State, expelled for his allegiance to the Falange Genaro Riestra, Spanish consul 
general in Cuba.  Expulsions from the island followed over the next few years of a Spanish 
consul, of the inspector general of the Falange Exterior, and of the head of the Falange in Cuba.  
In 1941 a Tribunal de Urgencia (Provisional Court) charged the directors of various groups—
including the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S., which had apparently once 
again not ceased to exist as ordered in December 1937 and April 1939—with endangering the 
stability of the country.  Though the tribunal absolved nearly all of the accused individuals, their 
organizations were legally dissolved.  Other men found to have collaborated with Axis powers 




 Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 Cuba declared war 
against the Axis powers.  As a result, the Cuban government established diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union and cut ties with the Vichy government—in September 1944 the island 
would be the first Latin American nation to recognize the provisional republican government of 
France.  Also upon entering World War II on the side of the Allies, Cuba instituted obligatory 
military service and, copying its powerful northern neighbor, interned foreign nationals from 
Axis countries without proven antifascist credentials.  At the time, the island was home to 777 
Japanese, 1,330 Italians, and 3,484 Germans.
4
   
Some foreign nationals from Axis countries and their descendants participated in the 
officially sanctioned Cuban antifascism that burgeoned in the years following the end of the 
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Spanish Civil War.  A group of men and women all with Germanic names, for example, founded 
the Comité Alemán Antifascista (German Antifascist Committee) in 1943.  Like many antifascist 
organizations before it, the Comité claimed to be an organization without “any sense of partisan 
politics,” inclusive of diverse individuals, and “based in democratic ideals.”  Among its aims 
were: to assist the Allies against the Axis powers “alongside Batista, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, 
and Chiang Kai-shek,” as well as the United Nations; to give “moral and material aid to the 
global German anti-Nazi movement;” to fight for a free Germany and a free Europe; to combat 
“Fifth Column-ism,” the work of fascists in Cuba; to promote antifascist propaganda in German 
and Spanish; to foster national and international solidarity in order to defend liberty; and “to 
combat unconditionally anti-Semitism wherever this vile and stupid weapon of fascism manifests 
itself.”
5
  Like their Afro-Cuban and Hispanic-Cuban counterparts during the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War, these antifascist German-Cubans saw fascism during World 
War II as a threat globally, to their “homeland,” and to the island of Cuba. 
Preceding the Comité Alemán, Jewish Cubans had identified anti-Semitism as a danger in 
Cuba several years earlier, shortly after Republican defeat in Spain.  The Comité Central de las 
Organizaciones Hebreas de Cuba (Central Committee of Cuban Hebraic Organizations) issued 
an address to the people of Cuba in May 1939 warning of the threat posed by a “few isolated 
outbreaks of anti-Semitic ideas in our country.”  A radio program and a morning newspaper, they 
warned, had begun campaigns against Jewish immigration to the island.  Quick to uphold the 
principle of freedom of thought and to acknowledge Cuba’s need for a “policy of national 
protection,” they couched their plea in terms meant to appeal to Cuban nationalism.  Applying to 
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one race or religion the “most derogatory adjectives that the dictionary can contain,” they argued, 
“violates the Cuban principles of brotherhood.”  Cuba had one race and one nationality: Cuban.  
Equal within it were “white and black, Chinese and Spanish, Hebrew and Catholic.”  All were 
sons of Cuba.
6
  In this way, like other antifascists before them, Jewish Cubans concerned about 
fascism’s anti-Semitism infecting the island tried to connect with other Cubans by invoking 
nationalist sentiments and values.  And like the Comité Alemán and others, they warned their 
fellow Cubans that fascism posed a direct threat to them on the island, not just far away across 
the Atlantic. 
The Comité Alemán Antifascista operated under the umbrella of Cuba’s Frente Nacional 
Antifascista (National Antifascist Front).
7
  Founded in the summer of 1941, the Frente was 
representative of the “broad democratic sectors of Cuban society”
8
 against fascism.  The Comité 
Gestor (Managing Committee) counted among its members a formidable and diverse who’s-who 
of influential Cubans—politicians, intellectuals, labor and student activists, feminists, doctors, 
lawyers, and veterans of the War of Independence, both black and white, male and female, and 
representative of diverse political persuasions, parties, and connections—many of them 
committed antifascists prior to 1939.   
Table 8.1 Frente Nacional Antifascista Comité Gestor 
 
Dr. Gustavo Aldereguía    Dr. Ramón Miyar 
José Luis Amigo    Dr. Benjamin Muñoz Ginarte 
Dr. Alfredo Antonetti    Dr. Alfredo Nogueira 
Dr. Manuel Bisbé    Alfredo Padrón 
María Josefa Bolaños    Lázaro Peña 
Eduardo Cañas     Antonio Penichet 
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Dr. Pablo Carrera Jústiz    Hermenegildo Portuondo 
Dr. José Guadalupe Castellanos   José Antonio Portuondo 
Carlos Fernández Cabrera   Dr. José M. Pérez Lamy 
Edith García Buchaca    Ramón León Rentería 
Dr. Ramón García Pujol    Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez 
Dr. José Angel González Rubiera  Dr. Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring 
Dr. Angel Alberto Giraudy   Comandante Bernardo Sandó 
Eloy González     Dra. Clara Luz Sifontes 
Dr. Luis Grau Agüero    Ing. Gustavo Urrutia 
Nicolás Guillén     Dr. Manuel Antonio Varona 
Dr. Alejandro Ibarra    Dr. Alejandro Vergara 
Francisco Malpica    Luis Gómez Wangüemert 




The Frente’s mission was “to fight in an organized manner against the political tendencies called 
Nazism, Fascism, and Falangism, to defend democracy and manage support for all peoples 
fighting against Nazi-Fascism.”  The organization sought to provide economic, military, and 
moral aid to antifascist causes.  Like the German committee, the Frente Nacional Antifascista 
organized to fight the threat at various levels: against fascist tendencies and agents in Cuba, 
alongside the Allies against the Axis powers, with the U.N. coalition, and in any place on earth 
where people fought fascism.
10
   
The scope of the agendas of both the Comité Alemán and the Frente Nacional signified 
the culmination within a new historical context of the longstanding Cuban antifascist movement.  
With western great powers and the Cuban government finally engaged in the struggle, Cuban 
antifascists moved beyond the passionate but modest goals of grassroots organizing to grander 
aspirations of participation on the international stage at the highest levels.  Cuban antifascism 
before 1939 had enjoyed widespread popular support and significant successes despite domestic 
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repression and international indifference.  The movement’s tenacious struggle of the 1930s laid 
the groundwork for its official debut in 1940. 
Meanwhile, many longtime Cuban antifascists continued to work for the cause in local, 
practical ways.  Groups we have studied, such as Cuba’s Masonic lodges and anarchist 
organizations, welcomed and assisted Spanish Republicans fleeing Franco, work facilitated by 
relationships and networks previously established with their Spanish brethren.
11
  Records of the 
Cuban Registry of Associations indicate that in 1940, 1942, and 1944 Cuban veterans of the 
Spanish Civil War founded their own antifascist organizations.
12
  The Asociación Cultural de 
Ex-Combatientes Antifascistas (Cultural Association of Antifascist Ex-Combatants), founded in 
June 1940 and headed by veterans Julio Constantino Cabarrocas (elsewhere written 
“Cavarrocas”) and Alberto Monteagudo Seoane, sought to organize not only veterans but also 
“all youth of both sexes, without racial distinction, who are antifascists and who feel social 
concerns with desires to overcome.”  The organization’s bylaws prohibited political and religious 
propaganda and threatened with expulsion any member trying to impose his ideology on others.  
Several of the identifiable members listed in the Association’s file were anarchists, and it seems 
as though the majority of the group may have had this political orientation.
13
  The group included 
                                                     
11
 Domingo Cuadriello, El exilio, 63–64.  
12
 See also: Domingo Cuadriello, El exilio, 62. 
13
 Julio C. Cabarrocas and Alberto Monteagudo, “Reglamento,” 5 June 1940, and Cabarrocas, “Acta de 
Constitución,” 20 June 1940, Asociación Cultural de Ex-Combatientes Antifascistas, Expediente 6951, 
Legajo 257, Fondo Registro de Asociaciones, ANC.  Members listed are: Alberto Monteagudo [Seoane], 
Manuel Romero, Julio C[onstantino] Cabarrocas, Gustavo Rodríguez [Malagamba], Abelardo Iglesia[s 
Saavedra], Oscar Gonzalez, Pedro Fajardo [Boheras], Francisco Villanueva, Orlando [León] Lemus, 
Martinez Cubielle, Antonio Torres, and Tito Peña [López].  According to Domingo Cuadriello, the 
majority of members were anarchists. Domingo Cuadriello, El exilio, 62, 64.  Frank Fernández, historian 
of Cuban anarchism, lists the following of these group members as anarchists who fought for the 




Spanish Republican refugees as well.
14
  The Formación de Excombatientes Antifascistas (Group 
or Squad of Antifascist Ex-combatants) was founded in October 1942 and headed by veterans 
Norberto Hernández Nodal and Mario Alvarez Izquierdo.  The large majority of members were 
Cuban veterans of the Republican forces during the Spanish conflict, and they stated the group’s 
mission as “exclusively antifascist.”
15
  They welcomed other veterans—both Cuban and those 
from the rest of America’s nations—to join their organization, along with any antifascist 
properly recommended by two veterans or two active members of a recognized antifascist 
organization in Cuba.  They took as their mission the “development of a collective war morale,” 
the “establishment of a national economy adequate for the development of the war plan,” 
struggle against “the fifth column” of fascists in Cuba, and raising funds “by all licit means” to 
support “the Democratic Cause.”
16
  Twenty-six members of the group gathered in November 
1942 to vote on officers.
17
  The organization was politically diverse.  Some of those listed as 
having attended the election were among the anarchist members who were previously or 
concurrently part of the Asociación Cultural de Ex-Combatientes Antifascistas; some were 
Communist Party members.  The inclusion of members of the Asociación founded in 1940 in the 
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Formación founded in 1942 indicates that the former may have split or dissolved; likewise, 
members of the first two organizations showed up again in the rosters of the Asociación de Ex-
Combatientes Anti-Fascistas Revolucionarios (Association of Revolutionary Antifascist Ex-
Combatants) founded in September 1944.  Intended to bring together as members both Cuban 
veterans and Spanish refugees of the war, the new organization borrowed language directly from 
the bylaws of the earlier two groups.
18
  When the Asociación elected officers in June 1946 
members elected as president Gustavo Rodríguez Malagamba, anarchist member of both of the 
previous groups, and as vice president Norberto Hernández Nodal, who reported being a member 
of the Communist Party in 1937, served as president of the Formación founded in 1942, and 
would go on to die in the anti-Batista attack on the Cuban Presidential Palace in March 1957.
19
 
Prominent scholars of Cuban history have dismissed Cuban antifascism based upon 
assessments of the Spanish Civil War and World War II periods as having been “liberal,” 
indicative of a move away from the vibrant grassroots political radicalism of the struggle against 
Machado and the years leading up to the disastrous strike of March 1935, and part of a general 
atmosphere of “defeatism” and “demoralization” among activists.  Those activists who remained 
revolutionary, they argue, took their efforts off the island, departing from the domestic struggle 
by traveling to Spain.
20
  In these interpretations, Cuban antifascism of the late 1930s and early 
1940s is either homogenously moderate or located outside of Cuban political activism.  Though 
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the extent of Cuban antifascism’s impact on the island’s broader political scene is certainly 
debatable, the assessment of it as simply moderate or foreign is incorrect.  Throughout the 
present study, we have seen that Cuban antifascism prior to 1939 was both politically diverse and 
in many ways a continuation of domestic political struggles.  Here, we see that although 
antifascism came to be officially recognized and supported on the island in the international 
context of World War II beginning in 1940 due to Batista’s newfound commitment and Cuba’s 
formal alliance with the Allies the following year—and therefore could be said to have become 
more mainstream—it continued to encompass political diversity and activists continued to relate 
it to domestic concerns.  Many of the individual antifascist activists of the officially sanctioned 
movement during the 1940s were the same people who had made up the movement of the 1930s.  
Though it is true that Cuban political radicalism and revolutionary activism entered a period of 
relative dormancy during the 1940s, strong strands of continuity remained, 1930s antifascism 
important among them.  And these tendencies did not stay dormant in Cuba for long. 
 
The Cuban Revolution: Remembering, Assessing, and Utilizing 1930s Antifascism 
 U.S. foreign relations officer Wayne Smith recounted in his memoir an anecdote from the 
eve of the Cuban Revolution concerning historical memory of the Spanish conflict.  Sitting in a 
Havana nightclub in 1958 in the midst of revolutionary tumult but before the fall of Batista’s 
dictatorship, Smith felt the emotional energy and excited tension of the pro-rebel Cubans around 
him.  They were hopeful, but unsure of the extent to which they could safely test the limits of 
Batista’s control.  One man, Smith recalled, tipsy and unable to control himself in the charged 
and expectant atmosphere, leapt to his feet and began loudly singing a revolutionary song of the 




down with the dictator!”  A moment of fear gripped the people in the nightclub: Would Batista’s 
agents apprehend the man?  The waiters, Smith remembered, silenced the singer quickly and 
went around the bar insisting to other patrons that the dictator in question was Franco, not Batista.  
Evidently this explanation was sufficient, because the subversively celebratory reveling 
continued with no interference from authorities.  Batista’s forces either were not present, Smith 
concluded, or they believed the waiters’ explanation.
21
  In this instance, a man overcome with the 
future potential of the revolutionary moment in Cuba called upon the past in Spain.  He inserted 
the Republican cause of the Spanish Civil War as a substitute for the rebels’ cause in the Cuban 
Revolution.  In keeping with the longstanding tradition of interpreting the antifascist struggle as 
part of the Cuban domestic struggle, later supporters of the Revolution such as this man in the 
nightclub equated the two.  Assessment of Batista as a fascist dictator, while perhaps more fitting 
in 1958 than it had been in 1938, was also a longstanding tradition. 
 Whereas the Republican cause in Spain had lost, the Cuban rebels won.  Many of those in 
the international left who had suffered bitter disappointment upon the Spanish Republic’s defeat 
rejoiced at the triumph of the Cuban Revolution.  For example, U.S. nurse and Spanish Civil War 
veteran Fredericka Martin, whom we met during our discussion of volunteers in Spain, expressed 
this common sentiment to her Cuban doctor friend Eduardo Odio Pérez in 1970.  Though well 
aware of the kinds of complications and contradictions existent within Cuban revolutionary 
reality, as commentary elsewhere in her correspondence indicates, Martin saw the Cuban 
Revolution as a desirable outcome.  She wrote to her old friend and fellow veteran of the Spanish 
conflict: “And the picture of you in the parade moves me to say you are even more handsome 
than in your younger days.  And so much happier, having seen so many of your dreams come 
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true for your homeland and to have been able to help with the process.”  She contrasted the 
Cuban and U.S. experiences: “Of the sad condition of my homeland I shall not talk…it breaks 
my heart as you can well imagine.”
22
  A 1974 summary of the Cuban contribution to the Spanish 
Republican cause produced by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. made explicit a 
comparison between the Spanish conflict and the Cuban Revolution: “Inspired by the heroic 
example of Spain, the Cuban people carried on the cause of the Spanish revolution.  Cuba was 
the first of the Spanish-speaking countries to have a victorious socialist revolution.”  Soviet 
authors commented in particular on the military training Granma expeditionary participants 
received from Spanish Civil War veteran Alberto Bayo, the influence of the Spanish conflict on 
“the political consciousness of the young Ernesto Che Guevara,” and the significant symbolism 
of slogans from “the heroic battle of Madrid” for “revolutionary Cuba’s confidence in victory 
during the days of the Bay of Pigs.”  Expressing revolutionary optimism, they concluded: “The 
Cubans, who are so greatly indebted to the heroic struggle of the Spanish people, firmly believe 
that they too will win their struggle for freedom.”
23
  Scholar Alistair Hennessy drew a similarly 
direct connection between the Spanish conflict and the Cuban Revolution in his 1982 essay on 
Cuba for the book The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939: American Hemispheric Perspectives.  
The war in Spain was the great revolutionary failure of the first half of the twentieth century, he 
asserted, and the Cuban Revolution was the revolutionary triumph of the second half.  It is 
significant, he argued, that two such intertwined countries “provided the touchstone for 
revolutionary enthusiasm on a world-wide scale.”  He explored, as we have done, a number of 
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the ways in which the two countries were interconnected at the time on interpersonal, cultural, 
and intellectual levels.
24
  More recently, at a February 2011 march commemorating the Battle of 
Jarama, two observations I made personally struck me regarding a continued relevance of the 
connection between the Spanish Civil War and the Cuban Revolution for many contemporary 
leftists.  The first, which was subtle, was the sight of a marcher holding aloft the flag of the 
Spanish Republic and wearing an olive green cap with a patch depicting the Cuban flag sewn on 
one side.  The second, much more overt, was the impassioned speech of a very elderly Spanish 
man who had fought for the Republic.  One of a handful of surviving and relatively mobile 
native veterans of the conflict able to attend the rally at the end of the march, the man was asked 
by event organizers to say a few words.  He took the opportunity to speak at length and with 
great intensity in support of the Cuban Revolution.
25
 
As some Spanish Civil War veterans have celebrated the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban 
Revolution has celebrated some Spanish Civil War veterans.  Before, during, and after the Cuban 
rebels’ successful fight, living Spanish Civil War veterans could turn out to be villains or heroes 
from the point of view of Revolutionary leaders, or their role could be ambiguous.  Manuel Cala 
Reyes, Rolando Masferrer, and Rafael Chao Santana exemplify, respectively, the ambiguous, 
villainous, and heroic position a veteran of the Spanish conflict could assume relative to the 
Cuban Revolution.  Teté Casuso, whom we have followed throughout this study, exemplifies a 
committed antifascist from the 1930s who became intimately involved in the Revolution and 
Revolutionary government and then broke with it bitterly.  Examining the post-1939 trajectories 
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of these four individuals as examples and considering the official assessment of Spanish Civil 
War veterans during the early years of the Cuban Revolutionary government, we explore the 
complexities and contradictions of the oversimplified view discussed above; an equation or 
straightforward progression between the Spanish Civil War and the Cuban Revolution may seem 
intuitively correct, but the historical reality is much more complex.  Examining history at the 
intimate level of individuals allows us to explore this complexity.   
Veteran Manuel Cala Reyes, also known as “Niño” Cala, was an ambiguous participant 
in the Cuban revolutionary struggle of the 1950s.  A native of Santiago de Cuba, an agricultural 
worker, and an activist in the anti-Machado struggle, Cala was remembered alternately as “a 
professional revolutionary who did not agree with any government” and “an expert marksman 
with a notorious reputation as a gun-slinging gangster.”
26
  This combination of characteristics 
was common in politically involved individuals of Cuba during the 1940s and 1950s.  Batista 
officials killed Cala in Santiago de Cuba the morning after Fidel Castro led his attack on the 
Moncada in July 1953.
27
  In a list of “Martyrs of the Moncada” published by the island’s 
Revolutionary press, Cala is listed among the civilians killed.
28
  Despite this historical distinction, 
and his activism in the anti-Machado fight and service in the Spanish Civil War, “Niño” Cala 
does not seem to have received much attention or promotion from the Revolutionary government 
as a hero.  A contemporary observer of the Moncada attack commented later that he was “was 
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old and exhausted.  There was no need to kill him.  He was not involved in anything.”
29
  This 
dismissive assessment suggests that perhaps Cala was not in fact an active rebel supporter, and 
was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Alternately, the 1930s historical record hints, 
he may have been downplayed for being a somewhat unsavory character.  While in Spain, Cala 
caught the attention of officials for possible sexual impropriety, as noted in Chapter 2.  Already 
in his late forties, he had become enamored of a 14-year-old Spanish girl, and claimed to want to 
marry her.  The official report noted that he denied having had sexual relations with her, and 
stated in his defense that it was common for older men to marry girls of 14 or 15 in his country.  
After a confrontation, the report recorded, “little Maria” denied having told Cala that she was 
miserable at home and wanted to run away with him.  “When he tried to kiss her, she struggled 
and was embraced by force,” it stated.  Due to the fact that he was, in the report’s highly 
euphemistic terms, “a fanatical and incurable romantic,” officials proposed detention until 
repatriation.  The record does not indicate whether or not detention was in fact enforced.
30
  Such 
ambiguity of character reminds us of an important conclusion from our discussion of Cuban 
volunteers in the conflict: Individuals—even committed activists—had diverse backgrounds, 
personalities, values, and reasons for deciding to travel to Spain, some nobler than others, and 
their conduct there and beyond was as varied as they were. 
In 1968 a Cuban observer wrote to a friend who had served in Spain: “There were quite a 
few who fought for the Republic, came back to Cuba, and proceeded to fight for Batista.  The 
process of such a transformation took some time, of course, and was not quite so simple; but that 
was its final outcome.”  Among these, she noted, was “the notorious Rolando Masferrer, a war 
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criminal, head of the ‘Tigres de Masferrer.’”
31
  Rolando Masferrer Rojas is arguably Cuba’s 
most infamous Spanish Civil War veteran.  The subject of a good deal of intrigue and 
speculation in non-academic sources, Masferrer has not garnered much scholarly attention—
brief mentions in the literature serve generally to illustrate either the political gangsterism of the 
1940s or the brutality of Batista’s government during the 1950s.  However, historian of the 
Spanish Republican exile in Cuba Domingo Cuadriello provides a useful biographical summary 
in a footnote.
32
  A leftist political activist beginning in his teenage years, Masferrer traveled to 
Spain as a volunteer at the age of 18, where he was shot in the leg and left with a limp.  A 
Communist during the 1930s and early 1940s, he worked for the party newspaper Noticias de 
Hoy (Today’s News) while studying for a law degree at the Universidad de La Habana, where he 
won a prestigious award for outstanding students.  He was a co-founder in 1945 of the 
newspaper Tiempo en Cuba (Cuban Times), which, under his direction and after his expulsion 
from the Communist Party that same year, served as both an anti-Franco and anticommunist 
vehicle that criticized Batista prior to the 1952  ou  d’é a  and later went on to become a 
journalistic voice supportive of his regime.  Masferrer was a well-known leader of a grupo de 
acción during the 1940s, a participant in the unsuccessful Cayo Confites expedition to oust 
Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1947, and a representative of the Province of 
Oriente elected in 1948.  When Batista’s coup succeeded, Masferrer took a group of his men—
“including, curiously, the ex-colonel of the Spanish Republican Army Valentín González 
(Campesino),” according to Domingo Cuadriello—to the Universidad “to take part in the armed 
defense of the constitutional system of the country.”  They departed when it became clear that 
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the ousted Auténticos were not going to fight.  Once President Carlos Prío Socarrás fled the 
country and Batista took over Masferrer became a supporter of the new leader.  In 1954 he was 
elected as a senator for Oriente Province.
33
  Described as a “political gangster”
34
 and a “Batista 
henchmen,”
35
 Masferrer was most notorious for his leadership of the brutal ‘Tigers’ mentioned 
above, a “paramilitary gang known for its crimes”
36
 and essentially Masferrer’s private army of 
approximately 2,000 men.
37
  There existed a longstanding animosity between Masferrer and 
Fidel Castro, his “personal enemy” dating back to Castro’s days as a university student in 
Havana.
38
  The offices of Tiempo en Cuba were ransacked during the triumph of the 
Revolution,
39
 and some claim that Castro was responsible for Masferrer’s death by car bomb in 
Miami in 1975.
40
  In one scholarly assessment, historian of Cuba Hugh Thomas opines 
generously that Masferrer’s trajectory made him “a man of great wasted talent.”
41
  Domingo 
Cuadriello concludes that his life “constitutes a strange and contradictory case of intelligence, 
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personal courage, and thuggery.”
42
  In any case, he certainly did not earn the rank of celebrated 
Spanish Civil War veteran in Revolutionary Cuba.  Interesting in relation to the use of historical 
memory of the Spanish conflict is the fact that Masferrer got left out when compilation for 
publication of the official Cuban lists of veterans of the Spanish conflict took place.
43
 
The Cuban Revolutionary government did not hesitate to make Spanish Civil War 
veteran Rafael Chao Santana into a hero, awarding him numerous medals of honor.
44
  A native of 
Havana who was born in 1916 who worked as a tintorero (dyer or drycleaner), Chao Santana 
joined the Communist Party in Cuba in the 1920s.
45
  In Spain, the Central Committee of the 
P.C.E. assessed his conduct as good, disciplined, serious, and valiant.  It noted that he was well 
respected among his comrades and called him a “good communist.”
46
  After spending time in a 
concentration camp at the conclusion of the Spanish conflict, he sailed to Cuba on the ship 
Orduna in May 1939, along with almost two hundred other returnees.
47
  Chao Santana joined the 
26
th
 of July Movement during the anti-Batista struggle of the 1950s.  Having met Fidel Castro in 
Miami, he traveled to Mexico, voyaged on the Granma, and fought in the Sierra Maestra.
48
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Though he would not become a member of the central heroic group of Spanish Civil War 
veterans most actively and publicly celebrated by the Cuban Revolutionary government 
(discussed below), Chao Santana enjoyed the benefits of a positive assessment of his credentials 
by the state.  For example, as a member of the Agrupación de Veteranos Internacionalistas 
Cubanos (Association of Cuban Internationalist Veterans), he was among those elderly Spanish 
Civil War volunteers to travel to Spain in 1996 for a commemoration of Cuban participants.
49
 
Antifascist and Spanish Civil War widow Teté Casuso worked within and then broke 
publicly with the Cuban government following the triumph of the Revolution.  Vehemently 
against Batista since the years leading up to the March 1935 strike, Casuso compared him to 
Franco in reference to his 1952 coup.  Like the Spanish dictator, she wrote, Batista in 1952 “set 
himself up as Chief of State—despite the fact that the deposed government of Prío had been an 
absolutely democratic one.”
50
  Teté lived in Mexico during the 1950s Batista regime, having lost 
any will for political activism.  In the summer of 1956 she saw in a newspaper that a group of 
Cubans had been imprisoned in Mexico as a result of having been caught training for an 
expedition to overthrow Batista, training they received, as noted above, from former Spanish 
Republican Army captain Alberto Bayo, “a pleasant, harmless man in his sixties” in Teté’s 
memory.  “I smiled bitterly,” she recalled, upon reading about the would-be revolutionaries.  She 
had little hope for these young prisoners, but, she stated, their “illusions, so remote from reality, 
touched me,” and she decided she wanted to meet them.  Aware of the historical memory of her 
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own political involvement among such activists of the era, and somewhat boastfully, she recalled 
the reaction of Fidel Castro and his compatriots to her arrival: “Fidel began calling over his 
comrades and introducing them to me.  Most of them knew of me and my past, largely through 
Pablo’s writings or from what they had heard about us.  Fidel was moved by my visit. …  He 
said he felt deeply honored that I, with all I symbolized in Cuba, had come to see them.”
51
  What 
did she symbolize in Cuba?  A revolutionary past, but one she distinguished with some degree of 
disappointment from the revolutionary future brewing in 1956.  With the exception of Fidel and 
his closest associates, the men in that Mexican prison were “much humbler and cruder” than the 
activists of Teté’s youth, she assessed.  “Their language was coarse, and from the things they 
said I thought some of them irresponsible.”  Nevertheless, Casuso’s encounter with Castro and 
his men set her life on a new course.
52
  She would go on to become a close friend and personal 
caretaker of the revolutionary leader. 
 Describing her state of mind at the beginning of her friendship with Fidel Castro, Casuso 
expressed an experienced activist’s bit of wisdom: “For revolutions, enthusiasm is essential, and 
this I did not have.”  She was cautious, weathered by many old disappointments.  Of Castro, she 
commented: “I had known so many like him whose dreams had been shattered by life’s realities.”  
Of his revolutionary exuberance, she wrote:  
I could not easily surrender to his ardor and confidence—I had seen too much of that.  I 
would not lightly accept a ‘messiah,’ a ‘savior of Cuba.’  I had known many people of 
high quality to compare him with, and enough of low quality to be on my guard.  And I 
was in a discouraged frame of mind.  Knowing my people’s mood, and the spirit of 
irresponsibility to which it had abandoned itself, I was unable to believe in it once more 
and to hope for a resurgence of heroism at the signal of another would-be liberator.
53
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In this statement, Casuso illustrated that a continuity of effort was not easy or straightforward for 
all 1930s antifascist activists.  The devastation of defeat and personal loss both in Spain and in 
the domestic struggle turned many away from politics altogether; only the very closest contact 
with the new revolutionary leader brought Teté back from her apolitical existence.  Castro 
organized her, asking her to describe the compatriots and experiences of her political youth, 
working to rekindle her enthusiasm, and asking no commitment from her during their first 
private conversation.  She admitted that she “was eager to be convinced by him,” though she 
expressed a great deal of skepticism about the chances he and his “naïve” companions had for 
success, and “felt a kind of pity” for Castro in reaction to his “confidence and firm conviction.”  
She compared him to an “irresponsible, irrepressible child.”  Nevertheless, Castro was a skilled 
organizer who recognized in Teté someone he could reach.  She recalled that “during that long 
conversation I began to have a feeling of esteem for him and sympathy for his cause.  My past 
appeared to join with his present and with Cuba’s future.”  He reached her: “Even before he left, 
I had already more or less decided to help him all I could.”  Castro returned the next day, and this 
time, he asked if he might store “a few things in her home”—a few things turned out to be seven 
carloads of weaponry.  He proceeded, she recalled, to “take possession of my house.”  She had 
cast her lot with the revolutionaries.
54
 
 Jailed for a time in Mexico for storing weapons, Teté was undeterred.  She continued to 
help the revolutionaries in Mexico, losing her lease and many of her possessions in the process.  
When, on New Year’s morning 1959, she got the news of Batista’s flight from Cuba, her 
reaction was shaped once again by her revolutionary past: “I felt only a kind of sad emptiness.  
Nothing seemed to affect me any more.  I was accustomed to winning and losing, to rising and 
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  Nevertheless, she sprang into action, seemingly by rote, securing the 
Cuban embassy in Mexico to rid it of symbols of Batista and protect it from vandalism at the 
hands of enthusiastic revolutionary exiles.  Back in Cuba, Castro appointed her ambassador-at-
large.  She worked for the Revolutionary government until October 1960, when she asked Castro 
to fire her rather than resigning.
56
  At that time, she denounced his government in the U.S. press 
while still expressing some fondness for him personally.
57
  In her memoir, she described her 
feelings for him during the period leading up to her break with his government as remaining 
intensely affectionate, yet she found him changed after his time in the mountains and suffered 
many frustrations with his management of both Cuba and those around him.  Her writings hint at 
the role her activist history may have played in the distance that grew between them.  Symbolism 
of the revolutionary past was still important, but perhaps the reality of individuals from that past 
was uncomfortable or dangerous to the Revolution.  At times, Casuso felt Castro “staring fixedly 
at me with actual hostility.  Of what did I remind him,” she asked, “I, a silent witness of the time 
when he was not yet the great Fidel Castro?”  Or perhaps, we may imagine, of an even earlier 
time when great revolutionaries fought heroically before Castro was even a grown man?  
Consistently, Casuso described her view of Castro as that of an adult looking at a child, “an 
outstanding child—outstanding, but, still, a child.  This was not the sort of reaction he was used 
to.”
58
  Here we glimpse the difficult complexity a living, breathing veteran of 1930s Cuban 
antifascism could present to the new revolutionary leaders.  Clearly, these men and women had 
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significance; but what would be their role in the new Revolution?  Could they prove useful, or 
were they dangerous? 
 A formal assessment of Cuban veterans of the Spanish Civil War took place during the 
very early period following the triumph of the Revolution.
59
  It is clear that the Cuban 
Communist Party played a substantial role in the effort, though most of the individuals or offices 
involved remain anonymous in the archive.  Incomplete and disorganized, the records of this 
effort available at the Instituto de Historia de Cuba (Institute of History of Cuba) comprise 
nevertheless a fascinating and sometimes chilling body of source material on 1930s antifascism 
in Cuban Revolutionary historical memory. 
 Information was recorded on a card for each Spanish Civil War veteran accounted for by 
the Revolutionary government.  Some cards had only the person’s name; some included a small 
headshot; and some gave further information about the person: his service in Spain, his trajectory 
since 1939, and/or his current status regarding place of residence, employment, and/or political 
engagement.  Many stated simply: “His whereabouts are unknown.”  Others, however, provided 
Revolutionary commentary on the individual.  Mario Alvarez Izquierdo, for example, one of the 
leaders of the Formación de Excombatientes Antifascistas founded in 1942, was listed as a 
secretary general of the port workers union, a “Mujalista” (a follower of anti-communist labor 
leader Eusebio Mujal), and, as of 1963, an exile.  About Manuel Rivero Setien, member of the 
later group Asociación de Ex-Combatientes Anti-Fascistas Revolutionarios, the card stated that 
he had been a bad combatant in Spain, that in Cuba he had been a Representative to the House 
for the Auténticos, that he “participated in all the shamelessness of that epoch,” and that he was 
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at present in Miami.  In other cases, the cards revealed a more dramatic end than exile.  Hector 
Morales Muñoz was listed as “currently imprisoned,” and Armentino Feria Pérez and Eufemio 
Fernández Ortega as having been executed.  Fernández Ortega’s record stated: “Executed [or 
shot] as a traitor, an agent of the C.I.A. in Cuba.”
60
  Another assessment document called each of 
these three men a “traitor” and noted that the latter two were executed.  (This document listed 
thirteen “traitors” among 167 veterans accounted for.)
61
  A third stated, regarding both Feria 
Pérez and Fernández Ortega: “Executed [or shot] by the Rev.  TRAITOR.”
62
   
 Other veterans received more favorable evaluations by the Revolutionary government.  
About Casimiro Jimenez, for instance, the assessment read: “His performance in Spain was good. 
Currently he holds up well politically.”  Similarly, that of Manasés Romero Salicrup stated: “His 
performance in Spain was good.  He remains with the Revolution.”  Eduardo Sosa’s read: 
“Currently works in the port of Havana.  His performance in Spain was good.”
63
 
The government was unable to locate information about the majority of the veterans, but 
not for lack of trying.  An undated report by veteran Federico Chao Rodríguez chronicles his 
travels through the provinces of Villa Clara and La Habana seeking out “ex-combatants of the 
antifascist war of Spain.”  A member of the Communist Party of Cuba beginning in 1932, Chao 
Rodríguez was, apparently, assigned the job of tracking down his fellow veterans of the Spanish 
conflict for assessment by the Revolutionary government.  For example, he found Rafael Chao 
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Santana, discussed above: “[W]e managed to locate the compañero Rafael Chao Santana, 
expeditionary of the Granma and Sierra Maestra fighter,” he recounted.  His report demonstrates 
the seriousness of the effort, but also its limitations.  In the province of Villa Clara, for example, 
Chao Rodríguez found only one volunteer who had died in combat, three who had died following 
the war—“excluding Rivero Setien, who died in Miami”—and three survivors.  The note 
regarding the omission of Rivero Setien, whose negative assessment we discussed above, 
indicates an intentional exclusion from the historical record of those Spanish Civil War veterans 
deemed unworthy by the Cuban Revolutionary government.  His name, like Masferrer’s, is 
omitted from official lists of veterans prepared for publication in the two major Cuban books on 
the subject (discussed below).
64
  Chao Rodr guez’s report describes the way in which the search 
for veterans got channeled by the Cuban Communist Party.  He sought out local Communist 
contacts, such as fellow longstanding Communist and veteran Manuel Corcho Díaz in Villa 
Clara, who then coordinated the effort to find veterans in their area.  Upon leaving the province, 
Chao Rodríguez noted, he had established “a close bond” with the local Central Committee.  In 
the province of Havana, Chao Rodríguez reported, he coordinated with the man responsible for 
the history of the province to initiate “a thorough job” of seeking information “at all levels” of 
the Cuban Communist Party.
65
 
The fact that revolutionary officials felt that such an assessment project was worth their 
time and resources during the first few years after the Revolution is indicative of the value they 
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placed on 1930s Cuban antifascism, and especially combat in the Spanish conflict.  The two 
most notable books on the subject published in Cuba—Cuba y la defensa de la República 
Española (1936–1939) (Cuba and the Defense of the Spanish Republic) produced by the Instituto 
de Historia del Movimiento Comunista y de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba in 1981 and Cuba 
en España: Una Gloriosa Página de Internacionalismo (Cuba in Spain: A Glorious Page in 
Internationalism) by Alberto Alfonso Bello and Juan Pérez Díaz in 1990—illustrated the way in 
which the Revolutionary government framed and used these elements of the island’s 1930s 
history.   
In 1981 Cuba y la defensa de la República Española compiled testimonies of selected 
surviving Cuban Spanish Civil War volunteers, biographical sketches of some both living and 
deceased, photographs and other images, reprints of a body of 1930s sources such as letters and 
published articles, and a lengthy though incomplete list of names of Cuban veterans.  It was, 
therefore, principally a collection of primary sources and remembrances of participants, not an 
analytical work.  The opening few pages, however, gave a sense of the viewpoint of the team of 
authors who produced the book for the Institute of History of the Central Committee of the 
Cuban Communist Party under the supervision of Ramón Nicolau González, the man put in 
charge by the Party of recruiting volunteers on the island for the International Brigades during 
the Spanish conflict.   
A quotation by Fidel Castro opened the work and set the tone.  Though his statement 
celebrated antifascism and internationalism generally in reference to Cuban support for the 
Spanish Republic during the conflict, it focused on the International Brigades and concluded by 
ascribing the entirety of the Cuban effort to the Communist Party.  Referring specifically to the 




noble and heroic contributions to the world revolutionary movement of our first Communist 
Party, who inspired this act of solidarity.”
66
   
A brief prologue providing the reader with historical context and some commentary 
followed Castro’s lead by highlighting the role of Communists and the Soviet Union, though it 
did include some more detail about the diversity of 1930s antifascism both internationally and in 
Cuba.  Like the present study, the prologue of Cuba y la defensa viewed the anti-Machado 
struggle as the foundation for Cuban antifascism and referenced the March 1935 strike as a 
critical point in the activism of the decade.  As we have seen, the strike and subsequent 
repression were formative not only for Communists but also for people across the political 
spectrum, many of whom interpreted the events within an international framework of fascist 
threat.  Considering this context for antifascism, the authors interpreted the continuity between 
the early anti-Batista and the anti-Franco struggles in terms they identified as Marxist-Leninist: 
“[I]t is well to remember the great Marxist-Leninist truth that, when applying firmly the principle 
of proletarian internationalism in helping other peoples fighting for their freedom, one defends 
simultaneously the freedom and interests of his own nation.”  Though Communists did certainly 
express this principle at the time, a belief in the global threat of fascism and in the importance of 
transnational solidarity in combatting that threat abroad and at home was hardly exclusive to 
Party members and Marxist-Leninists.  An explicitly pro-Communist interpretation is not, of 
course, surprising in a 1981 Cuban book produced by the Communist Party.  The commentary at 
the beginning of the volume skipped over, for instance, the alliance between Batista and the 
Cuban Communists in 1938, mentioning only “the legality of the Communist Party and other 
opposition parties to Batista in the summer of 1938” as a political victory that came as a 
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consequence of the popular political pressure exerted on the island by antifascist organizing.  In 
the case of Spain, the prologue credited the Spanish Communist Party and the Popular Front 
policy with the Republican electoral victory of 1936, the Soviet Union with being the Republic’s 
strongest ally, and international Communism with the mobilization of foreign volunteers.  These 
assertions are not false, but an emphasis on the Communist role downplays the contributions of 
others; however, the commentary in Cuba y la defensa did at least acknowledge explicitly the 
vital contributions of other “progressive sectors” and more broadly “all those who manifested 
themselves for democracy, social progress and peace, against fierce violence and war.”  
Similarly, the prologue ascribed the majority of antifascist work on the island to the Party, but 
recognized that the movement brought together “all the people against Batista and imperialism 
who now came to join the great public mobilizations of solidarity with the Spanish people.”  
Fascism, the authors emphasized, was a common enemy, a threat to the working class, to 
bourgeois democracy, and to colonized peoples.  These sectors came together in Cuba and 
worldwide to combat it, the authors acknowledged—though, like the activists of the 1930s, they 
were quick also to draw comparisons between the fascist and bourgeois democratic countries, 
mentioning the imperialism of England, France, and the United States.  Denouncing the 
meddling of Hitler and Mussolini in Spain to aid its traitors, they stated, was equivalent to 
denouncing the meddling of the United States in Cuba to aid Batista.
67
  Though the prologue 
does a solid job of discussing the antifascist contributions of non-Communists and the overall 
diversity of the anti-Batista struggle and of Cuban antifascism and support for the Spanish 
Republic, we know that the book’s producers omitted particular individuals deemed unworthy in 
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Revolutionary Cuba, and that they based omissions on explicitly Communist criteria within the 
Cuban Revolutionary context. 
In terms of the usefulness of 1930s antifascism to the Cuban present, the authors of Cuba 
y la defensa made the point strongly that contemporary and future generations in Cuba should 
learn from the antifascists of the 1930s.  This belief, they stated, motivated the publication of the 
book.  One central point they wanted readers to take away from the participation of Cubans in 
the Spanish conflict was its place in the island’s “internationalist tradition.”  This tradition, they 
noted, “in the conditions of the socialist Cuba of today” was “becoming extraordinarily gigantic 
bringing the encouragement and committed support of our people to Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.”
68
 
 Cuba’s tradition of internationalism was the central focal point of the second of the two 
major works produced in revolutionary Cuba on the history of Cuban antifascism and 
participation in the Spanish Civil War, as its title suggests.  Published in 1990, Cuba en España: 
Una gloriosa página de internacionalismo, which opened with a longer version of the same 
quotation by Fidel Castro, is primarily an analytical work.  Like its predecessor, it includes some 
biographical sketches and the official (but incomplete) list of Cuban volunteers in Spain, but the 
majority of the book consists of historical discussion and analysis.  Authors utilized interviews 
and published primary sources as well as works of scholarship, and the book does contain 
footnotes, though their use is sparse.  It is more scholarly a work than Cuba y la defensa, if one 
with an explicitly Marxist-Leninist analytical framework.
69
 
                                                     
68
 Ibid., 1–6. 
69




 Cuba en España is essentially an expansion of the same commentary and ideas found in 
the prologue of Cuba y la defensa, concerned with the relevance of 1930s Cuban antifascism for 
the education of contemporary and future political generations.  Authors surveyed the history of 
the international class struggle, of Cuban politics in the years leading up to the Spanish Civil 
War (highlighting the founding of the Cuban Communist Party or “first Marxist-Leninist 
Party”
70
), and of Spanish politics in the years leading up to the conflict.  They discussed the 
political composition of the international solidarity movement (breaking down, for instance, the 
party affiliation of the members of the Fifth Regiment: 50% Communist, 25% socialist, 15% 
Republican, 10% “without party” according to citations of publications by Spanish Civil War 
participants Enrique Lister and Vittorio Vidali
71
), and outlined the progression of the war.  They 
celebrated the support provided by the Soviet Union and “other progressive forces of the 
world.”
72
  Finally, they presented the Cuban movement in support of the Spanish Republic and 
the “Cuban heroes” who volunteered in Spain, concluding with a section on “revolutionary 
continuity” discussing those who “support strongly the first Socialist Revolution in America, our 
Communist Party, and its maximum inspiration and guide, our Commander in Chief, Fidel 
Castro Ruz.”
73
  The discussion of “heroes” introduced the reader to the central group of Spanish 
Civil War veterans—both martyrs and survivors of the conflict—most actively and publicly 
celebrated by the Cuban Revolutionary government.  Presentation of those who survived served 
                                                     
70
 Ibid., 27–28. 
71
 Ibid., 104. 
72
 Ibid., 128–141. 
73




to illustrate “revolutionary continuity,” with summaries of each individual describing their 
service in Spain followed by their service to the Cuban Revolution.   
 As was the case in Cuba y la defensa, Cuba en España omits some individuals, probably 
those deemed unworthy of remembrance and celebration in Cuba.  For example, sections on the 
heroism of Pablo de la Torriente Brau
74
 and on the Cuban campaign to aid Spanish children
75
 
both fail to mention Teté Casuso entirely.  The former begins with the March 1935 strike and 
follows Torriente from his time in New York City through his death in Spain.  It does cite letters 
of his from published volumes and remembrances of people who knew him, though not those of 
his wife.  Given their political collaboration, not to mention their close companionship, the 
omission of Teté from Pablo’s biography in the work is striking.  The latter misstates the name of 
the Asociación de Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español, contains other errors, and presents 
information and direct quotations almost entirely without citation.  And again, the description’s 
exclusion of the founding president of the organization may only be explained by reasons of 
political calculation and animosity.  Though it discusses diversity within 1930s antifascism and 
support for the Spanish Republic, therefore, the extent to which Cuba en España may be 
considered a scholarly work of history rather than a politicized work of historical memory 
intended to be used as propaganda is debatable. 
 Also regarding the calculated use—or in this case, lack thereof—of historical memory, it 
is perhaps significant that these two major works of commemoration of the Cuban defense of the 
Spanish Republic were published only after Franco’s death in Spain in 1975.  One of the many 
pragmatic considerations—and to some perhaps surprising ideological complexities—of the 
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Cuban Revolutionary government was its positive relations with the Franco dictatorship.  Expert 
on Cuban revolutionary foreign policy Jorge I. Domínguez explains this seeming contradiction.  
Following diplomatic isolation in the early 1960s caused in large part by its support of 
revolutionary movements in Latin America, the Cuban government adopted a new strategy for its 
relations with other states that placed less emphasis on the internal structure of a regime.  
“Regimes,” Domínguez writes, summarizing the policy, “even if they are right-wing and 
authoritarian, need not be opposed if their policies toward Cuba advance important Cuban goals.”  
The best example of the implementation of this policy, he argues, was the Cuban government’s 
relationship with the Franco government in Spain.  “Cuba was on a collision course with 
Francisco Franco’s regime in Spain in the early years of revolutionary rule in Cuba; beginning in 
1963, Spain and Cuba reached an understanding that allowed a mutually profitable trade to 
develop, and twelve years later Cuba officially mourned Franco’s death.”
76
 
The early conflict resulted from words and actions by the new Revolutionary government 
deemed inflammatory by Spanish officials.  In January 1960 Castro publicly accused U.S. and 
Spanish officials and elites of a conspiracy to overthrow him.  The Spanish ambassador went to 
the television station at which Castro was speaking to confront him, and an on-air brawl resulted, 
causing the Cuban government to demand the withdrawal of the ambassador.  The following 
year the Cuban government, as part of an ongoing confrontation with the Catholic Church, 
arrested dozens of priests and deported them to Spain, while the Spanish government cut tobacco 
imports.  Cuban imports from and exports to Spain fell substantially, and by 1963 Spain’s 
official airline had suspended all flights to the island.  However, Domínguez notes, the 
relationship between the two countries had a long and complex history not conducive to overly 
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simplistic policy.  “Although Spain’s trade with Cuba declined in part because Spain retaliated 
against Cuba,” for example, “Spain never formally supported the U.S. trade embargo.”  The two 
countries each had an interest in some maintenance of good relations.  Franco wanted to avoid 
Cuban support of his overthrow; Cuba needed trade with Spain and sought to avoid problems 
with its tens of thousands of Spanish permanent residents.
77
 
The same year that the Cuban Revolutionary government recorded many of its 
ideological assessments of Cuban Spanish Civil War volunteers, 1963 saw in November the 
establishment of a bilateral trading agreement with Franco’s regime that “was an important and 
profitable turning point for Cuba, given the country’s isolation from most market economies at 
that time” and “the first formal breach of the U.S.-initiated embargo by a Western European 
government.”  Spain’s official airline resumed flights, and throughout the decade the Franco 
government would be the island’s principal non-Communist trade partner.  To accommodate 
their position as ideologically strange bedfellows, Franco resisted internal pressures to break ties 
with Cuba while Castro declined to support Franco’s overthrow.  In a statement that illuminates 
the complex historical irony at play in this arrangement—particularly in the context of the 
present study—Domínguez notes that Castro’s commitment not to support Franco’s overthrow 




Twilight of the 1930s Cuban Antifascists 
 As noted above in our discussion of Rafael Chao Santana, a group of Cuban Spanish 
Civil War veterans—members of the Association of Cuban Internationalist Veterans on the 
                                                     
77
 Ibid., 187–188. 
78




island—were able to travel to Spain for a commemoration in 1996 celebrating the sixtieth 
anniversary of the creation of the International Brigades.  The Asociación de Amigos de las 
Brigadas Internacionales (Association of Friends of the International Brigades, or A.A.B.I.) 
hosted the visitors.  Photographs (Figures 8.1 and 8.2) of the event taken by the A.A.B.I. show 
emotional leftist elders carrying the flags of Cuba and the Spanish Republic, fists held up in 
salute, as they march in a parade.
79
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Figures 8.1 and 8.2 Cuban veterans of the Spanish Civil War return for a commemoration in 1996 
 
Who were the Cuban veterans chosen to be part of the visit to Spain in 1996?  
Fortunately, the Spanish organization that hosted them collected biographical information and, in 
some cases, copies of historical ephemera to learn about the Cuban volunteers.  A.A.B.I. records 
stored in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Albacete (Albacete Provincial Historical Archive) 
hold completed questionnaires for 32 Cubans that give us a sense of their backgrounds and 
include brief narrative statements (some narrated in the first person and others apparently 
compiled as testimonies by other members of the Association of Cuban Internationalist Veterans) 
concerning their political affiliation, their service in the war, and their recognition in Cuba by the 
Revolutionary government. 
The survey respondents were born between 1907 and 1921, with the majority born in the 
1910s.  They reported geographic origins in all six of the island’s provinces, though the 
overwhelming majority came from the city or province of Havana: 21 from Havana; two each 
from Santa Clara and Oriente; one each from Matanzas, Camagüey, and Pinar del Río; one from 




occupations at the time of their departure for Spain were diverse.  The group included four who 
had been students, two male and one female nurse (the woman had been a teacher also), three 
who listed dependiente de comercio (salesclerk), three who listed simply empleado (employee) 
in addition to two gastronomic employees and two commercial employees, two who listed 
obrero (worker), and one campesino (farmer or peasant).  There was a carpenter, a plumber, a 
builder, a construction worker, a mechanic, a bus driver, a telegraph operator, a dyer or 
drycleaner, and a graphic artist.  There was also a Cuban Navy crewman and an employee of the 
Communist Party, as well as one individual who listed that he had no profession.
80
 
The anti-Machado struggle was a common starting point for many of the Cuban 
questionnaire respondents.  All but one of the 32 listed the political organization or movement 
with which they were affiliated at the time they volunteered to help the Spanish Republic.  Of the 
31 who did, 18 listed a Communist Party or associated youth group and another three called 
themselves Communist “sympathizers.”  Three listed Antonio Guiteras’s group Joven Cuba, two 
called themselves unionists, and the remaining five listed the Club Julio Antonio Mella, the 
Partido Socialista Catalán, the Juventud Socialista de España, the C.N.T.-F.A.I., and the Asturias 
uprising of 1934 as their primary political affiliations.  Several of these Cubans were already in 
Spain prior to the start of the war, some having traveled there from the island when they were 
children, and thus listed Spanish groups rather than Cuban ones.
81
  Like many of the individuals 
we have encountered in the present study, it was common for survey respondents to live 
transnational lives moving between Cuba, Spain, and the United States. 
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The questionnaire respondents served in both the International Brigades and the regular 







 Division), which we examined in our discussion of 
combat volunteers, may have brought together Cuban volunteers who would later form an 
important network of honored veterans; 14 of the 32 questionnaire respondents reported having 
served in this particular battalion, whereas the group’s remainder listed no other single military 
unit more than three times.  Mario Morales Mesa, president of the Association of Cuban 
Internationalist Veterans, called this unit “the Battalion of Cubans reinforced with Latin 
Americans and Spaniards.”  The Cubans listed the battles in which they served and other events 
they experienced during the war, including wounds, hospitalizations, and imprisonments.  Eladio 
Paula Bolaños lost his brother Aurelio in the war.  Evelio Aneiro Subirats reported falling 
prisoner to Italian troops, and serving time performing forced labor.  Several respondents 
recalled hearing “La Pasionaria,” Dolores Ibárruri, speak upon the occasion of the disbanding of 




 Numerous questionnaire respondents stated that they had continued their revolutionary 
ideas and actions following their return from Spain, and the record makes clear that their 
government celebrated them for their actions.  Nearly all listed in their biographical syntheses 
the multiple medals and honors bestowed upon them by the Cuban Revolutionary government.  
Many of those in the Association of Cuban Internationalist Veterans group who responded to the 
surveys had also been featured in Cuba’s two major books on the Cuban contribution to the 
Spanish conflict.  Testimonies or biographical sketches in Cuba y la defensa featured 18 of the 






32 volunteers who completed A.A.B.I. surveys.  Cuba en España featured 24 veterans in its 
section on “revolutionary continuity.”  Of these, 14 were already deceased by 1996, and of three 
others their status at the time is unknown—the remaining seven, however, all were part of the 
group of veterans honored by the A.A.B.I. that year.   
Furthermore, a number of the files A.A.B.I. kept on the Cubans contain copies of articles 
celebrating them, preserved newspaper clippings likely offered by the veterans or their 
Association.  Two are from a series published in Cuba in 1976 featuring the remembrances of 
Cuban Spanish Civil War volunteers, the tone of which was overtly celebratory of the 
revolutionary and military achievements of the featured veterans.  One described Evelio Aneiros 
as speaking, for example, “with that mixture of pride and simplicity caused by having fulfilled 
one’s revolutionary duty.”  The bulk of the text was devoted to vivid descriptions of the 
experience of participating in the war, with an emphasis on combat.  Pro-Communist and pro-
Soviet political commentary was also readily apparent, as both veterans described the assistance 
the international volunteers and the Spanish Republic received from various Communist Parties 
and the U.S.S.R.  The only country that sent aid for free, commented Isidro Martínez, was the 
Soviet Union.  Aneiros concluded with his return to Cuba in December 1939, noting that a 
welcoming reception was dispersed by Cuban police.  A compañero, he remembered, told him to 
catch a bus and go quickly—“Two or three days later I received my card from the Party.  We 
returned to the fight!”
83
  In addition to celebrating the role of Communism and the U.S.S.R., the 
articles in the A.A.B.I. files focused on Cuban internationalism.  One featuring three Cuban 
                                                     
83
 Tatiana Coll, “La XV Brigada en el triángulo de la muerte,” Expediente 1/119, and “Con el Quinto 
Regimento,” Expediente 1/134, Legajo Cuba, Caja 63184, Archivo Histórico Provincial, Albacete.  
Clippings include no publication information, but the back of the first is marked: “REPUBLICA DE 
CUBA” and dated “1976 10–17 Octubre,” and a fragment of text on the back of the second reads: “1976: 




veterans was entitled: “Pioneers of internationalism: Spain, always in the hearts of the Cubans 
who fought for her,” and another, published in the mid-1980s, bore the heading “From our 
internationalist history.”
84
  These articles, like Cuba y la defense and Cuba en España, suggest 
that by the 1970s and 1980s, Cuban revolutionary officials had determined the principal 
significance of the Spanish Civil War volunteers.  It had two parts: First, they represented 
socialist continuity and a historical connection with the Soviet Union, and they could speak with 
conviction and authority of a belief in the longstanding benevolence of the U.S.S.R. towards 
people’s struggles.  Second, they symbolized Cuba’s internationalism.  Especially important in 
the era when Cuba was actively supporting fights in non-aligned nations,
85
 these early Cuban 
internationalists took on renewed importance.  They represented a historical tradition of Cuban 
individuals and groups traveling to foreign countries to assist other peoples in military conflicts 
against enemies viewed as oppressive. 
By the 1970s and 1980s, and certainly by the time of the trip to Spain in 1996, surviving 
Cuban veterans were getting older.  Photographs (Figures 8.3–9) of those featured in the articles 
show aging men. 
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Figures 8.3–9 Aging Cuban Spanish Civil War veterans 
 
1930s antifascists already of retirement age likely posed less of a potential threat to Cuban 
Revolutionary officials than a Rolando Masferrer or a Teté Casuso had in earlier decades.  Those 
featured were known quantities, their political standing long established.  The Revolution, too, 
was getting older.  The 1970s and 1980s saw it consolidate power and reach impressive 
achievements at home and abroad.  By 1996 serious new challenges had arisen following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  In a context of sudden and drastic economic hardship, any trouble 
posed by Spanish Civil War veterans to the Revolutionary government was likely practical rather 
than political in nature.   
 Increasingly elderly veterans had increasing needs, as documentation of accommodations 
necessary for the Cuban visitors to Spain in 1996 demonstrates.  Although most reported 
remaining “self-sufficient” in their daily activities, many listed various medical maladies and 
numerous medications they had to take.
86
  In January of that year in recognition of “the activities 
carried out in defense of freedom and the democratic principles by the volunteers that made up 
the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War,” the Spanish government had offered 
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citizenship through naturalization to aging Spanish Civil War volunteers around the world.  With 
a requirement to forfeit previous nationality, however, the offer met with few acceptances.  In 
2007, the Historical Memory Act would go on to extend the right of international veterans to 
citizenship while eliminating the need to give up their original nationalities.
87
  As we have seen, 
for many Cubans dual nationality was a longstanding reality.  The files kept by the A.A.B.I. 
indicate that one goal of the Association of Cuban Internationalist Veterans during its trip to 
Spain in 1996 may have been to confirm or negotiate Spanish pension assistance for some or all 
of the Cuban veterans.  The file of Enrique Gómez Corrales, born in Havana but a resident of 
Spain for a time beginning in 1914 when he was five years old, for instance, includes official 
Spanish documentation of a pension dated 1996.
88
  And a packet provided to the Spanish 
organization containing the names and addresses of the Cuban Association members lists their 
pension information as well as their revolutionary credentials.
89
  Although documentation in the 
archive does not confirm this hypothesis definitively, the coincidence of the new Spanish law in 
1996 along with the pension information included in the files suggests that there may have been 
a pragmatic consideration at play in the agenda for the Cuban visit to Spain, along with more 
idealistic and symbolic ones. 
 Obituaries heralded the death of one of the last known Cuban veterans of the Spanish 
Civil War in August 2009.  The long personal and political trajectories of Universo Lípiz 
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Rodríguez, who died at the age of 91 in his hometown of Matanzas, make his story a fitting 
endpoint to our journey with Cuba’s 1930s antifascists.  L piz was the son of anarchist parents 
exiled from Cuba in 1932 for revolutionary activism.  His family moved to Barcelona, and when 
the war began—and Universo was only a teenager—he was involved “in the early skirmishes 
with the rebels in the Plaza Catalunya” in July 1936.  When they entered Barcelona he “went 
with a group of anarchists to deal with them in the streets” and got shot in the knee.  Spanish 
anarchist Buenaventura Durruti was a friend of his family’s, and after convalescence he joined 
the anarchist Durruti Column to fight for the Republic in various fronts of the war. 
 
  




After Republican defeat in 1939 Lípiz spent time in French concentration camps, where he 
vowed to continue fighting fascism.  He joined the French resistance and was taken by the 
Gestapo as a prisoner of war and held in the German concentration camp at Dachau.  Early in 
1942 he, now in his twenties, and several companions were able to escape during a blackout, he 
claimed, after which they survived by stealing food and traveling only under the cover of 
darkness.  Finally making it back to Spain, Universo was arrested by the Guardia Civil and 
interned at yet another concentration camp prior to being deported back to Cuba.  He returned to 
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the island late in 1942.  There he took part in the fight against Batista and later the defense 
against the Bay of Pigs invasion.  In October 2008, less than a year before his death, the veteran 
traveled to Spain as a guest of the A.A.B.I., where he was honored with two medals as an 
internationalist combatant in the war and expressed the “pride and satisfaction of having 
defended an ideological position in which I still believe.”  Upon his death, his coffin was 
decorated with “the numerous awards received during his long life.”
91
 
Yet Universo Lípiz does not appear in the official Cuban lists of veterans of the Spanish 
conflict published in 1981 and 1990, or in other sources published on the island that account for 
the Cuban volunteers, even one that documents those in Catalonia specifically.
92
  If the obituaries 
are accurate, Lípiz was a committed anarchist with an undeniable history of revolutionary 
activity in Cuba and internationally: anti-Machado, antifascist, anti-Batista, and anti-imperialist.  
Raúl Roa, friend of Pablo de la Torriente Brau and later devoted Communist within the Cuban 
Revolutionary government, is quoted in a biography of Universo published in 2004 as having 
stated: “L piz is not a surname; it is a revolutionary institution.”
93
  It is probable that with this 
history, Lípiz would have been a complex figure politically for Cuban Revolutionary officials.  
Yet archival records of the Cuban Communist Party concerning Spanish Civil War veterans and 
containing assessments of them made only one mention of Universo in a list of names that 
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included no annotation, suggesting that officials may have taken little notice of him.
94
  Is it 
possible that he was simply unknown?  The possibility seems unlikely if he did indeed 
participate in the anti-Batista struggle and the Bay of Pigs invasion defense.  Given the fact that 
we have observed in other instances intentional omissions from the official record of 1930s 
antifascists on political grounds, there exists some suspicion.  One author of a commemoration 
noted the exclusion, and, referring to the idea that Lípiz was unknown, stated provocatively in 
passing: “There must be other explanation(s).”
95
  With a biography published on the island in 
2004, several articles in various Cuban publications in the years following, and commemorations 
in both Granma and Juventud Rebelde upon his death in 2009, Universo Lípiz received 
significant official recognition during his last years.  Perhaps, then, the explanation is that 
publicly celebrating an anarchist veteran who was by all accounts highly intelligent and 
outspoken was deemed risky—or at least not useful—in Revolutionary Cuba before he was a 
very elderly man. 
 
Final Thoughts  
 Coincident with the passing away of the 1930s antifascist generation over the past two 
decades has been ascension of many of the forces its members sought to fight.  Capitalism stands 
victorious over many previously asserted alternatives, corporations have taken the place of 
nation-states as principal exploiters of the resources of the earth’s less powerful people and more 
vulnerable places, many strongman governments still reign oppressively, right-wing 
fundamentalism makes itself apparent in different settings and contexts around the globe, and 
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even fascism itself—“neo-fascism,” with a nod to the 1930s—is on the rise in Europe, both at the 
grassroots level and in the form of political parties capable of winning in elections.   
The impetus to resist these forces is alive and well, also, if not exactly ascendant.  As I 
conducted research for this dissertation in 2011 and 2012, demonstrations, rebellions, and 
revolutions erupted across the world, providing me with ample contemporary examples of 
transnational activism, networks, and solidarity comparable to 1930s antifascism.  While in 
Spain, I watched reports of workers storming the Wisconsin state capitol to protest anti-union 
measures and of activists fighting to overthrow their dictator in Egypt.  Though comparisons 
made between the two events by some participants and observers were not literally accurate, 
neither were they laughable, as some experts asserted.  It is true that the situations in Egypt and 
Wisconsin were extremely different, and that most demonstrators in each probably had little 
understanding of the language, culture, or political realities of the other—but true solidarity born 
of the shared experience of struggle did exist between them.  In Cuba, a Cuban colleague asked 
me about the Occupy Wall Street strategy, and worried that the movement lacked “revolutionary 
discipline.”  An artist had painted a mural (Figures 8.11 and 8.12) on a University of Havana 
building depicting a ravenous capitalism monster—whose skin is covered with the names of 
corporations—gobbling up the world but restrained by ropes hooked into its skin labeled with the 
Occupy term “the 99%.”
96
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Figures 8.11 and 8.12 Anticapitalist mural on the side of a University of Havana building, June 2012 
 
Substantial barriers extant between Cuba and the United States did not impede Cubans’ sense of 
solidarity with the Yankee popular struggle, reports about which were included in the nightly 
news.  In one striking example of transnational and transhistorical solidarity, Russian activist 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, a member of the female punk rock band Pussy Riot convicted in 
August 2012 for her group’s protest against increasingly authoritarian tendencies of President 
Vladimir Putin, wore to court a shirt bearing the antifascist Spanish Civil War phrase “¡No 
pasarán!”  Activists in each country saw in the struggles of other places and even eras their own 
fight. 
Recent and current movements are the inheritors of a long history, one example of which 
has been the subject of this study.  By analyzing the diverse elements of Cuban antifascism and 
support for the Spanish Republic, the activism that drove it and the networks that facilitated it, 
we have formed a better understanding of a transnational movement, and of transnational 
solidarity.  In so doing, we have gained insight into movements generally and the role of 
solidarity within them.  We have uncovered the diversity and complexity—both personal and 
political—that exists within movements, learning that idealistic platitudes and myopic 




unrealistic.  We have seen idealism clash with both pragmatism and disappointment.  We have 
considered the problem of sustainability in activism, observing how either resilience and 
continuity or despair and disengagement can result from the many sacrifices and defeats endured 
by those who choose to struggle and fight.  Solidarity is the key to these challenges faced by 
activists and movements, all of which are applicable also to recent and current efforts.  Solidarity 
allows diverse activists and groups to work together with greater strength.  Solidarity builds a 
human foundation for positive change capable of meeting pragmatic challenges effectively and 
of withstanding disappointment.  Solidarity can be the last safeguard of sustainability in the 
difficult life of activism when youthful idealism and even ideological convictions have failed to 
preserve motivation.  Transnational solidarity brought diverse Cuban antifascists into a global 
struggle, along with their brethren from numerous other nations, and sustained the worldwide 
antifascist movement after the devastating blow of Spanish Republican defeat.   
Ahistorical misconceptions about how transnational solidarity functions are common in 
interpretations of recent and current struggles.  Over these past few years I have heard observers 
acknowledge the influence of movements in the Arab world over those in the United States or 
the inspiration movements in Latin America have taken from those in Europe.  Yet 
commentators have seemed to struggle with pinpointing why or how this influence and 
inspiration functions, beyond referencing the role of online social media.  They have credited, for 
example, Twitter with revolution.  Also, they have expressed a failure to appreciate how the 
frustrations of a young professional in Cairo could be truly understood by a public employee in 
Madison.  Citing supposedly irreconcilable obstacles of language, culture, religion, geographic 
distance, and ignorance of each group about the other, some have claimed that transnational 




As a case study of a 1930s movement that crossed borders and oceans, this project 
historicizes present concepts of transnational solidarity.  Offering one corrective to these 
misconceptions, we challenge narratives that attribute fundamental newness to current instances 
of transnational solidarity or doubt the sincerity or legitimacy of such connections.  Examining 
why, how, and to what extent solidarity functioned transnationally and impacted events in the 
past, we gain insight into its significance in the present, and work to form a vitally important 
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